tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-27204867132391458852024-03-08T06:34:31.985-05:00A Child is Missing: The International Child Abduction BlogIn our International Child Abduction Blog we report Hague Convention Child Abduction Cases decided by the US Supreme Court, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, Circuit Courts of Appeals, district courts and New York State Courts. We also provide information to help legal practitioners understand the basic issues, discover what questions to ask and learn where to look for more information when there is a child abduction that crosses country boarders.Joel R. Brandeshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00071300360715546038noreply@blogger.comBlogger682125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2720486713239145885.post-79749995548681021232024-02-04T12:50:00.003-05:002024-02-04T12:50:11.299-05:00Tereshchenko v. Karimi, 2024 WL 80427( S.D. New York.2024) - [Ukraine] [Petition for return of children to Father in France Granted]<p><span style="font-family: arial;"><b> </b></span><b style="font-family: arial;">In Tereshchenko v. Karimi, 2024 WL 80427( S.D. New York.2024) the petition filed by Roman Tereshchenko for the return of the children to their Father to reside in his home in France was granted. Tereshchenko was the father of M.T. and K.T., who were habitual residents of Ukraine before Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022. They were born, respectively, on March 27, 2016, and June 3, 2017. They were ages seven and six. Their parents, both of whom were citizens of Ukraine, were respondent Yasamin Karimi (“Karimi”) and petitioner Tereshchenko. M.T. was born in Kyiv, Ukraine; K.T. was born in Broward County, Florida. The parents married in Odesa, Ukraine, on April 22, 2017, after the birth of their first child, and divorced the following year, on November 16, 2018. At the time of their marriage, Tereshchenko was 41 years of age and an established, well-to-do international businessman. He frequently traveled internationally, and his office was located in Dubai at the time of the hearing. Karimi was 24 years old when they married. After their divorce, they negotiated a custody agreement (the “Custody Agreement”), which they executed on May 29, 2019. They agreed that the children would reside with the Mother and maternal grandmother in an apartment in Odesa, which Tereshchenko would purchase. The Agreement provided that the children would reside with their Father for at least seven days per month and that the Father could “freely visit” the children and participate in their upbringing. Beginning in early 2019, Karimi began to travel for extensive periods, spending more than half of her time away from Odesa. She moved to London at one point to earn a Masters Degree in “magazine journalism”. Eventually, the children came to live with their Father and his mother. The parents began to file criminal complaints against each other and claims for custody. On October 11, 2021, the Children’s Service of Odesa City Council determined that the children were to reside with their Father in Odesa (“Guardianship Ruling”). Shortly after the ruling had awarded custody to the children’s Father, the Mother abducted the children. It would be almost two years before the Father located them in New York and filed the petition.</b></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;"><b> </b></span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;"><b>After Russia invaded Ukraine, Karimi telephoned Tereshchenko and sought access to the children’s travel documents so that she could take them out of the country. At that time, Tereshchenko was out of the country. He agreed to provide her with those documents, which were delivered by his representative but asked that the children be brought to him in Dubai, where he had a home. That did not happen. Using the travel documents provided by Tereshchenko, Karimi took the children to Poland on March 2, 2022, and then to the Netherlands and Spain. On July 11, 2022, she brought them to the United States as part of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s “Uniting for Ukraine” program. At no point after she arrived in the United States did Karimi contact Tereshchenko or take any steps to notify him that she had taken the children to the United States or to advise him where the children could be found.</b></span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;"><b>In March 2023 Tereshchenko located an address for Karimi in New York City. This petition was filed on March 8, 2023.</b></span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;"><b> </b></span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;"><b>On November 21, 2023, the District Court of Odesa issued its decision, ruling that the children are to reside with Tereshchenko (“District Court Decision”). In a lengthy opinion, the District Court found that Karimi had repeatedly violated the terms of the Custody Agreement, had evaded her responsibilities, and had been frequently absent due to her foreign travels. Although Karimi and Tereshchenko had agreed to abide by the decision of the District Court, Karimi changed counsel after the District Court ruled against her and continues to oppose the petition. </b></span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;"><b>After the hearing, the Court granted the petition </b></span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;"><b> </b></span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;"><b>The parties agreed that the children were habitual residents of Ukraine. They also agreed that the law of Ukraine governs the rights of custody over the children and that under that nation’s Family Code, both parents have the right to participate in the decisions regarding where the children reside and the major decisions regarding their lives, such as their medical care and education. These rights survive a divorce. Neither parent may impede the other’s communication with the child, provided that the parent’s involvement with the child does not impair the child’s development. These parental rights exist even when the child resides with just one parent. </b></span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;"><b>Under Ukrainian law, parents may agree on the residence of a child without court approval. If they are no longer in agreement or are unable to reach a new agreement, either parent may apply to the local Guardianship Body or court to resolve the dispute over the child’s residence. If an application is made to the court, then in the normal course, any prior application to the Guardianship Body is stayed and the court submits its own request to the Guardianship Body for a recommendation. If the court rejects that recommendation, it must explain its reasons for doing so. Any court ruling is stayed pending appeal.</b></span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;"><b> </b></span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;"><b>The petitioner carried his burden of showing a breach of the Convention by the respondent. Karimi has interfered with Tereshchenko’s rights of custody since November 2021, when she abducted the children and took them to an undisclosed location. While Tereshchenko cooperated with the Karimi to allow the children to leave Ukraine when the Russian war with Ukraine made it unsafe for them to remain in Odesa, he has shown that thereafter Karimi prevented him from exercising his rights under the Ukrainian Family Code to be involved in decisions regarding the children’s residence, medical care, and education and to communicate with his children. She did not take them to Dubai, as he had requested, and unilaterally made the decision regarding where the children would be taken. She did not inform him that she had taken them to the United States. The petitioner has shown that Karimi’s actions in abducting the children and taking them to locations that she did not disclose to the petitioner, including to the United States, have interfered with his rights of custody under the Ukrainian Family Code. That is sufficient to show the wrongful removal and retention required by the Hague Convention.</b></span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;"><b> </b></span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;"><b>Tereshchenko offered persuasive evidence that under the law of Ukraine, the Custody Agreement lost all force once the parties were no longer willing to abide by it. Thereafter, both parties made applications to Ukrainian authorities to gain custody of the children. The petitioner has shown as well that the Guardianship Ruling went into effect at the time it was issued and has remained in effect since the District Court Ruling accepted it. Thus, since October 2021, Ukrainian authorities have formally awarded custody of the children to their Father. But, as already described, because Tereshchenko has shown that Karimi violated his rights of custody under the Ukrainian Family Code, the fact that she has also refused to comply with the Guardianship Ruling is immaterial to the decision rendered on this petition.</b></span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;"><b> </b></span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;"><b>The respondent’s chief defense has been that a return to Ukraine would pose a grave risk to the children. She must show by clear and convincing evidence that this defense, which is available under Article 13b of the Hague Convention, applies. 22 U.S.C. § 9003(e)(2)(A). . A grave risk of harm under Article 13(b) arises in two situations:(1) where returning the child means sending him to a zone of war, famine, or disease; or (2) in cases of serious abuse or neglect, or extraordinary emotional dependence, when the court in the country of habitual residence, for whatever reason, may be incapable or unwilling to give the child adequate protection.</b></span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;"><b>Id. (citation omitted). The grave risk of harm must be particular to the child, not just a general undesirable condition. Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060, 1067-69 (6th Cir. 1996). The U.S. State Department instructs that the grave risk of harm or “intolerable situation” is not intended to encompass a return to a home where living conditions are less than ideal or unlike the living conditions in the country to which the children have been brought. Public Notice 957, 51 Fed. Reg. 10494, 10510 (Mar. 26, 1986). The respondent failed to show that a return of the children to Ukraine would involve the grave risk of harm contemplated by Article 13(b). Tereshchenko represented that, if required by the Court, he would move with the children to a location in western Ukraine that is outside the zone of combat and danger. This offer is sufficient to defeat the Article 13(b) defense. In 2022, after Russia had begun its war with Ukraine, a court in the United Kingdom ordered the return of a child to a town in western Ukraine, finding that the risk of armed conflict was lower than the Article 13b “grave risk of harm” threshold. Q v. R, (2022) EWHC 2961 (Fam) at ¶¶ 56-66. In any event, as further described below, the Court will not require Tereshchenko to return to Ukraine.</b></span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;"><b> </b></span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;"><b>Making essentially the same argument about the danger posed by a return to Ukraine during a period of war, the respondent relies next on Article 20 of the Hague Convention.. For the reasons just explained, the return of the children to Western Ukraine would not constitute that rare occasion when the return of the children to the Father’s custody would shock the conscience. Therefore, this defense failed.</b></span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;"><b> </b></span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;"><b>Respondent relies as well on Article 13a of the Hague Convention, which provides a defense of consent and acquiescence. Karimi argues that the petitioner consented to her removing the children from Ukraine. She points to his assistance in providing her with their travel documents so she could take the children out of the country after the war broke out. This consent was narrow. Karimi has failed to show that Tereshchenko consented at any time to her taking the children to undisclosed locations, including the United States, or interfering with his access to them.</b></span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;"><b><br /></b></span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;"><b>Finally, the respondent argued that the petitioner may only seek the return of his children to Ukraine, and not to France. This argument failed. When a petitioner has succeeded in his claim, it may be appropriate to restore the children to him at his current residence even when that residence is not in the country that was the children’s habitual residence. In the circumstances that exist here, that is appropriate. The purpose of the Convention, as stated in the preamble, is to return a child to their country of habitual residence for the resolution of any custody dispute. None of these cases, however, addressed whether a court, in ordering the return of a child to a parent, may order that the return be to a parent’s current abode in a third country. And, apart from the Preamble, no other provision of the Convention refers to the return of the child to the state where they were once habitually resident. Article 12, which requires the “forthwith” return of the child, requires only that the authority granting the petition order “the return” of the child. Hague Convention, Art. 12. A decision issued recently in the United Kingdom has addressed this very issue and opined that the Hague Convention permits a court, in the exercise of its discretion, to return a child to a parent now living in a third state. In Re B (A Child), (2020) EWCA Civ. 1187, at ¶ 104. In In Re B, Lord Moylan explained that the Hague Convention did not accept “a proposal to the effect that the return of the child should always be to the State of its habitual residence.” Id. at ¶ 108 (citing the Perez-Vera Report). Lord Moylan further opined that “to confine the terms of Article 12 to permitting a return only to the state of habitual residence at the relevant date would not promote the objectives of the [Hague Convention].” Id. at ¶ 110.</b></span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;"><b> </b></span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;"><b>Where a petitioner no longer lives in what was once the child’s habitual residence, it makes little sense, and is contrary to the protections of the child from the harmful effects of abduction, to order the return of the child to a country in which the petitioner no longer lives. Here, Ukraine’s current laws provide additional support for this outcome. They allow a relative to unilaterally remove a child from Ukraine. In response to the war with Russia, the Executive Order of March 21, 2022 states that a child under the age of 16, accompanied by “one of [their] parents, grandparents, brother, sister, stepmother or stepfather” or another person authorized by one of the parents in a written statement certified by the Guardianship Body, may leave Ukraine upon presentation of documents containing information about the person accompanying the child. On Approval of the Rules of Crossing the State Border by Citizens of Ukraine, Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine. The petitioner seeks to relocate the children to his home in France. Even if the Court required the children to be taken to him in Ukraine, Ukrainian law permits him, because of the exigencies of the war, to take them immediately to live with him in France. It would elevate form over substance, in these circumstances, to require him to take the children into Ukraine before he could take them to his home in France. It would also add to the children’s trauma. That trauma can and should be avoided. </b></span></p><div><br /></div>Joel R. Brandeshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00071300360715546038noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2720486713239145885.post-16102247661837867662024-02-04T12:46:00.002-05:002024-02-04T12:47:18.018-05:00Recent Hague Convention District Court Cases - Harvey v Means, 2024 WL 324980 (W.D. Washington, 2024) [Scotland][Petition granted][Coercion not established][Grave risk of harm not established] .<p><span style="font-family: arial;"><b> [Scotland][Petition granted][Coercion not established][Grave risk of harm not established]</b></span></p><p><b style="font-family: arial;">In Harvey v Means, 2024 WL 324980 (W.D. Washington, 2024) the Court granted Petitioner Dale Harvey’s petition for the return of his children, Z.H.M. and E.H.M., to Scotland. Means and Harvey were the parents of Z.H.M. and E.H.M., ages six and four. Harvey was a citizen of Scotland and Means was a United States citizen, born and raised in Washington state. Her parents and extended family continue to reside in the Seattle area. Means and Harvey married on April 12, 2015, in Seattle, Washington. From the early days of their marriage, Harvey and Means experienced troubles in their relationship. In 2017, Harvey and Means moved from Brighton, England to Glasgow, Scotland, and purchased a flat. Later that year, their eldest daughter was born. Their youngest daughter was born two years later in 2019. Means and Harvey split primary caretaking responsibility evenly. Until the events giving rise to the Petition, the children resided at all times in Glasgow, Scotland, where they attended daycare and nursery. In 2019, Means began expressing her desire to relocate to the U.S. to be closer to her family and friends. Harvey objected to resettling in another country. In February 2020, Means initiated custody proceedings in Scotland, seeking to relocate the children to Washington. Harvey opposed the request, but due to COVID-19 lockdowns, the Scottish court delayed a contested hearing on the matter. In April 2020, during the custody proceedings, Means accused Harvey of sexually abusing Z.H.M. On April 7, 2020, Means contacted the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children (NSPCC). After receiving a referral from NSPCC, a Duty Social Worker, Scott Andrew McCabe, as well as Child Protection officers visited Harvey and Means’s home on April 8, 2020. On April 9, 2020, a consultant pediatrician conducted a medical examination of Z.H.M. The pediatrician told McCabe there were no internal or external injuries and no signs of abuse. Means does not contest the pediatrician’s findings and conceded there was no physical evidence of sexual abuse. Means did not allege other occurrences of sexual abuse after or before April 2020. A couple of weeks later, Means walked in Z.H.M.’s bedroom to find her with Harvey not wearing pants or underwear. Means saw Harvey put something in his pocket and he said, “the last time you accused me of being a pedophile, you said you needed therapy.” Harvey and Means’s relationship continued to deteriorate and they officially separated. In 2021, Z.H.M. told Means that she had taken a bath with Harvey. According to Harvey, this did not happen. It would have been logistically impossible given the size of their bath. On August 12, 2022, Sheriff Charles Lugton issued a judgment in which he denied Means permission to relocate with the children to Washington and awarded each parent 50 percent custody. He found Means made false sexual abuse allegations against Harvey. The judgment was later modified to prevent Means from removing the children from their current school and nursery and enrolling them elsewhere without Harvey’s permission. Means filed for divorce on April 28, 2023. On September 30, 2023, Means left Scotland with the children and moved to Seattle, Washington. At the time Means left with the children, Harvey was exercising his custodial rights. On November 8, 2023, Harvey filed a Petition for Return with this Court as well as a motion seeking an ex parte temporary restraining order transferring the children to his custody. In her sworn petition, Means stated that after her trip to Seattle with the children, she became “suicidal” when the children were with Harvey and she “knew [she] had to go home.” She left Scotland with the children to return to Seattle, knowing that doing so breached the Scottish custody order. She stated that if the children are forced to return to Scotland, “this holiday season will be the only one they ever spend in the US with their family and the last one they spend with me until adulthood.” She did not allege in the petition that the children will face abuse, sexual or otherwise if they are returned to Scotland.</b></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;"><b><br /></b></span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;"><b>The District Court found that Harvey established a prima facie case for the return of the children. Both children were born in Scotland and resided there exclusively until Means took them to the U.S. on September 30, 2023. At the hearing, Means argued that the children were born and remained in Scotland because of Harvey’s coercion. Means testified that she was unhappy in Glasgow and wanted to continue living in Brighton rather than move before Z.H.M.’s birth. Means also testified that she felt dependent on Harvey for her continued immigration status. Harvey testified he never threatened to revoke Means’s immigration status, and Means does not dispute this testimony. Means did not raise coercion as an issue in the Scottish court relocation proceedings. The Court found that Means’s claims about coercion lack credibility. The Court held that even if the Court accepted Means’s testimony as true, it failed to rise to the level of coercion because nothing suggested Means did not voluntarily move to and remain in Scotland with Harvey for the birth of their children. See Tsuruta v. Tsuruta, 76 F.4th 1107, 1110-11 (8th Cir. 2023) Moreover, coercion cannot be established simply because Harvey did not agree to allow Means to relocate to the United States with their children. See Silverman v. Silverman, 338 F.3d 886, 900 (8th Cir. 2003) (finding a respondent’s “subsequent, post-move desire to return to the United States,...d[id] not change the legal conclusion that the habitual residence of the children changed[.]”). Means grew to dislike Glasgow as her marriage and mental health worsened, but a change of heart cannot override the clear conclusion that Scotland was the children’s habitual residence.</b></span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;"><b><br /></b></span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;"><b>The District Court found that Means failed to establish the children will be at risk of grave danger if returned to Scotland. Means testified that the children would suffer harm if returned to Scotland because they would effectively lose their mother. She claimed she cannot return to Scotland because she felt suicidal there and when in Washington, she no longer experiences suicidal ideations. Means offered her medical records to argue this point. She also testified she would be unable to find employment or housing in Scotland and she could be subject to criminal prosecution for taking the children away in violation of the Scottish court order. The possible loss of access by a parent to the child—and vice versa—does not constitute a grave risk of harm per se under Article 13(b). Souratgar v. Lee, 720 F.3d 96, 106 (2d Cir. 2013); see also Charalambous v. Charalambous, 627 F.3d 462, 469 (1st Cir. 2010) (“[T]he impact of any loss of contact with the [parent] is something that must be resolved by the courts of the Children’s habitual residence.”). The Court found no unique harm posed by separating the children from Means beyond that “expected on taking a child away from one parent and passing the child to another.” See Nunez-Escudero, 58 F.3d at 377. As one Court observed, “[i]f the difficulty caused by such separation were deemed sufficient to satisfy the grave risk exception, the purposes of the Convention would be largely frustrated.” Aguilera v. De Lara, No. CV14-1209 PHX DGC, 2014 WL 3427548, at *5 (D. Ariz. July 15, 2014). It also found that the alleged abuse suffered by Means did not establish a grave danger to the children. Means also testified Harvey emotionally abused her during their marriage by surveilling her email account, physically blocking the door when she tried to take one of her daughters to lunch one time, and threatening to leave her. A grave risk to the respondent parent, however, does not automatically qualify as a grave risk to the children. See Charalambous, 627 F.3d at 468 (finding that the respondent parent “failed to draw a connection establishing, by clear and convincing evidence, that any risk to her constituted a grave risk to the children” even though she had endured some verbal and emotional abuse as well as one incident of physical abuse given that the children did not witness it). Courts may find a grave risk of harm if a respondent demonstrates “[s]pousal violence ...particularly when it occurs in the presence of the child.” Colchester, 16 F.4th at 718 (listing authority). Means and Harvey had a tumultuous marriage, but it was not until their divorce proceedings that Means would begin to characterize Harvey’s conduct as emotionally abusive. And while Means claims that Harvey emotionally abused her, she did not allege that he emotionally abused the children. Means could not link the conduct she allegedly suffered to any potential risk posed to the children. Whatever the dynamic was between Means and Harvey, it appears limited to their private interactions, and now that they are separated, the risk of the children suffering as collateral damage to their fighting is greatly diminished.