Search This Blog

Wednesday, March 21, 2018

Kim v Ferdinand, 2018 WL 721455 (E.D. Louisiana, 2018)[Thailand] [Habitual Residence] [Petition granted]




In Kim v Ferdinand, 2018 WL 721455 (E.D. Louisiana, 2018) the Court granted the mothers petition for the return of her children to Thailand.

 Soonhee Kim was the mother of L.J.F. (born in 2007) and A.J.F. (born in 2009) She alleged that on or before August 13, 2017, Kamau Bakari Ferdinand the children’s father, wrongfully retained them in Louisiana where they now remained.  The Mother and Father first met in Japan in 2002. In 2006, the parties married in Kawasaki, Japan.  The Mother was a citizen of the Republic of Korea, but was born in and lived most of her life in Japan. The Mother held special permanent resident status in Japan. The Mother had no immigration status in the United States. The Mother was permitted to enter the United States as a short-term visitor under the visa waiver program. The Father was a citizen of the United States. Prior to 2017, he lived in Asia for almost eighteen years. The Mother and Father both continued to work in Japan after their children’s births in 2007 and 2009. The Mother was a director and partner at a venture capital firm, and the Father was an English teacher. In December 2011, the parties jointly decided to move the family to Thailand, and resided together in Bangkok.  After the family arrived in Thailand, the Father enrolled in an educational program at a local university. The Father completed the curriculum in 2016. The Father did not work while he was attending school. He then started working as a part-time English teacher in 2016.  While in Thailand, the Mother, Father and children all held Thai visas.  From 2011 until mid-2017, their lives, as well as their children’s, centered in Bangkok, Thailand. The family leased and lived in a luxury condominium in Bangkok.

In 2016, after the family lived in Thailand for nearly five years, the parents began to experience marital discord. Eventually, the Father moved out, and rented another apartment in Bangkok. When the parents parted, they agreed on a schedule for the children to spend approximately equal time with both parents.  In 2017, the Father told the Mother he was thinking about finding a job in the United States and would be interviewing with a potential employer during a trip with the children to see their extended family in New Orleans. When the Father was planning this trip to the United States, the Mother had advised the Father that she would not agree for the children to travel to the United States unless the Father provided proof that he had purchased return plane tickets for the children to return to Thailand at the end of the vacation.  On May 5, 2017, the Father forwarded the Mother an e-mail confirmation of the children’s roundtrip ticket from Bangkok, Thailand to New Orleans, Louisiana.  The e-mail confirmation provided a departure date of June 29, 2017 from Bangkok and a return date of August 13, 2017. The children’s paternal grandfather purchased the tickets. On June 29, 2017, the children departed Thailand with the Father’s sister and arrived in New Orleans, Louisiana.  On August 13, 2017, the Father did not return the children to Thailand, and indicated to the Mother in an e-mail that he believes it was a good idea for them to stay. The Father said the children have outgrown the life Bangkok has to offer.

The district court observed that in determining the habitual residence of the children the threshold test is whether both parents intended for the child to ‘abandon the [habitual residence] left behind.’” (quoting Mozes, 239 F.3d at 1075). “Absent shared intent, ‘prior habitual residence should be deemed supplanted only where ‘the objective facts point unequivocally to this conclusion.’. When ‘the child’s initial move from an established habitual residence was clearly intended for a specific, limited duration [,]...most courts will find no change in habitual residence.’ ” Larbie, 690 F.3d at 311. Here, the Mother repeatedly asserted that she expected the children to return to Thailand after their summer visit to their grandparents’ home in New Orleans. Very telling was the fact the Father, through the grandfather, purchased round-trip tickets from New Orleans to Bangkok for the children. At trial, the Father confirmed this round-trip plan for the children:
The Court found that the shared intent of both parents was not to relocate the children from Bangkok, Thailand to New Orleans, Louisiana.  The Father contended that Thailand was never intended to be a permanent residence.  The Court found that the children’s home was built in Thailand, where the parents leased a condo, secured jobs, enrolled the children in school and extracurricular activities, and where the paternal grandparents visited them, inter alia.

Respondent further argued that the children were well adjusted in New Orleans. Perhaps this was true. But even though the children had seemingly accustomed themselves to New Orleans, with great support from their grandparents who are both accomplished medical professionals, the Fifth Circuit has cautioned courts not to equate this to establishment of habitual residence. Despite the superficial appeal of focusing primarily on the child’s contacts in the new country, in the absence of settled parental intent, courts should be slow to infer from such contacts that an earlier habitual residence has been abandoned. Mozes, 239 F.3d at 1078–79. The children’s support network in New Orleans was unrelated to the issue of determining habitual residence. 

