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Thursday, May 1, 2014

In re A.L.C., 2014 WL 1571274 (C.D.Cal.) [Sweden] [Habitual Residence ] [Acquiescence] [Fundamental Freedoms]

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In re A.L.C., 2014 WL 1571274 (C.D.Cal.) the district court granted the Petition of Andreas Carlwig for the return of his two minor children to Sweden.  On February 27, 2014, Petitioner Andreas Carlwig ("Father") filed a Verified Petition for Return of Children to Sweden. Respondent Sarodjiny Carlwig ("Mother") was served with the Petition on March 13, 2014. 

The district court found that Father and Mother married in Las Vegas, Nevada, on November 1, 2007. Father was a citizen of Sweden. Mother was born in India and is a citizen of both the U.S. and France.  Throughout their marriage, the family's residence has been largely dictated by Father's job assignments. Shortly after their wedding, the couple moved to Dubai, United Arab Emirates.  Their first child, A.L.C., was born in Dubai in 2008.  A.L.C. was a citizen of both the U.S. and Sweden.   In September 2011, Father's employer closed its operations in the U.A.E., and he was given a new assignment in Sweden.  Father commuted between Stockholm, Sweden and Dubai for the next three months. He testified at the hearing that he was able to visit his wife and A.L.C. in Dubai every third weekend.  In January 2012, the entire family relocated to Stockholm.  Father and A.L.C. left first for Sweden, while Mother remained in Dubai to finish the last part of the move.  Mother contended that she was forced to move to Sweden and only agreed to a six-month trial period. In her Response and at the hearing, Mother went into great detail about her residency status in Sweden and how the move to Sweden interrupted previous plans to move to the U.S. Ultimately, Mother acquiesced to the move and lived in Sweden with Father and A.L.C. for about thirteen months. While living in Sweden, A.L.C. started preschool and began making friends.  Father's relatives also lived in Sweden and A.L.C. was able to spend time with his relatives including his grandparents, aunts, and cousins.    When the family moved to Sweden in 2012, they moved into a rented apartment. The lease was for nine months and was later extended an additional three months. Father was employed in Sweden and was still employed by the same company he worked for in Dubai. Mother was not employed while the family lived in Sweden. Mother admitted that they left no belongings behind in Dubai.
   
        In September 2012, while living in Sweden, Mother learned that she was pregnant
with the couple's second child-E.R.S.C.   Father testified at the hearing that Mother first raised the possibility of traveling to Los Angeles in November 2012 for the purpose of giving birth to E.R.S.C. By all accounts, Mother's pregnancy with E.R.S.C. was a difficult one. The reason she gave Father for wanting to give birth in Los Angeles was to be close to her friends-whom she referred to as "family"-and because the birth of A.L.C. in Dubai was a bad experience.  Father ultimately agreed to the trip He purchased roundtrip tickets from Stockholm, Sweden to Los Angeles for Mother and A.L.C., with a departure date of January 16, 2013, and a return date of September 4, 2013.     Right before the scheduled departure date, Mother visited a doctor in Sweden and learned that she had a low platelet count.  Concerned about her health, the trip to Los Angeles was cancelled.  But Mother later changed her mind and a new flight to Los Angeles was booked for herself and A.L.C. They left for Los Angeles on February 27, 2013, while Father remained in Sweden. Both Mother and Father admitted to the existence of a note, written by Father, consenting to the trip to Los Angeles. A handwritten note, apparently signed by Father, was submitted by Mother in her Response. The note stated that Father consented to Mother taking A.L.C. to Los Angeles. The note was silent as to the trip's purpose or duration.  Father maintained that the note was either a forgery or an earlier draft of the note. Father stated that the final draft included that the trip was to be only four to six months in duration-enough time for Mother to give birth and recuperate. Father's contention that the trip was only temporary was consistent with the round-trip tickets that were initially purchased for Mother and A.L.C.  None of Mother's submissions indicated that the parties reached an agreement to move to anywhere in the U.S.in February 2013.    In May 2013, E.R.S.C. was born in Los Angeles. Father made arrangements to take time off from work and travel to Los Angeles for the birth, though Mother ultimately asked him to stay away.  But Father did visit Los Angeles to see A.L.C. and E.R.S.C. in June and July of 2013. Father stayed with Mother and the children in a temporary apartment.  During
the visit, the family took a trip to Carlsbad, California, and Father testified that he and A.L.C. visited LegoLand together.  However, Father had to return to work in Sweden at the end of July. In the Petition, Father stated that he suggested bringing A.L.C. back with him, but when Mother refused, he went home alone because the agreed-upon six months in Los Angeles had not passed. In August and September 2013, Mother and Father attempted to reach a resolution on where the family should live. But no resolution was reached, and Father never agreed to Mother remaining in Los Angeles with the children.  Mother also admitted on cross-examination that Father never agreed to a move to Los Angeles. Both parties filed for divorce. On September 9, 2013, Mother filed for divorce in Los Angeles County Superior Court. Father claims he was unaware of these proceedings until traveling to Los Angeles in November 2013.  Meanwhile, Father filed for divorce and custody of the children in Sweden in October 2013.  The couple remained in communication throughout this time and Mother was made aware of the proceedings in Sweden. On November 2, 2013, Father traveled to Los Angeles with the children's grandfather.   On November 10, 2013, Mother filed a police report alleging that Father sexually assaulted her during his visit to Los Angeles in June and July 2013. Mother also alleged that Father has been physically violent and verbally abusive throughout their marriage. Most of her allegations were vague.

The court found that Father met his burden of establishing a prima facie case for the return of A.L.C. and E.R.S.C. to Sweden.  The Petition was based on wrongful retention in the U.S.. Father argued that the trip to Los Angeles was supposed to be for four to six months while Mother gave birth and recuperated. Mother contended that the parties agreed that she was never returning to Sweden with A.L.C. and E.R.S.C., and that the children's habitual residence was now the U.S. In  Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir.2001), the Ninth Circuit emphasized the importance of shared parental intent in determining a child's habitual residence. Moreover, "the first step toward acquiring a new habitual residence is forming a settled intention to abandon the one left behind."  An actual change in geography and passage of an appreciable period of time sufficient for acclimatization are also relevant to whether a child's habitual residence has changed.  The second Mozes fact pattern is when a child's initial move from an established habitual residence was clearly intended to be of a limited and specific duration.  Courts in these cases will usually find that the changed intentions of one parent do not lead to a change in the child's habitual residence.  The third scenario arises when the petitioning parent initially agreed that the child could stay abroad for a period of indefinite or ambiguous duration. These cases are very fact-dependent
and usually have no clear answer.

    The court found that before A.L.C. departed Sweden with his mother on February 27, 2013, he was clearly a habitual resident of Sweden. While A.L.C. spent only about thirteen months total in Sweden, the length of time was not as important as the fact that the family had abandoned Dubai and A.L.C. had by all appearances a relatively stable and normal life in Sweden.  According to Father's testimony at the hearing, Mother first raised the idea of a trip to Los Angeles with A.L.C. in November 2012. Mother was pregnant with their second child at this point and expressed a desire to give birth in the U.S. Father ultimately agreed to the trip and permitted Mother to take A.L.C. with her. There were sufficient facts to demonstrate that Father only intended the trip to be temporary and last for a period of around six months. Father had been active in A.L.C.'s life in Sweden, but did not travel with Mother and A.L.C. Father made clear at the hearing that he had no job prospects in Los Angeles and that the family relied on his income. In addition, in June 2013, Father registered A.L.C. at a new school in Stockholm that he was expected to attend starting in September 2013. This comported with Father's belief that the trip to Los Angeles was merely an extended stay. Mother and A.L.C. also left belongings behind in Sweden.  The Court found Mother's testimony and supporting evidence with regard to the parties' understanding about the trip to Los Angeles to be less than credible. Therefore, the Court gave little weight to the note as evidence of parental intent regarding the purpose and duration of the trip to Los Angeles. Overall, the Court found no shared intent to abandon Sweden as A.L.C.'s habitual residence.  The Court noted that Mother has supplied evidence of A.L.C.'s acclimatization here in the U.S., but this did  not support a finding of a change in A.L.C's habitual residence.     The Court found the Father's testimony and evidence compelling and sufficient to meet his burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that A.L.C. was a habitual resident of Sweden before Mother's retention of A.L.C. in the U.S.