</b></span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;"><b> </b></span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial;"><b>Means raised the same allegation she raised in the Scottish court— that Harvey sexually abused Z.H.M. in April 2020 based on blood found in her underwear. Means also testified about two other incidents involving Harvey and the children that gave her pause. Means admitted, however, that she has no physical evidence of sexual abuse and that she does not suspect Harvey sexually abused the children on any other occasion. Harvey offered a plausible alternative explanation for the blood in Z.H.M.’s underwear. A doctor examined Z.H.M. two days after the injury and found no external or internal signs of sexual abuse. A social worker also investigated and found no abuse. The Scottish court dismissed these allegations as false. The Court found Means’s testimony less than credible and that the evidence—or her speculation about the cause of the blood—does not meet the clear and convincing standard. Means admitted that she did not have strong evidence to support her sexual abuse allegation. </b></span></p><p><br /></p>Joel R. Brandeshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00071300360715546038noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2720486713239145885.post-28540421316061883222023-12-13T10:37:00.007-05:002024-02-04T12:46:50.084-05:00Recent Hague Convention District Court Cases - Bre v Aguirre, 2023 WL 8371981( S.D. Florida, 2023)[Argentina][Habitual residence][Petition denied]<p><b> </b></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-autospace: none;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><b><br /></b></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-autospace: none;"><span face=""Arial",sans-serif" style="color: black; font-family: arial; font-size: 12pt; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;"><o:p><b> </b></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-autospace: none;"><span face=""Arial",sans-serif" style="color: black; font-family: arial; font-size: 12pt; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;"><b>In Bre
v Aguirre, 2023 WL 8371981( S.D. Florida, 2023) the District Court denied the <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>mothers Petition to have her minor child,
I.A.B., returned to her custody in Argentina. <o:p></o:p></b></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-autospace: none;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><span face=""Arial",sans-serif" style="color: black; font-size: 12pt; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;"><o:p><b> </b></o:p></span><b style="font-size: 12pt;">The
child was born in the United States in January 2015, but in 2017 moved to
Argentina with the Petitioner. On or about December 15, 2022, I.A.B. traveled
to the United States to spend the Argentine summer break period with the
Respondent, ending on March 15, 2023. The Respondent never returned I.A.B. to
Argentina, and I.A.B. remains in the United States. The Petitioner alleged that
she never consented to the child’s retention in the United States following the
child’s short-term visit to Florida.</b></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;"><b><span style="font-family: arial;"><span face=""Arial",sans-serif" style="color: black; font-size: 12pt; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;"> In opposition to the petition, the Respondent argued in his motion
to dismiss and at the hearing that I.A.B. was born in the United States and
that a Parenting Plan established by the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for
Miami-Dade County established by mutual agreement that I.A.B.’s country of
habitual residence is the United States. Courts must consider the totality of
the circumstances in determining the habitual residence of a child for Hague
Convention purposes. </span><a href="https://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=2050426310&pubNum=0000708&originatingDoc=I561b1e50933d11eea30dd39e2c429281&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_708_729&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.AlertsClip)#co_pp_sp_708_729"><i><span face=""Arial",sans-serif" style="color: #0e568c; font-size: 12pt; mso-font-kerning: 0pt; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">Monasky v.
Taglieri</span></i><span face=""Arial",sans-serif" style="color: #0e568c; font-size: 12pt; mso-font-kerning: 0pt; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">,
140 S. Ct. 719, 729 (2020)</span></a><span face=""Arial",sans-serif" style="color: black; font-size: 12pt; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;">. “As best I can
determine, the concept of “habitual residence” [...] means the place where the
child in fact has been living for an extended period—unless that place was
never regarded as more than temporary or there is another place to which the
child has a strong attachment.” </span><a href="https://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=2050426310&pubNum=0000708&originatingDoc=I561b1e50933d11eea30dd39e2c429281&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_708_734&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.AlertsClip)#co_pp_sp_708_734"><i><span face=""Arial",sans-serif" style="color: #0e568c; font-size: 12pt; mso-font-kerning: 0pt; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">Id.</span></i><span face=""Arial",sans-serif" style="color: #0e568c; font-size: 12pt; mso-font-kerning: 0pt; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;"> at 734-35</span></a><span face=""Arial",sans-serif" style="color: black; font-size: 12pt; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;"> (2020) (Alito, J., concurring). I.A.B. was born in Miami and lived here
with both parents until 2017, when the Petitioner moved to Argentina due to
immigration issues, bringing the child with her. The child did not hold
Argentine citizenship. In June 2021, the parties signed a Parenting Agreement,
under the terms of which it was agreed the child would live with the Petitioner
in Argentina until she was ten years old (January 2025), at which time she
would return to Miami, and the Respondent was allowed time sharing in Miami
during the extended summer and winter school breaks until that time. In
December 2022, the Petitioner allowed the Respondent to exercise his summer
visitation and allowed the paternal grandfather to take the child to Miami with
the understanding the child would be returned to Argentina in March 2023. The
grandfather returned to Argentina in March 2023 without the child, who remains
living in Miami with the Respondent. The Respondent told the Petitioner he did
not intend to return the child.<o:p></o:p></span></span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;"><b><span style="font-family: arial;"><span face=""Arial",sans-serif" style="color: black; font-size: 12pt; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;"> The Petitioner claimed that she was defrauded into signing the
Parenting Plan because she did not understand the contents of the document when
she signed it, and that the United States therefore should not be regarded as
the child’s habitual residence. The Court held that a person seeking to disavow
a contract based upon their claim of not being proficient in English must
establish more than lack of English proficiency to render the contract
unenforceable, such as fraud on the part of the other party. “[I]nability to
read in English will not preclude a person from entering into a binding
contract that he signs without reading.” “Unless one can show facts and
circumstances to demonstrate that he was prevented from reading the contract,
or that he was induced by statements of the other party to refrain from reading
the contract, it is binding. No party to a written contract in this state can
defend against its enforcement on the sole ground that he signed it without
reading it.” Federal courts have similarly found that inability to understand
English does not invalidate a contract..<a name="co_pp_sp_999_3_2"></a> The
Petitioner testified that she believed that the documents merely established
the Respondent’s paternity of the child and set forth the legal name of the
child agreed to by the parties. However, this subjective belief was
insufficient to establish that the Petitioner’s agreement was fraudulently
obtained. The Court therefore concluded that I.A.B.’s habitual residence was
the United States based upon the totality of the circumstances, including her
parents’ shared intentions as reflected in the Parenting Plan and Final
Judgment of Paternity and the child’s practical circumstances. Because the
child was currently present in the country of habitual residence, relief under
the Hague Convention was not available. <i>See</i> Hague Convention Preamble,
T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 4, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89, at 98.</span><span style="color: black; font-size: 10pt; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p><b> </b></o:p></p>Joel R. Brandeshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00071300360715546038noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2720486713239145885.post-68771126856221745932023-12-10T16:54:00.009-05:002023-12-10T16:54:46.393-05:00Tereshchenko v. Karimi, 2023 WL 8452224 (S.D. New York, 2023) [Ukraine][Subject matter jurisdiction] [Motion to dismiss denied]<p class="MsoNormal"><b><span style="color: #555555; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">In Tereshchenko
v. Karimi, </span><a name="co_document_1"></a><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">2023 WL
8452224 (S.D. New York, 2023) Yasamin Karimi and her children fled Ukraine in
early 2022, following Russia’s invasion. The children’s father, Roman
Tereshchenko petitioned the Court under the Hague Convention for the return of
his two minor children. Respondent moved to dismiss the petition pursuant to </span><a href="https://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=L&pubNum=1000600&cite=USFRCPR12&originatingDoc=Idae8f87094d511eea3d0be527924d0f5&refType=LQ&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.AlertsClip)"><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; text-decoration-line: none;">Rule 12(b)(1),
Fed. R. Civ. P</span></a><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">., on the ground that this Court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction. The Court denied the motion.</span></b></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none; text-justify: inter-ideograph;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;"><b> </b></span><b style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">Tereshchenko and Karimi, both Ukrainian
citizens, were married on April 22, 2017, in Odessa, Ukraine. The parties share
two minor children, K.T. and M.T. On November 16, 2018, the parties divorced.
On May 29, 2019, Tereshchenko and Karimi executed an agreement concerning their
respective custody rights. Under the Custody Agreement, the Children were to
reside with Respondent in Odessa, and Petitioner maintains certain visitation
rights. There are ongoing custody proceedings in Ukraine, where Tereshchenko
and Karimi are both seeking to modify provisions of the Custody Agreement. On
February 24, 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine. In early March, Karimi fled Ukraine
with the Children. In July, Karimi and the Children ultimately made their way
to the United States where they were granted humanitarian parolee status.
Karimi and the Children have remained in the United States since July 2022.
Tereshchenko has been residing in France since May 2022, where he asserts he
has established a primary residence.</b></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none; text-justify: inter-ideograph;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;"><b> </b></span><b><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">On March 8, 2023, Tereshchenko filed the
petition asserting that Karimi wrongfully removed the Children from Ukraine.
Tereshchenko seeks the Children’s return to him in France. Respondent moves to
dismiss the petition pursuant to </span><a href="https://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=L&pubNum=1000600&cite=USFRCPR12&originatingDoc=Idae8f87094d511eea3d0be527924d0f5&refType=LQ&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.AlertsClip)"><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; text-decoration-line: none;">Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(1)</span></a><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">, which requires the Court to dismiss an
action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction if the Court determines that it
lacks the constitutional or statutory power to adjudicate the case. When a </span><a href="https://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=L&pubNum=1000600&cite=USFRCPR12&originatingDoc=Idae8f87094d511eea3d0be527924d0f5&refType=LQ&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.AlertsClip)"><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; text-decoration-line: none;">Rule 12(b)(1)</span></a><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;"> motion is made solely based on the allegations in the pleading, the “task
of the district court is to determine whether the [p]leading alleges facts that
affirmatively and plausibly suggest” that subject-matter jurisdiction exists. </span><a href="https://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=2038828275&pubNum=0000506&originatingDoc=Idae8f87094d511eea3d0be527924d0f5&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_506_56&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.AlertsClip)#co_pp_sp_506_56"><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;">Carter v. HealthPort Tech., LLC</span><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; text-decoration-line: none;">, 822 F.3d 47,
56 (2d Cir. 2016)</span></a><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;"> (citation omitted). Courts must be careful,
however, not to conflate “federal-court ‘subject-matter’ jurisdiction over a
controversy[ ] and the essential ingredients of a federal claim for relief.” </span><a href="https://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=2054805785&pubNum=0008173&originatingDoc=Idae8f87094d511eea3d0be527924d0f5&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_8173_1076&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.AlertsClip)#co_pp_sp_8173_1076"><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;">Green v. Dep’t of Educ. of N.Y.</span><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; text-decoration-line: none;">, 16 F.4th 1070,
1076 (2d Cir. 2021)</span></a><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">. To resolve whether an issue goes to the
merits or subject matter jurisdiction, the Court must look to the language of
the statute to determine whether Congress intended “that a threshold limitation
on a statute’s scope shall count as jurisdictional.” </span><a href="https://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=2008499362&pubNum=0000780&originatingDoc=Idae8f87094d511eea3d0be527924d0f5&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_780_515&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.AlertsClip)#co_pp_sp_780_515"><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;">Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp.</span><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; text-decoration-line: none;">, 546 U.S. 500, 515 (2006)</span></a><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">.</span></b></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none; text-justify: inter-ideograph;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;"><b> </b></span><b style="text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">The district
court held that Karimi conflated jurisdiction with the merits of Tereshchenko’s
petition for the Children’s return. ICARA confers “concurrent original
jurisdiction of actions arising under the Convention” on “[t]he courts of the
States and the United States district courts.” </span><a href="https://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=L&pubNum=1000546&cite=22USCAS9003&originatingDoc=Idae8f87094d511eea3d0be527924d0f5&refType=RB&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.AlertsClip)#co_pp_8b3b0000958a4"><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; text-decoration-line: none;">22 U.S.C. §
9003(a)</span></a><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">. A petition for the return of a child is
properly heard by “any court which has jurisdiction ... in the place where the
child is located at the time the petition is filed.” </span><a href="https://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=L&pubNum=1000546&cite=22USCAS9003&originatingDoc=Idae8f87094d511eea3d0be527924d0f5&refType=RB&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.AlertsClip)#co_pp_a83b000018c76"><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;">Id.</span><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; text-decoration-line: none;"> §
9003(b)</span></a><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">. The Children were residing within this
district at the time the petition was filed, and thus </span><a href="https://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=L&pubNum=1000546&cite=22USCAS9003&originatingDoc=Idae8f87094d511eea3d0be527924d0f5&refType=LQ&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.AlertsClip)"><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; text-decoration-line: none;">§ 9003</span></a><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;"> confers subject matter jurisdiction upon this Court. Karimi made four
arguments in support of her assertion that this Court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over the petition. Three of those contentions related to an
element of proof required either of the Petitioner who sought the Children’s
return or of the Respondent who opposed that return.<a name="co_fnRef_B00012077674234_ID0ELKAC_1"></a> Those contentions do not,
however, relate to the Court’s power to adjudicate the merits. The fourth
argument -- that Petitioner may not seek the return of the Children to France,
a state other than their habitual state of residence -- was similarly
unavailing. That question concerns potential remedies available under the Hague
Convention. It has no bearing on whether the Court has subject matter
jurisdiction over the petition.</span></b></p><div><br /></div>Joel R. Brandeshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00071300360715546038noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2720486713239145885.post-53417984988745856302023-12-10T16:51:00.001-05:002023-12-10T16:51:02.900-05:00Guzzo v. Hansen, Not Reported in Fed. Rptr., 2023 WL 8433557 (Eighth Circuit, 2023)[Spain][Petition granted]<p> </p><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 6.0pt; margin-right: 6.0pt; margin-top: 12.0pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-autospace: none;"><b><br /></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 6.0pt; margin-right: 6.0pt; margin-top: 12.0pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-autospace: none;"><b><span style="color: #252525; font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;">In<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Guzzo
v. Hansen, <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></span><span style="color: black; font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;">Not Reported in Fed. Rptr., 2023 WL 8433557 (Eighth Circuit, <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>2023)<a name="co_anchor_Ib6155d5193f811ee9b97ef74318f8"></a><a name="co_pp_sp_999_1_1"></a><a name="co_fnRef_B00012077660839_ID0ELAAC_1"></a> Erica Hansen, a United States
citizen, appealed the district court’s<a name="co_fnRef_B00022077660839_ID0ESAAC_1"></a> order that her son with
Fabrizio Guzzo be returned to Spain. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Hansen argued
that the district court erred in determining the record did not support her
defenses to returning her son to Spain. This court discerned no error in the
district court’s conclusion that Hansen failed to establish her son would face
a grave risk of harm if returned to Spain. <i>See </i></span><a href="https://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=2031223983&pubNum=0000506&originatingDoc=Ied5088a093f611eea3d0be527924d0f5&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_506_874&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.AlertsClip)#co_pp_sp_506_874"><i><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-font-kerning: 0pt; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">Acosta v. Acosta</span></i><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-font-kerning: 0pt; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">, 725 F.3d 868,
874 (8th Cir. 2013)</span></a><span style="color: black; font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;"> (standard of review); <i>see also </i></span><a href="https://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1995137123&pubNum=0000506&originatingDoc=Ied5088a093f611eea3d0be527924d0f5&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_506_377&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.AlertsClip)#co_pp_sp_506_377"><i><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-font-kerning: 0pt; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">Nunez-Escudero
v. Tice-Menley</span></i><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-font-kerning: 0pt; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">,
58 F.3d 374, 377 (8th Cir. 1995)</span></a><span style="color: black; font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;"> (grave-risk
inquiry only requires assessment of whether the child will face immediate and
substantial risk of an intolerable situation if he is returned to habitual
residence). The court discerned no error in the district court’s finding that,
even if her son had attained sufficient maturity to consider his views, he did
not express a particularized objection to living in Spain. <i>See </i></span><a href="https://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=2040432825&pubNum=0000506&originatingDoc=Ied5088a093f611eea3d0be527924d0f5&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_506_1089&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.AlertsClip)#co_pp_sp_506_1089"><i><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-font-kerning: 0pt; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">Custodio v.