From the facts presented at trial, the Court concluded that the Mother has established that, before the removal of the children to New Orleans, the parties had a shared and settled intent to live with the children in Thailand. The Court found the Mother had custody rights under Thai law at the time of the retention. The Mother and Father jointly had “parental power” over the children under Thai law by operation of law because they wee the natural parents of the children. Section 1567 of the Civil and Commercial Code of Thailand provides that parental power includes: (A) the right to determine the child’s place of residence; (B) the right to punish the child in a reasonable manner for disciplinary purposes; (C) the right to require the child to do such work as may be reasonable to his ability and condition in life; and (D) the right to demand the return of the child from any person who unlawfully detains the child.  Parental power under Thai law is considered a right of custody in accordance with Article 5(a) of the Hague Convention because it includes rights relating to the person of the child and to determine the child’s place of residence.  Accordingly, the Mother demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that she had rights of custody in Thailand under Article 5(a) of the Convention. See Bader v. Kramer, 445 F.3d 346 (4th Cir. 2006) (holding joint rights of custody are considered “rights of custody” under Article 5(a) of the Hague Convention).

           The Court also found that the Mother was exercising rights of custody in Thailand.

The Court concluded that the Mother met her burden in establishing her prima facie case for the Court to order the return of L.J.F. and A.J.F. to Thailand. It also concluded that none of the discretionary exceptions applied to the children’s return and ordered the return of L.J.F. and A.J.F. to Thailand.



Hernandez v Montes, 2018 WL 405977 (E.D. North Carolina, 2018)[Mexico] [Temporary Restraining order]




In Hernandez v Montes, 2018 WL 405977 (E.D. North Carolina, 2018) the district court granted the Father’s motion for a preliminary restraining order prohibiting the removal of the Child, N.R.A., from the Eastern District of North Carolina pending the preliminary injunction hearing;” and directing the relinquishment of the Child’s travel documents, including his Mexican and American passports, to the United States Marshal.

The court observed that “A plaintiff seeking preliminary injunctive relief must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tip in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council. Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); see The Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. FEC, 575 F.3d 342, 346 (4th Cir. 2009), vacated on other grounds, 559 U.S. 1089 (2010), reissued in relevant part, 607 F.3d 355, 356 (4th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). After examining these factors, the court found that the requested TRO was authorized and necessary in this case.

First, the court found that allowing the Mother to flee with the Child would result in irreparable harm. See Alcala, 2014 WL 5506739. at *6. Second, the court found that any threatened harm to Mother and Barrios was minimal as compared to the probability of irreparable harm to Father and the Child…Third, the court found that Father had demonstrated that he is likely to succeed on the merits. Father’s evidence showed that (1) the Child’s habitual residence was Mexico immediately before the wrongful retention; (2) Father had “rights of custody” under Mexican law; and (3) Father was exercising his rights of custody and would have continued doing so but for Mother’s wrongful retention of the Child in the United States. Fourth, the public interest supported issuing the TRO. See Salguero v. Argueta, No. 5:17-CV-125-FL, 2017 WL 1067758, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 21, 2017) (unpublished) ( “Finally, a TRO serves the public interest. Since international abduction [and] wrongful retention of [a] child[ ] is harmful to [his or her] well-being,’ a TRO in this case will serve the public interest by protecting the child’s well-being.”; Alcala v. Hernandez, No. 4:14-CV-4176-RBH, 2014 WL 5506739, at *7 (D.S.C. Oct. 30, 2014) (unpublished). The court declined to require bond. A bond is not mandatory and can be waived. See Hoechst Diafoil Co. v. Nan Ya Plastics Corp., 174 F.3d 411, 421 n.3 (4th Cir. 1999)

Flores v Elias-Arata, 2018 WL 889023 (M.D. Florida, 2018)[Peru] [Federal & State Judicial Remedies] [Motion to dismiss denied]




In Flores v Elias-Arata, 2018 WL 889023 (M.D. Florida, 2018) Petitioner Miguel Benito Campomanes Flores (Father) initiated this action on January 25, 2018. The  Respondent Maria Fernanda Orbegoso Elias-Arata (Mother) moved to dismiss the Verified Petition for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule(s)). Upon review, the Court found  that the Verified Petition states a claim for wrongful retention under the Hague Convention, and as such, the Motion is due to be denied.3