  E.R.S.C.'s habitual residence presented a trickier question - the habitual residence of a newborn absent shared parental intent. While the issue was complicated by the fact that E.R.S.C, unlike her brother A.L.C., had never been to Sweden, the Court found that its assessment of parental intent with regard to A.L.C. applied equally to E.R.S.C. and ultimately favored the same result as A.L.C. E.R.S.C. was born  in the U.S., but a child's"place of birth is not automatically the child's habitual residence." Holder v. Holder, 392 F.3d 1009, 1020 (9th Cir.2004) Moreover, an infant's habitual residence is not established solely based on the location of the mother.  Nunez-Escudero v. Tice-Menley, 58 F.3d 374, 379 (8th Cir.1995) ("To say that the child's habitual residence derived from his mother would be inconsistent with the Convention, for it would reward the abducting parent and create an impermissible presumption that the child's habitual residence is wherever the mother happens to be.") Thus, E.R.S.C. was not a habitual resident of the U.S. simply because Mother was present here and desired to stay. The Third Circuit's holding in  Delvoye v. Lee, 329 F.3d 330 (3d Cir.2003) was instructive on the habitual residence of a newborn like E.R.S.C. In Delvoye, the court held  that Belgium was not the newborn's habitual residence, because the parents lacked a "degree of common purpose" to habitually reside in Belgium with the child..The mother was living out of suitcases in Belgium, had only temporary visa, and left most of her belongings behind in New York.  Like in Delvoye, the Court found that Father and Mother lacked a shared intent for E.R.S.C. to reside in Los Angeles or anywhere in the U.S. Father only consented to Mother traveling to Los Angeles for E.R.S.C.'s birth-not for E.R.S.C. to remain in the U.S. permanently.  The Court found that E.R.S.C.'s young age suggested that she could not simply acquire habitual residence here in the U.S. based on the ten months she has spent here.   The Court found that the best approach to E.R.S.C.'s habitual residence was to look to the last location of shared parental intent, which was Sweden. The last location of any stability for the family was Sweden. Sweden was where Father was employed. In addition, the Court had already found that A.L.C.'s habitual residence was Sweden. Splitting the children up for custody determinations in two countries was untenable. For these reasons, the Court found that E.R.S.C.'s habitual residence was Sweden and not the U.S.

  The Court found insufficient evidence that Father consented to the children
becoming habitual residents in the U.S. While consent does not have to be expressed with the same degree of formality that is required for subsequent acquiescence, a court should focus on "what the petitioner actually contemplated and agreed to in allowing the child to travel outside [his or her] home country." Baxter v. Baxter, 423 F.3d 363, 371 (3d Cir.2005). Here, Father did not consent to either A.L.C. or E.R.S.C. remaining in the U.S. Father allowed Mother to travel to Los Angeles with A.L.C. to give birth to E.R.S.C. Father only intended and consented to the trip lasting for four to six months-enough time for Mother to give birth and recuperate. Baxter, 423 F.3d at 371 ("The fact that a petitioner initially allows children to travel, and knows their location and how to contact them, does not necessarily constitute formal consent to removal or retention under the Convention."). There was also insufficient evidence to establish Father's subsequent acquiescence. Acquiescence requires "an act or statement with the requisite formality, such as testimony in a judicial proceeding; a convincing written renunciation of rights; or a consistent attitude of acquiescence over a significant period of time." Friedrich II, 78 F.3d at 1070. Mother submitted no evidence of a formal renunciation of custody rights by Father. Moreover, there was an utter lack of evidence of a "consistent attitude of acquiescence." The Court acknowledged that after Father realized that Mother was not going to return to Sweden with the children, he took steps to mediate the dispute with Mother. But at no time did Father agree to Mother remaining in Los Angeles with A.L.C. and E.R.S.C. Mother admitted during cross-examination at the hearing that Father never agreed to living in Los Angeles. In an email dated September 29, 2013, Father reiterated that he never agreed to a permanent stay in Los Angeles and continued to disagree with Mother retaining the children in Los Angeles.  Father did consider a move to New York City with Mother in August 2013, but he had certain conditions of which Mother was less than amenable. Discussions about potentially moving elsewhere in the U.S., if certain conditions such as finding a job are met, hardly amount to a "consistent attitude of acquiescence." Moreover, the Court found  that Father's attempts to reach a resolution with Mother only further demonstrated a lack of acquiescence to Mother's unilateral move to Los Angeles.

Mother alleged that Father had been physically and verbally abusive. She  also claimed that Father raped her on more than one occasion. But the Court found that Mother's allegations lacked credibility.

Mother proffered numerous news articles and Internet postings to argue that Sweden is a racist country that will not welcome her children, who were of mixed race.  However, a few examples of hate crimes and evidence of racist sentiments among a portion of the Swedish population did not reach the level of utterly shocking the conscience, especially when they did  not involve the parties at issue here. Unfortunately, Sweden was not the only country where hate crimes and racism exist, and many examples of similar crimes and sentiments can be found here in the U.S. Accordingly, the Court found that the fundamental principles of human rights and fundamental freedoms did not prevent this Court from ordering the return of A.L.C. and E.R.S.C. to Sweden.

         

Ortiz v. Martinez, 2014 WL 1409446 (N.D.Ill.) [Mexico] [Grave Risk of Harm]



In Ortiz v. Martinez, 2014 WL 1409446 (N.D.Ill.)  the district court denied the motion of Petitioner Julio Cesar Ortiz ("Ortiz") for a New Trial pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59, after his petition for the return of his minor children  was denied.  Ortiz brought a petition for the return of his two minor children, L.O. and A.O.,  who both resided in the United States with their mother Zulima Juarez Martinez ("Juarez") Respondent mother raised a defense  under article 13 of the Convention, claiming that the children faced grave risk of harm because Ortiz  had previously sexually abused his five-year-old daughter.  Additionally, Juarez claimed the children desired to remain in the United States with her instead of being returned to Mexico with their father.   The  Court found that while Ortiz demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that L.O. 
and A.O. were wrongfully removed to the United States by Juarez, the children were in grave  risk of harm if they returned to their native county, Mexico, and that the child L.O. had attained an age and maturity at which it is appropriate to take into account of his child's views, that he desired to remain with his mother in the United States as an independent factor for denial.

The Court observed that a motion for new trial may be granted at the court's discretion "for any reason for which a  rehearing has heretofore been granted in a suit in equity in federal court.” Because the court has discretion to grant a Motion for a New Trial, "a  district court need not write a comprehensive opinion explaining why it denied a motion for a new trial;  indeed, the judge need not give an explanation of any kind."   Dunn v. Truck World, Inc., 929 F.2d 311, 313 (7th Cir.1991).

In this case, the Petitioner claimed that a new trial was warranted for two
reasons:  (1) because the evidence that L.O. and A.O. were at a grave risk of danger because  Ortiz sexually abused A.O was insufficient under a clear and convincing standard and (2) because the Court considered the wishes of the child sua ponte as outlined in Article 13(2)(d) of the Convention. The Court rejected both arguments.

The court noted that determining whether the child faces a grave risk of harm requires a fact based inquiry. Petitioner challenged the sufficiency of the evidence,  arguing that the Respondent failed to offer documentary or physical evidence of sexual abuse.  The court held that one does not have to  provide documentary or physical evidence of sexual abuse when there is testimony that is corroborated by multiple witnesses.   See Sylvester v. SOS Children's Villages Illinois, Inc., 453 F.3d 900, 903 (7th Cir.2006). The Court heard testimony from all the witnesses, including Dr. Machabanski, and credited  the testimony of Juarez, which was corroborated by A.O., who was a bright child. During the court's interview with A.O., she stated that her father had done something bad "for not to tell mommy.   It was a secret."   When asked what  was bad, she replied with words and gestures that he put his finger in her vaginal area while she  was showering with him on more than one occasion.  During the court's interview with Juarez, she stated that she noticed recurrent rashes on A.O.'s vaginal area shortly after she was born, so she took her to see a doctor who prescribed medication for diaper rash.  However, the rashes reappeared in the summer of 2010.   Additionally, when A.O. was about three years old, Juarez walked in on Ortiz when he was bathing his daughter.  Juarez remembers that A.O. and  Ortiz were both naked, and that A.O. was standing against the shower wall and Ortiz was kneeling in front of her with his right hand between her legs without soap or a towel.    About a week after that, Juarez overheard  A.O. telling her father not to touch her in her private parts anymore.  This Court indicated that as the fact finder,  the Court properly weighed the evidence and credibility of the witnesses and found that the children would face a grave risk of harm if ordered to return to Mexico.   Petitioner failed to present any new facts or law  to change the Court's holding.

