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Wednesday, October 29, 2014

Application of Inna Kharlamova v. Roach, 2014 WL 4983837, (WD, Washington) [Canada] [Habitual Residence][Petition granted]



In Application of Inna Kharlamova v. Roach, 2014 WL 4983837, (WD, Washington)  Inna Kharlamova's petition for return of her two children to Canada was granted. The Petitioner and Respondent weret he parents of two daughter. Both children were born in Toronto, Canada. Petitioner was a Russian citizen who moved to Canada, from Russia, in 2001 and  obtained permanent resident status in Canada. Respondent Peter Roach was an American citizen. 

The Petitioner and Respondent met in Toronto 2001. After the birth of the children Respondent reconciled with his wife in 2006. The two children lived in Canada continuously until 2009. The Respondent maintained contact with his two daughters by visiting with them in Canada fairly regularly and provided financial assistance to the Petitioner for rent, food, various expenses including car insurance and for the girls.

On July 16, 2008 a Final Uncontested Order was entered in the Ontario Court of Justice which gave “final” custody of the two girls to Inna Sexton (Kharlamova) and permitted the Respondent to have access to each child. In addition, the Order permitted the Petitioner “to travel abroad without the consent of the Respondent father and was allowed to obtain, apply and renew passports for each child mentioned above without consent of the Respondent father.”  By letter dated June 22, 2008 the Respondent wrote to the Ontario Court of Justice and stated the following: “The issue of custody arose because of intended travel to Russia. As explained to me an extended stay in Russia required my two children to have Russian documentation, otherwise they would be provided tourist visas and would not be permitted to stay in Russia beyond 30 days. I am agreeing to grant Inna Sexton (Kharlamova) sole custody of the children to prevent any issues with travel, documentation or Russian laws until the children are back in Canada, or until Inna and I make further custody/family arrangements. Inna and I have agreed that I would have unrestricted access and visitation rights to the children.

According to the Petitioner, she obtained the Order from the Ontario Court of Justice to facilitate her plans to go to Russia to see her parents and her son, whom she had not seen since she moved to Canada in 2001. At the time of the trial her son was 17 years old and still resided in Russia. The Petitioner and her two daughters first went to Russia in August 2009 and returned to Canada until early October 2010. While her initial plan was to stay for several months, she extended her stay at her mother's request and because she wanted her daughters to learn more about Russia. The Respondent testified that he thought the Petitioner and the girls were moving to Russia and that Russia would be their home. His conclusion was based on the fact (1) that the Petitioner and the girls moved to Russia and (2) that nothing was left in her apartment as everything had been shipped. Prior to Petitioner and the girls traveling to Russia, the Respondent flew to Canada and helped the Petitioner pack. The Respondent pointed out that the Petitioner shipped 53 boxes of used household and personal effects which had a total weight of 2,576 lbs . Petitioner also stored a number of items in a storage facility in Toronto and left her truck in Toronto as well. These stored items were moved out of the storage facility on April 1, 2011.The Respondent's conclusion that in August 2009 the Petitioner intended to make her home in Russia was not based on a conversation or agreement. 

The Petitioner and the two girls returned to Toronto in October 2010. Following her return, the Respondent flew to Canada and helped the Petitioner find a place to live. The Petitioner next went to Russia with her daughters at the end of June 2011. The Petitioner's purpose of this visit was to see her mother and son and for her daughters to become closer to their brother and grandparents. When she went to Russia this time she stored some of her belongings with a friend, including her truck. The Petitioner provided no testimony regarding how long she initially planned to stay in Russia other than to say that she ended up staying longer than she had planned. She  testified that she never intended to relocate from Canada since becoming a permanent resident there and that testimony was not contradicted. The Respondent offered no testimony regarding any agreement or understanding between him and the Petitioner regarding the reason the Petitioner and the girls returned to Russia in June 2011. The Respondent did testify that the Petitioner was very concerned about not doing anything that would result in her losing her legal resident card with Canada. 

The girls remained in Russia until April 12, 2012, when Petitioner and Respondent agreed to meet each other in Berlin, Germany. The Respondent, with permission of Petitioner, took the two girls to Washington State with him. Prior to April 12, 2012 the girls had never been in the United States and had never lived with the Respondent. The girls  remained in Washington since that time. The parties agreed that initially the reason for the girls going to the United States was due to heart-related health problems of their oldest daughter and the need for evaluation and treatment of that condition. Both parties signed a “Permission to Travel with Minors Letter”  which reflected a travel date to Seattle on April 12, 2012 and an expected date of return of May 23, 2012. The Petitioner said this was needed as she had sole custody of the girls and this document would allow the father to travel with the girls without having any problems. 

After the Respondent picked up the girls in Berlin, the Petitioner went to Egypt in pursuit of her divemaster certification. In an email exchange between the parties on April 21 and 22, 2012  the Petitioner stated that she wanted her children returned on May 27, 2012  which was the date of the return tickets, and she requested that the children been sent to Egypt, where she planned to stay for another month, and then all three would return to Russia. In response the Respondent confirmed that the children would be “coming back on the date on the tickets.”  The girls were not returned in May and the parties eventually agreed that the Respondent would keep the girls over the summer. There clearly was a disagreement between the parties as to whether it was safe for the girls to be in Egypt while the Petitioner was pursuing her divemaster certification. The Respondent felt that there was too much unrest in Egypt so as to make it unsafe for the girls to live there. The Petitioner, on the other hand, felt that Egypt had a lot to offer her girls and she wanted them there with her.  The Petitioner also testified that the Respondent wanted to keep the girls in Washington over the summer because he had such a short period of time with them and he said he would return them in the fall of 2012. 

The testimony of the parties was divergent regarding the reason why the girls were not returned in the fall of 2012. According to the Petitioner, during October 2012 she wanted to know why the Respondent had not returned the girls. The Respondent said he did not have the money to return the girls and he was also working on obtaining citizenship for the youngest daughter. The Respondent told the Petitioner that he wanted to keep the girls with him longer because he thought the youngest might have to be interviewed for citizenship. So Petitioner agreed to leave the girls in the United States while the Respondent pursued citizenship for their daughter. At the time of this decision the Petitioner was not living in Canada. The Petitioner went to Egypt in April 2012 and left Egypt late January 2013. From Egypt she returned to Russia where she remained until mid April 2013 when she returned to Toronto. The Petitioner completed her divemaster training in June 2013 while in Toronto. 

          On May 19, 2013 petitioner sent an email to the Respondent advising him she had purchased tickets for the girls and the Respondent to fly to Canada on July 30, 2013.  Before the scheduled flight the Respondent called the Petitioner and told her he could not fly the girls to Toronto on that date The Petitioner filed her application with the Central Authority in Canada on January 27, 2014. According to the Respondent, the Petitioner told him she had to return to Russia on August 13, 2013 because her husband attacked her mother in her mother's apartment in Russia. The Petitioner returned to Canada on September 10, 2013 and the Respondent had decided prior to that date that he did not want to return his daughters Petitioner. He testified that in September 2013 he told the Petitioner that he was not going to return the girls to her.   The Court concluded that the habitual residence of the two girls, prior to their retention by the Respondent, was Canada. In order to establish a habitual residence, there must be a settled mutual intention of the parents. While there was no direct testimony in this regard, the circumstances surrounding the two girls living in Toronto led to the conclusion that the parents agreed to this as the girls habitual residence. They were both born in Toronto, attended school there when old enough, received medical care and the father visited with them in Canada.

The Respondent argued that the habitual residence in Canada was abandoned in favor of Russia. The court found there was no settled, mutual intention in this regard. There was no evidence presented about the parties having any discussion as to the reason the Petitioner and the girls would be going to Russia in 2009, how long they would be there or that they had any intention of making Russia their home. A letter written by the Respondent to the Ontario Court of Justice merely discussed an “extended stay” in Russia. In addition, the Respondent was very much aware of the fact that the Petitioner did not want to do anything that would cause her to lose her resident status in Canada. The Respondent asserted that the Petitioner and the two girls intended to make Russia their home when they moved there in 2009 because they moved out of the apartment and shipped all their belongings to Russia. The Court held that moving out of a rented apartment, when planning on an extended stay in Russia, cannot lead to the conclusion, without more, that the habitual residence in Canada was going to be abandoned. While the Petitioner did ship a large number of personal items to Russia, she also stored personal property in Canada, including her vehicle. If there had been no intention to return, it was reasonable to assume that the Petitioner would have sold the vehicle rather than stored it. Finally, the Petitioner and the two girls in fact returned to Canada after an extended stay in Russia. For these reasons, the Court concluded that with regard to the 2009 trip to Russia that there was no shared mutual intent to abandon Canada as the habitual residence as there was no agreement between the parties to that effect. 

The Petitioner again moved to Russia from Canada in the end of June 2011. The only testimony regarding the purpose of this trip was from the Petitioner and that was to visit with her mother and son and to have time for her daughters to become closer to their brother and grandparent. This could only lead to the conclusion that there was no shared, mutual settled intention to abandon Canada as the girls habitual residence. Since there was no shared mutual settled intention to abandon Canada, the Court concluded that the Petitioner was away from her habitual residence for a temporary absence of long duration. 