Samillan</span></i><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-font-kerning: 0pt; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">,
842 F.3d 1084, 1089 (8th Cir. 2016)</span></a><span style="color: black; font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;"> (standard of
review); <i>see also </i></span><a href="https://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=2070677566&pubNum=0008173&originatingDoc=Ied5088a093f611eea3d0be527924d0f5&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_8173_1048&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.AlertsClip)#co_pp_sp_8173_1048"><i><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-font-kerning: 0pt; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">Dubikovskyy v.
Goun</span></i><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-font-kerning: 0pt; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">,
54 F.4th 1042, 1048 (8th Cir. 2022)</span></a><span style="color: black; font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;"> (child’s
preference or generalized desire to remain in United States is insufficient, as
child’s testimony must include particularized objections to returning to former
country).</span></b><a name="co_footnote_B00022077660839_1"></a> <o:p></o:p></p>Joel R. Brandeshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00071300360715546038noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2720486713239145885.post-21192702240330325572023-11-24T14:24:00.000-05:002023-11-24T14:24:00.811-05:00Rubio v. Lopez, 2023 WL 8031322 , S.D. New York (2023) [Mexico][Petition dismissed][Mootness]<p><b> </b><b><span style="color: #252525; font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;">In Rubio v. Lopez, </span><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">2023 WL 8031322 , S.D. New York (2023) <a name="co_opinion_1"></a><a name="co_pp_sp_999_1_1"></a>Petitioner Franco Bartzik Rubio and Respondent
Sandra Leticia Morales Lopez were former spouses who are engaged in a bitter
custody fight in Mexico over their six-year-old child, A.B.M. Bartzik Rubio
filed a petition under the Hague Convention for “the return” of A.B.M., who was
allegedly “removed from Mexico” to this District by Morales Lopez without
Bartzik Rubio’s “consent or acquiescence.” Morales Lopez moved to dismiss the
case as moot on the ground that A.B.M. was already in Mexico.<a name="co_pp_sp_999_2_1"></a> The Court founds that Morales Lopez carried her burden and that the case must be
dismissed as moot. “To prevail on a Hague Convention child custody claim, a
petitioner must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that: ‘(1) the
child was habitually resident in one State and has been removed to ... a
different State; (2) the removal ... was in breach of the petitioner’s custody
rights under the law of the State of habitual residence; and (3) the petitioner
was exercising those rights at the time of the removal.’ ” </span><a href="https://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=2011710535&pubNum=0006538&originatingDoc=Ia4da4200885c11eeb3c4fbcc73dde359&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_6538_34&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.AlertsClip)#co_pp_sp_6538_34"><i><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; text-decoration-line: none;">Daunis v. Daunis</span></i><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; text-decoration-line: none;">, 222 F. App’x
32, 34 (2d Cir. 2007)</span></a><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;"> (summary order) (quoting </span><a href="https://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=2005899625&pubNum=0000506&originatingDoc=Ia4da4200885c11eeb3c4fbcc73dde359&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_506_130&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.AlertsClip)#co_pp_sp_506_130"><i><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; text-decoration-line: none;">Gitter v. Gitter</span></i><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; text-decoration-line: none;">, 396 F.3d 124,
130-31 (2d Cir. 2005)</span></a><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">). “The Convention’s central operating
feature is the return remedy.” </span><a href="https://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=2022052220&pubNum=0000780&originatingDoc=Ia4da4200885c11eeb3c4fbcc73dde359&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_780_9&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.AlertsClip)#co_pp_sp_780_9"><i><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; text-decoration-line: none;">Abbott v. Abbott</span></i><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; text-decoration-line: none;">, 560 U.S. 1, 9
(2010)</span></a><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">. That is, while a court adjudicating a
petition under the Hague Convention may order a child returned to his or her
country of habitual residence, it must leave decisions regarding custody
arrangements to the courts of the country of habitual residence. It follows
that where there is no dispute as to a child’s country of habitual residence <i>and</i>
the child has returned to that country, courts generally dismiss as moot
petitions brought pursuant to the Hague Convention. That is the situation here.
First, there was no dispute that Mexico was A.B.M.’s country of habitual
residence. And second, the record confirmed that A.B.M. was in Mexico (and
likely had been for nearly the entire duration of this case). Morales Lopez
submitted a sworn declaration attesting that A.B.M. was currently residing in
Mexico and, with the exception of a three-day shopping trip to McAllen, Texas,
near the Mexico border, in May 2023, “has been in Mexico continuously since
March 12, 2023.” She also submitted photographs of A.B.M. in Mexico with date,
time, and location stamps, including one taken as recently as November 3, 2023.
Significantly, Bartzik Rubio did not present any evidence (let alone admissible
evidence) to the contrary — even though the Court granted him discovery on the
question of mootness. At best, he pointed to an Amber Alert identifying A.B.M.
as missing that was issued in Mexico on August 20, 2023.. But the Amber Alert
(which was almost certainly inadmissible hearsay) was apparently deactivated
within days, and it appeared to have been generated in the first instance by
Bartzik Rubio’s own unverified complaints to the Mexican police, Making matters
worse, it came only a few months after a Mexican court deactivated an earlier
Amber Alert that was also apparently orchestrated by Bartzik Rubio — and
granted Morales Lopez a protective order. In short, the Amber Alert was no
evidence that A.B.M. was (or remains) outside of Mexico, let alone that she was
(or remains) in the United States. Lacking evidence that A.B.M. was outside of
Mexico, and in this District in particular, Bartzik Rubio sought to avoid
dismissal by invoking the exception to mootness for cases that are “capable of
repetition, yet evading review.” </span><a href="https://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=2055723480&pubNum=0008173&originatingDoc=Ia4da4200885c11eeb3c4fbcc73dde359&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_8173_395&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.AlertsClip)#co_pp_sp_8173_395"><i><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; text-decoration-line: none;">Exxon Mobil
Corp. v. Healey</span></i><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; text-decoration-line: none;">,
28 F.4th 383, 395 (2d Cir. 2022)</span></a></b><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;"><b>. The
exception is available only in exceptional situations.<a name="co_fnRef_B00032077504226_ID0EQFAE_1"></a> This is not one of those
“exceptional situations.”</b></span></p>Joel R. Brandeshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00071300360715546038noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2720486713239145885.post-44629627682141090082023-11-19T16:45:00.000-05:002023-11-19T16:45:04.589-05:00Recent Hague Convention District Court Cases - Duhart v Kristan, 2023 WL 79277779 N.D. Georgia, 2023) [Germany][Petition dismissed] [Lack of jurisdiction]<p><b><span style="font-family: arial;">In Duhart v Kristan, 2023 WL 79277779 N.D. Georgia, 2023) the court denied the petition and dismissed the case upon a 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) frivolity review of pro se Petitioner’s Complaint and Verified Petition for Return of a Child under the Hague Convention.</span></b></p><p><b><span style="font-family: arial;"> Petitioner, Jovan Duhart, was the father of minor A.D. He contended that he and the child’s mother, Taylor Kristan, share joint legal and physical custody of A.D. According to Duhart, as of June 4, 2023, the child has been wrongfully detained by Kristan in Stuttgart, Germany. Duhart filed his Petition on September 1, 2023 requesting a preliminary injunction hearing in an effort to obtain an order from this Court directing that A.D. be returned to the State of Georgia. </span></b></p><p><b><span style="font-family: arial;">The Court observed that an in forma pauperis (IFP) complaint such as this one must be dismissed “if the court determines that ... the action or appeal (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA), establishes procedures for requesting return of a child wrongfully removed to or retained in the United States. 22 U.S.C. § 9003. The Act authorizes “[a]ny person” seeking return of a child under the Convention to file a petition in state or federal court. Id. The petition must be filed “in any court ... which is authorized to exercise its jurisdiction in the place where the child is located at the time the petition is filed.” Id. See also Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060, 1063 (6th Cir. 1996) (Under the Hague Convention, “a court in the abducted-to nation has jurisdiction to decide the merits” of an ICARA petition); Yang v. Tsui, 416 F.3d 199, 201 (3d Cir. 2005) (“The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to ICARA.... At the time [petitioner’s] Petition was filed in the District Court, the child was located in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.”); Lops v. Lops, 140 F.3d 927, 936 (11th Cir. 1998) (jurisdiction over petition in Georgia was proper where children were located in Georgia, because ICARA jurisdiction is based on children’s location, not traditional residency). The child was allegedly being wrongfully retained in Germany on September 1, 2023, the date Duhart filed this Petition. Accordingly, this Court had no jurisdiction over Duhart’s claims. Duhart’s assertion that venue was proper based on Kristan’s federal employment had no bearing on the jurisdictional analysis under ICARA.</span></b></p><p><b><span style="font-family: arial;"> </span></b></p><div><br /></div>Joel R. Brandeshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00071300360715546038noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2720486713239145885.post-42082360519906506952023-10-28T16:32:00.000-04:002023-10-28T16:32:04.900-04:00Recent Hague Convention District Court Cases - Nisbet v Bridger, 2023 WL 6998081 (D. Oregon, 2023) [Scotland][Petition denied[Habitual residence][Grave risk of harm]<p> </p><p class="MsoNormal"><b><o:p> </o:p></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-autospace: none;"><br /></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-autospace: none;"><span style="color: black; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;"><o:p><b><span style="font-family: arial;"> </span></b></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-autospace: none;"><span style="color: black; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;"><b><span style="font-family: arial;">In Nisbet v Bridger, 2023 WL 6998081 (D. Oregon, 2023)<a name="co_pp_sp_999_1_1"></a><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>the
district court denied the petition for the return to Scotland of the two
children, five-year-old ACN and three-year-old KRN.<o:p></o:p></span></b></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-autospace: none;"><b style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: arial;"> In June 2022, the children and their mother,
Respondent Spirit Rose Bridger, left Scotland for the United States, and have
lived in Oregon ever since. The children’s father, Petitioner Andrew Nisbet,
argued that Respondent took their children in violation of the Hague
Convention. The evidence compelled two conclusions. First, Petitioner failed to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the children’s habitual residence
was Scotland. The evidence showed that the children did not have a settled
permanent home in Scotland before arriving in the United States. The facts
proved that the children lacked a meaningful connection to Scotland, that their
caregiving parent had long intended to move to Oregon, and that their absentee
parent had coerced their caregiver into remaining longer than she wished. They
were unsettled largely because Petitioner killed his mother in August 2019 and
then was detained and committed to St. Andrew’s a secure psychiatric facility
in England. One of the children was not yet born at the time of those events. The
petitioner had been sentenced to an indefinite period of psychiatric
confinement. The petitioner has not lived in Scotland since 2017. The petitioner
continued to display behaviors like those he showed in Jersey. On May 18, 2023,
a month before filing his Hague Petition, Petitioner threatened to attack staff
when he was moved between wards. The petitioner refused treatment recommended
by St. Andrew’s, insisting that he receive therapy from his personal therapist,
Jane Pointon, whom he has seen since 2017. Petitioner has also decided that
mindfulness methods, not intensive therapy, suffice as treatment. This is so although
even Petitioner’s expert did not see any document recommending Petitioner go
without therapeutic treatment. Finally, in confinement, Petitioner has
apparently at times barricaded himself from hospital staff, punched walls,
banged his head against a window, and had physical altercations with the staff.
The children did not have a habitual residence on June 17, 2022; the Court
therefore denied the Petition.</span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;"><span style="color: black; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;"><o:p><b><span style="font-family: arial;"> </span></b></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;"><b><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="color: black; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;">Assuming the children’s habitual
residence was Scotland before they moved to Oregon, the Convention did not
require a return of the children because Respondent had shown by clear and
convincing evidence that a return to Scotland would present a grave risk of
harm or otherwise place the children in an intolerable situation. The children
had no familial support network there. Their father, Petitioner, remained
indefinitely committed to a secure in-patient psychiatric health facility. And
Petitioner had a history of violent and coercive behaviors that constitute
major risk factors for domestic abuse.</span><span style="color: black; font-size: 10pt;"><span style="mso-font-kerning: 0pt;"> </span></span><span style="color: black; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;">Although
there was no evidence that Petitioner physically abused Respondent or the
children, there was evidence of coercive, manipulative, violent, and
threatening behavior directed at Respondent and Petitioner’s family. Such
long-standing behavior constituted a grave risk of harm to ACN and KRN if they were
returned., Petitioner here had a broader history of familial abuse against his
mother, father, and brother as well as Respondent. Finally, the grave risk of
displacing the children is starker still when juxtaposed with depriving the
children of their mother and their support network in Oregon. As the Second
Circuit has explained, “the fact that a child is settled may form part of a
broader analysis of whether repatriation will create a grave risk of harm,”
though it cannot be categorically dispositive. </span><a href="https://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=2001078606&pubNum=0000506&originatingDoc=I23e5f50072ee11ee842dd07014231253&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_506_164&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.AlertsClip)#co_pp_sp_506_164"><i><span style="color: #0e568c; mso-font-kerning: 0pt; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">Blondin v. Dubois</span></i><span style="color: #0e568c; mso-font-kerning: 0pt; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">, 238 F.3d 153, 164 (2d Cir.