In the Verified Petition, Father alleged that he and Mother have had an “intermittent relationship” for several years, during which time the Minor Child, J.C.O., was born. Father attaches to the Verified Petition the Minor Child’s birth certificate which reflects that the Minor Child was born in Peru, in January of 2013. The birth certificate names Petitioner as the father and Respondent as the mother.  Father alleges that he shared responsibility for the care of the Minor Child, spent time with him, and provided for his care and well-being. According to Father, in the spring of 2017, Mother asked Father to allow her to bring the Minor Child to the United States to visit Mother’s parents. Father asserts that, at Mother’s request, he signed a Temporary Consent agreement documenting his consent to this temporary travel. According to Father, the temporary travel plans provided that Mother would return to Peru with the Minor Child on August 25, 2017.  Father alleges that Mother did not return to Peru as agreed upon and has informed Father that she has no intention of returning to Peru with their son.  Indeed, Father maintains that Mother “lied about her travel plans to the United States promising to return to Peru with the [M]inor [C]hild while having no intention of doing so.”  As such, Father asserts that Mother’s removal of the Minor Child from Peru was done in a “deceptive manner” and “without [his] consent.”  Father contends that prior to the events giving rise to this case, the Minor Child had resided in Peru since birth, enjoyed “substantial timesharing” with Father, and “was completely settled and integrated in Peru’s life and culture.”

The district court found that the father had set forth sufficient factual allegations to support a plausible claim for wrongful removal or wrongful retention under the Hague Convention. The Mother argues that Father’s allegations are insufficient because he fails to allege facts supporting a wrongful removal and fails to allege that he has rights of custody under Peruvian law. The Court disagreed. It was not entirely clear whether Father sought to pursue a claim of wrongful removal or one of wrongful retention., Even if Father mistakenly characterized his claim as a “wrongful removal,” it was apparent from the facts alleged that Father has stated a claim for “wrongful retention” under The Hague Convention. Mother also contended that Father failed to adequately plead that he has rights of custody under Peruvian law. This argument was plainly without merit. Father alleged the following facts in support of his custody rights: (1) he is the Minor Child’s father, as listed on the birth certificate, (2) the parties “shared responsibilities for the care of their son”, (3) Father spent time with his son almost every day and provided for his care and well-being, (4) Mother asked Father for permission to take the Minor Child to the United States and requested that he sign a Temporary Consent agreement documenting his consent to this plan, , and (5) prior to the wrongful retention, the Minor Child lived with Mother while enjoying “substantial timesharing” with Father. “The Convention broadly defines ‘rights of custody’ as ‘rights relating to the care of the person of the child and, in particular, the right to determine the child’s place of residence.’ ” See Hanley v. Roy, 485 F.3d 641, 645 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Convention, art. 5). At this stage of the proceedings, the foregoing factual allegations, and in particular, the allegation that Mother asked Father to sign a form consenting to her travel with the Minor Child, were sufficient to give rise to the inference that Father had rights of custody pertaining to the Minor Child within the meaning of the Hague Convention and was exercising those rights.


Dona v Castilblanco, 2018 WL 928976 (N.D. Texas, 2018) [Costa Rica] [Rights of Custody] [Motion for TRO denied]



In Dona v Castilblanco, 2018 WL 928976 (N.D. Texas, 2018) Petitioner brought the action on September 14, 2017, requesting that the court order the return of his three-year old biological son J.S.M.P. to his alleged “habitual residence” of San Antonio de Coronado, Costa Rica. In addition, Petitioner requested: (1) “for the well-being of the child, that he be given immediate access to his child, pending further hearing in this Court”; (2) that the court issue an order immediately prohibiting the removal of J.S.M.P. from the jurisdiction and requiring the turnover of the child’s travel documents; and (3) that the court set the matter for an expedited hearing.  the district court denied Petitioner’s motion for Entry of a Temporary Restraining Order and Scheduling of an Expedited Hearing.


In support of his Petition for Return of the Child to Petitioner), Petitioner submitted a copy of the Convention; a portion of the Spanish version of Costa Rica’s Family Code or Código de Familia; an unsworn affidavit by Petitioner, which constitutes no evidence; correspondence dated January 6, 2017 from the Patronato Nacional De La Infancia; and a “Formulario de denuncia” or “denunciation form” dated September 6, 2016, that Petitioner filed with the Patronato Nacional De La Infancia in Costa Rica. 