Because there was never a shared mutual intent to abandon Canada as the habitual residence for the two girls, the Court  had to consider whether there were objective facts which pointed to that conclusion. The Court concluded that being present in Russia which permitted her mother and son to move to a larger apartment, starting the process of obtaining real property in Russia, and the permission granted the Petitioner by the Respondent to change the place of registration for the girls in Russia did not point to an intention, on the part of the Petitioner, to change her habitual residence. Rather, the steps taken by the Petitioner were her right as a Russian citizen. Nothing was presented to the Court to show that these actions could only have been taken if the Petitioner intended to reside permanently in Russia. Even marrying while in Russia did  not support the argument of abandonment as her husband, though they were separated, now resides in Canada. 

In addition, there was no evidence before the Court for it to conclude that the Petitioner abandoned Canada as the habitual residence of the girls in favor of the United States. The Court could not conclude that the evidence of acclimatization was sufficient to establish that Canada has been abandoned as the girls habitual residence due to acclimatization. In  light of the Court's direction to “be slow to infer from such contacts that an earlier habitual residence has been abandoned” the Court did not believe that the evidence was sufficient to overcome this directive. The Court concluded that returning the girls to Canada would not be tantamount to taking them “out of the family and social environment in which [their] life has developed. 

The Court concluded that the wrongful retention occurred in September 2013; that  the retention breached the rights of custody attributed to the Petitioner under the law of the habitual residence; and  the Petitioner was exercising her custody rights at the time of the retention.

Dawson v McPherson, 2014 WL 4748512 (M.D.N.C.) [United Kingdom] [Necessary Cos



In Dawson v McPherson, 2014 WL 4748512 (M.D.N.C.)) the petitioner moved pursuant to ICARA, for attorneys fees and expenses after the district court granted his petition for return of his children, C.M.S. and L.S. to the United Kingdom.

The Court's indicated that its decision to order the return of the Children to Petitioner signified that Respondent's actions were wrongful. The Court recognized that ICARA, by providing for an award of attorneys' fees and expenses after a judgment of wrongful removal or retention of a child, contemplates the use of such awards as a deterrent to violations of the Convention. In light of this purpose, and after careful review of the parties' pleadings on this issue, the Court found that Respondent failed to establish that it would be clearly inappropriate for the Court to award attorneys' fees and expenses to Petitioner in this instance. Therefore, the Court only had to determine the reasonableness of the dollar amount requested by Petitioner for fees and expenses related to the return of the Children. Petitioner requested a total of $41,938.57 in attorneys' fees and expenses and $7,795.78 for other, non-legal expenses incurred by Petitioner in securing the return of the Children.

The district court held that it is well established that the "lodestar" for obtaining a Request for method for determining reasonable attorneys' fees.  Consistent with the general acceptance of the method, federal courts have applied the lodestar approach to cases where ICARA is at issue. The lodestar figure is determined by multiplying the number of reasonable hours expended times a reasonable rate. See  Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1939, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). To determine the reasonable rate and reasonable number of hours to use in calculating reasonable attorneys' fees under the lodestar approach, the Court is guided by the twelve "Johnson " factors: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) the level of skill required to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) the time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputations, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the "undesirability" of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases.  Rum Creek, 31 F.3d at 175; (citing  Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir.1974)). These "Johnson " factors are to be considered as part of the Court's
determination of the reasonable number of hours and the reasonable rate to be used in this case. See  Grissom, 549 F.3d at 320-21. Therefore, in applying the lodestar analysis, the Court has the discretion to reduce the award requested by Petitioner.  Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437. With this standard in mind, the Court determined  whether the number of hours incurred by Petitioner's attorneys in this matter were reasonable.   To establish the number of hours reasonably expended, Petitioner had to  "submit evidence supporting the hours worked." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433. The court indicated that number of hours should be reduced to exclude hours that are "excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary" in order to reflect the number of hours that would properly be billed to the client.   Where a district court finds a duplication in the hours reported by the attorney of the party requesting attorneys' fees, the court has discretion to exclude from the calculation of attorneys' fees hours that were not "reasonably expended."  Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433. Furthermore, "[w]here the attorney's
documentation is inadequate, or the claimed hours are duplicative or excessive, the [C]ourt may reduce the award accordingly.  Neves, 637 F.Supp.2d at 340 (citing Wasniewski, 549 F.Supp.2d at 972).

The Court found that there was a lack of specificity as it related to some of the work performed by Ms. Dildine, Ms. Hawkins, or Mr. Cox. There was also, what appeared to be duplication of the work done by Ms. Dildine, Ms. Feuchs-Marker, Ms. Hawkins, and Mr. Cox. As such, it was not possible for the Court to isolate or distinguish the exact number of hours Ms. Dildine, Ms. Feuchs-Marker, or their assisting staff spent on performing necessary tasks to prepare for this case or to determine why the efforts of these four individuals, on what appears to be very similar-if not the same-activities, were necessary in this case. Therefore, the Court  reduced the number of hours reported for work done by Petitioner's North Carolina representation by 20%.

 Petitioner's Leeds Representation reported 22.75 hours preparing the December 4, 2013 Request for Return Application under the Hague Convention  and assisted in "subsequent related matters through the end of December 2013." In support of these hours worked, Petitioner filed an affidavit along with an invoice, which purported to breakdown the fees charged for the Leeds Representation. The fee breakdown, however, was not as informative as the itemized list provided by Petitioner's North Carolina Representation. The fee breakdown contained the date of services, a description of services rendered, the name of counsel performing the services, the hours worked, counsel's rate per hour, the amount of time worked, and the billed amount. While the fee breakdown was detailed, in that it told who worked on the case, for how long, and how much was billed for the services, the explanation of the actual services was not descriptive. For instance, the description for one hour, for which the client was billed L921.25, stated "Attendance-Client."   Other examples of billed for time, included descriptions such as, "Long Telephone Calls-Client," Consideration/perusal-Detailed Correspondence/ emails-TOB letter," and "Preparation/drafting-Detailed File Note."  The court pointed out that Petitioner "bears the burden of establishing entitlement to an award and documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437. As it related to his Leeds Representation, Petitioner had failed to meet this burden. The Court was unable to decipher what tasks the Leeds Representation actually performed during the time for which they billed Petitioner based on the fee breakdown submitted by Petitioner. Therefore, it was impossible to know whether Petitioner was billed for duplicative efforts and whether the time billed for was spent on necessary tasks relevant to the action. Accordingly, the Court denied Petitioner's request for attorneys' fees for his Leeds Representation, because the Court could not determine whether any of the hours billed were reasonable in light of the factors to be considered.

   Once a reasonable number of hours has been determined, the Court must determine
a reasonable rate, "calculated according to the prevailing market rates in the relevant community." Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 1547, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984)."This determination is fact-intensive and is best guided by what attorneys earn from paying clients for similar services in similar circumstances." Rum Creek, 31 F.3d at 175.    Both the Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit prescribe a method of rate determination whereby the district court uses discretion influenced by "evidence of fees paid to attorneys of comparable skill in similar circumstances." Blum, 465 U.S. at 895;  Rum Creek, 31 F.3d at 175. In this instance, as to Petitioner's North Carolina Representation, the Court reviewed Ms. Dildine's Affidavit submitted by Petitioner and the Court has also reviewed the 2012 North Carolina Bar Association Economic Survey ("North Carolina Survey") outlining estimations of the hourly rates charged by attorneys and support staff. Based on this review, the Court found that a rate reduction was appropriate as to Ms. Dildine, Ms. Hawkins, and Mr. Cox. The Court found that Ms. Dildine's, Ms. Hawkins', and Mr. Cox's rates should be reduced based on this information, in order to achieve congruence with those rates charged for similar services in the North Carolina legal market. Therefore, the Court, in its discretion,  reduced the rates of Ms. Dildine to $215, Ms. Hawkins to $75, and Mr. Cox to $50. However, as to Ms. Feuchs-Marker's fee, the Court found the fee of $375 per hour was reasonable based on Ms. Feuchs-Marker's experience and the amounts billed by those with similar experience in North Carolina.

   Petitioner also requested that the Court award him $6,979.66 for non-legal expenses, for which he could provide documentation. Those amounts were attributed to (1) the cost of the round trip airline ticket for Petitioner; (2) the cost of the one-way airline tickets for the Children; (3) the cost of the change flight fee for Petitioner; (4) the cost of the private investigator hired to locate the
Children in the United States; and (5) Petitioner and the Children's lodging in the United States. The Court found these non-legal expenses to be properly documented and reasonable. Further, such expenses, which were incurred during the pendency of this action, were necessary and not inappropriate pursuant to 42 U.S.C.  11607(b)(3).See  Neves, 637 F.Supp.2d at 344 (finding that airfare, lodging, transportation, postage, and investigative expenses reasonable and necessary under ICARA). Thus, Petitioner was entitled to receive those actual expenses in the amount of $6,979.66, given the Court's finding as to the necessity of those expenses which were related to Petitioner's efforts to obtain the return of the Children under ICARA and the Hague Convention.