2001)</span></a><span style="color: black; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;">, <i>abrogated
on other grounds by </i></span><a href="https://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=2056415234&pubNum=0000708&originatingDoc=I23e5f50072ee11ee842dd07014231253&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.AlertsClip)"><i><span style="color: #0e568c; mso-font-kerning: 0pt; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">Golan</span></i><span style="color: #0e568c; mso-font-kerning: 0pt; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">, 142 S. Ct. 1880</span></a><span style="color: black; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;">.<a name="co_fnRef_B00122076978805_ID0ENEBG_1"></a> Because of the isolation of
COVID-19 and Petitioner’s absence from the children’s lives, they developed an
especially strong bond with their mother. And in Oregon, the children have
family, friends, and social benefits that, if returned to Scotland, they would
lose in an extremely short time frame. As Dr. Poppleton testified, losing their
mother, family, and support network so quickly could have cascading effects on
the children’s development and health. Coupled with the risk posed by
Petitioner, this clearly presents an intolerable situation and grave risk to
the children. <a name="co_anchor_I99de58a172ef11ee9aa0aa31bf91f"></a>In sum,
the children’s return to Scotland posed a grave risk of harm and intolerable
situation to them. For this reason, as well as the children’s lack of a
habitual residence on June 17, 2022, the Court would not order that the
children be returned to Scotland.<o:p></o:p></span></span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;"><span style="color: black; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;"><b><span style="font-family: arial;"> <a name="co_anchor_I99dea6c172ef11ee9aa0aa31bf91f"></a><o:p></o:p></span></b></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;"><b><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="color: black; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;">Petitioner argued that the Court
should order the children’s return to Scotland so that he can visit them while
they live under the supervision of either a live-in nanny or Petitioner’s
friend, Mr. Harper (who testified). This Court found these ameliorative
measures unworkable. </span><a href="https://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=2056415234&pubNum=0000708&originatingDoc=I23e5f50072ee11ee842dd07014231253&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_708_1892&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.AlertsClip)#co_pp_sp_708_1892"><i><span style="color: #0e568c; mso-font-kerning: 0pt; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">Golan</span></i><span style="color: #0e568c; mso-font-kerning: 0pt; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">, 142 S. Ct. at 1892–94</span></a><span style="color: black; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;"> (giving district courts broad
discretion to consider such measures).<o:p></o:p></span></span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;"><span style="color: black; font-size: 10pt;"><b><span style="font-family: arial;"> <o:p></o:p></span></b></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;"><span style="color: black; font-size: 10pt;"><o:p><b><span style="font-family: arial;"> </span></b></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;"><span style="color: black; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;"><o:p><b><span style="font-family: arial;"> </span></b></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;"><span style="color: black; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;"><b><span style="font-family: arial;"> <o:p></o:p></span></b></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;"><b><span style="font-family: arial;"><a name="co_anchor_I99b5c20172ef11ee9aa0aa31bf91f"></a><span style="color: black; font-size: 10pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;"><b><span style="font-family: arial;"><a name="co_anchor_I99c63cc172ef11ee9aa0aa31bf91f"></a><span style="color: black; font-size: 10pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;"><span style="color: black; font-size: 10pt;"><b><span style="font-family: arial;"> <o:p></o:p></span></b></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;"><span style="color: black; font-size: 10pt;"><o:p><b><span style="font-family: arial;"> </span></b></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>Joel R. Brandeshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00071300360715546038noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2720486713239145885.post-20086726784339962822023-10-28T16:29:00.009-04:002023-10-28T16:29:42.191-04:00Recent Hague Convention District Court Cases - Maduhu v Maduhu, 2023 WL 6979606 (WD Texas, 2023)[United Kingdom][Petition granted][Necessary Costs and Expenses]<p><b> </b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-autospace: none;"><span style="color: black; font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;"><b>In
Maduhu v Maduhu, 2023 WL 6979606 (WD Texas, 2023) the Court granted the petition
of <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Sonda Jonathan Maduhu seeking the
return of his two minor children, R.A.M. and M.H.M., to the United Kingdom. The
Court concluded that R.A.M. and M.H.M. had been wrongfully removed and that a
return order was warranted. A Final Judgment was issued on June 6, 2023 (ECF
No. 30), and Petitioner timely moved for an award of fees and costs on June 28,
2023, seeking $19,057.50 in attorney’s fees and $10,733.85 in costs<a name="co_fnRef_B00012076972118_ID0E3AAC_2"></a><a href="file:///C:/Users/joel/Dropbox/1-All%20other%20files/Volume%209%20Chapter%2072%20Section%2072-61%20Footnote%201%20Maduhu%20v%20Maduhu%20.docx#co_footnote_B00012076972118_2"><sup><span style="color: #0e568c; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">.</span></sup></a> <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>No response had been filed.<o:p></o:p></b></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;"><b><span style="color: black; font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;"> </span><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">The Court observed that the lodestar method is an accepted approach for
determining attorney’s fees in Hague Convention cases. </span><a href="https://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=2055557031&pubNum=0000999&originatingDoc=Ie7d44df0729811ee842dd07014231253&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_999_1&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.AlertsClip)#co_pp_sp_999_1"><i><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; text-decoration-line: none;">Velarde</span></i><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; text-decoration-line: none;">, 2017 WL
11663478, at *1</span></a><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">. In calculating attorney’s fees under the
lodestar method, the Court engages in a three-step process: (1) determine the
nature and extent of the services provided; (2) set a value on those services
according to the customary fee and quality of the legal work; and (3) adjust
the compensation based on other <i>Johnson</i> factors that may be relevant to
the case. </span><a href="https://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1982137564&pubNum=0000350&originatingDoc=Ie7d44df0729811ee842dd07014231253&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_350_1092&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.AlertsClip)#co_pp_sp_350_1092"><i><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; text-decoration-line: none;">Copper Liquor,
Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co.</span></i><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; text-decoration-line: none;">, 684 F.2d 1087, 1092 (5th Cir. 1982)</span></a><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">; </span><a href="https://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1974108744&pubNum=0000350&originatingDoc=Ie7d44df0729811ee842dd07014231253&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_350_717&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.AlertsClip)#co_pp_sp_350_717"><i><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; text-decoration-line: none;">Johnson v. Ga.
Highway Express, Inc.</span></i><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; text-decoration-line: none;">,
488 F.2d 714, 717–19 (5th Cir. 1974)</span></a><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">. The
“lodestar” amount—which is the “appropriate fee award [ ] determined by
multiplying the number of hours reasonably worked on litigation by a reasonable
hourly rate”—is calculated by steps one and two. </span><a href="https://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1983122905&pubNum=0000780&originatingDoc=Ie7d44df0729811ee842dd07014231253&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_780_433&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.AlertsClip)#co_pp_sp_780_433"><i><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; text-decoration-line: none;">Hensley v.
Eckerhart</span></i><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; text-decoration-line: none;">,
461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)</span></a><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">. Both the hours worked,
and the hourly rate must be reasonable, and the Court considers only the hours
spent on successful claims. <i>See </i></span><a href="https://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1983122905&pubNum=0000780&originatingDoc=Ie7d44df0729811ee842dd07014231253&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_780_433&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.AlertsClip)#co_pp_sp_780_433"><i><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; text-decoration-line: none;">id.</span></i><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; text-decoration-line: none;"> at 433–34</span></a><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">. Reasonable hourly rates “are to be calculated according to the
prevailing market rates in the relevant community” for the purposes of the
lodestar calculation. </span><a href="https://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=2025831298&pubNum=0000506&originatingDoc=Ie7d44df0729811ee842dd07014231253&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_506_381&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.AlertsClip)#co_pp_sp_506_381"><i><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; text-decoration-line: none;">McClain v.
Lufkin Indus., Inc.</span></i><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; text-decoration-line: none;">,
649 F.3d 374, 381 (5th Cir. 2011)</span></a><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;"> (citing </span><a href="https://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1984114238&pubNum=0000780&originatingDoc=Ie7d44df0729811ee842dd07014231253&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_780_895&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.AlertsClip)#co_pp_sp_780_895"><i><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; text-decoration-line: none;">Blum v.
Stevenson</span></i><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; text-decoration-line: none;">,
465 U.S. 886, 895 (1983)</span></a><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">). The relevant market to
determine the prevailing rate to be used in the lodestar calculation is the
market in which the district court sits. </span><a href="https://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=2002166696&pubNum=0000506&originatingDoc=Ie7d44df0729811ee842dd07014231253&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_506_368&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.AlertsClip)#co_pp_sp_506_368"><i><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; text-decoration-line: none;">Tollett v. City
of Kemah</span></i><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; text-decoration-line: none;">,
285 F.3d 357, 368 (5th Cir. 2002)</span></a><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">. The third
step of the reasonable attorney fee calculation is reserved for the adjustment
of the lodestar using the twelve <i>Johnson</i> factors. That is, once the
basic fee is calculated, the Court may adjust the amount upward or downward.
Rarely are all factors applicable, however, and a trial judge may give them
different weights. <i>Id.</i> The “<i>Johnson</i> factors” are (1) the time and
labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the legal questions; (3) the
requisite skill to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of
other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the
customary fee for similar work in the community; (6) whether the fee is fixed
or contingent; (7) the time limitations imposed by the client or the
circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the
experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the “undesirability”
of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with
the client; and (12) awards in similar cases. </span><a href="https://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1974108744&pubNum=0000350&originatingDoc=Ie7d44df0729811ee842dd07014231253&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_350_717&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.AlertsClip)#co_pp_sp_350_717"><i><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; text-decoration-line: none;">Johnson</span></i><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; text-decoration-line: none;">, 488 F.2d at
717–19</span></a><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">. The court may not consider <i>Johnson</i>
factors it already used to calculate the lodestar amount. </span><a href="https://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=2031767145&pubNum=0000506&originatingDoc=Ie7d44df0729811ee842dd07014231253&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_506_503&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.AlertsClip)#co_pp_sp_506_503"><i><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; text-decoration-line: none;">Black v.
SettlePou, P.C.</span></i><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; text-decoration-line: none;">,
732 F.3d 492, 503 (5th Cir. 2013)</span></a><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">.</span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;"><span style="color: black; font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;"><b> <o:p></o:p></b></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;"><b><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">The Court
found that the lodestar need not be modified in this case based on the twelve
factors, and therefore finds that an award of attorney’s fees of $19,057.50 was
reasonable. Petitioner sought $9,149.08 in costs under </span><a href="https://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=L&pubNum=1000600&cite=USFRCPR54&originatingDoc=Ie7d44df0729811ee842dd07014231253&refType=LQ&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.AlertsClip)"><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; text-decoration-line: none;">Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 54(d)</span></a><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;"> and </span><a href="https://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=L&pubNum=1000546&cite=22USCAS9007&originatingDoc=Ie7d44df0729811ee842dd07014231253&refType=RB&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.AlertsClip)#co_pp_d801000002763"><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; text-decoration-line: none;">Section
9007(b)(3)</span></a><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;"> of ICARA.<a name="co_fnRef_B00042076972118_ID0ELDAE_2"></a> </span><a href="https://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=L&pubNum=1000600&cite=USFRCPR54&originatingDoc=Ie7d44df0729811ee842dd07014231253&refType=LQ&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.AlertsClip)"><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; text-decoration-line: none;">Rule 5 4(d)</span></a><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;"> provides that costs “shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing
party.” </span><a href="https://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=L&pubNum=1000546&cite=28USCAS1920&originatingDoc=Ie7d44df0729811ee842dd07014231253&refType=LQ&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.AlertsClip)"><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; text-decoration-line: none;">Section 1920</span></a><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;"> defines the term “costs” as used in </span><a href="https://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=L&pubNum=1000600&cite=USFRCPR54&originatingDoc=Ie7d44df0729811ee842dd07014231253&refType=LQ&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.AlertsClip)"><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; text-decoration-line: none;">Rule 54(d)</span></a><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;"> and enumerates the expenses that a federal court may tax as a cost under
the authority found in </span><a href="https://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=L&pubNum=1000600&cite=USFRCPR54&originatingDoc=Ie7d44df0729811ee842dd07014231253&refType=LQ&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.AlertsClip)"><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; text-decoration-line: none;">Rule 54(d)</span></a><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">. </span><a href="https://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=2004863956&pubNum=0000506&originatingDoc=Ie7d44df0729811ee842dd07014231253&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_506_450&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.AlertsClip)#co_pp_sp_506_450"><i><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; text-decoration-line: none;">Gaddis v. United
States</span></i><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; text-decoration-line: none;">,
381 F.3d 444, 450 (5th Cir. 2004)</span></a><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">; <i>see also </i></span><a href="https://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1987074411&pubNum=0000780&originatingDoc=Ie7d44df0729811ee842dd07014231253&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_780_441&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.AlertsClip)#co_pp_sp_780_441"><i><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; text-decoration-line: none;">Crawford Fitting
Co. v. Gibbons</span></i><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; text-decoration-line: none;">,
482 U.S. 437, 441 (1987)</span></a><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">. Thus, unless otherwise
authorized by statute, the types of costs that may be awarded under </span><a href="https://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=L&pubNum=1000600&cite=USFRCPR54&originatingDoc=Ie7d44df0729811ee842dd07014231253&refType=LQ&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.AlertsClip)"><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; text-decoration-line: none;">Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 54(d)</span></a><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;"> are limited to those enumerated in </span><a href="https://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=L&pubNum=1000546&cite=28USCAS1920&originatingDoc=Ie7d44df0729811ee842dd07014231253&refType=LQ&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.AlertsClip)"><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; text-decoration-line: none;">28 U.S.C. § 1920</span></a><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">. </span><a href="https://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=L&pubNum=1000546&cite=28USCAS1920&originatingDoc=Ie7d44df0729811ee842dd07014231253&refType=LQ&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.AlertsClip)"><i><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; text-decoration-line: none;">Id.</span></i><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; text-decoration-line: none;"> Section 1920</span></a><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;"> provides: A judge or clerk of any court of the United States may tax as
costs the following: (1) Fees of the clerk and marshal; (2) Fees for printed or
electronically recorded transcripts necessarily obtained for use in the case; (3)
Fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses; (4) Fees for exemplification
and the costs of making copies of any materials where the copies are
necessarily obtained for use in the case; (5) Docket fees under section 1923 of
this title; (6) Compensation of court appointed experts, compensation of
interpreters, and salaries, fees, expenses, and costs of special interpretation
services under section 1828 of this title. </span><a href="https://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=L&pubNum=1000546&cite=28USCAS1920&originatingDoc=Ie7d44df0729811ee842dd07014231253&refType=LQ&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.AlertsClip)"><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; text-decoration-line: none;">28 U.S.C. § 1920</span></a><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">.</span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;"><b><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">Article 26 of the Hague Convention further provides the judiciary with the
discretionary authority to direct an award of costs upon ordering the return of
the child. “ICARA goes beyond the discretion bestowed by the Hague Convention
and includes a mandatory obligation to impose necessary expenses, unless the
respondent establishes that to do so would be ‘clearly inappropriate.’ ” </span><a href="https://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=2033288995&pubNum=0000506&originatingDoc=Ie7d44df0729811ee842dd07014231253&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_506_519&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.AlertsClip)#co_pp_sp_506_519"><i><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; text-decoration-line: none;">Salazar</span></i><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; text-decoration-line: none;">, 750 F.3d at
519</span></a><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;"> (quoting </span><a href="https://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=2005789336&pubNum=0000506&originatingDoc=Ie7d44df0729811ee842dd07014231253&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_506_346&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.AlertsClip)#co_pp_sp_506_346"><i><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; text-decoration-line: none;">Sealed Appellant
v. Sealed Appellee</span></i><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; text-decoration-line: none;">,
394 F.3d 338, 346 (5th Cir. 2004)</span></a><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">).
Specifically, ICARA provides that, in connection with “[c]osts incurred in
civil actions”:</span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;"><b style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">The Court awarded: $402.00 for the
fees of the clerk; <a name="co_anchor_I516ca82172d511ee9729bf8ab51a0"></a>$65.00
of the $141.60 requested for service of summons; $342.28 for “fees and
disbursements for printing; $3,416.06 in transportation costs under ICARA. Post-judgment
interest shall accrue at a rate of 5.18% per annum.</b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;"><b><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;"> Petitioner sought an award of $29.35 for
postage and $19.43 for wire transfer fees (charged in connection with payments
to his counsel). Postage is not included in </span><a href="https://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=L&pubNum=1000546&cite=28USCAS1920&originatingDoc=Ie7d44df0729811ee842dd07014231253&refType=LQ&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.AlertsClip)"><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; text-decoration-line: none;">section 1920</span></a><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;"> and is not recoverable as a cost. </span><a href="https://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1997040607&pubNum=0000345&originatingDoc=Ie7d44df0729811ee842dd07014231253&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_345_418&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.AlertsClip)#co_pp_sp_345_418"><i><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; text-decoration-line: none;">Embotelladora
Agral Regiomontana, S.A. de C.V. v. Sharp Capital, Inc.</span></i><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; text-decoration-line: none;">, 952 F. Supp.