Petitioner alleged that Respondent, the biological mother of J.S.M.P, removed the child to the United States without Petitioner’s consent. It was apparent from the documents relied on by him they are not married. The parties’ pleadings and the documentation submitted by Petitioner also show that Petitioner, Respondent, and J.S.M.P. were all born in Honduras; that Petitioner, Respondent, and J.S.M.P. were residing in Costa Rica immediately before J.S.M.P.’s removal; that Petitioner’s country of habitual residence was Costa Rica; and Respondent’s country of habitual residence was the United States. Petitioner alleged that Respondent wrongfully removed the child without his consent from Costa Rica to the United States on February 27, 2016. Petitioner alleges that Respondent has continued to wrongfully retain the child in the United States, and he believes the child is presently living with his mother in Dallas, Texas, at his maternal grandmother’s residence. Petitioner contended that he had rights of custody under Costa Rican law (Articles 141, 151, and 157 of Costa Rica’s Código de Familia or Family Code); that he was exercising those custody rights before the child was wrongfully removed; and that return of the child to Costa Rica is required under Articles Three and Five of the Convention. On January 2, 2018, Respondent filed her pro se Answer to the Petition, denying Petitioner’s allegations and contending that this action is baseless and frivolous:

On February 13, 2018, Petitioner moved for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”). In his motion for a TRO, Petitioner requests that the court prohibit Respondent, and others acting on her behalf, from removing J.S.M.P. from the court’s jurisdiction until after a determination has been made regarding the merits of his Petition.  The district court observed that a court may grant such relief only when the movant establishes that: (1) there is a substantial likelihood that the movant will prevail on the merits; (2) there is a substantial threat that irreparable harm will result if the injunction is not granted; (3) the threatened injury [to the movant] outweighs the threatened harm to the defendant; and (4) the granting of the preliminary injunction will not disserve the public interest. Clark v. Prichard, 812 F.2d 991, 993 (5th Cir. 1987); Canal Auth. of the State of Florida v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567, 572 (5th Cir. 1974) (en banc). The party seeking such relief must satisfy a cumulative burden of proving each of the four elements enumerated before a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction can be granted. Mississippi Power and Light Co. v. United Gas Pipeline, 760 F.2d 618, 621 (5th Cir. 1985); Clark, 812 F.2d at 993.. Because a TRO is considered an “extraordinary and drastic remedy,” it is not granted routinely, “but only when the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.” Holland Am. Ins. Co. v. Succession of Roy, 777 F.2d 992, 997 (5th Cir. 1985).

  The court determined that Petitioner had not established that all requirements for a TRO had been met.


Regarding the first requirement, whether there is a substantial likelihood that the movant will prevail on the merits, the court determined that there was no evidence to support Petitioner’s conclusory allegations that: (1) J.S.M.P.’s habitual residence before removal to the United States was Costa Rica; (2) Petitioner has custody rights under Costa Rican law; and (3) Petitioner was exercising those rights before J.S.M.P.’s removal to the United States. The conclusory statement in the Petition and Petitioner’s affidavit that J.S.M.P. has lived with Petitioner in Costa Rica since his birth until his removal were insufficient to establish that Petitioner and Respondent had a shared intent or settled purpose to make Costa Rica J.S.M.P.’s habitual residence. Larbie, 690 F.3d at 310. First, this statement conflicted with another statement in Petitioner’s affidavit that J.S.M.P. was born in Honduras. If the child was born in Honduras, he could have lived his entire life in Costa Rica, and Petitioner does not specify how long J.S.M.P. has resided in Costa Rica. Thus, at most, this statement by Petitioner indicatesdonly that, for some unspecified period of time, J.S.M.P. lived with Petitioner in Costa Rica, before the child was removed by his mother to the United States. Moreover, that J.S.M.P. may have lived for a length of time in Costa Rica with Petitioner must be viewed in light of other facts. Specifically, as noted, the parties’ allegations and the documentation submitted by Petitioner indicate that Petitioner, Respondent, and J.S.M.P. were all born in Honduras and lived in Honduras for a time before they moved to Costa Rica; Respondent has immediate family in Dallas, Texas; and Petitioner acknowledges that Respondent’s country of habitual residence is the United States. Taken together, these facts did not support a finding that J.S.M.P.’s habitual residence was Costa Rica at the time of his removal to the United States.

Further, Petitioner did not establish that J.S.M.P.’s removal or retention breached Petitioner’s custody rights under Costa Rican law. Petitioner alleged in his Petition and affidavit that Articles 141, 151, and 157 of Costa Rica’s Código de Familia provided him with rights of custody and offers the following English translation of Convention Articles 141, 151, and 157: Article 141: The rights and obligations inherent to parental authority cannot be renounced. Neither can they be modified by agreement of the parties as they relate to the custody, upbringing, and education of the children, except for the provisions for separation and divorce by mutual consent. Article 151: The father and mother exercise parental authority over the children with equal rights and duties in the marriage relationship. In the event of a disagreement, at the request of either parent, the Court shall make the decision, even without the formalities of process and without the need for the parties’ hiring lawyers. The Court must decide based on the child’s interest.... Article 157: The provisions of Article 151 shall apply when the mother of a child born out of marriage exercised parental authority together with the father. 