   Petitioner also requested an additional $816.12 in court costs relating to his Article 15 Declaration. Petitioner was unable to provide documentation concerning these expenses. Therefore, the Court was unable to assess the validity of such expenses. Accordingly, the Court declined to award Petitioner the expenses for which he could not provide documentation, specifically, as it related to Petitioner's
request for $816.12 in court costs associated with his Article 15 Declaration.

The court ordered that Respondent was to pay to Petitioner the total sum of $30,463.26, reflecting attorneys' fees in the amount of $23,483.60 and necessary expenses in the amount of $6,979.66.


De La Vera v Holguin, 2014 WL 4979854 (D. NJ) [Spain] [Habitual Residence] [Petition granted]



In De La Vera v Holguin, 2014 WL 4979854 (D. NJ) the district court granted the Petition of Washington Alberto Delgado De La Vera for the return of his two minor children to Spain.
Petitioner was a Spanish citizen residing in Zaragoza, Spain, and was the father of two minor children, K.H. and G.H. Respondent Sonia Piedad Holgguin, the mother of K.H. and G.H., was a Spanish citizen living in Trenton, New Jersey, with K.H. and G.H. In April 1999, the parties' first child, K.H., was born in Ecuador. In or around fall 2001, the parties moved with K.H. to Zaragoza, Spain.  The parties' second child, G.H., was born in September 2002 in Spain.. Although Petitioner and Respondent never married, the parties lived together with their two children as a familial unit in Zaragoza, Spain, from fall 2001 until July 2012. K.H. lived eleven years of her life, and G.H. lived ten years of her life, in Zaragoza, Spain. Petitioner was employed as a bus driver for over ten years in Spain. Respondent was primarily a stay at home parent who worked for a few months at a time through job placements by a staffing agency.

In July 2012, Respondent was unemployed and traveled to the United States through a visa-waiver, which permitted her to stay in the United States for ninety days, to find short-term work. Respondent purchased a round trip ticket to Orlando, Florida, arriving July 13, 2012 and with a return flight scheduled for October 5, 2012. Respondent left many of her personal items and effects in Zaragoza when she departed for the United States. Shortly after arriving in the United States, Respondent traveled to Trenton, New Jersey, where she knew classmates from Ecuador, and rented a room. From July 13, 2012, through September 14, 2012, the children resided with Petitioner at the family residence in Zaragoza. In September 2012, Respondent suggested to Petitioner that the children travel to the United States. The children traveled to the United States, arriving in Philadelphia on September 14, 2014, bringing along clothing, school records, immunization records, photographs, karate medals, and K.H.'s guitar. The children left many of their personal items and effects in Zaragoza. The children's return flight was scheduled for October 14, 2012. Petitioner testified that the children's trip to the United States was only supposed to be for one month, during which time they would visit their paternal grandfather and then travel back to Spain with Respondent. Petitioner stated that the children brought the guitar, photographs, and medals to “show their grandfather and to leave some of those things with him as a memento. Petitioner testified that he sent the children to the United States with their school and immunization records because Respondent told him “that all those documents were necessary so that you could move around the United States freely. So that if the police were to stop them by showing those documents, she could be supported by those documents.”
In contrast, Respondent testified that she suggested to Petitioner that the children travel to the United States to live with her and attend school in the United States, but Petitioner said no. Respondent stated then suddenly one day Petitioner called her and told her the children would be arriving in the United States that same week and for Respondent to find out the documents needed for the children to begin school when they arrived. As to the length of the children's stay in the United States, Respondent's testimony was inconsistent. First, Respondent testified that she and Petitioner discussed the possibility of the entire family relocating to the United States, including Petitioner and “the girls would come and then see if they would adapt here. If they didn't get adapted to this place, then we would return.”  Later Respondent, however, insisted that Petitioner “knew from the very beginning that the girls were not going to return to Spain” and that Petitioner was also going to move to the United States permanently.

The Court found that Petitioner initially agreed to allow the children to stay abroad for an indefinite duration to attend school in the United States. Petitioner sent the children to the United States at the beginning of the school year with their school records. Prior to leaving Spain, Petitioner did not send the children to the first few days of their school year in Spain. The Court found incredible Respondent's testimony that both parties agreed, before the children arrived in the United States, that the children were not going to return to Spain and that Petitioner would also relocate to the United States.

In October 2012 Respondent advised Petitioner she was ending her relationship with Petitioner for a new man in the United States and that the children would not be returning to Spain. The Court found that Petitioner did not consent to Respondent keeping the children in the United States and began to make arrangements to travel to the United States to bring the children back to Spain. Petitioner arrived in the United States on November 8, 2012. Petitioner intended to take the children on a trip to visit their paternal grandfather in Massachusetts and then bring the children back to Spain. Petitioner ultimately returned the children back to the custody of Respondent pursuant to a court order for temporary custody obtained by Respondent from the New Jersey Superior Court.
On December 8, 2012, Petitioner returned to Spain without the children because he was required to return to work. On December 11, 2012, Petitioner filed a report with the Spanish Department of Homeland Security stating the children were wrongfully detained in the United States without his consent. On or about December 22, 2012, Petitioner submitted a petition for the return of the children with the Spanish Central Authority. On or about July 10, 2014, Petitioner filed the Petition with the district Court.

During the two years of living in the United States, the children lived with Respondent at three different residences. Currently, Respondent rented two rooms from a couple she met after arriving in Trenton two years ago.  The children shared a bedroom on the same floor as the couple, and Respondent has a room in the basement. Respondent and the children share a kitchen and bathroom with the couple.  Respondent has also held four different jobs while in the United States and was working at a factory making approximately $450 per week.  Respondent did not have legal authority to work in the United States. Both children attended school in the United States for two years but did not participate in any extracurricular activities. The only extended family the children had contact with in the United States was Petitioner's father in Massachusetts but have only visited him on two occasions. They overstayed their visas and are not able to travel outside of the United States to visit other extended family members or Petitioner, and the children did not have healthcare insurance.
The Court interviewed K.H. and G.H. separately in camera.  K.H. was fifteen years old and had just begun the tenth grade. K.H. stated that she preferred to live in the United States but might have been okay with returning to Spain in November 2012 if her mother had returned with her and her sister.  G.H. just turned twelve years old and was in the seventh grade. When asked what types of things she does in the United States with her mother, G.H. could only identify going to the mall and had to be prompted to identify more activities such as playing games. When asked directly, G.H. stated she wanted to remain in the United States but did not give any reasons for her choice.

The Court observed that first step in its analysis was determining the actual date of the children's removal or retention “so as to establish the relevant date of [the children's] habitual residence for purposes of the Convention.” Karkkainen, 445 F.3d at 290. Here, the assertion was that the children were unlawfully retained here by Respondent. In determining the date of a wrongful retention, the court pointed out that Third Circuit has agreed that the wrongful retention does not begin until the noncustodial parent clearly communicates her desire to regain custody and asserts her parental right to have her child live with her.” The Court found that the date of retention may have taken place sometime during October 2012, but began no later than November 9, 2012. Petitioner testified that during October 2012 he contacted Respondent and Respondent told him that she intended to remain in the United States with the children permanently. After the telephone call, Petitioner understood that Respondent did not intend to bring the children back to Spain, informed her that he did not consent to the children remaining in the United States, and planned a trip to the United States to bring the children back to Spain.

Having determined that November 9, 2012 was the measuring date of the children's wrongful retention, the Court had to determine the place of the children's habitual residence as of this date. The record indicates that K.H. and G.H. had only been in the United States for a little over a month when the wrongful retention occurred. It could not be said that K.H. and G .H. became “firmly rooted in their new surroundings.”Karkkainen, 445 F.3d at 292. Furthermore, neither party argued that the children had acclimatized to the United States at the time of retention. It was undeniable that Spain was the children's habitual residence before they traveled to the United States. As there was no shared mutual intent, on the part of the parties, for the children to abandon their prior residence and no evidence that the children were acclimatized to the United States prior to retention, the Court concluded that the children's habitual residence immediately prior to November 9, 2012, was Spain.

The Court found that at the time of the children's retention in the United States, Petitioner had rights of custody as established by Spanish law. Respondent's retention over the children in the United States against Petitioner's will violated Petitioner's right to exercise parental authority over K.H. and G.H. in accordance with the Spanish Civil Code and Spanish Constitution. From July 2012 through September 2012, Petitioner was the primary caregiver of the children while Respondent was in the United States. Respondent acknowledged that Petitioner remained in contact with herself and the children during the first few weeks the children were in the United States. Once Petitioner was informed by the authorities in the United States he was not allowed to take the children with him back to Spain against Respondent's wishes, Petitioner began the legal process to have his children returned. These facts sufficiently establish that Petitioner was exercising his custody rights at the time of wrongful retention. The district court held that  Petitioner satisfied his prima facie burden of proving that K.H. and G.H. were wrongfully retained in the United States.