415, 418 (N.D. Tex. 1997)</span></a><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">. Similarly, the Court can
find no basis for an award of wire transfer fees in </span><a href="https://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=L&pubNum=1000546&cite=28USCAS1920&originatingDoc=Ie7d44df0729811ee842dd07014231253&refType=LQ&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.AlertsClip)"><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; text-decoration-line: none;">§ 1920</span></a><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">. Because they were not necessarily incurred to secure the return of the
children, these costs in the total amount of $48.78 were denied, and
Petitioner’s award of costs is reduced by this amount.</span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;"><span style="color: black; font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;"><b> <o:p></o:p></b></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;"><b><a name="co_anchor_I516f674172d511ee9729bf8ab51a0"></a><span style="color: black; font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;">Petitioner
was awarded a total of $23,282.84 in attorney’s fees and costs, together with
post-judgment interest thereon at the rate of 5.18% thereon, <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;"><span style="color: black; font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;"><o:p><b> </b></o:p></span></p>Joel R. Brandeshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00071300360715546038noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2720486713239145885.post-39665243360462797962023-10-28T09:18:00.003-04:002023-10-28T09:18:19.102-04:00Brandt v Caracciolo, 2023 WL 7015680 (Fourth Circuit, 2023) [Sweden][Petition denied[[Wrongful retention not established]<p><b> </b></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-autospace: none;"><span style="color: black; font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;"><b>[Sweden][Petition
denied[[Wrongful retention not established]<o:p></o:p></b></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-autospace: none;"><span style="color: black; font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;"><o:p><b> </b></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-autospace: none;"><span style="color: black; font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;"><b>In
Brandt v Caracciolo, 2023 WL 7015680 (Fourth Circuit,2023) <a name="co_pp_sp_999_1_1"></a>the Fourth Circuit affirmed by unpublished opinion
(Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.) the denial of
the petition of Minna-Marie Brandt (“Appellant”) for return of her minor
children to Sweden. It held that the Appellant failed to demonstrate wrongful
retention of the minor children in violation of her custody rights. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></b></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;"><b><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">Appellant,
a Swedish citizen, met Appellee, a United States citizen, in 2015 while
Appellee was in Sweden. The two began an on-again, off-again relationship that
continued through 2021. Throughout their relationship, the parties sometimes
resided together in Sweden. Although they never married, Appellant and Appellee
have two children together: a son, S.C., and a daughter, J.C. The children were
born in Örebro, Sweden, in 2016 and 2019 respectively, and were Swedish
citizens. Until April 16, 2021, the children lived continuously in Sweden with
Appellant. Appellee also resided with them intermittently. During this time,
the children took a few short trips to visit Appellee’s family in the United
States. Appellant maintained sole custody until March 2020, when the parties
reached a custody agreement. Appellant agrees the parties held joint custody
pursuant to their agreement. On December 30, 2020, social services in Sweden
(“social services”) began an investigation into the safety of Appellant’s home
and the children’s’ welfare. According to Appellant, social services advised
that the children may be moved to foster care. Appellant contends that the
parties then discussed Appellee taking the children to the United States for a
three-month trip. In contrast, Appellee claims the parties agreed that the
entire family would move to the United States and Appellee would obtain citizenship
for the children. On April 16, 2021, Appellee and the children traveled to
North Carolina, where they have remained. Appellee brought along the children’s
passports, as well as most of their clothing and toys.</span><a name="co_fnRef_B00012076990386_ID0E3FAC_1" style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;"></a><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;"> On July 3, 2021, Swedish Social
Services sent a letter to the parties stating that “[s]ocial services were
planning to place the children in temporary care,” but that the parties had
“finally [come] to the agreement that the children could live with [Appellee]
and [his] family in the U.S. for some time.” On July 6, 2021, as part of the
ongoing custody dispute in Sweden, a Swedish district court entered an “interim
decision” confirming that the parties had joint custody of the children,
pending resolution of the custody dispute. And while it acknowledged that the
children resided with Appellee in the United States, the Swedish district
court’s interim order did not require Appellee to return the children to
Sweden. Nevertheless, on July 7, 2021, when the children did not return to
Sweden, Appellant reported that they had been kidnapped by their father. On
July 21, 2021, Appellant filed an application with the Swedish Ministry for
Foreign Affairs pursuant to the Hague Convention,</span><a name="co_fnRef_B00022076990386_ID0EKHAC_1" style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;"></a><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;"> seeking return of the children
to Sweden. </span><a name="co_pp_sp_999_2_1" style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;"></a><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">*2</span><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;"> On March 31, 2022, the
Swedish district court entered a final order awarding Appellee </span><i style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">sole custody</i><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">
of the children and providing Appellant with a right of contact in the form of
a weekly call. Thereafter, on July 6, 2022, Appellant filed a petition in the
Western District of North Carolina, for return of the children. After
considering the evidence, the district court denied Appellant’s petition.</span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;"><span style="color: black; font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;"><b> <o:p></o:p></b></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;"><b><a name="co_pp_sp_999_3_1"></a><span style="color: black; font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;">Appellant argued that the district court
erred by ignoring her joint custody rights and improperly placing exclusive
reliance on the March 31, 2022 order from the Swedish district court, which,
despite being issued nearly a year after the alleged wrongful retention, awarded
Appellee sole custody. However, this is not what the district court did.<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;"><b><span style="color: black; font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;"> The district court began by correctly identifying “the relevant time
period [a]s April through July 2021,” the period when the children traveled to
the United States. As this court has explained, “the only reasonable reading of
the [Hague] Convention is that a removal’s wrongfulness depends on rights of
custody <i>at the time of removal.</i>” </span><span style="font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt;"><a href="https://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=2030607212&pubNum=0000506&originatingDoc=I998f0aa073b411eea76695209c33e2ad&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_506_306&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.AlertsClip)#co_pp_sp_506_306"><i><span style="color: #0e568c; mso-font-kerning: 0pt; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">White v. White</span></i><span style="color: #0e568c; mso-font-kerning: 0pt; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">, 718 F.3d 300, 306 (4th Cir.
2013)</span></a><span style="color: black; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;"> (emphasis is
original).<a name="co_fnRef_B00062076990386_ID0EXIAE_1"></a> Thereafter, the
district court explicitly stated that “[t]he March 2022 custody order is not
dispositive as a matter of law on the issue of wrongful retention ... [b]ut the
[c]ourt [did] consider that order as evidence.” <o:p></o:p></span></span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;"><b><span style="color: black; font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;">While the Hague Convention prevents a person from “insulat[ing] the child
from the ... return provisions merely by obtaining a custody order in the
country of new residence, or by seeking there to enforce another country’s
order,” it does not preclude the court from considering the facts and
circumstances surrounding any such order. </span><span style="font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt;"><a href="https://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=l&pubNum=0001037&cite=UUID(IF9BC19C0366211DAAECA8D28B8108CB8)&originatingDoc=I998f0aa073b411eea76695209c33e2ad&refType=CP&fi=co_pp_sp_1037_10494&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.AlertsClip)#co_pp_sp_1037_10494"><span style="color: #0e568c; mso-font-kerning: 0pt; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">51 Fed. Reg. 10494-01, 10504</span></a><span style="color: black; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;">. To the contrary, the Hague Convention expressly permits
“the judicial or administrative authorities of the requested State<a name="co_fnRef_B00072076990386_ID0E2MAE_1"></a><a href="file:///C:/Users/joel/Dropbox/1-All%20other%20files/Hague%20Brandt%20v%20Caracciolo%20(Fourth%20Circuit,2023)%20.docx#co_footnote_B00072076990386_1"><sup><span style="color: #0e568c; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">7</span></sup></a> [to] take account
of the reasons for [a decision relating to custody] in applying this
Convention.” Hague Convention art. 17, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 5. Moreover,
nothing in the Courts precedent prevents the district court from considering
the full panoply of circumstances surrounding the alleged retention. This
included the March 31, 2022 order. Therefore, the district court did not err in
considering the March 31, 2022 final custody order.<o:p></o:p></span></span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;"><span style="color: black; font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;"><b> <o:p></o:p></b></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;"><b><span style="color: black; font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;">“Rights of custody” as defined by the Hague Convention arise by: (1)
operation of law; (2) judicial or administrative decision; or (3) an agreement
having legal effect pursuant to the law of the state of habitual residence of
the child prior to the wrongful abduction. </span><span style="font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt;"><a href="https://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=l&pubNum=0001037&cite=UUID(IF9BC19C0366211DAAECA8D28B8108CB8)&originatingDoc=I998f0aa073b411eea76695209c33e2ad&refType=CP&fi=co_pp_sp_1037_10494&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.AlertsClip)#co_pp_sp_1037_10494"><span style="color: #0e568c; mso-font-kerning: 0pt; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">51 Fed. Reg. 10494-01, 10506</span></a><span style="color: black; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;"> (citing </span><a href="https://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=l&pubNum=0001037&cite=UUID(IF9BC19C0366211DAAECA8D28B8108CB8)&originatingDoc=I998f0aa073b411eea76695209c33e2ad&refType=CP&fi=co_pp_sp_1037_10494&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.AlertsClip)#co_pp_sp_1037_10494"><span style="color: #0e568c; mso-font-kerning: 0pt; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">Hague Convention</span></a><span style="color: black; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;">, art. 3, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 2). And, pursuant to Article 14 of the
Hague Convention, a court “may take notice directly of the law of, and of
judicial or administrative decisions, formally recognized or not in the State
of habitual residence” in order to determine whether the removal breached
Appellant’s custodial rights. Hague Convention art. 14, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at
5. Appellant contended that, as joint custodian of the minor children at the
time of retention, Swedish law provides her with the right to “make decisions
concerning the child[ren’s] personal affairs,” including determining where the
children reside. J.A. 270; Föräldrabalk [FB] [Children and Parents Code]
1983:47 (Swed.). In support, Appellant directed this court to section 14a of
the Swedish Children and Parents Code. But nothing in section 14a suggests
Appellee violated Appellant’s joint custody rights. Section 14a merely states,
“[i]f both parents have custody of the child the court may, on application of
one or both of them, decide which of the parents the child is to live with.”
Föräldrabalk [FB] [Children and Parents Code] 2006:458 (Swed.). Here, the
parties both presented evidence that a Swedish custody dispute and child
welfare investigation was ongoing during the time period preceding the
purported retention. And to prevent the children from being placed in foster
care, the parties agreed that Appellee would take the children to the United
States. While the parties dispute the permanency of this stay, Appellant bore
the burden of proving that Appellee wrongfully retained the children. She
failed to do so. <a name="co_pp_sp_999_4_1"></a><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In reaching its conclusion that Appellant had
failed to meet her burden to demonstrate wrongful retention, the district court
relied on Appellant’s own testimony that she, as a joint custodian, had
consented to the children taking an indeterminate trip to the United States to
live with Appellee. Specifically, the district court relied upon Appellant’s
testimony at the evidentiary hearing that “it was up to [Appellee] to decide
[the departure and return dates] himself.” Thus, by Appellant’s own concession,
there was not a meeting of the minds that Appellee would return the children on
a specific date -- or at all. “Appellee possessed physical and legal custody of
the children at the time of the alleged retention. And since a primary purpose
of the Hague Convention is to “preserve the [pre-removal or pre-retention]
status quo,” it <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>concluded that the
children indefinitely staying with the joint custodial father, in the United
States, was the status quo. </span><a href="https://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=2030607212&pubNum=0000506&originatingDoc=I998f0aa073b411eea76695209c33e2ad&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_506_306&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.AlertsClip)#co_pp_sp_506_306"><i><span style="color: #0e568c; mso-font-kerning: 0pt; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">White</span></i><span style="color: #0e568c; mso-font-kerning: 0pt; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">, 718 F.3d at 306</span></a><span style="color: black; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;"> (quoting </span><a href="https://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=2001157555&pubNum=0000506&originatingDoc=I998f0aa073b411eea76695209c33e2ad&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_506_398&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.AlertsClip)#co_pp_sp_506_398"><i><span style="color: #0e568c; mso-font-kerning: 0pt; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">Miller v. Miller</span></i><span style="color: #0e568c; mso-font-kerning: 0pt; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">, 240 F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir.
2001)</span></a><span style="color: black; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;">). As such,
there was no wrongful retention in the first instance.<o:p></o:p></span></span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;"><span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;"><b> </b><o:p></o:p></span></p>Joel R. Brandeshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00071300360715546038noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2720486713239145885.post-12463293240170897492023-10-22T12:31:00.007-04:002023-10-22T12:31:48.719-04:00Recent Hague Convention District Court Cases - McElligott v McElligott, 2023 WL 6923493, NOT FOR PUBLICATION, (D. New Jersey, 2023)[Ireland][Petition granted][Necessary fees and costs]<p><b> </b></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none; text-justify: inter-ideograph;"><b><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">In McElligott v McElligott, <a name="co_document_1"></a><a name="I328a55606f1f11eea76695209c33e2ad_Target"></a>2023
WL 6923493, NOT FOR PUBLICATION, (D. New Jersey, 2023) the district
court granted in part the unopposed Motion for Attorney’s Fees by Stephen
McElligott which sought an award of $68,623.10 in attorney’s fees pursuant to </span><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;"><a href="https://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=L&pubNum=1000546&cite=22USCAS9007&originatingDoc=I328a55606f1f11eea76695209c33e2ad&refType=LQ&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.AlertsClip)"><span style="color: #0e568c; text-decoration-line: none;">22 U.S.C. § 9007</span></a> Petitioner was awarded the reduced amount of costs and fees of
$68,327.00.</span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none; text-justify: inter-ideograph;"><span style="color: black; font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;"><b> <o:p></o:p></b></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none; text-justify: inter-ideograph;"><span style="color: black; font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;"><b>After the Court granted the Petition and
ordered C.M. returned to Ireland. Petitioner filed a Motion for Attorney’s Fees
accompanied by an attorney certification stating that Petitioner’s attorneys
had worked 296.85 hours on the matter at a requested rate of $200.00 per hour. Because
Petitioner was represented <i>pro bono</i>, Petitioner’s counsel did not charge
Petitioner. However, counsel certified that attorneys at Rutgers Law Associates
charge clients represented through the Victims of Crime Compensation Office at
a rate of $200.00 per hour, which typically involves work similar to Hague
Convention matters. Petitioner also sought $6,453.10 in other expenses,
including “fees for filings, our expert’s report, travel expenses, postage, and
expenses from accompanying the minor child to boarding his flight to Ireland.” <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Petitioner’s Motion in total requested
$68,623.10, which includes $59,370 in attorney’s fees (296.85 hours × $200.00
per hour) and $9,253.10 in expenses ($8,425.00 in expert witness fees + $828.10
in other fees). <a name="co_anchor_I8e10be916f2111eeb69f959598e78"></a><a name="co_anchor_I8e11d0016f2111eeb69f959598e78"></a>Respondent offered no
evidence that an award of costs and fees would be “clearly inappropriate” here.
<a name="co_pp_sp_999_3_1"></a>The Court applied the Lodestar approach to
determining whether Petitioner’s requested award of attorney’s fees is
appropriate. <i>See </i></b></span><span style="font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt;"><b><a href="https://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1998229184&pubNum=0004637&originatingDoc=I328a55606f1f11eea76695209c33e2ad&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_4637_727&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.AlertsClip)#co_pp_sp_4637_727"><i><span style="color: #0e568c; mso-font-kerning: 0pt; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">Distler v. Distler</span></i><span style="color: #0e568c; mso-font-kerning: 0pt; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">, 26 F. Supp. 2d 723, 727 (D.N.J.
1998)</span></a><span style="color: black; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;">; </span><a href="https://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=2070625220&pubNum=0000999&originatingDoc=I328a55606f1f11eea76695209c33e2ad&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_999_1&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.AlertsClip)#co_pp_sp_999_1"><i><span style="color: #0e568c; mso-font-kerning: 0pt; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">Soulier v. Matsumoto</span></i><span style="color: #0e568c; mso-font-kerning: 0pt; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">, No. 20-4720, 2022 WL 17250549,
at *1 (D.N.J. Nov. 28, 2022)</span></a><span style="color: black; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;">. Respondent did not contest Petitioner’s application and offered no
evidence rebutting Petitioner’s <i>prima facie</i> case that his attorney’s fee
rate was reasonable. <i>See </i></span><a href="https://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=2018405424&pubNum=0000506&originatingDoc=I328a55606f1f11eea76695209c33e2ad&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_506_150&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.AlertsClip)#co_pp_sp_506_150"><i><span style="color: #0e568c; mso-font-kerning: 0pt; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">McCutcheon v. Am.’s Servicing Co.</span></i><span style="color: #0e568c; mso-font-kerning: 0pt; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">, 560 F.3d 143,
150–51 (3d Cir. 2009)</span></a><span style="color: black; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;">
Thus, the Court accepted $200.00 per hour as a reasonable rate for the complex,
time-sensitive representation Petitioner’s counsel performed here. The Court found
that the amount of time billed on this matter, in light of the exigent
circumstances driving this Hague Convention litigation and the need to prepare
for trial in a short time frame, was reasonable. The court granted the
requested $59,370.00 in attorney’s fees. <a name="co_pp_sp_999_4_1"></a><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Petitioner sought $8,425.00 in expert witness
fees—comprising $5,625.00 for the initial expert report, $1,400.00 for the
expert’s deposition appearance, and $1,400.00 for the expert’s appearance at
trial. The court found this unopposed request for necessary expenses
reasonable. This falls squarely within the “court costs” contemplated by ICARA.
</span><a href="https://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=L&pubNum=1000546&cite=22USCAS9007&originatingDoc=I328a55606f1f11eea76695209c33e2ad&refType=RB&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.AlertsClip)#co_pp_d801000002763"><span style="color: #0e568c; mso-font-kerning: 0pt; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">22 U.S.C. § 9007(b)(3)</span></a><span style="color: black; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;">. The balance Petitioner sought was $296.10 in expenses for gas and
parking for commuting to the courthouse and the airport; counsel’s meal at the
airport; and a postage fee to send an expert’s fee by overnight mail. The Court
found that the $296.10 in expenses do not fall within the “necessary expenses”
encompassed by ICARA, and therefore must be excluded from the fee award.
Therefore, the Court awarded only $8,957.00 in costs and fees. The fact that
Petitioner did not pay for the expense of litigating the Petition out of
pocket—as he was represented <i>pro bono</i>—does not bar the recovery of
attorney’s fees. <i>See </i></span><a href="https://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=2021946224&pubNum=0000506&originatingDoc=I328a55606f1f11eea76695209c33e2ad&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_506_1143&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.AlertsClip)#co_pp_sp_506_1143"><i><span style="color: #0e568c; mso-font-kerning: 0pt; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">Cuellar v. Joyce</span></i><span style="color: #0e568c; mso-font-kerning: 0pt; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">, 603 F.3d 1142, 1143 (9th Cir.