Petitioner offered no explanation as to why he believed Articles 141, 151, and 157 of Costa Rica’s Código de Familia provided him with rights of custody under Costa Rican law. Article 141 appears in Chapter I of the Costa Rican Family Code includes general rules of disposition applicable to the rights and obligations conferred by parenthood. Código de Familia [CDF], art. 141 (Costa Rica). Article 151 appears in Chapter II of the Costa Rican Family Code and applies specifically to the rights of parents when a child is born in wedlock.   The court interpreted these provisions as setting forth the general rule in Costa Rican law that provides a joint or equal right of custody to both parents when a child is born in wedlock. See Fernandez v. Somaru, No. 2:12-CV-262-FtM-29DNF, 2012 WL 3553779, at *7 n.5 (M.D. Fl. Aug. 17, 2012). Article 157, which appears in Chapter III of the Family Code, applies to children like J.S.M.P, who were born outside of marriage, and only provides for joint or equal rights of custody to both parents if the mother exercised parental authority together with the father. According to Article 155,5 which also appears in Chapter III of the Costa Rican Family Code, when a child is born outside of marriage, the mother, even if she is a minor, has the right to exercise parental authority over a child born outside of marriage and has full legal status for these purposes.. The father, on the other hand, only has the right to exercise parental authority together with the mother in special cases, if such authority is conferred by a tribunal or court upon request of a party or the Patronato Nacional de la Infancia and done solely in consideration of the child’s interests.  In Fernandez v. Somaru, an ICARA case, the court reached the same conclusion based on expert testimony and an official translation of Costa Rican law regarding parental custody: Costa Rican law provides, [in the event a child is born out of wedlock], that, [t]he mother, even when she is under age, shall have custody of the children born out of wedlock and shall have legal rights for that purpose. The Tribunal could, in special cases, confer custody to the father and natural mother jointly, according to its judgement, or upon request from Patronato Nacional de la Infancia and concerning solely the minors’ interests.

The court concluded that Petitioner did not share rights of custody under Costa Rican law with Respondent with respect to J.S.M.P. because he did not allege and had not established that: (1) the parties had a legally binding agreement to share custody of J.S.M.P; or (2) the Patronato Nacional de la Infancia had conferred him with rights of joint custody as to J.S.M.P. As a result, Petitioner could not have been exercising his alleged rights of custody together with J.S.M.P.’s mother when the child was removed from Costa Rica by his mother, and the removal was not wrongful. Thus, even assuming that the Petition for J.S.M.P.’s return was not subject to a well-settled defense by Respondent as a result of Petitioner’s allegations regarding the reasons for his delay in filing his Petition more than one year after J.S.M.P.’s removal, Petitioner had not shown a substantial likelihood that he will be able to succeed on the merits of his Petition under the Convention, ICARA, and applicable law, which require a showing that J.S.M.P.’s removal from Costa Rica was wrongful. 



Saturday, December 30, 2017

Davies v Davies, 2017 WL 6616691 {2d Cir., 2017)[French St. Martin] [Grave Risk of Harm] [Petition denied]



          In Davies v Davies, 2017 WL 6616691 {2d Cir., 2017) the Second Circuit affirmed a judgement which denied the fathers petition for repatriation of his five-year-old son K.D. to French St. Martin. 

          In July 2016, K.D.’s mother, Respondent-Appellee Sally K. Davies, removed K.D. from French St. Martin to New York after suffering years of psychological abuse and increasingly violent behavior from Mr. Davies, much of which occurred in the presence of K.D. Mr. Davies’s uncontrollable anger and abusive behavior was often directed at K.D. Based on documentary evidence and testimony from Ms. Davies, Mr. Davies, nine other fact witnesses, and five expert witnesses the District Court denied Mr. Davies’s petition for repatriation of K.D. See Davies v. Davies, No. 16-cv-6542, 2017 WL 361556, at *1–17 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2017). There was no dispute that Mr. Davies set forth a prima facie case. The principal issue on appeal was whether Ms. Davies satisfied her burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that one of the four narrow exceptions to the Convention’s repatriation provision applied: that the return of K.D. to French St. Martin would expose him to a “grave risk” of “physical or psychological harm or otherwise place [him] in an intolerable situation” under Article 13(b) of the Convention. 