Respondent raised three affirmative defenses recognized by the Convention: (1) that Petitioner consented and acquiesced to the children's retention in the United States; (2) that proceedings were commenced more than one year after wrongful retention and the children are now “well settled” in the United States; and (3) that the children are at an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of their views, and both children stated they wanted to remain in the United States. The court, however, “retain[s] the discretion to order return even if one of the exceptions is proven.”Feder v. Evans–Feder, 63 F.3d 217, 226 (3d Cir.1995).

Nothing in the record demonstrated that Petitioner consented to the children's permanent retention in the United States or to Respondent making unilateral decisions regarding the children's future, nor was there evidence that Petitioner acquiesced to the present arrangement. The evidence did not support Respondent's contention that the arrangement was permanent. Moreover, since learning of Respondent's decision to retain K.H. and G.H. in the United States, Petitioner  objected and pursued his rights under the Convention. Thus, the record demonstrated that Petitioner agreed to allow the children to visit the United States for an indefinite period, but it was unclear that he agreed to anything beyond that. This intent fell short of the standard for finding consent or acquiescence under Article 13(a) of the Convention.

The Court found that K.H. and G.H. were not sufficiently settled here. The children arrived in New Jersey two years earlier and lived in three different residences, and currently shared an apartment with strangers Respondent had only known for a short period of time. The children were not involved in any extracurricular activities, and the only family they had, outside their mother, was a paternal grandfather they had only seen twice. Furthermore, Respondent's employment is not settled as she testified to having at least four different jobs since her arrival, some with hours in the middle of the night. Respondent testified that she dids not have the legal authority to work in the United States. Finally, while not a dispositive factor, the immigration status of Respondent and the children was a factor that disfavors finding the children settled in their new environment. Respondent and the children originally travelled to the United States on a tourist visa that expired in October 2012 and December 2012, respectively. Respondent had not applied for residency or any other visa on behalf of herself or her children. All three were here illegally and thus subject to deportation at any time. The Court found that Respondent had not proven that K.H. and G.H. have settled in their new environment.

The Court noted that while the child's wishes can be the sole reason that a court refuses to order the return of the child to his or her habitual residence a ‘court must apply a stricter standard in considering a child's wishes when those wishes are the sole reason underlying a repatriation decision and not part of some broader analysis,’ such as whether the child would suffer a grave risk of harm if returned to his or her habitual residence. . In analyzing whether to apply the “wishes of the child” exception a court should consider: “whether the child is of sufficient age and maturity for his or her views to be taken into account” and “whether a child's desire to remain or return to a place is the product of undue influence.” The children were fifteen years old and twelve years old and had been in the United States for just over two years. Both children were informally questioned in the presence of counsel but not the parties. Both children expressed the view that they would prefer to remain in the United States, but only K.H. provided reasons for her preference. K .H. expressed that she believed there were better opportunities for her in the United States than Spain and mentioned that she did not believe her mother would return to Spain if she was sent back there. K.H. acknowledged that her job opportunities and her life in the United States in general are more limited than in Spain because of her immigration status. Both children reported to have contact with their extended family members in Spain and acknowledged the only family they had in the United States was their mother and their paternal grandfather, who they had only seen twice. The Court found that K.H. has reached an age of maturity at which it was appropriate to take account of her views. The circumstances do not warrant providing their views controlling weight.  The children had lived here two years, at least in significant part, as direct result of their wrongful retention here by Respondent. As the Third Circuit noted, “[a] lengthy wrongful retention could enable the child to become comfortable in his or her new surroundings, which may create a desire to remain in his or her new home.”Yang, 499 F.3d at 280. In such a case, “application of the exception ... would reward [a respondent] for violating [a petitioner's] custody rights, and defeat the purposes of the Convention.”

In addition to requesting that this Court order K.H. and G.H.'s return to Spain, Petitioner sought Petitioner's expenses and costs, including attorney's fees and transportation costs, pursuant to 42 U .S.C. § 11607.  The Court had already determined that the assignment of pro bono counsel to Respondent was appropriate due to Respondent's financial circumstances and inability to pay. Thus, an award of expenses and costs would be “clearly inappropriate.” Petitioner's request for expenses and costs was denied.

Tuesday, October 28, 2014

Matter of R.B v. K.G., 2014 WL 5347587 (Fam Ct, 2014) [New York Family Court] [Israel] [Well Settled] [Age and Maturity]

In Matter of R.B v. K.G., 2014 WL 5347587 (Fam Ct, 2014) Petitioner-father R.B. filed petitions in early 2014, asserting that Respondent-mother K.G. wrongfully retained the subject children, M.B. (13) and G.B. (10), in the United States and that they should be returned to Israel, their country of habitual residence. The Family Court granted the petition.
The parents were born and married in Israel. Their two children were born in Israel and lived there for their entire lives until August 4–5, 2012, when the mother brought them to the United States. The parties August 12, 2007 divorce agreement was incorporated, but not merged, into a September 2007 judgment of divorce from a Family Court in Haifa, Israel. The Agreement stipulated that Ms. G. would have primary residential custody of the children and that both parents "will be guardians to the Children" within the meaning of Israeli custody law. It provided that: The Minors shall not leave Israel except upon the joint consent of the Husband and Wife. Notwithstanding the above, the Husband and Wife shall not withhold approval of the Minor's exiting the country where it is required for a trip abroad with the Husband or the Wife or any of their relatives or friends, for a period of up to 1.5 months. Both parties testified that, following the divorce, the father fully exercised his parenting and custodial rights in Israel. The children were closely bonded to each parent.
According to the mother's testimony, she developed an intent in or about December 2011 to spend at least a year in the United States with the children. She notified the father that she wished to do so, stating that she wished to study in the United States and that the children would have the opportunity to learn English. Mr. B. informed Ms. G. of his opposition to this plan. Over a period of several months, the parties attempted to hammer out an agreement through mediation. Ultimately, the father agreed to permit the children to accompany the mother to the United States for the one-year period of August 2012 to August 2013 provided that the mother agree to certain conditions. The parties never signed the agreement. The father testified that, ultimately, he did not want to interfere with the children's chance to spend a year in the United States and to learn English, and that he clearly understood that, even if not all of the financial arrangements were fixed, the children would in any case be returning within one year and that the mother would pay for his round-trip airfare to visit the children in the United States. The court found the father to be a truthful, very straightforward witness whose testimony the court credited. On August 4–5, 2012, the mother flew to New York with the children. Ms. G. did not return the children to Israel.
The father maintained regular contact with the children, by telephone and via Facetime, as well as through letters and packages. He tried to speak with the children about three times per week through telephone or Facetime, although he was not always successful. He visited the children in New York in October 2012, with the mother paying for his round-trip airfare. The father visited the children again in March 2013, staying with his new partner at a hotel in New York. The mother again paid for his round-trip airfare. During the spring 2013 visit, the mother raised for the first time the issue of having the children stay in New York for another year. The father adamantly opposed any extension. On April 6, 2013, the mother sent the father an email, stating in pertinent part,"... I have decided to try to extend our stay here for another year considering, among other things, the children's wishes and their best interest. " The father made clear his opposition to the children remaining in the United States.

In January 2014, the father, through counsel, filed a request for Family Court to register the Israeli divorce/custody order in New York and to enforce that order by directing the mother to return the children home to Israel. See DRL 77–d. On February 11, 2014, the mother filed an objection to the registration of the out-of-state custody order. The court held that the mother had not proffered any basis pursuant to statute to object to the registration of the order and that it was therefore proper to register the Israeli order.

Following the registration of the Israeli order, Mr. B.'s counsel re-filed the petition on March 3, 2014, seeking enforcement of the Israeli custody order and the return of the children to Israel, based in part upon the requirements of the Hague Convention. On May 5, 2014, the mother, through counsel, filed an answer and cross-petition seeking to "enforce and modify an order and for contempt of court." In the verified document, the mother specifically stated that the parties modified the 2007 Israeli order in 2012 and again in 2013. Ms. G. averred that the parties agreed in 2012 that the children would join her in New York "through the summer of 2013" and in 2013 that the children would remain in New York "through the summer of 2014." On June 11, 2014, the court on its own motion dismissed the mother's cross-petition for lack of jurisdiction for the reasons, citing, inter alia, DRL 76–b. The court indicated that determination as to habitual residence is fact-intensive and depends upon the most recent "settled intent" shared by those entitled to fix the children's residence, here their parents. Gitter, supra, 396 F.3d at 131–32. The focus is on the latest time the parents shared an intent. See also Hofmann v. Sender, 716 F.3d 282, 291–92 (2d Cir.2013). In making this determination, courts review the actions and declarations of the parents, as that normally controls the habitual residence of the children.

The Court found that Mr. B. established a prima facie of wrongful retention of the children. Although the parties did not actually sign the agreement permitting the mother to take the children to the United States before their trip to New York in August 2012, the parties had reached an understanding that the mother could take the children to New York for one year. The father, whose testimony the court credited based upon its observation of the father on the witness stand, as well as upon the logic and consistency of his testimony, acknowledged that he agreed to have the mother take the children to New York for one year from August 2012 to August 2013, although he and the mother could not come to terms on the financial assurances or penalties for noncompliance by the mother. Despite the mother's belated assertion that there was no firm agreement, her prior sworn statements that the initial trip to New York was for one year belied her later statements that it was for an indefinite period of time. In addition, based upon the mother's material inconsistencies in her sworn statements and testimony, as well as upon the court's observation of her demeanor on the witness stand, the court did not credit her testimony to the extent that it contradicted that of the father.