The Petitioner claimed that the Court erred when it raised the ‘”wishes of the child” exception sua sponte, and  that the burden was on the Respondent to raise such an exception. However, Petitioner ignored the language of the Convention, which specifically grants the court discretionary authority to avoid return based on the child's preference.   This Court did not err by exercising its discretionary authority.

Mauvais v Herissee, 2014 WL 1454452 (D.Mass.)) [Canada] [Habitual Residence] [Grave Risk of Harm]



In Mauvais v Herissee,  2014 WL 1454452 (D.Mass.)) the district court granted the petition of  Manel Mauvais  for the return of his two minor children to Canada.   The petitioner, and the respondent, Nathalie Herisse, were both citizens of  Haiti. They had two children together: MM and RM. They lived together in Haiti until September 2009, when Herisse moved to her aunt's home in  Mattapan, Massachusetts, so that the baby she was expecting would be born in the United  States. Mauvais and MM remained in Haiti. RM was born in Boston in November 2009. After MM was born in France in 2005, Herisse returned to  Haiti.  A catastrophic earthquake devastated Haiti in January 2010. Mauvais and MM moved to Quebec, Canada in February 2010. Herisse was still living in  Massachusetts with her aunt and new infant. She asked Mauvais to bring  MM to Massachusetts, but he refused. In turn, he urged Herisse to join him in Canada. She testified he threatened to harm MM if she did not. In March 2010, Herisse reluctantly took RM to Canada. Mauvais, Herisse, their two  daughters, and two of Mauvais's children from a prior relationship lived for a while in Montreal with Mauvais's sister and her family.   In July 2010, Mauvais and Herisse moved into their own apartment with their two daughters and Mauvais's twin children. They lived together there until January 2011, when Herisse moved out, taking the children with her. The three first stayed with relatives, but in September 2011  they moved to a separate apartment in Montreal. In February or March 2012, Mauvais  convinced her to allow him and his other children to move into her apartment. The children  lived with their mother in an apartment in Montreal for about two years prior to the events that gave rise to the present petition.  MM was enrolled in and attended a primary school beginning with the 2011-2012 school year, and was enrolled for the 2013-2014 school year when she was taken by the respondent to the United States. RM was enrolled in a full time day care program between the end of April 2013 and late August 2013. Both children visited regularly with relatives, apparently on both their mother's and their father's sides. With some of the father's relatives, they regularly attended church and Sunday school. According to an aunt, they developed a "Quebecois" accent when speaking French.   In late August 2013, Mauvais consented to RM traveling to the United States for a month to  live with Herisse's aunt in Mattapan, and the aunt traveled to Canada to take RM to Massachusetts.

  In the fall of 2012, RM began to have some health problems, including frequent nosebleeds and weight loss. Herisse took her to various clinics but was not satisfied with the care RM  received. Herisse decided that it would be best for RM, a U.S. citizen, to return to the U.S. to receive medical care. For that purpose, the parties agreed that Herisse's aunt could bring RM to the U.S. in late August 2013. Medical records from the Boston Medical Center in evidence indicate no major health issues. In the fall of 2013, RM was examined and treated for eczema, a tendency to experience nosebleeds, and mild anemia. For the latter, she was prescribed an iron supplement.

  The parties' written agreement provided that RM would be returned to Canada  around September 20, 2013. She was not returned as agreed. On September 13, 2013, the respondent left Canada with MM and traveled to her aunt's home  in Massachusetts, where she and her two children remained.

The district court found that prior to the children's removal and retention in September 2013, that the parties both were content to have their children live in their  existing setting in Canada. For approximately two years, the children lived in a settled,  "acclimatized" way in Canada. The fact that one or both of the parties may have harbored some desire eventually to move to the United States did not undercut these conclusions. After Herisse had stopped living with Mauvais, she established her own household with the children in Montreal. The children attended school and participated in various social activities. Herisse's actions showed that even when she was not  under Mauvais's control or influence, she chose to remain in Canada. That she subsequently  had a change of heart and decided that the children would be better off living elsewhere was of no moment, as any such intent was not a shared one with Mauvais. It was noteworthy RM had spent almost her entire life, and MM about half her life, in Canada, and the evidence presented at trial showed that both she and MM had had sufficient time for acclimatization. The court found that Mauvais had proven that Canada was the habitual residence of the  children at the time of their retention and removal and, consequently, that MM and RM were wrongfully removed or retained within the meaning of the Convention.

The respondent testified that the petitioner frequently acted toward her in a sexually abusive manner. She further testified that he insisted on sexual activity at times and under circumstances when the children were or could have been exposed to it. The testimony was general and vague, however, and it was difficult to draw any reliable conclusions about how frequently such conduct occurred or how significant any impact on the children might have been.  She also testified that Mauvais's son, BM, who was a few years older than MM, was sexually assaultive toward her. One such incident occurred while the family was still living in Haiti. According to the respondent, when she reported the incident to the petitioner, he disciplined BM by beating him with a belt. The respondent's aunt testified about a similar incident a couple of years later in Canada. There was no evidence as to what, if any, discipline was meted out to BM for that occasion.   The evidence in the nature of an opinion that RM and/or MM might suffer psychological harm if returned to Canada was unconvincing because it did not appear to be based on an indepth investigation, but rather on some office interviews and a review of hospital records that themselves did not disclose any grave medical or emotional issue. The evidence fell well short of supporting a finding of a grave risk of psychological harm.   Herisse contended that MM and RM faced a grave risk of physical and psychological harm if they  return to Canada. At trial, Herisse testified that Mauvais has sexually abused her for many years, that BM had acted in sexually inappropriate ways toward MM on numerous occasions,  and that Mauvais has been violent toward BM. Herisse also argued that RM's medical issues might not be as adequately addressed in Canada  as in the United States. Herisse relied heavily on the First Circuit's decision in Walsh, but in that case the court relied on "ample evidence" that the petitioner "has been and can be extremely violent and ... cannot control his temper," and that the petitioner had a history of violence toward others, including threats to kill a neighbor and a physical confrontation with his adult son.  Walsh, 221 F.3d at 219-20. The petitioner in Walsh was also a fugitive who had demonstrated a "chronic disobedience of court orders."

The facts of this case were neither as dire nor as clear. Herisse admited that Mauvais had never harmed or attempted to harm MM or RM. Even after moving out in January  2011, Herisse took no steps to prevent Mauvais from having contact with their children. A general likelihood that serial spousal abusers may also eventually abuse 
their children is insufficient to establish, by the requisite degree of proof, grave risk of physical or psychological harm to MM and RM. Further, as to RM's medical care, there was insufficient  evidence that there is a grave risk that RM's medical condition could not be appropriately  addressed in Canadian medical facilities.

Sunday, March 23, 2014

Pignoloni v Gallagher, 2014 WL 642596 (2d Cir 2014) [Italy] [Consent] [Petition denied]


In Pignoloni v Gallagher, 2014 WL 642596 (2d Cir 2014) Petitioner Fabrizio Pignoloni brought a petition pursuant to the Hague Convention seeking an order directing Respondent Luise Gallagher, the mother, to return their two minor sons, E.G.P. and A.T.P. to Italy. The district court denied the petition. The Second Circuit affirmed in a summary order.