2010)</span></a><span style="color: black; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;"> Nonetheless, in
evaluating the reasonableness of fees, the Court considers whether Petitioner
would have permitted his attorney to expend such resources had he been required
to pay for them out-of-pocket. <i>See </i></span><a href="https://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=2038270098&pubNum=0000999&originatingDoc=I328a55606f1f11eea76695209c33e2ad&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_999_5&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.AlertsClip)#co_pp_sp_999_5"><i><span style="color: #0e568c; mso-font-kerning: 0pt; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">Cillikova</span></i><span style="color: #0e568c; mso-font-kerning: 0pt; text-decoration: none; text-underline: none;">, 2016 WL 541134, at *5 n.2</span></a></b><span style="color: black; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></p>Joel R. Brandeshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00071300360715546038noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2720486713239145885.post-60205160737415020912023-10-13T18:06:00.006-04:002023-10-13T18:06:31.394-04:00Galaviz, v. Reyes, --- F.4th ----, 2023 WL 6619478 (Fifth Circuit, 2023) [Mexico] [Petition granted][Grave risk of harm]<p><b> </b></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none; text-justify: inter-ideograph;"><b><span style="color: #252525; font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;">In Galaviz, v. Reyes, </span><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">--- F.4th ----, 2023 WL 6619478 (Fifth Circuit, 2023) </span><a name="co_anchor_I5a81df4268c911eea1aef2021cbf1"></a><a name="co_pp_sp_999_1_1"></a><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;"> </span><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">Galaviz and
Reyes had two children in Mexico together, Andrew and Grace. After Galaviz and
Reyes separated, the children remained in Mexico with Galaviz. In July 2021,
Reyes took the children to El Paso and refused to return them. Galaviz filed an
action in the district court requesting the return of the children to Mexico
under the Hague Convention. Reyes raised two affirmative defenses claiming that
returning the children would violate their fundamental right to an education
and would expose them to a grave risk of harm or an intolerable situation. The
district court concluded that Reyes had satisfied his burden and denied
Galaviz’s request for return of the children. The Fifth Circuit reversed and
remanded with instructions that the court enter an order that the children be
returned to Mexico.</span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none; text-justify: inter-ideograph;"><span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;"><b> </b></span><b style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">Andrew
and Grace were four and five years old respectively at the time of the district
court proceedings. After Galaviz and Reyes separated, the children remained in
Juarez, Mexico under Galaviz’s care. Reyes moved out of the home and relocated
to El Paso, Texas. Galaviz and Reyes have no formal custody or possession court
orders in place governing each parent’s custodial rights. In July 2021, Reyes
took the children to El Paso for an appointment with a physician and declined
to return them. In August, Galaviz filed a petition for custody of the children
with the Seventh Family Court for Hearings in the Judicial District of Bravos,
Chihuahua, Mexico. Galaviz has yet to obtain service on Reyes. In November,
Galaviz filed a Verified Petition for the Return of the Children under the
Hague Convention and the International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA) in
the Western District of Texas, El Paso Division.</span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none; text-justify: inter-ideograph;"><span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;"><b> </b></span><b style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">The district court held a trial. Reyes
conceded that Galaviz met her burden of establishing a prima facie case of
wrongful removal by a preponderance of the evidence. The burden then shifted to
Reyes, who opposed the return, to establish an exception.<a name="co_fnRef_B00012076834802_ID0EHFAC_1"></a><a href="file:///C:/Users/joel/Dropbox/1-All%20other%20files/Hague%20Galaviz%20v.%20Reyes,%20---%20F.4th%20----%202023%20WL%206619478%20(Fifth%20Cir%202023).docx#co_footnote_B00012076834802_1"><sup><span style="color: #0e568c; text-decoration-line: none;">1</span></sup></a> Reyes raised the
exceptions set forth in Articles 20 and 13(b) of the Convention. As to Reyes’s
Article 20 defense, the district court concluded that “[Galaviz’s] inability to
be present with the children, as required so that they can attend school,
effectively denies the children the fundamental right to an education,” and
“[t]he denial of an education to two special needs children in their most
formative years utterly shocks the conscience of the court.” As to Reyes’s
Article 13(b) defense, the court concluded that “[t]he incidents of abuse and
neglect collectively and the strong suggestion of sexual abuse constitute a
grave risk of physical and psychological harm and an intolerable situation
should the children return to Juarez.” The court concluded that Reyes had
established these exceptions by clear and convincing evidence<a name="co_fnRef_B00022076834802_ID0EOHAC_1"></a><a href="file:///C:/Users/joel/Dropbox/1-All%20other%20files/Hague%20Galaviz%20v.%20Reyes,%20---%20F.4th%20----%202023%20WL%206619478%20(Fifth%20Cir%202023).docx#co_footnote_B00022076834802_1"><sup><span style="color: #0e568c; text-decoration-line: none;">2</span></sup></a> and denied
Galaviz’s request for the return of the children to Mexico.</b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none; text-justify: inter-ideograph;"><b><span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></b><b><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">The Fifth Circuit observed that the Article
20 defense allows repatriation to be denied when it ‘would not be permitted by
the fundamental principles of the requested State relating to the protection of
human rights and fundamental freedoms.’ ”<a name="co_fnRef_B00152076834802_ID0EXLAE_1"></a> Article 20 is to be
“restrictively interpreted and applied.”<a name="co_fnRef_B00162076834802_ID0E5LAE_1"></a> It “is not to be used ... as a
vehicle for litigating custody on the merits or for passing judgment on the
political system of the country from which the child was removed.”<a name="co_fnRef_B00172076834802_ID0ESMAE_1"></a> This exception should only be “invoked
on the rare occasion that return of a child would utterly shock the conscience
of the court or offend all notions of due process.”<a name="co_fnRef_B00182076834802_ID0EDNAE_1"></a><a name="co_pp_sp_999_3_1"></a> The
district court found that while in Galaviz’s care, the children did not attend
preschool or kindergarten due to the school’s requirement that Galaviz attend
school with them to help with their special needs. Because Galaviz was unable
to comply with this requirement, the children did not attend school. These
findings do not establish an Article 20 defense. The district court focused on
Galaviz’s actions or inactions regarding the children’s education, not on
Mexican laws or policies that would prohibit return.<a name="co_fnRef_B00192076834802_ID0EGRAE_1"></a> The court even acknowledged
that “the law in Mexico may provide for special education.” By focusing on
Galaviz’s actions or inactions, the court essentially made an impermissible <i>custody</i>
determination. Reyes did not present clear and convincing evidence
demonstrating that the return of the children would utterly shock the
conscience of the court or offend all notions of due process</span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 10pt;">.</span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none; text-justify: inter-ideograph;"><span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;"><b> </b></span><b style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; text-indent: 0.5in;">The district
court concluded that Reyes presented evidence demonstrating a history of
neglect and abuse by Galaviz for ten reasons: While in Galaviz’s care: “(1) the
children’s physical and cognitive abilities declined;” “(2) the children did
not attend school although they suffered severe special needs;” “(3) [Grace]
received no treatment for her special needs;” “(4) the children remained
completely non-verbal;” “(5) the children’s healthcare needs were being
neglected as the children were missing vaccines, and had unaddressed auditory,
visual, and dental issues;” “(6) the children’s hygiene was being neglected;”
(7) “the children’s ability to use the toilet had regressed and the children
reverted to using diapers;” (8) “the children had been physically abused;” (9)
“there was a strong suggestion the children experienced sexual abuse;” and (10)
“Petitioner presented no evidence of a suitable means of childcare while she is
at work.” The Fifth Circuit held that the <a name="co_anchor_I5a90101168c911eea1aef2021cbf1"></a><a name="co_pp_sp_999_4_1"></a>findings
pertaining to neglect (findings (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), and (10)) did
not satisfy the clear and convincing evidence burden. If there are “equally
plausible explanations” for the outcome, a party does not sustain its burden of
proving clear and convincing evidence.<a name="co_fnRef_B00252076834802_ID0EG5AE_1"></a><a href="file:///C:/Users/joel/Dropbox/1-All%20other%20files/Hague%20Galaviz%20v.%20Reyes,%20---%20F.4th%20----%202023%20WL%206619478%20(Fifth%20Cir%202023).docx#co_footnote_B00252076834802_1"></a> In the present case, the district
court’s findings regarding the children’s healthcare, including the children’s
cognitive decline, the fact that they remained non-verbal, or their regression
to using diapers may be supported by evidence that would be sufficient in a
custody dispute.<a name="co_fnRef_B00372076834802_ID0EVLAG_1"></a> However,
this evidence fell short of meeting Reyes’s clear and convincing burden. <a name="co_pp_sp_999_5_1"></a>Finally, Reyes presented no evidence that
unsuitable childcare would expose the children to a grave risk of harm. He
merely expressed concern that Galaviz often left the children with her older
daughters and they did not take care of the children. This is not clear and
convincing evidence of a grave risk of harm.</b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none; text-justify: inter-ideograph;"><span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;"><b> </b></span><b style="text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">Next, the
evidence related to physical abuse does not establish a grave risk of harm
under a clear and convincing burden. The Second Circuit has stated that
“[s]poradic or isolated incidents of physical discipline directed at the child,
or some limited incidents aimed at persons other than the child, even if
witnessed by the child, have not been found to constitute a grave risk” under a
clear and convincing burden.<a name="co_fnRef_B00382076834802_ID0EISAG_1"></a>
Cases concluding that the grave risk exception has been met often involve
physical abuse that is repetitive and severe.<a name="co_fnRef_B00392076834802_ID0ESSAG_1"></a> The district court found that
the children had been physically abused based on the children’s behavior and on
the testimony of Galaviz’s former friend. The court found that the children
cowered and protected their heads when bathing, that Andrew reacted to protect
Grace when she spilled her beverage, and that he covered her mouth to quiet her
when she cried. Reyes testified that he never saw Galaviz hit the children, but
that he observed her yell at them. Reyes stated that he would attempt to
conduct video conferences between Galaviz and the children, but that they would
become very upset and cry and throw the phone at him. <a name="co_pp_sp_999_6_1"></a>There
were other plausible explanations for the children’s behavior.<a name="co_fnRef_B00502076834802_ID0EWBBG_1"></a> Reyes’s sister acknowledged
that it was possible the children did not want to be bathed by someone they
didn’t know. The children could have behaved fearfully because of prior actions
by Reyes—Galaviz testified that Reyes had punched her, tried to strangle her, and
caused swelling, bruises, black eyes, a busted lip, and a </span><a href="https://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?entityType=injury&entityId=Ib2200751475411db9765f9243f53508a&originationContext=document&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0"><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; text-decoration-line: none;">broken nose</span></a><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">. Galaviz’s former friend testified that she witnessed Galaviz physically
abuse the children. She stated that Galaviz hit Andrew with a foam slipper to
reprimand him for climbing a kitchenette. She saw Galaviz slap her adult
daughter when she confronted her about spanking Andrew. She also testified that
Galaviz would hit the children because they would cry. This is not the kind of
repetitive and severe abuse seen in cases like <i>Simcox v. Simcox, 511 F.3d
594, 608 (6th Cir. 2007)</i> This case was more similar to </span><a href="https://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=2016723112&pubNum=0000506&originatingDoc=Id408d9f068a011ee922bed6f7704f51c&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.AlertsClip)"><i><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; text-decoration-line: none;">Altamiranda Vale</span></i></a><i><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">. </span></i><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">The evidence, therefore, did not satisfy an
Article 13(b) defense. Neither the evidence of the children’s behavior nor the
former friend’s testimony about the alleged abuse meet the clear and convincing
burden.</span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none; text-justify: inter-ideograph;"><span style="color: black; font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;"><b> </b></span><b><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">Lastly, there was no clear and convincing evidence establishing sexual
abuse. The district court determined that there was a “strong suggestion of
sexual abuse” which constituted a grave risk of harm or an intolerable
situation. This “strong suggestion” was based on the findings that Reyes
received anonymous text messages stating that Grace and Andrew had been
sexually abused with Galaviz’s knowledge, a police report filed by Reyes, a
physical examination in which a physician expressed his or her belief that
Andrew “could have been sexually abused,” and a police report filed by the
physician. This evidence did not meet the clear and convincing evidence burden.
In </span><a href="https://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=2002225869&pubNum=0000506&originatingDoc=Id408d9f068a011ee922bed6f7704f51c&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.AlertsClip)"><i><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; text-decoration-line: none;">Danaipour v.
McLarey</span></i></a><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">,<a name="co_fnRef_B00512076834802_ID0E2GBG_1"></a><a href="file:///C:/Users/joel/Dropbox/1-All%20other%20files/Hague%20Galaviz%20v.%20Reyes,%20---%20F.4th%20----%202023%20WL%206619478%20(Fifth%20Cir%202023).docx#co_footnote_B00512076834802_1"></a> the First Circuit determined that
there was a clear and substantial claim of abuse because of evidence including,
vaginal redness on one child after her return from visits with her father, the
child’s statements to a psychologist that her father had caused the redness,
statements by the child that her father had hurt her “pee-pee,” and that she
had exhibited symptoms of abuse.<a name="co_fnRef_B00522076834802_ID0ECHBG_1"></a>
Similarly, in </span><a href="https://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=2036447965&pubNum=0000506&originatingDoc=Id408d9f068a011ee922bed6f7704f51c&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.AlertsClip)"><i><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; text-decoration-line: none;">Ortiz v.
Martinez</span></i></a><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">,<a name="co_fnRef_B00532076834802_ID0EVHBG_1"></a><a href="file:///C:/Users/joel/Dropbox/1-All%20other%20files/Hague%20Galaviz%20v.%20Reyes,%20---%20F.4th%20----%202023%20WL%206619478%20(Fifth%20Cir%202023).docx#co_footnote_B00532076834802_1"></a> the mother had described how she had
seen the father molesting the child in the shower, how she had overheard the
child tell her father not to touch her anymore, and that the child had
exhibited behavior consistent with having suffered sexual abuse.<a name="co_fnRef_B00542076834802_ID0E3HBG_1"></a> This evidence was sufficient to
establish the grave risk exception.<a name="co_fnRef_B00552076834802_ID0EGIBG_1"></a><a href="file:///C:/Users/joel/Dropbox/1-All%20other%20files/Hague%20Galaviz%20v.%20Reyes,%20---%20F.4th%20----%202023%20WL%206619478%20(Fifth%20Cir%202023).docx#co_footnote_B00552076834802_1"></a> By contrast, in </span><a href="https://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=2015427693&pubNum=0000506&originatingDoc=Id408d9f068a011ee922bed6f7704f51c&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.AlertsClip)"><i><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; text-decoration-line: none;">Kufner v. Kufner</span></i></a><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">,<a name="co_fnRef_B00562076834802_ID0ETMBG_1"></a> the First Circuit
concluded that the respondent did not establish the grave risk exception
despite evidence that the father took four graphic photographs of his children
and the children began exhibiting physical symptoms such as bed-wetting,
nervous eye twitching, sleeplessness, and nighttime crying and screaming after
a vacation with the father.<a name="co_fnRef_B00572076834802_ID0E1MBG_1"></a><a href="file:///C:/Users/joel/Dropbox/1-All%20other%20files/Hague%20Galaviz%20v.%20Reyes,%20---%20F.4th%20----%202023%20WL%206619478%20(Fifth%20Cir%202023).docx#co_footnote_B00572076834802_1"><sup><span style="color: #0e568c; text-decoration-line: none;">57</span></sup></a> <a name="co_pp_sp_999_7_1"></a>In the present case, the physician stated that
Andrew <i>could</i> have been sexually abused. The Texas Department of Family
and Protection Services initiated an investigation but closed it with no
findings. The El Paso Police Department also closed its investigation. The
district court acknowledged that the text messages could “be from just about
anyone with bad intentions.” This court had previously concluded that
information from an unknown source is not sufficient to establish a grave risk
of harm.<a name="co_fnRef_B00582076834802_ID0ERPBG_1"></a> The district court
erred in concluding that Reyes established an Article 13(b) defense.</span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-autospace: none;"><span style="font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;"><o:p><b> </b></o:p></span></p>Joel R. Brandeshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00071300360715546038noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2720486713239145885.post-70221887286627442372023-10-09T09:40:00.007-04:002023-10-09T09:40:36.259-04:00Royal Borough of Kensington & Chelsea v. Bafna-Louis, Not Reported in Fed....2023 WL 6173335 (2d Cir.,2023)[United Kingdom][Habitual residence][Rights of custody] [Petition granted] <p> </p><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-autospace: none; text-indent: .5in;"><b><span style="color: #555555; font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;">In Royal Borough of Kensington & Chelsea v.
Bafna-Louis, Not Reported in Fed....</span><span style="color: black; font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;">2023 WL
6173335 (2d Cir.,2023) the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district
court granting the petition for return. <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none; text-justify: inter-ideograph;"><b><span style="color: black; font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; text-indent: 0.5in;">Bafna-Louis
first challenged the District Court’s determination that Baby L’s habitual
residence was the United Kingdom. A child’s habitual residence presents a
“mixed question of law and fact—albeit barely so.” </span><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><a href="https://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=2050426310&pubNum=0000708&originatingDoc=Ice115cd059ae11eeb336d6875dfb31d7&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_708_730&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.AlertsClip)#co_pp_sp_708_730"><i><span style="color: #0e568c; text-decoration-line: none;">Monasky v. Taglieri</span></i><span style="color: #0e568c; text-decoration-line: none;">, 140 S. Ct. 719, 730 (2020)</span></a> (quotation marks omitted). “Once “the
trial court correctly identifies the governing totality-of-the-circumstances
standard, however, what remains for the court to do in applying that standard
... is to answer a factual question: Was the child at home in the particular
country at issue?” Because the District
Court identified the correct legal standard, it reviewed its habitual residence
determination “by a clear-error review standard deferential to the factfinding
court,” <i>id.</i>, keeping in mind that “courts must be sensitive to the
unique circumstances of the case and informed by common sense,”. In general,
“[a] child ‘resides’ where she lives. [A child’s] residence in a particular
country can be deemed ‘habitual,’ however, only when her residence there is
more than transitory.”). For children who are too young to acclimate to their
surroundings, as is the case with Baby L, the “intentions and circumstances of caregiving
parents are relevant considerations.” “No single fact, however, is
dispositive[.]” Here, the District Court considered all of the relevant factors
and credited Bafna-Louis’s testimony that she intended to relocate to New York
with Baby L. The District Court nevertheless found that Baby L was a habitual
resident of the United Kingdom. That finding was supported principally by the
following record evidence: (1) Baby L was born in London and was issued a
passport by the United Kingdom; (2) at the time Baby L was born, Bafna-Louis
“had long maintained a residence in [the United Kingdom];” (3) when Bafna-Louis
traveled internationally prior to Baby L’s birth, she resided principally in
the United Kingdom; and (4) Baby L’s biological father was physically located
in the United Kingdom, and the court proceedings related to him occurred there.