The parties' understanding that the mother could take the children for one year from August 2012 to August 2013 had great significance for the court's analysis. First, there was no wrongful removal of the children from Israel. The parties agreed to the one-year removal even though they did not sign a document. As that was the case, the claim by the mother and the attorney for the children that the father did not file the petitions within one year of the wrongful removal or retention of the children could not prevail. The father filed the proceedings in early 2014, well within a year of the alleged wrongful retention of the children in August 2013; consequently, the court could not analyze whether or not the children were well settled in their new environment and should not be returned.
There was no question but that the retention of the children in the United States after the initial year of August 2012 to August 2013 was wrongful. The father never consented to the children staying for a second year and not thereafter. The email exchanges between the parties and the father's credible testimony established that he vehemently opposed the children remaining in the United States for a second year. The period of wrongful retention commenced when the non-custodial parent, Mr. B., clearly communicated his desire to regain his custody rights and demanded the return of the children. In spring 2013, the father demanded return of the children as of August 2013. After not receiving an affirmative response and after exchanges with Ms. G., the father offered to allow the children to stay in New York for one final year, from August 2013 to August 2014 only if certain conditions were agreed upon and met, and only if that agreement were reduced to writing and signed by the mother, with the agreement ratified by the Family Court in Israel. The mother did not meet those conditions and the parents had no meeting of the minds as to a second year, and no shared intent to change the children's habitual residence. The father never abandoned attempts to have the children returned to Israel. The mother's testimony as to whether or not the father agreed to a second year was inconsistent and not credible. The mother's retention of the children in New York impaired and prejudiced the father's rights of access to his children in direct contravention of a long-negotiated agreement incorporated into the 2007 Israeli order of divorce. Both parties agreed at trial that the father was at all times exercising his custody rights. Under these circumstances, the court found that the mother's retention of the children in the United States as of August 2013 was wrongful.

With respect to respondent's "wishes of the children" defense, the focus is not so much on the wishes as it is on a valid "objection" to returning to Israel. While M. expressed enthusiasm about remaining in New York and articulately expressed her reasons therefor, the court was at the same time impressed by M.'s description of her ties to Israel. The court found G. to be very sincere, but at his age, he did not demonstrate the level of maturity necessary to make a life-changing decision to remain in the United States. M. did demonstrate a real level of maturity, but neither child focused upon what it would mean not to have their father in their life to the extent that he could participate in their day to day activities and decisions that materially affect their lives, as he had done since birth until the time the mother took them to the United States. Although the mother did not exercise undue influence upon the children, the court found that at least a substantial portion of the children's wish to stay in the United States resulted from the mother's wrongful retention of them here for a second year. In addition, the children did not "object" to being returned to Israel within the contemplation of this provision of the Hague Convention and ICARA. "They clearly preferred or wished to remain here, but an objection within the meaning of the Convention and ICARA refers to a more substantial basis, such as fear of physical, emotional or psychological harm, or some substantive basis other than enjoying the activities in which they are engaged or liking their friends in their new environment or the opportunities that new environment presents. The Court held that even were the court to find that the children "object" to repatriation in Israel within the meaning of the Hague Convention, it would exercise its discretion to order the return of the children to Israel because the parties had agreed that its courts would determine all custody issues. It noted that if the Israeli Family Court believes it is in the children's best interest to remain in or re-visit the United States, it has the power to modify its custody order.

Authors comment:

Hague Convention cases are not custody cases. The court is limited to adjudicating "only rights under the Convention" and may not decide "the merits of any underlying child custody claims. See Ozaltin v. Ozaltin, 708 F.3d 355, 360 (2d Cir. 2013). A petition for the return of a child commencing a civil action for the return of a child must be filed "in any court which has jurisdiction of such action." 22 U.S.C. § 9003 (b), formerly cited as 42 USC § 11603 (b).

The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear these proceedings. N.Y. Const, art VI, § 7[a]. On the other hand, the Family Court is a court of limited jurisdiction, whose jurisdiction is proscribed by Article VI, § 13 of the New York State Constitution. It has not been conferred with jurisdiction under Article VI, § 13 of the New York state constitution to determine such cases. A court hearing a Hague Convention proceeding must have jurisdiction of the action and must be authorized to exercise its jurisdiction in the place where the child is located at the time the petition is filed. 22 U.S.C. § 9003 (b), formerly cited as 42 USC § 11603 (b). Family Court is not authorized to exercise such jurisdiction. While 22 U.S.C. § 9003, formerly cited as 42 USC § 11603, grants original jurisdiction of these proceedings to State and federal district courts, it does not grant jurisdiction to state courts of limited jurisdiction, such as the family court and surrogates court, nor does it purport to do so.

Moreover, Domestic Relations Law §77-a, the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, which provides that a "court of this state may enforce an order for the return of the child made under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction as if it were a child custody determination", does not authorize the commencement of a civil action for the return of a child.


It appears that the Family Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear Hague Convention cases. This has been confirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which has held that " [t]he phrase "in any court which has jurisdiction of such action," 42 U.S.C. § 11603(b), underscores that while § 11603(a) confers jurisdiction in a particular federal forum (i.e., in United States district courts), it does not confer jurisdiction in particular state courts (e.g., a family-law court; a juvenile court; or a court of general jurisdiction); the appropriate state forum for an action under the Hague Convention is an issue of state law. The court in which the petition is filed must also be "authorized to exercise its jurisdiction in the place where the child is located at the time the petition is filed." Ozaltin v. Ozaltin, 708 F.3d 355, 360 (2d Cir. 2013). See footnote 25.

Thursday, October 16, 2014

Matter of MG v WZ, --- N.Y.S.2d ----, 2014 WL 5026267 (N.Y.Fam.Ct.), Editors Comment Regarding Jurisdiction of Family Court

In Matter of MG v WZ, --- N.Y.S.2d ----, 2014 WL 5026267 (N.Y.Fam.Ct.), 2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 24296, the Family Court granted the motion of Respondent for an order reopening an Order of Custody on Default and allowing him to proceed on his petition for return of the Child to the Dominican Republic pursuant to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, as implemented by the International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42 United States Code § 11601, et seq. The Court denied the petition for return.

In footnote 1 the court indicated that it had advised counsel that this “was not a custody hearing.” Hague Convention cases are not custody cases. The court is limited to adjudicating “only rights under the Convention” and may not decide “the merits of any underlying child custody claims. See Ozaltin v. Ozaltin, 708 F.3d 355, 360 (2d Cir. 2013). A petition for the return of a child commencing a civil action for the return of a child must be filed "in any court which has jurisdiction of such action." 22 U.S.C. § 9003 (b), formerly cited as 42 USC § 11603 (b) 

The New York State Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear these proceedings. N.Y. Const, art VI, § 7[a].  On the other hand, the Family Court is a court of limited jurisdiction, whose jurisdiction is proscribed by Article VI, § 13 of the New York State Constitution. It has not been conferred with jurisdiction under  Article VI, § 13 of the New York state constitution to determine such cases. 

A court hearing a Hague Convention proceeding must have jurisdiction of the action and must be authorized to exercise its jurisdiction in the place where the child is located at the time the petition is filed. 22 U.S.C. § 9003 (b), formerly cited as 42 USC § 11603 (b). Family Court is not authorized to exercise such jurisdiction. While 22 U.S.C. § 9003, formerly cited as 42 USC § 11603, grants original  jurisdiction of these proceedings to State and federal district courts, it does not grant jurisdiction to state courts of limited jurisdiction, such as the family court and surrogates court, nor does it purport to do so. 

Moreover, Domestic Relations Law §77-a, the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, which provides that a “court of this state may enforce an order for the return of the child made under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction as if it were a child custody determination”, does not authorize the commencement of a civil action for the return of a child.