Pignoloni was an Italian citizen and Gallagher was a United States citizen. They married in New York in 2005 and shortly thereafter moved to Italy. Their elder son, E.G.P., was born in New York, while their younger son, A.T.P., was born in Italy; both children lived nearly all their lives in Italy and were citizens of both Italy and the United States. Pignoloni and Gallagher continued to live together in Italy until approximately September 2010, when they signed a separation agreement  which was “so ordered” by an Italian court. Pignoloni thereafter moved out of the family apartment. In April 2011, the parties signed a supplemental separation agreement  which was then “so-ordered” by an Italian court. The agreement gave the parties joint custody of the children and imposed certain support obligations on Pignoloni. Pignoloni agreed to pay monthly child support and spousal support, and to pay the rent on the apartment in which Gallagher and the children lived. Paragraph O of the 2011 Separation Agreement, upon which the District Court heavily relied,  provided conditions under which Gallagher might be permitted to remove the children from Italy. That paragraph read: (o) In case of non-payment of several monthly rent installments by Mr. Pignoloni resulting in lawsuits on behalf of the owners / or of non-bank-deposit for at least four months of the support for the children and for the wife and should the wife be unable, not having any type of income of her own, to support and maintain the children and herself, Mr. Pignoloni is willing to authorize the wife to return with the children to the United States to her family's home provided that the wife proves that she has found a job of her own.

On April 24, 2012, Gallagher traveled to New York with the two children. At the end of June 2012, Gallagher notified Pignoloni that she was remaining in the United States with the children. On July 3, 2012, Pignoloni filed his petition under the Hague Convention District Court held a bench trial. It found that Pignoloni had failed to meet his monthly spousal and child support and rent obligations, and that Gallagher was unable to support herself in Italy.  The District Court denied the petition on two separate bases. First, it found that the removal of the children from Italy and their retention in the United States was not wrongful, because all of the conditions set forth in Paragraph O of the 2011 Separation Agreement had been met, giving Gallagher the right to change the children's habitual residence to the United States. Second, it found Pignoloni had given his prior consent in Paragraph O to the children's removal and retention, and therefore Gallagher had a valid affirmative defense under Article 13(a) of the Hague Convention. 

On November 22, 2012, after the trial, but only two days before the District Court issued its decision, an Italian court modified the 2011 Separation Agreement and granted sole custody to Pignoloni. There was a pending motion before the Court to supplement the record with this Italian court decision. The District Court denied the petition on two separate bases: failure to make out a prima facie case and the affirmative defense of consent. Only the first basis relied on the 2011 Separation Agreement as establishing enforceable custody rights. The Italian court ruling, which altered the parents' custody rights prospectively, did not affect the analysis of their agreement in 2011. The Court stated that even if it were to grant Pignoloni's motion to supplement the record with the Italian court decision, it held that it would still affirm the District Court's decision as to consent. Accordingly, it denied Pignoloni's motion to supplement the record as moot. 

The District Court found that Gallagher had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that Pignoloni consented to the children's removal. Specifically, it found that “Paragraph O constituted Petitioner's ex ante consent to Respondent's return to the United States, consent which is not rendered inoperable by Petitioner's ex post regret that he permitted Respondent to relocate his children to the United States under the terms of the court-ordered April 2011 Separation Agreement.” On appeal, Pignoloni argued that the words “is willing to authorize” could not be read to mean that he, in fact, authorized Gallagher to remove the children. Rather, he claimed, once the conditions in Paragraph O were met, Gallagher was required to seek his authorization and the approval of the Italian court system in order to return to the United States. This was unpersuasive. The District Court found that Paragraph O was a result of negotiations in which Gallagher accepted an 80% reduction in spousal support per month in exchange for this clause. It also credited Gallagher's testimony that she perceived the clause to be a safety net in the event of Pignoloni's failure to provide spousal and child support. The District Court's credibility determinations on these issues were not clearly erroneous. Furthermore, its interpretation of the 2011 Separation Agreement—based on Italian contract law and relying on Pignoloni's legal expert—were correct. For substantially the reasons stated by the District Court, it adopted its conclusions as to Paragraph O. The Italian court decision did not change this conclusion. The District Court's holding that Paragraph O effected Pignoloni's ex ante consent applied whether or not Paragraph O could modify the actual, legally enforceable custody arrangement between the parties. That was so because, on a plain reading of the agreement, Pignoloni consented to Gallagher's removal of the children if certain conditions came to pass. The District Court determined that those conditions did indeed come to pass. That was sufficient to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Pignoloni had consented. Such a finding did not conflict with the Italian court decision.       


 Accordingly it affirmed the District Court's finding that Pignoloni consented to the children's removal and retention in Paragraph O of the 2011 Separation Agreement. 


Darin v. Olivero-Huffman, --- F.3d ----, 2014 WL 1053775 (C.A.1 (Puerto Rico)) [Argentina] [Habitual Residence] [Consent] [Acquiescence] [Petition granted]


In Darin v. Olivero-Huffman, --- F.3d ----, 2014 WL 1053775 (C.A.1 (Puerto Rico)) Lisandro Jonathan Darin ("Darin") initiated  proceedings against Lua Cecilia Olivero-Huffman ("Olivero"), seeking the return of their son ("LAD") to Argentina from the United States. In 2007 the parties entered into a romantic relationship. Olivero became pregnant, and by then the parties were living together in Olivero's apartment. During the pregnancy, Darin and Olivero traveled together to the United States, returning to Argentina prior to the arrival of their son. LAD was born in Buenos Aires on April 20, 2008, and was a citizen of both the United States and Argentina. Following the birth of their son, the parties moved into a Buenos Aires apartment Darin had inherited from his father.  

      On January 31, 2011, the family traveled to the United States. Their first stop
was Orlando, Florida, where they spent a total of four days. The family then moved
on to Puerto Rico. At the outset of the trip, the plan was to spend some time in
Puerto Rico with Olivero's family and then fly back to Argentina on March 2, 2011.
However, during their stay in Puerto Rico, the plan began to change and the date
of return was pushed back due to Olivero's involvement in a car accident and her
apparently new-found interest in pursuing a business venture with her sister.
Around mid-March 2011, Olivero announced to Darin that neither she nor LAD would
be returning to Argentina. Darin remained on the island as long as he could, but
his tourist visa was set to expire in July 2011.   On July 7, 2011-just two days before Darin's departure-Darin and Olivero executed an affidavit regarding the care and supervision of their son during Darin's absence. Olivero drafted the Affidavit herself. The Affidavit's terms authorized her to take any steps necessary to provide for the education, health care, and overall well-being of the child. A provision authorizing the child to travel with either parent was there as well. At Darin's insistence, language was included stating he was leaving the United States "against his will" and was not abandoning his child. He eventually left the country on July 9, 2011.  Thereafter, although separated geographically, Darin maintained continuous and frequent communication with his son.

    On November 18, 2011, Olivero filed for legal custody of LAD in Puerto Rico
state court. According to the custody petition, Olivero filed so that she could
"send [LAD] to visit [Darin] at Christmas," since they had not been able to reach
an agreement and she feared the retention of the child.  On December 19, 2011,
Darin filed an application under the Convention with the Argentina Central
Authority requesting the return of his son to Argentina. On February 22, 2012,
Darin filed the action with the federal district court in Puerto Rico, alleging Olivero's actions amounted to a "wrongful retention" of his son.

        After holding a hearing the district court concluded that Darin had not met his
burden of establishing a wrongful removal or retention. Indicating that the
alleged removal or retention had occurred in July 2011, on the date which Darin
left Puerto Rico, the court found that as of that time "a new habitual residence in [the United States] was acquired based on the parents' shared intention in signing the affidavit."  Darin had, according to the court, "acquiesced/consented" to LAD remaining in Puerto Rico. The court concluded that because LAD "was a habitual resident of Puerto Rico at the time of the claimed removal or retention," the retention or removal was not wrongful. It denied Darin's petition and dismissed his claims.

           The First Circuit reversed. No one disputed that  Darin had custody rights over LAD or that he was exercising them at the time of the alleged retention. The only question was whether Darin established by a preponderance of the evidence that Argentina ( was LAD's habitual residence prior to his retention. The district court thought Darin fell short, Upon  de novo review the First Circuit disagreed with it and found that he established habitual residence in Argentina.