  The Second Circuit pointed out that on appeal, Mr. Davies challenged several of the district court’s factual findings, which “[w]e must accept ... unless we have a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Souratgar v. Lee, 720 F.3d 96, 103 (2d Cir. 2013) It  owes” particularly strong deference where the district court premises its findings on credibility determinations.” Mathie v. Fries, 121 F.3d 808, 812 (2d Cir. 1997). Therefore, “when a trial judge’s finding is based on his decision to credit the testimony of one of two or more witnesses, each of whom has told a coherent and facially plausible story that is not contradicted by extrinsic evidence, that finding, if not internally inconsistent, can virtually never be clear error.” Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985). Having carefully examined the record, it concluded that the district court’s factual findings challenged by Mr. Davies are not erroneous, much less clearly erroneous.

  It concluded that the district court’s findings of fact were not clearly erroneous, including its findings (i) that K.D. was subjected to severe and persistent psychological abuse by Mr. Davies, and (ii) that this abuse would continue if K.D. returned to French St. Martin.

        The Court explained that under Article 13(b)’s grave-risk-of-harm exception to repatriation, “[t]he potential harm to the child must be severe, and the level of risk and danger required to trigger this exception has consistently been held to be very high.” Souratgar, 720 F.3d at 103 “This grave risk exception is to be interpreted narrowly,” a rule that the district court was “acutely aware of.”  It has held that Article 13(b) relief could be granted if repatriation posed a grave risk of causing unavoidable psychological harm to the child,” and “[e]vidence of prior spousal abuse, though not directed at the child, can support the grave risk of harm defense, as could a showing of the child’s exposure to such abuse.” Souratgar, 720 F.3d at 104. But spousal abuse is relevant under Article 13(b) only if it “seriously endangers the child,” and the “inquiry is not whether repatriation would place the respondent parent’s safety at grave risk, but whether so doing would subject the child to a grave risk of physical or psychological harm. ”The grave risk inquiry “involves not only the magnitude of the potential harm but also the probability that the harm will materialize.”  These [are] fact-intensive cases,” and “at one end of the spectrum are those situations where repatriation might cause inconvenience or hardship ... [and] at the other end of the spectrum are those situations in which the child faces a real risk of being hurt, physically or psychologically, as a result of repatriation,” Blondin, 238 F.3d at 162. It concluded that this appeal presented circumstances that fell at the latter end of the spectrum. 

           Reviewing de novo the district court’s application of Article 13(b) to its well-supported factual determinations, it affirmed its decision to deny the petition for repatriation because returning K.D. to French St. Martin would, by clear and convincing evidence, expose him to a grave risk of psychological harm. Based on Mr. Davies’s psychological abuse of not only K.D., but also of Ms. Davies in K.D.’s presence, it found no error in the district court’s conclusions as to the magnitude of the potential psychological harm to K.D.––“severe”––and the probability of that harm materializing if he returned to French St. Martin––“a near certainty.” This conclusion was not based on “[s]poradic or isolated incidents,” or “conjecture and speculation” of abuse, rather, as the district court explained, it was premised on “overwhelming evidence of Mr. Davies’s extreme violence and uncontrollable anger, as well as his psychological abuse of Ms. Davies over many years, much of which was witnessed by K.D., and the fact that Mr. Davies frequently screamed and yelled at K.D. for no legitimate reason.” Like the district court, it found alarming Mr. Davies’s escalation of violence immediately prior to the departure of K.D. and his increasingly hostile threats since then. If K.D. returned and Mr. Davies were to follow through on his threat “that there was no amount of money that he would take to exact his revenge on [Ms. Davies],”–and there was clear and convincing evidence that he would––there is no doubt K.D. would suffer grave psychological harm.
  It found no error in the district court’s conclusion that there were no ameliorative measures that would protect K.D. from harm if he returned to French St. Martin. See Blondin, 238 F.3d at 163 n.11 (“[B]efore a court may deny repatriation on the ground that a grave risk of harm exists under Article 13(b), it must examine the full range of options that might make possible the safe return of a child to the home country.”). The district court heard testimony from four expert witnesses concerning the protections afforded to victims of domestic violence (children and spouses) under French St. Martin’s legal system. Moreover, the district court was in the best position to evaluate Mr. Davies’s credibility about abiding by certain ameliorative measures (such as a stay-away order), which was marred by (i) his deceit and manipulation of the legal system in French St. Martin, (ii) his untruthfulness and unwillingness to accept responsibility for his actions while testifying, and (iii) his escalating threats toward Ms. Davies even after their separation. The day before Ms. Davies and K.D. left French St. Martin, Mr. Davies told her that he would rather take all their money, burn it, and kill himself than resolve their dispute “through the courts.” It declined to disturb the district court’s careful and thorough evaluation of the ameliorative measures.