 It appears that the Family Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear Hague Convention cases. This has been confirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which has held that " [t]he phrase “in any court which has jurisdiction of such action,” 42 U.S.C. § 11603(b), underscores that while § 11603(a) confers jurisdiction in a particular federal forum (i.e., in United States district courts), it does not confer jurisdiction in particular state courts (e.g., a family-law court; a juvenile court; or a court of general jurisdiction); the appropriate state forum for an action under the Hague Convention is an issue of state law. The court in which the petition is filed must also be “authorized to exercise its jurisdiction in the place where the child is located at the time the petition is filed.”  Ozaltin v. Ozaltin, 708 F.3d 355, 360 (2d Cir. 2013). See footnote 25 

Matter of MG v WZ, --- N.Y.S.2d ----, 2014 WL 5026267 (N.Y.Fam.Ct.),[Dominican Republic] [ Habitual Residence}





In Matter of MG v WZ, --- N.Y.S.2d ----, 2014 WL 5026267 (N.Y.Fam.Ct.), 2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 24296, the Family Court granted the motion of Respondent  for an order reopening an  Order of Custody on Default and allowing him to proceed on his petition for return of the Child to the Dominican Republic pursuant to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, as implemented by the International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42 United States Code § 11601, et seq. Upon Respondent's application, the Court permitted Respondent to testify and
participate in the hearing via video hook-up from the Dominican Republic. The Court denied the petition for return. It found that the parties started residing together in 2004 in the Dominican Republic and Petitioner had a three year old non-subject son, A. The Child was born in March, 2004. In September, 2004, Petitioner immigrated to the United States where she was now a legal resident, leaving the Child and A in the Paternal Grandmother's care. In the beginning of 2006, the parties ended their relationship and shortly thereafter, Petitioner returned to the Dominican Republic for three weeks to a month and stayed with the maternal great grandmother. While Petitioner was in the Dominican Republic in 2006, the Paternal Grandmother petitioned for and was granted guardianship of the Child. Petitioner consented to the Paternal Grandmother having guardianship of the Child but Respondent did not consent.  In May, 2010 Petitioner traveled to the Dominican Republic and returned to the United States with the Child. Petitioner testified that she needed Respondent's
permission in order to leave the Dominican Republic with the Child and Respondent gave his written consent for the Child to travel to the United States. The night before Petitioner left the Dominican Republic with the Child, she and Respondent agreed not to make a final decision on whether the Child would remain in the United States rather than returning to the Dominican Republic. Instead the agreement was that they would wait to see if the Child obtained his permanent residency and whether he was adjusting to and liked life in the United States.  The Child has been living in New York with Petitioner and A since May, 2010, and obtained his permanent residency status in October, 2010. The Child had not been back to the Dominican Republic since he left in May, 2010.  The Child had been enrolled in P.S. 227 in the Bronx since 2010 where he ha been consistently receiving high grades. The Child has been enrolled in a community based baseball league. The Child also enjoys playing basketball and will be enrolled in a community based baseball league. English is now the Child's dominant language although Petitioner and the Child more often communicate in Spanish. The Child has many school friends, and enjoys watching cartoons in
English.  Petitioner worked as a cashier and receives food stamps and medicaid for herself and the children. Petitioner's mother (the Child's maternal grandmother) lives five blocks from Petitioner and the Child with two of the Child's uncles and cousins. The Child has an aunt who has two children who live in the Bronx and another married aunt who has three children. All of these family members are on Petitioner's side of the family and live in the Bronx. The Child spends a great
deal of time with his extended family.

The Family Court observed that where proceedings for return of a child have been commenced after the expiration of the period of one year [from the date of wrongful removal or retention], the court shall [ ] order the return of the child, unless it is demonstrated that the child is now settled in its new environment." Lozano v. Alvarez, 134 S Ct 1224, 1229 (2014) (quoting Article 12 of the Hague Convention). The "abducting parent" must establish that the exception to the return applies by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. Thus, the one year period is not a statute of
limitations. It also observed that courts apply a two-part test to determine a child's country of habitual residence. “First, the court should inquire into the shared intent of [the parents] at the  latest time that their intent was shared. In making this determination the court  should look, as always in determining intent, at actions as well as  declarations. Normally the shared intent of the parents should control the  habitual residence of the child. Second, the court should inquire whether the  evidence unequivocally points to the conclusion that the child has acclimatized
 to the new location and thus has acquired a new habitual residence,  notwithstanding any conflict with the parents' latest shared intent.  Hofmann v. Sender, 716 F3d at 291-92, quoting  Gitter v. Gitter, 396 F3d at 34. The Court found that the  the habitual residence of the Child was the United States. Initially, the parties agreed that Petitioner would precede the Child to the United States and
that Respondent would follow by means of marrying a United States citizen who would then petition for he and the Child to come to the United States. Respondent eventually did marry a United States citizen who petitioned for Respondent to immigrate to the United States but according to Respondent that petition was never granted and in 2012 he and his wife divorced.   Meanwhile, Petitioner grew frustrated with Respondent's lack of progress with his plans for immigrating to the United States via marriage to a United States citizen and initiated the process to petition for the Child to join her in the United States. While Respondent was initially upset that Petitioner filed a petition to have the Child join her in the United States, he gave his written, unqualified consent for Petitioner to travel with the Child to the United States on May 20, 2010. However, the night before Petitioner left the Dominican Republic with the Child in May, 2010, Respondent's unqualified or unconditional consent became conditional when the parties agreed that they would make a final
determination on the Child's residency based on whether the Child obtained his permanent residency and whether he was adjusting to and liked life in the United States. Thus, the last time the parties shared their intent for the Child's place of residence, they conditionally agreed that it would be the United States. The condition on the Child residing in the United States was that he would have to be granted permanent residency and he would have to be adjusting to and liking his
life in the United States. See  Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. at 11;  Hoffmann v. Sender, 716 F3d at 293.  The conditions placed on whether the Child would permanently reside in the United States have been met. The Child obtained his permanent residency status in the United States and he has fully adjusted to and enjoys his life in the United States. The Court found that the Child had fully adjusted to and enjoys his life in the United States because he consistently receives high grades in school, plays community based league sports, speaks predominantly English, and lives with his half brother A and has many relatives within close proximity with whom he spends a great deal of time. Consequently, the Child's habitual residence is the United States since the last time the parties' intent was shared, their shared intent was for the Child to reside in the United States upon his obtaining that which he now has obtained, permanent residency and a settled, enjoyable life in the United States.  Hoffmann v. Sender, 716 F3d at 293.

The Family Court pointed out that where proceedings for return of a child have been commenced after the expiration of the period of one year from the date of wrongful removal or retention, the court shall order the return of the child, unless it is demonstrated that the child is now settled in its new environment." Lozano v. Alvarez, 134 S Ct 1224, 1229 (2014) (quoting Article 12 of the Hague Convention). The "abducting parent" must establish that the exception to the return applies by a preponderance of the evidence. Thus, the one year period is not a statute of
limitations. The Family Court held that even if Respondent had established a prima facie case for return to the Dominican Republic it  would not order the Child's return to the Dominican Republic because more than a year had passed since Petitioner "retained" the Child in the United States and the child was now settled in his new environment. See Taveras v. Morales, 2014 U.S. Dist Lexis 67892;  2014 WL 2038318 (SDNY, August 26, 2014); Jakubik v. Schmirer, 956 F Supp 2d 523 (SDNY 2013).




Tuesday, October 14, 2014

International Child Abduction Remedies Act Reclassified

The International Child Abduction Remedies Act,  42 U.S.C §§11601 - 11611  was editorially reclassified as sections 9001-9011  of Title 22. It can now be found in  22 U.S.C. §§  9001-9011.

Monday, September 8, 2014

Seaman v. Peterson, 2014 WL 4377582, --- F.3d ---- (11th Cir., 2014) [Mexico] [Habitual Residence] [Petition granted]



In Seaman v. Peterson,  2014 WL 4377582, --- F.3d ---- (11th Cir., 2014) the Appellant, John Kennedy Peterson, removed his four children from Mexico to the United States. His wife, and mother of the children, Pandita Charm–Joy Seaman, sued in the district court invoking ICARA and demanding an order returning the children to Mexico.The district court granted that relief. Peterson appealed. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. 

In February  2002.Peterson and Seaman married in Georgia. Peterson was a citizen of the United States and a disabled Army veteran suffering from PTSD (post traumatic stress disorder). Seaman was a Jamaican citizen holding a “green card” with permanent residence status in the United States. From July, 2002–May, 2006 Peterson and Seaman established their family home in the area of Warner Robins, Houston County, Georgia. During this period they had three children: T.L.P., C.D.P. and R.T.P. The elder child, T.L.P. (who was born in Mexico) was 8 years of age at the time the petition was filed in this case. C.D.P. was age 7, and R.T.P was age 5. In May  2006.Peterson and Seaman disposed of their belongings in Georgia, and moved with their three children to Mexico. They first lived for a brief time in Guadalajara, near Seaman's parents and extended family, and then moved to a more permanent location in nearby Chapala, State of Jalisco, Mexico, on the lake of the same name about twenty five miles south of Guadalajara. Soon after leaving the United States, Peterson and Seaman had a fourth child, S .A.D., who was born in Mexico and was 4 years of age at the time of Seaman's petition under ICARA. In July, 2010, after living there for more than four years, Peterson left Mexico and returned to the United States. Seaman and the four children remained at their home in Chapala. On September 27, 2010 both Peterson and Seaman appeared before the Mexican Municipal Court which issued a “written declaration” that allowed Peterson to spend October 2, 2010, with the children subject to a strict order that they be returned to Seaman's custody by 10:00 p.m. the same day. On October 2, 2010 Peterson took custody of the four children in Mexico and absconded with them to the United States. After a three day trip in Peterson's automobile, they arrived in the Warner Robins area, Houston County, Georgia. On November 30, 2010 Seaman filed this action under the Hague Convention and ICARA in the district court.  On January 14, 2011 the district court entered its Order granting Seaman's petition and directing that the four children be returned to Mexico. Peterson was directed to pay the necessary transportation expenses. On February 8, 2011Seaman and the children returned to Mexico. The Eleventh Circuit held that a mixed standard of review is appropriate for determining habitual residence. Accordingly, it accepts the district court's finding of historical facts unless clearly erroneous, but with regard to the ultimate issue of habitual residence, the appellate court will review de novo, considering legal concepts in the mix of facts and law and exercising judgment about the values that animate legal principles.

