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Sunday, November 4, 2012

Walker v. Kitt, --- F.Supp.2d ----, 2012 WL 5237262 (N.D.Ill.) [Israel] [Grave Risk of Harm] [Article 20]

In Walker v. Kitt, --- F.Supp.2d ----, 2012 WL 5237262 (N.D.Ill. Juaquin Walker ("Petitioner") brought an action for the return of his daughter to Israel under the Hague Convention. Petitioner claimed that Jaquelyn Kitt ("Respondent"), the Child's mother, wrongfully retained the Child in violation of the Convention and ICARA. The district court granted the petition.

Petitioner and Respondent both joined the Black Hebrew Israelite community in Dimona, Israel in the 1970's, as children. Members of the Community recite vows each year in which they promise not to question the judgment of the leader of the Community, who is Considered to be the spiritual Messiah. The Community permits polygamous marriage, and the Israeli government recognizes such marriages as legitimate. In general, women in the Community are subservient to men. A woman's path in life consists of getting married and serving her husband. Petitioner testified that if a woman acts not in accordance with her husband's wishes, she should be punished.

Respondent testified that women are not able to express themselves in the Community. Several additional witnesses testified that women in the Community do not have the ability to make decisions governing their own lives, but that the leader and the men make the decisions. Respondent began to pursue Petitioner when she turned seventeen and was of age to be allowed by the Community to do so. On April 30, 2003, Respondent married Petitioner, becoming his second concurrent wife. Petitioner has six children with his first wife. Before they married, Petitioner's first wife slapped and spat on Respondent. Respondent testified that after the marriage, she continued to be disrespected and verbally abused by Petitioner's first wife, and that she was treated like a servant by Petitioner and his first wife. Respondent gave birth to the Child in Israel in September 2004. Respondent moved out of Petitioner's house in May 2005, but after Petitioner reported her action to Community officials, she moved back in. In October 2005, Respondent again moved out of Petitioner's house and into her father's, taking the Child with her. Petitioner ordered Respondent to return to his house, but she refused. In October 2005, shortly after she moved out of Petitioner's house, the Community leadership requested that Respondent travel to the United States to work in one of the Community's restaurants. She explained to Petitioner and several members of the Community leadership that she did not want to be separated from her daughter, but she was told to go anyway. Respondent believed that if she did not obey the Community leadership, she could be expelled from the Community. Respondent left Israel to come to the United States at the request of the Community leadership in December 2005. She returned to Israel in May 2007 and stayed with her sister. Respondent and Petitioner were not on speaking terms, and the Child stayed with Respondent at her sister's. Respondent returned to the United States in August 2007. She again visited Israel in June 2009. ( She stayed in Israel for six months, and the Child stayed with her during this period. Respondent's mission ended in 2009, yet she returned to the United States in December 2009. Respondent returned to Israel in June 2011, and she remained there until she left for the United States with the Child in September 2011.

In a declaratory judgment action in September 2011, an Israeli family court issued an order, based on DNA testing, declaring Petitioner's paternity of the Child. The Child was currently eight years old. She lived in Israel her entire life until Respondent brought her to the United States in September 2011. Petitioner and Respondent agreed that the Child would visit the United States with Respondent until the end of the Jewish holiday season in November 2011.(Petitioner and Respondent reported to the Child's school and the United States Embassy in Israel that the Child would return to Israel after less than two months. Respondent and the Child resided in the Washington, D.C. area from September 2011 until the filing of this action in July 2012. Respondent testified that, once in the United States, the Child "began to cry regularly, saying she did not want to go back to Israel, but that she wanted to stay with [Respondent] in the U.S. instead." In late October, Petitioner requested that Respondent's brother, who was planning a trip to Israel, bring the Child with him. Respondent understood the agreement to entail Petitioner's coming to the United States to retrieve the Child and did not allow the Child to return to Israel with Respondent's brother. In November 2011, Respondent retained the Child beyond the two-month visit that she and Petitioner had agreed upon. Respondent testified that she received phone calls from Petitioner's family informing her that Petitioner was planning on kidnaping the Child.