On such a record, it could not conclude that the District Court clearly erred
in finding that Baby L’s habitual residence was the United Kingdom.</span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none; text-justify: inter-ideograph;"><b><span style="color: black; font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;"> </span><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;"> </span><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">Bafna-Louis
next challenged the District Court’s conclusion that the Royal Borough of
Kensington and Chelsea (“RBKC”) had custody rights over Baby L at the time Baby
L was removed from the United Kingdom. According ”considerable weight” to the
laws of the United Kingdom, the country of Baby L’s habitual residence, it affirmed
the District Court’s conclusion that RBKC had custody rights over Baby L at the
time of removal. First, before Baby L was removed, the High Court of Justice
(the “High Court”), Family Division in London issued two </span><i style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">ne exeat</i><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;"> orders
prohibiting the removal of Baby L from the United Kingdom. </span><i style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">See</i><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;"> App’x 77;
App’x 898 (“The mother must not remove the child from the jurisdiction of
England and Wales until further order.”). These </span><i style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">ne exeat</i><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;"> orders granted
the High Court rights of custody over Baby L. </span><i style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">See A v. B (Abduction:
Declaration)</i><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;"> [2009] 1 FLR 1253, 1259-60 (noting that courts become vested
with rights of custody once a “judicial determination” has been issued). The
High Court’s </span><i style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">ne exeat</i><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;"> orders vested the RBKC with custody rights over
Baby L before his removal and that the RBKC properly exercised those rights in
this case.</span><a name="co_fnRef_B00022076638990_ID0ENGAE_1" style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;"></a><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">.</span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none; text-justify: inter-ideograph;"><b><span style="color: black; font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;"> <span> </span></span><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; text-indent: 0.5in;">Finally,
Bafna-Louis contended that the District Court erred in determining that Baby L
did not face a “grave risk that his ... return would expose the child to
physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable
situation,” within the meaning of Article 13(b) of the Convention. While the
holder of a “<i>ne exeat</i> right has a right of custody and may seek a return
remedy, a return order is not automatic.” “[A] respondent who opposes the
return of the child has the burden of establishing ... by clear and convincing
evidence” that Article 13(b) applies. </span><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><a href="https://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=L&pubNum=1000546&cite=22USCAS9003&originatingDoc=Ice115cd059ae11eeb336d6875dfb31d7&refType=RB&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.AlertsClip)#co_pp_9e660000185f2"><span style="color: #0e568c; text-decoration-line: none;">22 U.S.C. § 9003(e)(2)(A)</span></a>; <i>see </i><a href="https://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1999195042&pubNum=0000506&originatingDoc=Ice115cd059ae11eeb336d6875dfb31d7&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_506_245&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.AlertsClip)#co_pp_sp_506_245"><i><span style="color: #0e568c; text-decoration-line: none;">Blondin v. Dubois</span></i><span style="color: #0e568c; text-decoration-line: none;">, 189 F.3d 240, 245 (2d Cir.
1999)</span></a>. But Article 13(b)’s
“grave risk of harm” standard “involves not only the magnitude of the potential
harm but also the probability that the harm will materialize.” <a href="https://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=2030717987&pubNum=0000506&originatingDoc=Ice115cd059ae11eeb336d6875dfb31d7&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_506_103&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.AlertsClip)#co_pp_sp_506_103"><i><span style="color: #0e568c; text-decoration-line: none;">Souratgar</span></i><span style="color: #0e568c; text-decoration-line: none;">, 720 F.3d at 103</span></a>. “The potential harm to the child
must be severe, and the level of risk and danger required to trigger this
exception has consistently been held to be very high.”. More specifically, “a
grave risk of harm from repatriation arises in two situations: (1) where
returning the child means sending him to a zone of war, famine, or disease; or
(2) in cases of serious abuse or neglect, or extraordinary emotional
dependence, when the court in the country of habitual residence, for whatever
reason, may be incapable or unwilling to give the child adequate protection.”</span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none; text-justify: inter-ideograph;"><b><span style="color: black; font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;"> <span> </span></span><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; text-indent: 0.5in;">Based
principally on her testimony that Individual-1 and Individual-2 raped,
harassed, and assaulted her, Bafna-Louis argued that there is a grave risk that
Baby L will be exposed to great harm from those individuals if he is returned to
the United Kingdom. Substantially for the reasons set forth in the District
Court’s March 7 order, however, it agreed that Bafna-Louis failed to show that
Baby L’s removal to the United Kingdom posed a grave risk of harm to the child
or would create an intolerable situation under Article 13(b). </span><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><a href="https://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=2073434188&pubNum=0000999&originatingDoc=Ice115cd059ae11eeb336d6875dfb31d7&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_999_27&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.AlertsClip)#co_pp_sp_999_27"><i><span style="color: #0e568c; text-decoration-line: none;">Bafna-Louis</span></i><span style="color: #0e568c; text-decoration-line: none;">, 2023 WL 2387385, at *25-27</span></a>.</span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none; text-justify: inter-ideograph;"><span style="color: black; font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;"> <o:p></o:p></span></p>Joel R. Brandeshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00071300360715546038noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2720486713239145885.post-52128308681133350782023-09-16T12:50:00.007-04:002023-09-16T12:50:46.371-04:00Recent Hague Convention District Court Cases - Mcelligott v. Mcelligott, 2023 WL 5932947 (D. New Jersey, 2023)[Ireland][Petition granted] [Wishes of the Child Defense] [Indue influence]<p> <b><span style="color: #555555; font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;">Mcelligott
v. Mcelligott, </span></b><b><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">2023 WL 5932947 (D. New Jersey, 2023)</span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none; text-justify: inter-ideograph;"><a name="co_opinion_1"></a><a name="co_anchor_Idc18cd2251fe11ee8fbeb70b7ba0b"></a><b><span style="color: black; font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></b><b><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">The District Court granted the Petition by Stephen McElligott for the
return of his minor child C.M., to Ireland. Petitioner Stephen McElligott was born
in Ireland and was an Irish citizen. Respondent Audrey McElligott (nee Mocco) was
born in New York and was an American citizen. The parties were married on
November 10, 2009, in Ireland where they lived together until November 14, 2022.
The parties’ older son, C.M., was born in Ireland on April 9, 2011, and lived
in the family home in Ireland with both parents until November 14, 2022. On
November 14, 2022, Petitioner gave written consent to Respondent to travel to
the United States with C.M. and J.M. from November 14, 2022, until November 28,
2022. C.M. <a name="_Hlk145760729">was </a>a
citizen of Ireland. J.M., a second son, was born in Ireland on March 19, 2013,
and lived in the family home in Ireland with both parents and his older
brother, C.M. The Court concluded that Petitioner made out a <i>prima facie</i>
case under the Convention that C.M. was wrongfully retained in the United
States after removal from his habitual residence in Ireland, in violation of
Petitioner’s custody rights under Irish law, which he was exercising at the
time of wrongful retention. <a name="co_anchor_Idc74a8c151fe11ee8fbeb70b7ba0b"></a>The
Court found that C.M. offered rational and particularized reasons for opposing
return, beyond a mere “generalized desire” to remain where he was. <a name="co_anchor_Idc2b91d151fe11ee8fbeb70b7ba0b"></a><a name="co_anchor_Idc68c1e151fe11ee8fbeb70b7ba0b"></a>The Court found that C.M.’s
desire to remain in the United States and not return to Ireland was the product
of undue influence. The Court found that the child’s wrongful detention in New
Jersey for what was approaching a year among his mother and her close-knit
family, all of whom view Petitioner very negatively and apparently had no
hesitation in expressing the same in front of C.M. — coupled with the welcome
American accoutrements such as summer camps, cellphones, and private gyms that
were not afforded to him in Ireland — had understandably but improperly
contributed to his desire to remain here.
Accordingly, the Court exercised its discretion under the Convention to
find that this is not an appropriate case in which to deny the Petition. C.M.
must return to his father and brother in Ireland.</span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none; text-justify: inter-ideograph;"><b><span style="color: black; font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;"> <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none; text-justify: inter-ideograph;"><b><span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></b></p>Joel R. Brandeshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00071300360715546038noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2720486713239145885.post-31848369721834918202023-09-09T09:36:00.003-04:002023-09-09T09:36:20.994-04:00Green v Phuong, 2023 WL 5608992 ( Ninth Circuit, 2023) [Indonesia][ Subject matter jurisdiction ][Petition denied]<p><b> [<span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; text-align: justify;">Indonesia][ Subject matter jurisdiction ][Petition
denied]</span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none; text-justify: inter-ideograph;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;"><b> </b></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none; text-justify: inter-ideograph;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;"><b>In Green v Phuong, <a name="co_document_1"></a><a name="Ic245898047d411eeb209de0b8756a87e_Target"></a> 2023 WL 5608992 ( Ninth Circuit, 2023) <a name="co_pp_sp_999_1_1"></a>Richard Lee Green appealed pro se from the district
court’s judgment dismissing for lack of subject matter jurisdiction his action
under the Hague Convention. The Ninth Circuit held that the dismissal of
Green’s action was proper because Green did not allege facts sufficient to show
that his children were “habitually resident in a Contracting State” because
Indonesia is not a Convention signatory. <i>See</i> Convention, Art. 4
(providing that the Convention applies “to any child who was habitually
resident in a Contracting State immediately before any breach of custody or
access rights”)</b><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none; text-justify: inter-ideograph;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;"> <o:p></o:p></span></p>Joel R. Brandeshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00071300360715546038noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2720486713239145885.post-10895585565995813582023-08-11T09:59:00.000-04:002023-08-11T09:59:01.826-04:00Tsuruta v Tsuruta,2023 WL 5114936 (Eighth Circuit, 2023) [Japan][Habitual Residence][Petition granted]<div class="WordSection2"><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-autospace: none; text-indent: .5in;"><b><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">In Tsuruta v Tsuruta,2023 WL 5114936 (Eighth Circuit, 2023) the Eighth
Circuit affirmed the order of the District Court which granted the Petition of Naoteru Tsuruta (“Naoteru”) for the return of
the parties' child to Japan <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-autospace: none;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;"><b> <span> </span></b></span><b style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.5in;">In 2015, Sarah
gave birth to L.T. in Miami, Florida. At the time, Naoteru was living in the
U.K. Ten months after L.T. was born, Sarah and L.T. moved to the U.K. to live
with Naoteru. In 2018, Naoteru and Sarah married, and the family moved from the
U.K. to Japan. While in Japan, L.T. attended school/daycare, learned to speak
Japanese and English, engaged in extracurricular activities, traveled, and
spent time with extended family. In November 2019, Sarah and L.T. traveled from
Japan to Missouri to visit Sarah’s family. In February 2020, Sarah and L.T. voluntarily
returned to Japan. Sarah became unhappy with the living situation in Japan and
repeatedly told Naoteru she wanted to leave Japan and get a divorce. After
continued arguments between Naoteru and Sarah, Naoteru attempted to conceal
L.T.’s Japanese passport and expired U.S. passport. On October 15, 2021, Sarah
found the concealed passports in Naoteru’s work storage facility and went to
the U.S. Embassy in Japan. At the Embassy, Sarah reported she feared for her
life and her child’s safety. The Embassy issued an emergency passport, and the
two went directly to the airport and flew back to the United States. Sarah and
L.T. had return flights booked for March 15, 2022. In November 2021, Sarah
filed a petition for divorce in Missouri. After learning of the divorce filings
in March 2022, Naoteru filed the present petition to have L.T. returned to
Japan under the Hague Convention.</b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none; text-justify: inter-ideograph;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;"><b> <span> </span></b></span><b style="text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;"> The only contested element of the
prima facie case was L.T.’s habitual residence prior to being removed in
October 2021. At an evidentiary hearing, Naoteru argued Japan was L.T.’s
habitual residence because L.T. had spent most of her time in Japan for the
previous three years, attended school in Japan, participated in extracurricular
activities in Japan, and gotten to know the extended family in Japan.