The Eleventh Circuit observed that following the teaching of this court's decision in Ruiz v. Tenorio, 392 F.3d at 1252–53, the district court first determined whether there was a settled intention on the part of Seaman and Peterson to abandon a prior habitual residence and take up a new one. Seaman testified that the move from Georgia to Mexico in May, 2006, was intended to be permanent. Peterson testified that it was intended as an extended vacation and visit with Seaman's parents. The district court, viewing the objective facts, credited Seaman's testimony and, implicitly if not explicitly, discredited Peterson. The court noted that the parties sold their possessions in Georgia and took up their own dwelling in Mexico rather than living with Seaman's parents or in temporary quarters such as a hotel; that they enrolled the children in Mexican schools when they reached the appropriate age; that they were absent from the United States from a residential standpoint for more than four years, returning to the United States only a few times for visits of limited duration; that they established legal, temporary residence in Mexico; and, according to Seaman, intended to become citizens there. The district court concluded on the basis of those findings that, insofar as the parents were concerned, they either traveled to Mexico intending to stay for a brief period and then changed their minds in favor of abandoning their Georgia residence, or they traveled to Mexico already intending to make their new home there. Either way, they came to share an intent that Mexico was, or had become, their habitual residence within the meaning of the Convention and ICARA. The district court then turned its attention, following the analytical regimen dictated by Ruiz, 392 F.3d at 1253, to the question whether there had been an actual change in geography and the passage of a sufficient length of time for the children to have become acclimatized in the new place of residence. As stated in Ruiz, the intention of the parents is a crucial factor, but “cannot alone transform the habitual residence.” The district court found this to be an easier call. The geographic movement of the children was beyond dispute. Further, the children were all acclimatized and settled in Mexico; they were all fluent in Spanish; they attended and were well adjusted in school in Mexico, the eldest for almost four years, while the youngest, though not yet in school, was almost four years of age at the time of abduction and had never been to the United States. The district court thus concluded that under both prongs of the analysis required by Ruiz, the habitual residence of the children at the time of their abduction on October 2, 2010, was in Mexico. The district court  found that Seaman did enjoy rights of custody under Mexican law and that she was actively exercising those rights at the time of the children's abduction. The Eleventh Circuit  found no error in fact or law with respect to either conclusion.

Peterson made two claims in support of the grave risk of harm defense that he was required to establish by clear and convincing evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 11603(e)(2)(A); Convention, Art. 13(b). Those claims were: (1) that Seaman's family belonged to a religious organization known as The Family International (“TFI”) which practices communal living that facilitates or even encourages sexual contact with children; and (2) that the children were malnourished and deprived of needed medical attention. With respect to TFI, the district court found that although some of Seaman's family members were part of that organization, Seaman herself disavowed her allegiance to TFI approximately 10 years ago, and there was no evidence that the Peterson children had ever been subjected to any improper contact or harmful influence of any kind. The district court determined that the medical evidence initially offered by a physician in Georgia concerning malnourishment of the children in general, and the lack of proper medical care of one of them in particular, had been manipulated by Peterson through inaccurate information he had communicated to the doctor. The court found that, in fact, there was no reliable evidence of neglect or abuse of any kind and that the children were well cared for. The district court therefore concluded that returning the children to Mexico would not “expose the child[ren] to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place [them] in an intolerable situation.” Convention, Art. 13. Upon review, the Eleventh Circuit found no error, much less clear error, in the district court's factual findings rejecting the defense of grave danger.

In rejecting Peterson’s claims of error by the district court in its findings of historical fact supporting its ultimate legal conclusion that the habitual residence of the Peterson children was in Mexico at the time of their abduction on October 2, 2010, the Court pointed out that the law is well settled that “[i]f the district court's account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety, the court of appeals may not reverse it even though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently.”Anderson, 470 U.S. at 573–74, 105 S.Ct. 1504. It may reverse the district court only when “on the entire evidence” it is  “left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”. After reviewing the lengthy record in its entirety, it was  left with no such conviction. Ample evidence supported the district court's reasoned findings, and therefore there was clear error. Upon de novo review of that legal conclusion in light of the record as a whole, it found that the district court got it right when it concluded that the habitual residence of the Peterson children was in Mexico when they were removed from Seaman's custody and brought to the United States.

Peterson challenged the district court's handling of the grave risk issue contending that the court: (1) effectively imposed upon Peterson, contrary to Baran v. Beaty, 526 F.3d 1340 (11th Cir.2008), the burden of proving that the Mexican courts are unable or unwilling to ameliorate a grave risk of harm; or (2) that the district court effectively deferred a decision on the grave risk defense to the courts of Mexico contrary to Danaipour v. McLarey, 286 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.2002). The Eleventh Circuit held that neither of those decisions were  of any help to Peterson because both were easily distinguishable. In Baran, the Court held  that once a responding parent proves, by clear and convincing evidence, that a child would face a grave risk if returned to his habitual residence, the responding parent does not have to prove, in addition, that the courts of the requesting state cannot be relied upon to shield the child from that risk. Here, the district court's concern that the children's exposure to the practices of TFI should be monitored by the court deciding custody issues—if such exposure occurs—was by no means an enlargement of Peterson's burden of proof nor was it inconsistent with the court's finding concerning the lack of a grave risk. Simply put, in this area of the law, there are grave risks established by clear and convincing evidence, and there are potential risks that are less than grave but bear watching. Recognizing that distinction is all that the district court did; and in so doing the court did not delegate its responsibility under the Convention or ICARA to the Mexican courts as in Danaipous v. McLarey, supra. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. 

Friday, August 29, 2014

Berezowsky v Ojeda, 2014 WL 4216286 (5th Cir, 2014) [Mexico] [Habitual Residence] [No Habitual Residence]



In Berezowsky v Ojeda, 2014 WL 4216286 (5th Cir, 2014) Michelle Gomez Berezowsky filed a petition under the Hague Convention, asserting that Pablo Angel Rendon Ojeda had wrongfully removed their child, PARB, from Mexico to Texas. The district court granted Berezowsky's petition and ordered that PARB be returned to Mexico. The Fifth Circuit held that Berezowsky failed to meet her burden of establishing that Mexico was PARB's place of habitual residence. It vacated the district court's order and remanded with instructions to dismiss. 

The Fifth Circuit noted that Berezowsky and Rendon were both Mexican nationals. In September 2008, Berezowsky learned that she was pregnant and she and Rendon became engaged. By March 2009, their relationship had deteriorated to the point that Berezowsky moved to her parents' home in Kingwood, Texas, and cut off communication with Rendon.   Berezowsky was living in the United States on a student visa.  She gave birth to PARB on May 31, 2009, in Kingwood, Texas. Approximately one month after PARB was born, Rendon learned his child's name, sex, and date of birth through a private investigator.

In February 2010, Rendon brought the parties custody dispute to the 410th District Court of Montgomery County, Texas, where Berezowsky and PARB were living at the time. The parents litigated PARB's custody in the Texas state court system for the next two years while PARB continued to live in Texas with his mother. More than a year later, Berezowsky and Rendon stipulated that Rendon was PARB's biological father. The 410th District Court of Texas entered an order awarding Rendon and Berezowsky joint parental rights, and giving Rendon the right to determine PARB's residence (Texas Order).  The Texas Order limited PARB's primary residence to three geographic areas in Mexico “until further order of the court of continuing jurisdiction or agreement of the parties.” It also required each parent to give notice to the other before traveling with PARB outside of Mexico. The Texas Order gave Berezowsky standard visitation rights and ordered her to pay child support. Pursuant to the Texas Court Order, Rendon drove across the border with PARB to Cuernavaca, Mexico, in October 2011. Berezowsky moved to Mexico City on October 18, 2011, and then moved to Cuernavaca two weeks later.  Berezowsky filed a suit to terminate Rendon's parental rights in Cuernavaca, in the State of Morelos (7th Mexican Court). On January 12, 2012, the 410th District Court of Texas found that Berezowsky was in violation of the possession and access, as well as the passport provisions of the Texas Order, and had wrongfully withheld PARB from Rendon for a period of time greater than one month (Second Texas Order). The 410th District Court of Texas noted that Berezowsky had “claimed to the courts of Morelos[, Mexico,] that the child was abducted from Texas by his father” and then concluded that Rendon was in compliance with the Texas Order, had not abducted PARB from the United States, and had a superior right to possess PARB.  The 410th District Court of Texas also issued a temporary restraining order, prohibiting Berezowsky from interfering with Rendon's right to possess PARB, or  hiding or secreting PARB. The 410th District Court of Texas suspended Berezowsky's rights to possession of, and access to, PARB pending a further order from that court.  On the same day, the 410th District Court of Texas also signed an order clarifying that Berezowsky and her parents were misrepresenting the Texas Order “to the courts of Morelos or the United Mexican States.  The 410th District Court of Texas explained that the Texas Order “is a valid, existing, final and enforceable order, and the matter of the primary custody of the child PARB is res judicata.”In addition, the 410th District Court of Texas clarified that unless and until an appellate court reversed the Texas Order, that it would remain both final and enforceable. Subsequently, the 410th District Court of Texas gave Rendon sole custody and the exclusive right to designate PARB's primary residence with no geographic restrictions. Berezowsky was appointed possessory conservator with only the right to receive information from Rendon regarding PARB's health, education, and welfare. Berezowsky was given supervised visits with PARB . Despite this order, Berezowsky continued to maintain possession of PARB in Mexico. In August 2012, she moved from Cuernavaca to Mexico City. 