Petitioner filed a Petition and Emergency Petition for Warrant of Arrest, which was granted and Petitioner was given temporary custody of the Child pending resolution of his petition for her return. A hearing was held on October 11. Respondent did not provide any evidence or arguments that the removal was not wrongful either in her response or in the evidentiary hearing. Given that the Child lived in Israel from the time she was born until Respondent brought her to the United States in September 2011, a fact the parties stipulated to, the Court found that the Child was a habitual resident of Israel. The Israeli law relevant here, provided by Petitioner, is Israel's Capacity and Guardianship Law of 1962. The law provides that parents, as the natural guardians of their minor children, have "the right to the custody of the minor, to determine his place of residence and the authority to act on his behalf."Capacity and Guardianship Law, 5722-1962, 16 LSI 106, 14-15 (5722-1961/62) (Isr.). As the Child's natural father, Petitioner had custody rights over her, which were breached by Respondent's retention of the Child past the agreed-upon time period. If a person has valid custody rights to a child under the law of the country of the child's habitual residence, that person cannot fail to 'exercise' those custody rights under the Hague Convention short of acts that constitute clear and unequivocal abandonment of the child." Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060, 1066 (6th Cir.1996)(Friedrich II ). No such acts were present in this case; in fact, by Respondent's own admission, Petitioner cared for the Child during the time periods when Respondent was in the United States and was a good father. Finally, Petitioner obtained an ex parte decision in the Beer Sheva Family Court in Israel declaring that Petitioner and Respondent have joint custody rights under Israeli law, and that Respondent's actions had violated Petitioner's custody rights.

Thus, the Court found that Petitioner has met his initial burden and has established a prima facie case of wrongful retention under the Hague Convention.

The Court rejected the affirmative defenses asserted by Respondent. Respondent did not provide the Court any reasons or evidence indicating that the Child should be considered of sufficient age and maturity to have her views considered. The Court conducted an in camera interview with the Child on October 11, 2012. The Court asked the Child where she considered "home." The Child answered firmly and without hesitation, "in Israel." "The Court found it unnecessary to determine whether the Child was of sufficient age and maturity to have her views considered because the Child did not give any indication that she would prefer to remain in the United States. Thus, Respondent's assertion of the "age and
maturity" exception failed because the Child did not object to returning to Israel.

 Respondent contended that the Court should refuse to return the child based on Article 13(b) of the Convention. Respondent believed "there is a grave risk that the child would be exposed to physical and psychological harm and that the child would be put in an intolerable situation" if the Court ordered her return to Israel. Respondent contended, and introduced multiple witnesses at the evidentiary hearing to testify, that women are subordinate to men in the Community. Respondent testified that the Child should stay in the United States where she would have better opportunities for education and self-expression than she would in the Community. Additionally, Respondent testified that she had been mistreated by Petitioner's first wife and treated as a servant in Petitioner's household. Respondent's mother, who had lived in the Community at least part-time for 35 years, expressed concern that as the daughter of Petitioner's second wife, the Child may not receive the same opportunities or affection as his other children.

The Court commended Respondent's desire to provide better educational opportunities for her daughter while admonishing her methods. However, the Article 13(b) exception is "not intended to encompass return to a home where money is in short supply, or where educational or other opportunities are more limited than in the requested State. The lack of opportunities available to women in general and children of second wives more specifically does not approach a "grave risk of harm" or an "intolerable situation" for the purposes of the Convention. The Court did not condone the subordination of women. Given the testimony about the lack of meaningful educational opportunities and the limited roles available for women in the Community, the Court empathized with Respondent's desire to raise her daughter in the United States. However, where the Child may be better off is a custody matter, which is reserved for the courts in the country of her habitual residence. The Court concluded that returning the Child to a community that may only ever afford her second-class status because of her gender does not pose a grave risk of harm as intended by Article 13(b) of the Convention. Respondent testified that she believed Petitioner was a good father; that she believed he would protect the Child from harm; that he had never abused or neglected the Child or any of his other children; that Respondent felt comfortable with the Child visiting and staying with Petitioner; and that she had  never had any reason to contact the police or social services about Petitioner.