  The First Circuit diverged from the district court on the question of when
LAD's alleged retention occurred. The district court indicated that the relevant date of retention was July 2011, which was when Darin left Puerto Rico. Darin argued that the retention occurred in mid-March 2011, when Olivero informed him that she would be remaining in Puerto Rico. The Fifth Circuit found the record supported Darin's position. By mid-March 2011, Olivero made it clear to Darin that she and their son would be permanently residing in the United States. Her actions afterwards only confirmed this. Olivero, true to her word, refused to return to Argentina.  Once Olivero decided to stay in the United States with the child, there was nothing Darin could do to prevent a separation from his son. His tourist visa excluded the possibility of staying indefinitely with LAD in the United States, and he could not take LAD back to Argentina because the POA authorizing the child to travel with only one parent had been revoked.  As of mid-March 2011, Darin had no legal way of remaining with his son.

The next question was whether Argentina was LAD's habitual residence in mid-March 2011. The Court observed that a child's habitual residence is the place where he or she has been physically present for an amount of time sufficient for acclimatization and which has a 'degree of settled purpose' from the child's perspective. In cases involving more than one potential residence, a distinction must be made between the abandonment of a prior habitual residence and the acquisition of a new one.  When the question is whether a young child-lacking both the material and psychological means to decide where he or she will reside-has abandoned a prior
habitual residence, "the intention or purpose which has to be taken into account
is that of the person or persons entitled to fix the place of the child's residence." Mozes, 239 F.3d at 1076.  Generally, it is "the parents' shared intent or settled purpose regarding their child's residence" that guides the inquiry.  One parent's wishes are not sufficient, by themselves, to effect a change in a child's habitual residence.   Utilizing Darin's July 2011 departure date as the operative date of retention, the district court found that the Affidavit (signed a couple days before), "clearly show[ed] the parents' last shared intent in determining habitual residence." The court's ultimate conclusion was the United States was LAD's habitual residence prior to the alleged retention. Upon conducting a de novo review, the Fifth Circuit concluded that this determination was flawed.   Based on the uncontested facts, it was safe to say that, prior to mid-March  2011, the parties' shared intent was not for the child to be a habitual resident
of the United States. It was the parties' shared intent to return to Argentina on March 2, 2011. Olivero did not deny this was the plan; she testified as much. Olivero admitted it was she who had a change of heart once in Puerto Rico and decided to stay there with her son. A unilateral decision is not enough. There was simply no evidence in the record from which the district court could have found a mutual intent to change their son's habitual residence on the date of retention.   Furthermore, the district court was misguided in emphasizing LAD's acclimatization to the United States for purposes of its habitual residence determination. Evidence of acclimatization is not enough to establish a child's habitual residence in a new country when contrary parental intent exists. See Mozes, 239 F.3d at 1078-79. A "change in geography" and "the passage of an appreciable period of time ... that is sufficient for acclimatization" are considerations for the court when "the decision to alter a child's habitual residence depends on the shared settled intention of the parents."  In the absence of shared parental intent, the district court should have "be [en] slow to infer ... an earlier habitual residence has been abandoned."    The evidence on record did not show that the parties shared an intent to change LAD's habitual residence to the United States, but instead it pointed only to Olivero's individual intent to do so. Accordingly, it concluded that the district court's finding otherwise was clearly erroneous. Applying the de novo standard of review the ultimate habitual residence determination calls for it found that Darin had established by a preponderance of the evidence that LAD's habitual residence as of the retention was Argentina, and that Olivero wrongfully retained LAD in the United States.

The Fifth Circuit found that the district court, incorrectly using the terms consent and acquiescence interchangeably, found that Darin had agreed to LAD remaining in the United States. It found that Darin, by signing the Affidavit, "voluntarily and without
intimidation, threats or coercion" was agreeing that LAD could stay in the United
States for an indefinite period of time. The district court also found that Darin had "consent[ed] to LAD's retention in the United States because he "failed for five
(5) months to make any meaningful effort to obtain return of the minor child and
failed to pay any child support." The evidence on record compelled the Fifth Circuit to conclude that the district court got it wrong.

The consent inquiry focuses on the time prior to the retention and therefore Darin's signing of the Affidavit was out of play. Focusing on the parties' conduct prior to mid-March 2011, there was little Olivero could rely on to support a consent defense during this time period. The objective facts in the record pointed to one conclusion only: Darin did not consent to LAD's retention in the United States in mid-March 2011. Olivero did not make the required preponderance-of-the-evidence showing and her consent defense failed. Because the defense of acquiescence pertains only to what happened post-retention, the relevant period was  between mid-March 2011
and Darin's filing of the petition for return on December 19, 2011.  Acquiescence tends to require more formality than consent. When attempting to characterize ambiguous conduct as a basis for inferred acquiescence, courts employ a pure subjective intent inquiry. The subjective intent refers to the subjective intent of the parent who is claimed to have acquiesced. Olivero's primary argument was that the Affidavit evidences Darin's acquiescence to LAD remaining in the United States. This was a dead end. Acquiescence to LAD's retention in the United States could not be found in the plain language of the Affidavit, nor could the Affidavit be read to imply such. The district court was mistaken in concluding it did.  A reading of the Affidavit revealed no mention in the entire two-page document, express or implied, of establishing a new residence in, or permanently relocating to, the United States.  Also, the fact that the Affidavit contained open-ended terms was not evidence that Darin acquiesced to LAD remaining permanently in the United States. Both parties testified that they executed the Affidavit so Olivero could take care of LAD while Darin was away.  In light of the Affidavit's language and the parties' testimony as to their reasons for its execution, the Affidavit simply could not be read as a declaration of acquiescence, much less unconditional acquiescence, to the retention of the child in the United States. The defense of acquiescence calls for definiteness and clarity, i.e., a clear and unequivocal expression of an agreement or a convincing written renunciation of rights. The Affidavit fell far short.    Moreover, the Affidavit did not support the district court's alternative finding that it functioned as a renunciation of rights under the Convention.

    Olivero contended that Darin's acquiescence could be inferred from some of
his actions after he left Puerto Rico. She argued that Darin's filing of the  petition for return in December 2011 was inconsistent with Darin opposing LAD's relocation to the United States. That Darin took around five months to file the petition after he was back in Argentina was not enough to constitute acquiescence. The fact that Darin officially filed on December 19, 2011 did not mean he decided to pursue legal action on that day.    Furthermore, the Convention allows for a petition to be filed up to a year after the wrongful retention. See Convention, supra Article 12 at 1502. And even when a petition is filed after the one year period, there are instances where a federal court may still order a child's return. To say that Darin acquiesced because he filed within the time prescribed by the Convention is irrational. It would render the Convention's one year provision pointless. Darin had a full year to file his petition, and he did file within that year. In this particular instance, the passage of time between Darin's departure from the United States and his filing of a timely petition for return was not probative of acquiescence.

      Darin established wrongful retention by a preponderance of the evidence.
Because Olivero did not introduce sufficient evidence to establish Darin's consent
or acquiescence to this retention, the court  ordered the return of LAD to Argentina.

Mendoza v Silva, 2014 WL 658068 (N.D.Iowa) [Mexico] [ Attorneys Fees] [Clearly inappropriate]



In Mendoza v Silva, 2014 WL 658068 (N.D.Iowa)   Plaintiff Maria Guadalupe Aguilar Mendoza, a citizen of Mexico, filed an action pursuant to the Hague Convention to secure the return of her daughters, to Mexico. After the district court ordered Mr. Medina to transfer the minor children to Ms. Mendoza at the United States/Mexico border in Nuevo Laredo, Mexico, the case was before the district court on Ms. Mendoza's December 20, 2013, Motion For attorney's fees totaling $32,265.00 and expenses totaling $3,084.62.

Mr. Medina contended that no award of fees or expenses was appropriate because he believed (and still believes) in good faith that the parties had an agreement for the children to come to and remain in the United States to start school; the attorney's fees and costs claimed by Ms. Mendoza were not reasonable and, were  approximately three times his own attorney's fees; and he was earning only approximately $9.00 per hour, so that he could not possibly afford to pay any attorney's fees or expenses in this matter.