Duran-Peralta v Luna, 2017 WL 6596632(S.D. N.Y., 2017)[Dominican Republic] [Habitual Residence][Consent]



In Duran-Peralta v Luna, 2017 WL 6596632(S.D. N.Y., 2017) the district court granted the Petition of Juana Livia Duran-Peralta, a resident and citizen of the Dominican Republic, seeking the return of the parties’ minor child (“IM”) to the Dominican Republic.

IM was born in the Dominican Republic on August 5, 2015. On October 12, 2015, respondent took IM to the United States. Respondent has kept IM in the United States since then despite petitioner’s appeals that respondent return IM to the Dominican Republic, which culminated in this lawsuit. According to petitioner, she and respondent were romantically involved for several years, during which time she became pregnant with IM. Respondent claimed that petitioner served as a surrogate for him and his wife and that he and petitioner were never romantically involved. The Court found the testimony of petitioner considerably more credible than that of respondent and those who testified on his behalf.
          The Court found the petitioner mother of IM, lived with her eldest daughter in Santo Domingo in the Dominican Republic, where she lived her entire life. Respondent was also born in Santo Domingo. He lived in the United States with his wife, to whom he had been married for about ten years. Respondent had five children in addition to IM. Petitioner and respondent met in 2012, when he would stop by the “exchange house” next to where she worked, and shortly thereafter began a romantic and sexual relationship. When she became pregnant, petitioner quit her job and respondent financially supported her. In June 2015, respondent rented a house for petitioner in anticipation of IM’s birth. IM was born in the Dominican Republic on August 5, 2015.

IM had medical problems after her birth, including neurological complications from a knotted umbilical cord and a skin condition called scabiasis. Respondent told petitioner that he did not want IM to go to doctors in Santo Domingo, and the parties discussed the possibility of seeking medical treatment for IM in the United States. Respondent told petitioner that his sister, who is a doctor, would see IM in New York. Accordingly, in September, petitioner signed what she understood to be an authorization permitting respondent to bring IM to the United States. This “authorization” most likely was an application for an American passport, which petitioner and respondent filled out at the law office of Justina Echavarria. In October 2015, respondent visited the Dominican Republic again. When he returned to the United States, on October 12, 2015, he brought IM with him. Petitioner believed that respondent was taking IM to the United States for just two months for the sole purpose of receiving medical treatment and that he would return her to the Dominican Republic in December. In November 2015, respondent returned to the Dominican Republic (without IM) and told petitioner that he needed a new authorization to take IM to doctors in the United States. Petitioner and respondent made another visit to Justina Echavarria’s law office on November 5, 2015 and signed a document that petitioner believed authorized respondent to seek medical treatment for IM in the United States but in fact provided that petitioner waived her maternal rights over IM (the “Release”). While IM was in the United States, petitioner “was communicating constantly with” respondent. She inquired about the status of the doctors’ visits and asked respondent to send pictures and videos of IM, which he did. She also “constantly” sent “him messages asking him why [he] didn’t bring the girl back.” Respondent provided various reasons for why he could not bring IM back, such as that “he didn’t have any money to travel back to Santo Domingo, [or] that he had too much work.” Respondent has never returned to the Dominican Republic with IM. Petitioner filed the instant action on October 11, 2016.

          The district court noted that Courts in the Second Circuit use the following approach in determining a child’s state of habitual residence: First, the court should inquire into the shared intent of those entitled to fix the child’s residence (usually the parents) at the latest time that their intent was shared. In making this determination the court should look, as always in determining intent, at actions as well as declarations. Normally the shared intent of the parents should control the habitual residence of the child. Second, the court should inquire whether the evidence unequivocally points to the conclusion that the child has acclimatized to the new location and thus has acquired a new habitual residence, notwithstanding any conflict with the parents’ latest shared intent.

In determining IM’s habitual residence, the preliminary question the Court had to resolve was whether petitioner’s signing the Release demonstrated that she intended IM to remain in the United States permanently. The Court had little doubt that petitioner did not, in signing the Release, anticipate, let alone intend, that respondent would retain IM in the United States permanently. The two-page, as-signed Release provided that, “I [petitioner] want to declare further that I waive all of my rights over the girl; and declare, that this is in the best interest of the girl.” The Release further provided that petitioner “designate[s] [respondent] Johnny Antonio Luna as a qualified and adequate adult competent to perform any proceedings to retain the girl if [her] rights as mother are terminated.” The Release also identified Luna’s address in New York State.