  On September 18, 2012, the 11th Mexican Court recognized and enforced the Texas Orders and ordered Berezowsky to immediately surrender PARB to Rendon. On October 11, 2012, Rendon arrived at PARB's school with a group of men just as PARB was being released to go home. Rendon left with PARB.  On November 1, 2012, Rendon drove across the border and entered Texas with PARB. The 24th Mexican Court reaffirmed that Berezowsky had exclusive rights to, and custody of, PARB. 

On November 30, 2012, Berezowsky filed a petition in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas (Southern District Court) under the Hague Convention. In January 2013, the Southern District Court issued an order holding that PARB had been wrongfully removed from Mexico and ordered his immediate return. The order awarded attorney's fees and costs to Berezowsky. The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that because Berezowsky filed this action under the Hague Convention, she had to  demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that Mexico was PARB's habitual residence in order to establish her claim that PARB was wrongfully removed, and failed to do so. 

The Fifth Circuit observed that courts use varying approaches to determine a child's habitual residence, each placing different emphasis on the weight given to the parents' intentions.”Larbie, 690 F.3d at 310. Like the majority of circuits, it had “adopted an approach that begins with the parents' shared intent or settled purpose regarding their child's residence.” This approach does not ignore the child's experience, but rather gives greater weight to the parents' subjective intentions relative to the child's age. For example, parents' intentions should be dispositive where, as here, the child is so young that he or she cannot possibly decide the issue of residency. In such cases, the threshold test is whether both parents intended for the child to abandon the [habitual residence] left behind. Absent shared intent, prior habitual residence should be deemed supplanted only where the objective facts point unequivocally to this conclusion. It affirms the district court's determination that the parents shared an intent to make a particular country their child's habitual residence unless it is implausible in light of the record as a whole. See Larbie, 690 F.3d at 306. It noted that at least one court has found that it is possible for a young child to have no habitual residence when there is no evidence of a shared intention for the child to be settled in any particular location. See Delvoye v. Lee, 329 F.3d 330, 334 (3d Cir.2003).  The mere fact that the parents have consented for the child to move to a new country does not prove that they share the necessary intent to make that new location the child's habitual residence. 

The Fifth Circuit found that Rendon and Berezowsky's relationship ended before PARB's birth, and the record did not indicate that the two parents had ever shared any plans regarding his upbringing or future.  The district court concluded that Rendon and Berezowsky intended to make Mexico PARB's habitual residence. The district court devoted only one paragraph to the habitual residence analysis, and made the following statements in support of its conclusion that Mexico was PARB's habitual residence:





“Although [PARB] was born in the United States, the facts established that the parents intended to make Mexico [PARB's] habitual residence. Specifically, [Berezowsky] and [Rendon] are both Mexican nationals, they met while residing in Mexico, they are not citizens of the United States, do not own real property in the country, and do not have immigration status that allows them to permanently reside here. Moreover, [Rendon] moved [PARB] to Mexico pursuant to a Texas court order that designated Mexico as [PARB's] place of residence. In the Texas [O]rder, both parents listed Mexico as their place of residence. [Rendon] admitted, and the evidence establishes, that he represented to the Mexican courts that his residence was Mexico. In other words, the evidence establishes that neither parent has meaningful or deep-rooted ties to the United States. Moreover, [PARB] resided in Mexico for approximately thirteen months and was attending school there before [Rendon] removed him to the United States. Therefore, based on these undisputed facts, the Court concludes that Mexico was [PARB's] habitual residence.”






Only the first line of this paragraph references parental intent. The Fifth Circuit found that in reaching this conclusion, it appeared that the district court misunderstood what is required to form a shared parental intent for purposes of the habitual residence determination. A shared parental intent requires that the parents actually share or jointly develop the intention. In other words, the parents must reach some sort of meeting of the minds regarding their child's habitual residence, so that they are making the decision together. Here, the district court did not find that the parents reached an agreement to make Mexico PARB's habitual residence. Instead, the district court focused on the fact that “neither parent has meaningful or deep-rooted ties to the United States.”In doing so, the district court ignored the primary consideration in the habitual residence determination: shared parental intent. Even accepting all of the facts cited by the district court as true, those facts could not  support a finding of shared parental intent as understood for purposes of the Hague Convention. In the district court's brief analysis, the court never found that Rendon and Berezowsky reached an agreement or meeting of the minds regarding PARB's future. Likewise, the district court did not make a finding that Berezowsky and Rendon intended to abandon Texas as PARB's habitual residence. Nor did the record support a determination that the parents formed a shared intent to make Mexico PARB's habitual residence. Berezowsky did not even argue that she and Rendon reached an agreement on this issue. Instead, she tried to establish that both she and Rendon separately formed the intent to change PARB's habitual residence, and then argued that this could serve as the basis for a shared parental intent. The Court disagreed and held that Berezowsky failed to meet her burden to establish that she and Rendon shared an intent to change PARB's habitual residence. 



In an effort to defeat the 410th District Court of Texas's contrary determination, Berezowsky conceded that Texas was originally PARB's habitual residence, but argued that Mexico has supplanted Texas as PARB's current habitual residence. Berezowsky asserted that the Texas Order, which limited PARB's primary residence to one of three areas in Mexico, established Mexico as PARB's new place of habitual residence. The Fifth Circuit rejected her argument finding that Berezowsky mistakenly conflated that idea of a primary residence with a habitual residence.  Berezowsky offered no support for the proposition that the two terms are interchangeable. The Texas Family Code does not define “primary residence” and the court was not aware of any cases that interpret it in a way that would suggest that the term means “habitual residence” under the Hague Convention. As a result, the fact that the Texas Order designated Mexico as PARB's primary residence was insufficient to prove that Mexico also became his habitual residence. Moreover, Berezowsky had not demonstrated that the Texas Order evinced the necessary shared parental intent to establish a habitual residence under the Hague Convention. The mere fact that the Texas Order designated Mexico as PARB's primary residence was insufficient to demonstrate a shared parental intent for Mexico to become his habitual residence. Even assuming arguendo that the separate, uncoordinated intentions of two parents could form the necessary shared intent to change a child's habitual residence, Berezowsky did not meet her burden in proving that each of the parents here had such an intent. Berezowsky did not demonstrate that she intended to make Mexico PARB's habitual residence. Although she now asserted that she intended to abandon Texas, where there is a dispute regarding a child's habitual residence, ‘the representations of the parties cannot be accepted at face value, and courts must determine habitual residence from all available evidence. It  examined the evidence presented by Berezowsky, and concluded that she had not demonstrated that she had such an intent.Likewise, Rendon's decision to remain in Mexico during the ensuing months while he battled with Berezowsky over PARB's custody did not indicate a shared intent to raise PARB there. And the Texas Order designating Mexico as PARB's primary residence did  not establish Rendon's settled intent to raise PARB in Mexico. This was especially true in light of the fact that Rendon requested and received a revised order lifting this geographic restriction just four months after receiving the Texas Order. By that time, Rendon was no longer in possession of PARB, and was not in a position to determine where PARB would live. Just weeks after Rendon regained possession of his son, he moved back to Texas. These were not the actions of a man with a settled intention for his son to habitually reside in Mexico. 
The Fifth Circuit pointed out that the District Court made much of the fact that both Berezowsky and Rendon were Mexican nationals, with no immigration status that allowed them to permanently reside in the United States. While these facts might indicate that Texas was not PARB's habitual residence, they do not prove that the parents established Mexico as the child's habitual residence. Given the constant cross-border battle over his custody, it was possible that PARB had no habitual residence. See Delvoye, 329 F.3d at 334. While it is true that both parents listed locations in Mexico as their residences on the Texas Order, the record also showed that neither parent was living in Mexico at the time that they made these representations to the 410th District Court of Texas. It did  not appear that the decision for PARB to reside in either Texas or Mexico was connected to a shared intention to settle their son in that place; rather, the geographic decisions seemed wholly dependent on where the parents happened to be fighting their court battles at the time, and where each parent thought they could gain an advantage. Given the constant disagreement and multiple cross-border moves in the span of a few years, Berezowsky did not meet her burden in proving that she and Rendon shared an intent or settled purpose regarding their child's habitual residence. It did not  appear that Berezowsky and Rendon had shared any intention or settled purpose regarding their child since his birth. The district court's determination of habitual residence in this case appeared to have relied upon an understanding of that term that gave insufficient weight to the importance of shared parental intent under the Convention.”Mozes, 239 F.3d at 1084 .11