         The district court surveyed the relevant cases under  42 U.S.C. § 11607(b)(3) and observed that there is a relatively small, but significant group of decisions of the Circuit Courts of Appeals concerning the standards for awards of fees and expenses under these provisions. (Citing Hollis v. O'Driscoll, 739 F.3d 108, 113 (2d Cir.2014) ; Ozaltin v. Ozaltin, 708 F.3d 355, 377 (2d Cir.2013); Whallon v. Lynn,  356 F.3d 138, 140 (1st Cir.2004);  West v. Dobrev, 735 F.3d 921, 932 (10th Cir.2013). The appropriate standards for awarding fees and expenses in international child return cases are as follows: [Section] 11607(b)(3) retains what we have previously described as the  "equitable" nature of cost awards.  Moore v. County of Delaware, 586 F.3d 219,  221 (2d Cir.2009).... [A] prevailing petitioner in a return action is presumptively entitled to necessary costs, subject to the application of  equitable principles by the district court. Absent any statutory guidance to the  contrary, the appropriateness of such costs depends on the same general  standards that apply when "attorney's fees are to be awarded to prevailing  parties only as a matter of the court's discretion." Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc.,  510 U.S. 517, 534, 114 S.Ct. 1023, 127 L.Ed.2d 455 (1994)."There is no precise  rule or formula for making these determinations, but instead equitable
 discretion should be exercised in light of the [relevant] considerations."Ozaltin, 708 F.3d at 375.   The Circuit Courts of Appeals have also provided guidance on specific considerations that go into the district court's exercise of its discretion and equitable consideration of claims for fees and expenses in international child return cases. First, where the respondent "is not blameless for the current state of affairs," the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that an award of fees and expenses is not "clearly inappropriate."  West, 735 F.3d at 933.   On the other hand, where the respondent had a "reasonable basis for thinking at the time of removing the children to the United States ... that her actions were consistent with [the law of the country of habitual residence]," that belief, even if mistaken, "is a relevant equitable factor when considering whether a costs award is appropriate." Ozaltin, 708 F.3d at 375. Also, "[a]t least two courts of appeals have recognized that a fee award in a case under the Convention might be excessive and an abuse of discretion if it prevents the respondent-parent from caring for the child." Norinder v. Fuentes, 657 F.3d 526, 536 (2d Cir.2011) (citing  Whallon, 356 F.3d at 139, and  Rydder, 49 F.3d at 373-74).   Several district courts have not simply reduced awards of costs in light of a respondent's inability to pay, but have declined to award costs at all, where the losing respondent would be unable to pay any amount of an award, on the ground that any award would be "clearly inappropriate" in such circumstances.

      The district court concluded that it was "clearly inappropriate" to award any of Ms. Mendoza's claimed legal fees against Mr. Medina. The court found it to be a very close case. It believed that Mr. Medina had a mistaken, but nevertheless good faith belief that the parties had agreed that he would take the children to the United States where they would attend school. See  Ozaltin, 708 F.3d at 375. Just as importantly, it  found that Mr. Medina's financial circumstances made it "clearly inappropriate" to award any substantial amount of attorney's fees against him. Doing so would interfere with his ability to provide other support to his children. Mr. Medina earned approximately $9 per hour, and the record did not show that he had any other assets from which so large a fee award could be satisfied. However, with regard to Ms. Mendoza's claimed expenses it found that even considering Mr. Medina's financial condition, awarding some share of Ms. Mendoza's expenses is consistent with the goals of Article 26 of the 1980 Hague Convention and 42 U.S.C. § 11607(b)(3); and, in part, because Ms. Mendoza had some obligation to pay these expenses out-of-pocket, even if her legal representation was pro Bono.  It awarded her one-half of her claimed expenses, that is $1,542.31,against Mr. Medina.

Friday, March 14, 2014

Neergaard v Colon, 2014 WL 936691 (D.Mass.) [Singapore] [Habitual Residence] [Petition Granted]



In Neergaard v Colon, 2014 WL 936691 (D.Mass.) Petitioner Peter Moeller Neergaard, a Danish citizen, and respondent Lisette Neergaard Colon, a United States citizen, lived in Singapore with their two minor daughters, S.S. and L.A.  Petitioner and respondent were married. Petitioner worked for a software company in Singapore.. His employer expects him to work in Singapore for three years, beginning in June 2012. Respondent, who worked for the Boston Public Schools, requested an extension of her maternity leave through June 2015, the conclusion of the three-year period. The couple had two daughters, S.S., age 3, and L.A., age 2. The daughters were dual Danish and American citizens.   In December 2013, the parties and the children traveled to Denmark to celebrate Christmas. They agreed that on January 4, 2014, respondent and her children would fly to the  United States and remain here for two weeks. Respondent reserved seats for herself and the children on a return flight to Singapore on January 20, 2014, but they did not board the plane. Since that time, the parties were unable to resolve the situation among themselves. The remained in the United States. Petitioner filed a verified petition for immediate return of the children to Singapore pursuant to the Hague Convention. After a hearing the district court granted the petition. 

Respondent did not challenge the substantive allegations of the petition , nor did she allege that any of the  exceptions excusing the ordering of immediate return upon a finding of wrongful retention applied. The dispute  boiled down to the following question: what was the children's habitual residence immediately preceding the retention? If it was Singapore, the retention is unlawful. If it was the United States, it is lawful.

Petitioner contended that "[t]he parties' only shared intention was to leave the U.S. and reside in Singapore. The parties rented a house in Singapore and shipped their belongings there. They  opened a bank account and bought health insurance in Singapore. They enrolled S.S., their eldest daughter, in educational programs. Both daughters  lived in Singapore for the majority of their lives. They had regular "play dates" with friends there. Id. In short, "[t]he children have become  accustomed to life in Singapore since their arrival in June 2012.

Respondent contended that the parties understood that the move to Singapore 
was temporary; they did not agree to stay there beyond the three-year job assignment. Petitioner had obtained permanent resident status in the United States and met with an attorney to make sure the move to Singapore did not  compromise that status. They owned two condominiums in Boston, the second of which they purchased the week  before they moved.  Respondent did not extend her maternity leave beyond the end of the three-year assignment and intends to return to work at that time.   According to her, "[p]eople who share an intent to abandon the United States for a new home in Singapore do not behave in that manner.”

The district court found that the parties agreed to move to Singapore for three years, and the three-year period had not yet elapsed. "To establish an habitual residence, it is not necessary to have an intention to stay in a place indefinitely."  McManus v. McManus, 354 F.Supp.2d 62, 67 (D.Mass.2005). What is  required is a " 'sufficient degree of continuity to be properly described as settled.' "  Feder v. Evans-Feder, 63 F.3d 217, 223 (3d Cir.1995) (quoting re Bates, No. CA 122-89, High Court of Justice, Family Div'l Ct. Royal Courts of Justice, United Kingdom (1989)). Petitioner found work in Singapore and the parties settled there to live as a family, even if not indefinitely. They did what people who settle in a new place do: find a house, open financial accounts, establish medical care, and explore schooling options. Respondent's intention not to remain there cannot overcome this undisputed fact. The Court found that the parties' shared the intention that S.S. and L.A. reside in Singapore. The record showed that S.S. and L.A. had acclimated to Singapore.  Given the parties' shared intention to live in Singapore as a family and the degree to which  S.S. and L.A. have adapted to life there, the court found that  Singapore was the children's place of habitual  residence in January 2014 when respondent retained them in the United States, and granted the petition.

Friday, March 7, 2014

Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez [United Kingdom] [Equitable tolling]

In Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, --- S.Ct. ----, 2014 WL 838515 (U.S.) Respondent Montoya Alvarez and petitioner Lozano resided with their daughter in London until November 2008, when Montoya Alvarez left with the child for a women's shelter. In July 2009, Montoya Alvarez and the child left the United Kingdom and ultimately settled in New York. Lozano did not locate Montoya Alvarez and the child until November 2010, more than 16 months after Montoya Alvarez and the child had left the United Kingdom. Lozano filed a Petition for Return of Child pursuant to the Hague Convention in the Southern District of New York.