          The court concluded that although respondent credibly testified that she did not read the Release, there was evidence that she might have understood its import. Before petitioner signed the Release, someone from the Echavarrias’ law firm asked Ramon Antonio Gilminjete, an attorney and notary, to notarize the document. Gilminjete, who was perhaps the only one of respondent’s witness whom the Court found half-way credible, testified that he has known petitioner since she was born. When Gilminjete arrived at the office, he read the document immediately and asked petitioner “if she knew what she was signing, what she was about to sign, because she hadn’t signed it yet,” and she responded that she knew what she was signing, Gilminjete told her “it says that she is giving away the custody of the child to the father,” and that it was “too strong.”. Respondent again told him that “she knew what she was doing.” Nonetheless, Gilminjete took the document with him to his office “to maybe give her the opportunity to think it through.”. Petitioner called him “the next day or two days later” to tell him that he could give the document to respondent. Gilminjete then returned the Release to the Echavarrias’ office, which sent the document to get an apostille from the ministry in the Dominican Republic (which is akin to a verification).However, even assuming arguendo that, contrary to her testimony at trial, petitioner was aware that the Release waived her maternal rights - either because she read the document or because Gilminjete informed her of the document’s terms - the evidence still did not support a finding that petitioner ever intended IM to live in the United States. Rather, petitioner was told, and believed, that she was signing the Release so that IM could be seen by doctors in the United States. There was no evidence that petitioner actually “understood” her execution of the Release as consent to IM’s living with respondent in the United States. The Release did not explicitly provide that IM would live in New York. It was silent on IM’s future residence. The Release could be read as implying that IM will live in the United States, but there was no evidence that petitioner drew this inference. Petitioner was not represented by counsel when she signed the Release, Gimlinjete may have explained to petitioner that by signing the Release, she gave custody to respondent, but he apparently did not actually explain to her that the practical effect of her waiving custody would be that respondent would take IM to the United States. There was abundant evidence, on the other hand, that petitioner signed the Release so that respondent could take IM to doctors in the United States and that respondent represented to her that he would bring IM back to the Dominican Republic in December. In addition to petitioner’s testimony, the parties’ text message communications while IM was in the United States confirm that petitioner believed that respondent had taken IM to the United States temporarily to visit doctors.
          The Court next found that the Dominican Republic was IM’s habitual residence at the time of her removal. The parties shared an initial intent that IM reside in the Dominican Republic. In the years preceding IM’s birth, the Dominican Republic was the site of the parties’ relationship. There was no evidence that petitioner even once visited respondent in the United States. When petitioner became pregnant, respondent financially supported her in the Dominican Republic, including by paying the rent on her house in Santo Domingo. Therefore, there was sufficient evidence to conclude that the parties shared an intent that the Dominican Republic be IM’s habitual residence.


          The shared intent of the parents is not dispositive of a child’s habitual residence,” and “[a] court must additionally examine the evidence to determine if it unequivocally points to the child having acclimatized.” Gitter, 396 F.3d at 135. But the Court finds that IM was “acclimatized” to the Dominican Republic at the time of her removal See Ovalle v. Perez, 681 F. App’x 777, 784 (11th Cir. 2017). Here, prior to IM’s entry into the United States, she had never lived anywhere other than the Dominican Republic. The Court found that petitioner has established her claim under the Hague Convention and that there were no defenses. 

Marcoski v Rath, --- Fed.Appx. ----, 2017 WL 6604247 (11th Cir.,2017)[Czech Republic] [Habitual Residence] [Petition granted]


          In Marcoski v Rath, --- Fed.Appx. ----, 2017 WL 6604247 (11th Cir.,2017) Veronika Marcoski, L.N.R.’s mother, appealed the district court’s judgment ordering that L.N.R. be returned to the Czech Republic, where he was born. The district court adopted the report and recommendation issued by the magistrate judge. It found that Mr. Rath and Ms. Marcoski were “in a committed relationship with a shared intent for the foreseeable future to live with L.N.R. in the Czech Republic.”  

         The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. It noted that Ms. Marcoski challenged some of the district court’s underlying factual findings and contended that certain evidence established that L.N.R.’s “habitual residence” was not in the Czech Republic. The district court found that Mr. Rath was “credible and [Ms. Marcoski was] not credible,” and provided detailed reasons for its view of the evidence on important disputed issues, including whether they were living together. While Ms. Marcoski was correct that the district court clearly erred in two of its factual findings, those errors related to subsidiary historical facts and did not change the fact that substantial evidence supported the district court’s ultimate finding regarding shared intent. That is, any error made by the district court “was harmless because there was plenty of other evidence proving the same [ultimate] fact.” Bobo v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 855 F.3d 1294, 1300 (11th Cir. 2017). In sum, the Eleventh Circuit saw no basis for setting aside the district court’s credibility assessments and factual findings. Ms. Marcoski presented an interpretation of the evidence that could have allowed the district court to find in her favor, but “[w]here there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574.