Additionally, L.T. had spent limited time in the United States before being
removed in October 2021, spending only a few months in Missouri before
voluntarily returning to Japan. Sarah argued Japan was not L.T.’s habitual
residence because Sarah was coerced into living in Japan, L.T. had significant
connections to the United States, Japan was never intended as a permanent
residence, and L.T. never acclimated to Japan. To support her coercion
argument, Sarah asserted Naoteru had her sign a marriage license she didn’t
understand, controlled all of the finances, isolated L.T. from Sarah by only
speaking Japanese, and controlled all important decisions. Sarah also argued
Naoteru’s petition was an effort to “forum shop.” Sarah asserted Naoteru wanted
to avoid a child custody case in the United States due to negative experiences
in previous U.S. divorce proceedings with a different woman including the
issuance of warrants for his arrest for failure to pay child support.</span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none; text-indent: .5in; text-justify: inter-ideograph;"><b style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; text-indent: 0.5in;">The district court noted the determination of
habitual residence “is a ‘fact-driven inquiry’ and ‘depends on the totality of
the circumstances specific to the case.’ ” The district court then found
Naoteru had shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Japan was L.T.’s
habitual residence prior to removal in October 2021. In reaching this
conclusion, the district court relied on several factors including: evidence
showing L.T. acclimated to Japan between 2018 and 2021, evidence showing Sarah
and Naoteru had a “settled purpose of creating a home in Japan,” and a lack of
evidence to show Sarah was coerced into living in Japan. The district court
concluded the lack of physical abuse, violence, or threats of violence as well
as limited evidence of control distinguished this case from other instances
where coercion impacted the habitual residence determination.</b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none; text-indent: .5in; text-justify: inter-ideograph;"><b style="text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">The Eighth
Circuit observed that Determining habitual residence is a mixed question of
fact and law. </span><a href="https://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=2050426310&pubNum=0000708&originatingDoc=I5c0431c037ae11eeb6cfac6fd6085178&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_708_730&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.AlertsClip)#co_pp_sp_708_730"><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;">Monasky</span><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; text-decoration-line: none;">, 140 S. Ct. at 730</span></a><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">. It found
that the district court did not commit a clear error in determining L.T. was
“at home” in Japan as of October 15, 2021. L.T. spent most of her time in Japan
since 2018. She attended school/daycare in Japan. She participated in
activities in Japan. While Sarah might not have intended to spend the rest of
L.T.’s life in Japan, Japan was where L.T. was “at home” on the relevant date.</span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none; text-indent: .5in; text-justify: inter-ideograph;"><b style="text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">On appeal,
Sarah again argued Japan could not be L.T.’s habitual residence because Sarah
was coerced into living in Japan and therefore did not intend to make Japan
L.T.’s home. Sarah cites two cases for the proposition that one parent being
coerced into living in a country is relevant to the habitual residence
determination because it affects the intent of the parents. <u>See</u> </span><a href="https://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1993167689&pubNum=0000345&originatingDoc=I5c0431c037ae11eeb6cfac6fd6085178&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_345_368&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.AlertsClip)#co_pp_sp_345_368"><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;">Application of Ponath</span><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; text-decoration-line: none;">, 829 F.Supp. 363, 368 (D. Utah 1993)</span></a><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;"> (“Petitioner’s coercion of respondent by means of verbal, emotional and
physical abuse removed any element of choice and settled purpose which earlier
may have been present in the family’s decision to visit Germany.”); </span><a href="https://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=2001564536&pubNum=0004637&originatingDoc=I5c0431c037ae11eeb6cfac6fd6085178&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_4637_1049&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.AlertsClip)#co_pp_sp_4637_1049"><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;">Tsarbopoulos v. Tsarbopoulos</span><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; text-decoration-line: none;">, 176 F.Supp. 2d
1045, 1049 (E.D. Wash. 2001)</span></a><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;"> (“The verbal
and physical abuse of one spouse by the other is one of several factors in the
Court’s determination of the existence of ‘shared intent’ to make a place the
family’s ‘habitual residence.’ ”). The district court addressed these cases and
found: <a name="co_pp_sp_999_3_1"></a>“The physical abuse, verbal abuse, and
controlling behavior that motivated the courts in both </span><a href="https://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=2001564536&originatingDoc=I5c0431c037ae11eeb6cfac6fd6085178&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.AlertsClip)"><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;">Tsarbopoulos</span></a><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;"> and </span><a href="https://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1993167689&originatingDoc=I5c0431c037ae11eeb6cfac6fd6085178&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.AlertsClip)"><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;">Ponath</span></a><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;"> are simply
not present here. There is no evidence of physical abuse, violence, or threats
of violence in this case. Additionally, having considered the testimony of
Petitioner and Respondent and having reviewed the text message exchanges
between the parties, the court did not find evidence of the type of verbal
abuse or controlling behavior that would suggest that Petitioner was coerced or
forced into staying in Japan.” Therefore, Sarah’s coercion argument on appeal was
inconsistent with the district court’s
factual findings, which are not clearly erroneous.</span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none; text-justify: inter-ideograph;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;"><b> <span> </span></b></span><b><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;"> </span></b><b style="text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">Sarah also
argued, for the first time on appeal, that Naoteru had “unclean hands” which
precluded him from seeking relief in this case. Given the factual questions and
the lack of a record or findings as to a connection between Naoteru’s allegedly
improper conduct and this case, the Court declared that this was not the time
to decide whether “unclean hands” applies to Hague Convention cases.</span></b></p>
</div>
<span style="font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;"><br clear="all" style="mso-break-type: section-break; page-break-before: always;" /></span>Joel R. Brandeshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00071300360715546038noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2720486713239145885.post-28717637803829673872023-08-06T17:19:00.002-04:002023-08-06T17:19:52.756-04:00The New York Matrimonial Trial Handbook by Joel R. Brandes<p> </p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://www.nysdivorce.com/uploads/8/1/3/4/81349156/published/matrimonial-trial-handbook-edited-cover.jpg?1646495948" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="144" data-original-width="106" height="144" src="https://www.nysdivorce.com/uploads/8/1/3/4/81349156/published/matrimonial-trial-handbook-edited-cover.jpg?1646495948" width="106" /></a></div><p class="MsoNormal" style="background: white;"><b style="background-color: transparent; font-family: arial;"><span style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; color: red; font-size: 11pt;">The New York Matrimonial Trial Handbook </span><span style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; font-size: 11pt;">is a “how to” book. It focuses on the procedural and substantive law, as well as the law of evidence, that an attorney must have at his or her fingertips when trying a matrimonial action and custody case. The book deals extensively with the testimonial and documentary evidence necessary to meet the burden of proof. There are <i><span style="color: red;">thousands of suggested questions </span></i>for the examination and cross-examination of the parties and expert witnesses at trial. It is available in </span><a href="https://store.bookbaby.com/book/new-york-matrimonial-trial-handbook1"><span style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; font-size: 11pt;">hardcover</span></a><span style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; font-size: 11pt;">, as well as </span><a href="https://www.nysdivorce.net/new-york-matrimonial-trial-handbook.html"><span style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; font-size: 11pt;">Kindle and electronic</span></a><span style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; font-size: 11pt;"> editions. </span><span style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; color: #0a2bf0; font-size: 11pt;">It is also available from </span><a href="https://www.amazon.com/s/ref=nb_sb_noss/142-4975004-3615469?url=search-alias%3Dstripbooks&field-keywords=matrimonial+trial+handbook" target="_blank"><span style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; color: red; font-size: 11pt;">Amazon</span><span style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; color: #5199a8; font-size: 11pt; text-decoration-line: none;">, </span></a><span style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; color: #0a2bf0; font-size: 11pt;"> and other booksellers. </span><span style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; font-size: 11pt;">See </span><a href="https://www.nysdivorce.net/uploads/8/1/3/4/81349156/new_york_matrimonial_trial_handbook_contents.pdf" target="_blank"><span style="font-size: 11pt;">Table of Contents. </span></a></b></p><p class="MsoNormal"><b style="font-family: arial;"><a href="https://www.amazon.com/New-York-Matrimonial-Trial-Handbook/dp/B0BW2GFT9Y/ref=sr_1_1?crid=1JTFPXWCAOAP&keywords=NEW+YORK+MATRIMONIAL+TRIAL+HANDBOOK+%3A+2023+Cumulative+Update&qid=1677880707&s=digital-text&sprefix=new+york+matrimonial+trial+handbook+2023+cumulative+update+%2Cdigital-text%2C84&sr=1-1-catcorr&ufe=app_do%3Aamzn1.fos.f5122f16-c3e8-4386-bf32-63e904010ad0" target="_blank"><span style="background: white; color: #f00642; font-size: 11pt;">The New York Matrimonial Trial Handbook 2023 Cumulative Update</span><span style="background: white; color: #5199a8; font-size: 11pt;"> </span><span style="background: white; color: black; font-size: 11pt; mso-themecolor: text1;">is available on Amazon</span></a><u><span style="background: white; color: #7b8c89; font-size: 11pt;"> </span></u><span style="background: white; font-size: 11pt;">in hardcover, paperback, Kindle, and electronic editions</span><span style="background: white; font-size: 11pt;">.</span><span style="font-size: 11pt;"> <span style="background: white;">This update includes changes in the law and important cases decided by the New York Courts since the original volume was published. It brings the text and case law up to date through and including December 31, 2022, and contains additional questions for witnesses. </span>See </span><a href="http://www.nysdivorce.net/uploads/8/1/3/4/81349156/table_of_contents_new_york_matrimonial_trial_handbook_2023_cumulative_update.pdf" target="_self" title="Consulting Services Bookstore Website"><span style="font-size: 11pt;">Table of Contents.</span></a></b></p>Joel R. Brandeshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00071300360715546038noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2720486713239145885.post-64641341547690574582023-08-06T17:13:00.005-04:002023-08-06T17:13:42.908-04:00Recent Hague Convention District Court Cases - Soterano v. Aponte, 2023 WL 3790895, (S.D. Florida,2023)<p> <span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">[</span><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">Venezuela][Petition
denied][Well-settled]</span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;">
Soterano v. Aponte, 2023
WL 3790895, (S.D. Florida,2023).<br /><br />
Petitioner, Adel Jose Sabbagh Soterano, sought the return of his son A.S.O. and
his daughter R.S.O. to Venezuela. The Mother argued one of the Hague Convention
exceptions applies, specifically that the Father was not exercising custodial
rights, that the Children would be at risk of harm if they were to return, or
because the Father’s filing is untimely, the Children are well-settled and
object to returning to Venezuela. The Court found that the Father had
established a prima facie case for return. However, because the Father’s
petition was not filed within a year of removal and the Mother had met her
burden in showing that the Children were well-settled in their new environment
and prefer to live with their Mother, the Court denied the Petition.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;"> </span></p>Joel R. Brandeshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00071300360715546038noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2720486713239145885.post-91736112616765276522023-08-06T17:12:00.004-04:002023-08-06T17:12:44.379-04:00Recent Hague Convention District Court Cases - Sarmiento v Morales. 2023 WL 3886075 (S.D. Texas, 2023)<p> <span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">Ecuador][Petition
denied][Grave risk of harm]</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-autospace: none;"><span style="font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt;">Sarmiento v Morales. 2023 WL 3886075 (S.D. Texas, 2023)<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">Petitioner by Victor Modesto Hernandez Morales for the return of his
five-year-old son, VAHV (o Ecuador. In January 2022, when he was not yet four,
VAHV was brought to the United States by his mother. The Court found that
Petitioner met his burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
VAHV was wrongfully removed from Ecuador. the Court found that Respondent met
her burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that VAHV was at grave
risk of being exposed to physical and psychological harm should the Court order
his return to Ecuador. The Court declines to order a return. The Petition for
Return was denied.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 10pt;"> </span></p>Joel R. Brandeshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00071300360715546038noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2720486713239145885.post-13779708841001718522023-08-06T17:11:00.005-04:002023-08-06T17:11:55.154-04:00Recent Hague Convention District Court Cases - Rothman v Rothman 2022 WL 20208933 ( N.D. California,2022)<p> <span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">[United Kingdom][Discovery motion to compel granted]</span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;">
Rothman v Rothman 2022 WL
20208933 ( N.D. California,2022)<br /><br /> Petitioner objected on relevance grounds to the production of documents
responsive to the following discovery requests: Documents sufficient to show
all real or personal property possessed by you, any corporate entity in which you
hold at least a 50% ownership interest, or any trust for which you are either a
settlor or beneficiary, which property was located within California between
August 2020 and the present.; Any state
and federal tax returns filed by you in the United States for the years of 2020
and 2021; Any filings or submissions provided, or representations made, to any
authority of the United Kingdom or any political entity therein with
responsibility for taxation of income or assets. The relevant time period for
this request was any year for which income obtained between January 1, 2020,
and December 31, 2021, would be relevant to such filings, submissions, or
representations. The Court held that Courts regularly consider tax return
evidence in determining habitual residence under the Hague Convention. <i>See,
e.g., </i></span><a href="https://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=2003538581&pubNum=0000506&originatingDoc=Ia853be9011fe11eeadcbcfe0feb6c1ed&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_506_890&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.AlertsClip)#co_pp_sp_506_890"><i><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 107%; text-decoration-line: none;">Silverman
v. Silverman</span></i><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 107%; text-decoration-line: none;">, 338 F.3d 886, 890 (8th Cir. 2003)</span></a><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 107%;">; </span><a href="https://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=2049873011&pubNum=0007903&originatingDoc=Ia853be9011fe11eeadcbcfe0feb6c1ed&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_7903_599&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.AlertsClip)#co_pp_sp_7903_599"><i><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 107%; text-decoration-line: none;">Foster
v. Foster</span></i><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 107%; text-decoration-line: none;">, 429 F. Supp. 3d 589, 599, 609 (W.D. Wis. 2019)</span></a><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 107%;">; </span><a href="https://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=2030525615&pubNum=0000506&originatingDoc=Ia853be9011fe11eeadcbcfe0feb6c1ed&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_506_287&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.AlertsClip)#co_pp_sp_506_287"><i><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 107%; text-decoration-line: none;">Hofmann
v. Sender</span></i><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 107%; text-decoration-line: none;">, 716 F.3d 282, 287-88 (2d Cir. 2013)</span></a><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 107%;">; </span><a href="https://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=2037680454&pubNum=0007903&originatingDoc=Ia853be9011fe11eeadcbcfe0feb6c1ed&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_7903_51&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.AlertsClip)#co_pp_sp_7903_51"><i><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 107%; text-decoration-line: none;">Wild
v. Eliot</span></i><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 107%; text-decoration-line: none;">, 147 F. Supp. 3d 49, 51 (D. Conn. 2015)</span></a><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 107%;">; </span><a href="https://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=2015781362&pubNum=0004637&originatingDoc=Ia853be9011fe11eeadcbcfe0feb6c1ed&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_4637_965&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.AlertsClip)#co_pp_sp_4637_965"><i><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 107%; text-decoration-line: none;">Sorenson
v. Sorenson</span></i><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 107%; text-decoration-line: none;">, 563 F. Supp. 2d 961, 965 (D. Minn. 2008)</span></a><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 107%;">. Similarly, ownership by one or both parents
of property within the jurisdiction can be a relevant consideration. </span><a href="https://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=2004843341&pubNum=0000506&originatingDoc=Ia853be9011fe11eeadcbcfe0feb6c1ed&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_506_635&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.AlertsClip)#co_pp_sp_506_635"><i><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 107%; text-decoration-line: none;">Gaudin
v. Remis</span></i><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 107%; text-decoration-line: none;">, 379 F.3d 631, 635 (9th Cir. 2004)</span></a><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 107%;">; </span><a href="https://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=2051928876&pubNum=0000506&originatingDoc=Ia853be9011fe11eeadcbcfe0feb6c1ed&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_506_560&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.AlertsClip)#co_pp_sp_506_560"><i><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 107%; text-decoration-line: none;">Smith
v. Smith</span></i><span style="color: #0e568c; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 107%; text-decoration-line: none;">, 976 F.3d 558, 560 (5th Cir. 2020)</span></a><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 107%;">. The Court concluded that the information
sought by the Respondent was relevant and discoverable.<a name="co_fnRef_B00022075369064_ID0EWIAC_1"></a> The respondent’s motion to
compel was granted. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-autospace: none;"><span style="font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-autospace: none;"><span style="font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt;"> </span></p>Joel R. Brandeshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00071300360715546038noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2720486713239145885.post-2458067899801014582023-08-06T17:10:00.007-04:002023-08-06T17:10:58.005-04:00Recent Hague Convention District Court Cases - Revelo v Cedeno, 625 F.Supp.3d 529 (W.D. Louisiana, 2022)<p> <span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">[</span><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">Ecuador][Habitual
residence][Petition granted][No Grave risk of harm]</span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;">
Revelo v Cedeno, 625
F.Supp.3d 529 (W.D. Louisiana, 2022)<br /><br />
The District Court held that the child’s place of habitual residence was
Ecuador; the child’s removal violated the father’s rights of custody, for the purpose
of deciding the petition; the father was exercising his custody rights at the time
of the child’s removal, supporting petition; and evidence was insufficient to
demonstrate that child faced grave risk of harm if returned to live with father
in Ecuador. Petition granted.<o:p></o:p></span></p>Joel R. Brandeshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00071300360715546038noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2720486713239145885.post-32469859722901094012023-08-06T17:09:00.005-04:002023-08-06T17:09:45.035-04:00Recent Hague Convention District Court Cases - Peyre v McGary, 2023 WL 3726728. (D. Arizona, 2023)<p> <span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">[France][Petition granted][</span><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;"> Consent and Grave risk of harm not established]</span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;">
Peyre v McGary, 2023 WL 3726728. (D. Arizona, 2023).<br /><br />
While living in France, Father, and Mother got married and had twins. On June
30, 2022, Mother flew to the United States with the Children while Father
remained in France. Mother contended it was part of an agreed-to plan for her
to permanently relocate to the United States with the Children as she and
Father were considering whether to divorce, while Father contended it was a
summer vacation from which Mother and the Children were expected to return.
Mother’s primary defenses were that “Father consented and/or acquiesced to
removal or retention of the Children from France to Arizona” and that the
return of the Children would expose them to a grave risk of harm based on
Father’s domestic violence against Mother and serious abuse or neglect against
the Children. The Court concluded that Father was entitled to relief and Mother
was required to return the Children to France. Mother had not come close to
establishing that the Children would be exposed to a grave risk of physical or
psychological harm if returned to France.<o:p></o:p></span></p>Joel R. Brandeshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00071300360715546038noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2720486713239145885.post-37287411431500221072023-08-06T17:08:00.006-04:002023-08-06T17:08:46.894-04:00Recent Hague Convention District Court Cases - Peyre v McGarey, 2023 WL 4351544 (D. Arizona, 2023).<p> <span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">[France][Petition granted][</span><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;"> Mother’s motion for reconsideration denied]</span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;">
Peyre v McGarey, 2023 WL 4351544
(D. Arizona, 2023).<br /><br />
The Court ordered the Mother to return the parties’ twin children to France. The
mother’s motion for reconsideration was denied.<o:p></o:p></span></p>Joel R. Brandeshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00071300360715546038noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2720486713239145885.post-24094262696603688292023-08-06T17:07:00.003-04:002023-08-06T17:07:30.985-04:00Recent Hague Convention District Court Cases - Neiuwenhoven v Pisani, 2023 WL 3794568, (M.D. Florida, 2023)<p> <span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; text-align: justify;">[Australia][Petition
granted][</span><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; text-align: justify;"> application for
attorney’s fees and costs]</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-autospace: none;"><span style="font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt;">Neiuwenhoven v Pisani, 2023 WL 3794568, (M.D. Florida, 2023)<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;"><b><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">T</span></b><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">he Court found that the minor child was
wrongfully removed from her country of habitual residence and was due to be
returned. Upon referral of Petitioner’s application for attorney’s fees and
costs recommended that Petitioner’s motion be granted in part and denied in
part and that he should be awarded attorney’s fees and costs in the total
amount of $45,210.30. This total recommended award reflects reductions for a
reasonable attorney hourly rate and a 30% reduction for financial hardship
considerations.</span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 10pt;"> </span><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">The requested
hourly rate for Ms. Lungarelli was reduced from $495 per hour to $300 per hour,
and the requested hourly rate for Ms. Estevez was reduced from $400 per hour to
$250 per hour.</span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 10pt;"> </span><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">Respondent
offered no documentation in support of her contentions about financial
hardship. While she stated she is not working, she did not state she was
incapable of working. Nonetheless, she had no doubt incurred considerable
expense during this litigation, her earning potential was unclear, and issues
relating to marital finances likely remain unresolved. Whatever her income, the
potential fee award in this case would be a substantial portion of it.
Moreover, in his reply to Respondent’s memorandum opposing the application for
fees, Petitioner did not dispute Respondent’s assertions regarding hardship or
regarding her strained financial circumstances<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;"> </span></p>Joel R. Brandeshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00071300360715546038noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2720486713239145885.post-69506373083351640452023-08-06T17:06:00.003-04:002023-08-06T17:06:24.962-04:00Recent Hague Convention District Court Cases - McElliott v McElliott 2023 WL 4764816 (D. New Jersey, 2023)<p> <span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; text-align: justify;">[Ireland][ motion to appoint a guardian </span><i style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; text-align: justify;">ad litem denied]</i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-autospace: none;"><span style="font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt;">McElliott v McElliott 2023 WL 4764816 (D. New Jersey, 2023)<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">Respondent’s motion to appoint a guardian <i>ad litem</i> for the benefit
of the minor child C.M. whom Petitioner seeks returned to Ireland was denied.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-align: justify; text-autospace: none;"><span style="font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt;"> </span></p>Joel R. Brandeshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00071300360715546038noreply@blogger.com0