The United States ratified the Hague Convention in 1988, and Congress implemented the Convention that same year through the International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA). 102 Stat. 437, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11601–11610. That statute instructs courts to “decide the case in accordance with the Convention.” § 11603(d). Echoing the Convention, ICARA further provides that “[c]hildren who are wrongfully removed ... are to be promptly returned unless one of the narrow exceptions set forth in the Convention applies.” § 11601(a)(4). ICARA requires the abducting parent to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Article 12's exception to return applies. § 11603(e)(2)(B). Article 12 of the Convention states the general rule that when a court receives a petition for return within one year after the child's wrongful removal, the court “shall order the return of the child forthwith.”  Article 12 further provides that the court, “where the proceedings have been commenced after the expiration of the period of one year [from the date of the wrongful removal], shall also order the return of the child, unless it is demonstrated that the child is now settled in its new environment.” Thus, at least in some cases, failure to file a petition for return within one year renders the return remedy unavailable. 

Finding that the petition was filed more than one year after removal, the district court denied the petition on the basis that the child was now settled in New York. It also held that the 1–year period could not be extended by equitable tolling. In re Lozano, 809 F.Supp.2d 197, 204 (S.D.N.Y.2011). “Viewing the totality of the circumstances, ” the court found sufficient indicia of “stability in her family, educational, social, and most importantly, home life,  to conclude that the child was settled in her current environment and that repatriation would be “extremely disruptive Lozano argued that the child should be returned forthwith because the 1–year period in Article 12 should be equitably tolled during the period that Montoya Alvarez concealed the child. The court rejected that argument, holding that the 1–year period could not be extended by equitable tolling. The District Court held in the alternative that even if equitable tolling could apply, it would not be warranted in this case because Lozano had contact information for Montoya Alvarez' sister Maria in New York. Lozano's solicitors did not attempt to contact Maria to determine if Montoya Alvarez and the child were there. 809 F.Supp.2d, at 229–230. Consistent with Second Circuit precedent, see Blondin v. Dubois, 238 F.3d 153, 164 (2001), the District Court also considered “whether to exercise its discretion and repatriate the child even though she was now settled in New York.” 809 F.Supp.2d, at 234. The court declined to exercise that discretion because the “strong evidence that the child is quite settled in New York” outweighed Lozano's “fairly diligent” search efforts and Montoya Alvarez' conduct. On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed. 697 F.3d 41 (2012). The Court of Appeals agreed that the 1–year period in Article 12 is not subject to equitable tolling. The United States Supreme Court, in an opinion for a unanimous court by Justice Thomas, held that Article 12's 1–year period is not subject to equitable tolling and affirmed.

Thursday, February 27, 2014

In re One Infant Child, 2014 WL 704037 (S.D.N.Y.) [Fees and Costs]

In In re One Infant Child,  2014 WL 704037 (S.D.N.Y.) the District Court awarded the successful petitioner attorneys fees of  $ 217,949.56, attorney's costs of $1,274.08, fact witness fees of $6,279.52, expert witness fees of $2,400, transcript fees of $1,465.20, lodging and travel fees of     $20,451.88 and Investigative fees of  $33,246.38 . [See Souratgar v. Fair, 12 Civ. 7797 (PKC), 2012 WL 6700214, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 26, 2012) aff’d Souratgar v. Lee, 720 F.3d 96 (2d Cir.,2013)]. 
                
           The District Court observed that the 'lodestar' approach is the proper method for determining the amount of reasonable attorneys' fees once a court orders the return of the child under the Hague Convention." (Citing Knigge v. Corvese, 01 Civ. 5743 (DLC), 2001 WL 883644, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6,2001) (quoting Distler v. Distler, 26 F. Supp. 2d 723, 727 (D.N.J. 1998). It observed that "Both [the Second Circuit] and the Supreme Court have held that the lodestar-the product of a reasonable hourly rate and the reasonable number of hours required by the case-creates a "presumptively reasonable fee." (Citing Millea v. Metro-North R. Co., 658 F.3d 154, 166 (2d Cir. 2011). The presumptively reasonable attorney's fee is calculated by setting the reasonable hourly rate and multiplying it by the hours spent on the client's matter. (Citing Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass'n v. Cnty. of Albany and Albany Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 522 F.3d 182, 186 (2d Cir. 2008). "The reasonable hourly rate is the rate a paying client would be willing to pay." Id. at 190. The Court should endeavor to determine "the market rates prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation." Gierlinger v. Gleason, 160 F.3d 858, 882 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). The court "should ... bear in mind that a reasonable, paying client wishes to spend the minimum necessary to litigate the case effectively." Arbor Hill, 522 F.3d at 190. The starting point is a determination of whether the proposed hourly rate is reasonable in this district for the type of services and work. Id. In setting the reasonable hourly rate, Arbor Hill approves the use of the twelve Johnson factors cited in Arbor Hill and several related considerations: "the complexity and difficulty of the case, the available expertise and
capacity of the client's other counsel (if any), the resources required to prosecute the case effectively (taking account of the resources being marshaled on the other side but not endorsing scorched earth tactics), the timing demands of the case, whether an attorney might have an interest (independent of that of his client) in achieving the ends of the litigation or might initiate the representation himself, whether an attorney might have initially acted pro bono (such that a client might be aware that the attorney expected low or non-existent remuneration), and other returns (such as reputation, etc.) that an attorney might expect from the representation." rd. at 184.2 "[Considerations concerning the quality of a prevailing party's counsel's representation 2 See Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974), abrogated on other grounds by Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 92-93, 96 (1989). "The twelve Johnson factors are: (I) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) the level of skill required to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the attorney's customary hourly rate; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) the time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved in the case and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) normally are reflected in the reasonable hourly rate." Perdue v. Kenny A ex reI Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 553 (2010).


       In support of his attorneys' proposed hourly rates, Souratgar's counsel submitted the affirmation of a matrimonial law attorney  who attested that counsels billable rates were reasonable in this district for attorneys of their experience and qualifications. The district court appeared to discounted his affirmation because he did not state whether he was experienced in Hague Convention litigation or whether his hourly rate was consistent with the rates of other attorneys in this district who practice in this niche area of law.

The district court pointed out that in determining the reasonableness of the requested attorneys' fees, the Court considers the quality of the work done by the attorneys. The Court concluded that a rate of $425.00 per hour was reasonable on this record for lead counsel and $300.00 was reasonable for his associate. The Court awarded attorneys fees of $217,949.56. 

The court held that time billed for dealing visitation disputes during the pendency of the proceeding is not recoverable. See Saldivar v. Rodela, 894 F. Supp. 2d 916, 937 (W.D. Tex. 2012) (denying fees and costs incurred in obtaining a court order providing for increased visitation hours), Aldinger v. Seigler, 338 F. Supp. 2d 296,298 (D.P.R. 2004), affd, 157 Fed App'x 317 (1st Cir. 2005) (reducing fees in part because at least 20 billable hours were spent on visitation issues). 

       The application sought reimbursement for legal services by foreign attorneys, Gomez and Vasu.  Gomez was an Advocate and Solicitor who had practiced law in Singapore for 26 years.  Vasu has practiced law in Singapore for 16 years. Gomez and Vasu advised Souratgar’s attorney  on the laws of Singapore and Malaysia, discussed  legal strategy with him, and reviewed drafts of submissions to this Court and the Second Circuit. The court held that they were not entitled to be compensated for legal advice and strategy regarding Souratgar's case in the district court, nor may they recover for coordination between proceedings in the district court and other foreign tribunals. "[The foreign attorney] did not represent [Petitioner] in the instant action before this Court. There is no showing that [the foreign attorney] is admitted to practice in [this state] or before this Court. [Petitioner] has not submitted any authority which allows this Court to award fees and costs incurred by an attorney who does not represent a patty in an action before this Court." Freier v. Freier, 985 F. Supp. 710,714 (B.D. Mich. 1997). But see Distler v. Distler, 26 F. Supp. 723,728 (D.N.J. 1998) (awarding fees for a foreign attorney who provided legal services to the petitioner in support of the Hague Convention petition). 

Gomez testified as a fact witness, not as an expert witness, during the
evidentiary hearing. Souratgar v. Fair, 12 Civ. 7797 (PKC), 2012 WL 6700214, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 26, 2012). She  was entitled to reimbursement for travel expenses and lost time due to her testimony. Prasad v. MML Investors Services, Inc., 04 Civ. 380 (RWS), 2004 WL 1151735, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 24,2004) ("[T]he federal courts ... are generally in agreement that a witness may properly receive payment related to the witness' expenses and reimbursement for time lost associated with the litigation."). The Court awarded fact witness fees of $6,279.52. The Court held that  Gomez's business class flight was not compensable at the rate of  $ 8,113.00.  28 U.S.C. § l82l(c)(1) provides that a witness shall be paid for "the actual expenses of travel" at the "most economical rate reasonably available." See Salvidar, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 947 (applying 28 U.S.C. § 1821 to a Hague Convention case). Gomez's nightly hotel rate of $369.00 was within the range of reasonableness, and the Court compensated her for three nights.  Gomez charged Souratgar a daily fee of $783.63 per day, which she attested was a reduction of her usual rate. The Court found this rate reasonable compensation for her lost time. It observed that the average price of a hotel room in New York City in 2012 was $281.00. See "NYC Statistic page" NYC: The Official Guide, http://www.nycgo.comlarticles/nyc-statistics-page (last accessed January 30,2014). The hearing  was held in the month of December which is a peak period and the hearing was convened on relatively short notice. Accordingly, one would expect a higher than average rate.

Souratgar requested expert fees in the amount of $21,500. He sought $13,000 in
fees for the expert testimony of Awad, an expert on Singapore and Malaysian law. The Court found  that "To determine whether an expert's proposed rate is reasonable, courts in this Circuit are guided by eight factors: (1) the [expert]'s area of expertise, (2) the education and training that is required to provide the expert insight that is sought, (3) the prevailing rates for other comparably respected available experts, (4) the nature, quality and complexity of the discovery responses provided, (5) the cost of living in the particular geographic area, (6) the fee being charged by the expert to the party who retained him, (7) fees traditionally charged by the expert on related matters, and (8) any other factor likely to be of assistance to the court in balancing the interests implicated by Rule 26." Matteo v. Kohl's Dep't Stores, Inc., 09 Civ. 7830 (RJS), 2012 WL 5177491, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19,2012), affd, 533 Fed App'x 1 (2d Cir. 2013). 

Awad testified at trial regarding Islamic family law and the Singapore legal system. He testified that he is admitted to practice law in New York and New Jersey, and that a substantial part of his practice is devoted to matrimonial litigation. He also testified that he has certain expertise in Islamic family law and the family laws of Muslim countries. He stated on the record that he billed at the rate of $550.00 per hour. The court pointed out that in support of this motion, Souratgar  provided no evidence of Awad's rate, the services provided, or any data regarding comparable experts. He did  not establish what work Awad conducted that would make his fees reasonable. Souratgar did not provide relevant documentation of the services provided to him by Awad, or any evidence of Awad's compensation rate. The Court held that "In the face of very limited evidence, a court may, in its discretion, simply apply an across-the-board reduction of expert's fees. Matteo, 2012 WL 5177491, at *5.  The Court awarded expert witness fees of $2,400.


The Court found that there is no authority allowing a prevailing party to recover expert witness fees of a witness who did not testify at trial." Freier v. Freier, 985 F. Supp. 710, 714 (E.D. Mich. 1997). Accordingly, Souratgar's request for Dr. Lubit's fee ( a child psychologist)  was denied.

Souratgar sought $2,038.00 for his round trip flight from Singapore to New York,
$1,479.00 for his change of flight from New York to Singapore and his son's return flight to Singapore. The Court granted his motion for travel expenses in the amount 
of  $3,517.00 

Souratgar sought lodging fees totaling $22,579.84. The Court found that Souratgar did not establish that the cost of his accommodations was reasonable. Souratgar stayed in Kingston, New York, during the proceedings, which is located approximately 100 miles from the courthouse located in Manhattan. Souratgar only argued that the costs of lodging were reasonable because of the "cost of living in the New York metropolitan area."  Souratgar did not demonstrate that an average rent of approximately $2,800.00 per month in Kingston, New York was reasonable. Therefore the  Court found that a reduction in  the lodging costs of 25% was appropriate given the lack of documentation supporting the rate as reasonable. The Court granted Souratgar's motion for lodging expenses in the amount of $16,934.88.


The court noted that a petitioner may be entitled to recover investigation costs if such costs are "necessary" to secure the return of the child. Neves v. Neves, 637 F. Supp. 2d 322, 344 (W.D.N.C. 2009) (finding, after reviewing supporting documentation, that an expense of $10,324.65 in investigative fees was reasonable and necessary). The Court reviewed the supporting documentation for the investigative fees.
While some award of investigative fees was appropriate, it found that the fees should be reduced, as not all expenses were necessary to secure the child's return and Souratgar did not demonstrate that the rates charged by the investigators were reasonable. Souratgar submitted invoices from three separate investigative firms. The Court did not find that investigative fees incurred after the issuance of the warrant were necessary to secure the return of the child. Just as attorney's fees regarding visitation are not recoverable under the ICARA, investigator hours supervising visitation and other investigative work after the issuance of the warrant are not recoverable. Additionally, investigative hours spent conducting background checks on potential lawyers to bring the petition were not necessary to secure the return of the child, and are not compensable. Souratgar did not demonstrate the reasonableness of the rates paid for the investigative services. The court noted that "If the parties do not provide sufficient evidence to support the moving party's interpretation of a reasonable rate, a court may use its discretion to determine a reasonable fee.  Matteo, 2012 WL 5177491, at *5 (discussing expert and expert investigator fees). The Court concluded that of the $92,958.10 in fees incurred, $44,328.50 were necessary costs to secure the child's return. 

The Court pointed out that Fair argued that  awarding any fee would be clearly inappropriate  because: (1) of Souratgar's past abusive behavior towards Fair. (2) her inability to pay; (3) her son would be adversely affected by any award because further financial strain will impede her ability to pay her Singapore counsel, which would prevent her from obtaining representation in future  custody hearings and may result in the complete loss of the child's relationship with Fair. 

  The Court found that Souratgar engaged in abusive conduct towards Fair.  
Souratgar v. Fair, 2012 WL 6700214, at *11. But Fair did not establish that the past abuse in this case made an award of fees clearly inappropriate. Fair did not establish that the past abuse of her was causally related to her decision to  leave Singapore with her son in violation of a court order issued by a court of that country. 

 Fair asserted that she lacked the financial resources to pay any award. She was represented by pro bono counsel. Fair attested that  pro bono representation in Singapore was unavailable to her. She stated that she owed approximately $17,600 in car payments and $3,820.45 in attorney's fees to the law firm that represented her in proceedings in Singapore. Fair had not worked in 5 years. She did  not provide the Court with any other information regarding her current income. Her Central Provident Fund Board  Account, contained $149,558.59. While it ws not clear that Fair would be able to access the funds in her CFP account in the near future, she did not demonstrate that she would never have access to those funds.   Fair owned a one-third interest in a family property in Malaysia. Fair asserteds that she held this interest in trust for 
her brother; however, Fair came forward with nothing other than her say-so to support the claim of trust. In the absence of documentation for the alleged trust arrangement, she failed to establish that this interest would not be properly reachable by the judgment.

Fair's claim as to the effects in custody proceedings if an award of fees was 
entered against her was speculative. Fair provided the Court with a bill from her Singapore  lawyers  but did not demonstrate, beyond speculation, that she would 
be unable to acquire representation in the Singapore proceedings as a result of a fee award.  Fair did not provide the Court with any concrete information about how her lack of funds might affect her under Singapore or Malaysian law. She did not endeavor to explain whether and to what extent her wages may be subject to garnishment or pension assets reached, whether and to what extent her interest in property jointly owned with others in Malaysia could be reached, whether and to what extent a judge presiding over a divorce proceeding with her present husband, Souratgar, could take account of the judgment in adjudicating her rights to any marital or other property. Instead, Fair speculated that she was likely to face jail time because Mr. Souratgar's Singapore lawyer has made it clear that Souratgar intends to pursue his contempt of court application". Fair did not proved the Court with any documentation of her assets or income beyond the CFP account and the deed of her interest in her family's home. 


The court concluded that Fair had not established that an award would be clearly inappropriate, and that she wrongfully removed her son from Singapore and absconded to the United States. By doing so, she violated an order of the Court in Singapore and demonstrated an indifference to whether the young boy would ever see his father again. An unreduced award  on the basis of Fair's inability to pay would not be "clearly inappropriate."