Respondent appealed to the exception provided in Article 20 of the Hague Convention. Article 20 states that "[t]he return of the child ... may be refused if this would not be permitted by the fundamental principles of the requested State relating to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms." Hague Convention, art. 20. Respondent contended that "[p]olygamy is illegal in the United States without exception. And molestation and the subjection of women are considered to be against the fundamental principles of this society." Respondent argued that even if Israel has laws with respect to those behaviors, "the government acquiesces, at least in the polygamy realm." Respondent filed a supplemental brief alleging that "[e]qual protection of women is a fundamental principle in the United States." Respondent argues that because "[t]he principles and practices of this community are anathema to the fundamental principles of the United States relating to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms of women," the Child's "future prospects in this community will be affected negatively by the role designated to women." Finally, Respondent suggested that the facts that all adults in the Community pledge yearly oaths of allegiance and obedience to the leader and that the Child "may inevitably have to pledge oaths and submit to the wishes of the leader" might "utterly shock the conscience"of the Court.

Both Respondent and the Court were unable to find a single decision from a court in the United States in which a child was not repatriated based on Article 20. Respondent's counsel admitted failure to find precedent but argued that "there has to be a case where [Article 20] does apply." The court held that this case is not it. While polygamy is certainly illegal in this country, and the systemic subordination of women is incompatible with the United States' aim of equality, "the Convention requires that the fundamental principles of the State not permit the return of the child; merely offending principles espoused in [United States] laws is insufficient." Habrzyk v. Habrzyk, 759 F.Supp.2d 1014, 1027 (N.D.Ill.2011) .The narrow jurisdiction of the Court, however, was limited to determining if any defense exists to the mandatory repatriation of the Child for the purposes of custody proceedings in Israel. Unfortunately, the fact that the Child may not have as robust rights as a man when she reaches maturity does not shock the conscience under Article 20. Cultural gender inequality is a serious issue. However, accepting cultural gender inequality as a sufficient basis for an Article 20 defense would undermine the Convention. To invoke Article 20 to refuse to return a child for anything less than gross violations of human rights
would seriously cripple the purpose and effectivity of the Convention. The Court found that Respondent had failed to provide the clear and convincing evidence necessary in asserting an Article 20 defense.

Prouse v. Thoreson, 2012 WL 5199182 (W.D.Wis.) [Italy] [Habitual Residence

In Prouse v. Thoreson, 2012 WL 5199182 (W.D.Wis.) Petitioner Giorgio Prouse brought an action against his wife, respondent Robin Thoreson under the Hague Convention, petitioning for the return of his minor daughter to Milan, Italy.

The district court denied the petition. It pointed out that before respondent brought their daughter to the United States. Petitioner Dr. Giorgio Prouse and respondent Robin Thoreson were married and the parents of an eight-year-old child, JP. Petitioner lived in Milan, Italy, and worked as a cardiovascular surgeon. Until December 2011, respondent lived in Milan and worked as a flight attendant out of Chicago, Illinois. JP was born in Milan and lived there with her parents for most of her life. JP visited the United States regularly during her school breaks and spent time here with her maternal grandparents. In the summer and fall of 2011, while petitioner was still completing his residency program, the family began experiencing financial difficulties. Throughout 2011, the parties discussed various living arrangements after petitioner completed his residency in 2012. The parties agreed that respondent and JP would go to the United States, where JP could attend the local school and live with respondent's parents while respondent worked. On December 28, 2011, respondent and JP flew to the United States. They moved in with respondent's parents in Beloit, Wisconsin, where JP began attending school in the local school district. Respondent's parents cared for JP while respondent lived during the week in Chicago. Respondent made a trip back to Milan in early January to finish cleaning their previous home and to bring some of the family pets to the United States. When respondent and JP left Italy, petitioner listed the family's home for sale or lease and entered into a four-year lease with the right to renew the lease for four additional years. Next, he moved into the family's old apartment, a small one-bedroom below ground unit adjacent to his mother's home. Finally, he wrote JP's school in Milan and informed the administrators that JP would no longer be in attendance due to "our move" to the United States for "sudden, unexpected reasons of work ." (Petitioner said that he referred to "our move" only in an attempt to persuade the school to refund a portion of JP's tuition that he had already paid.) Petitioner, respondent and JP visited each other in the United States and Italy in the following months. Petitioner visited the United States in January 2012 for JP's birthday. At that time he asked respondent to book the return portion of his flight for August "when returning to Italy would be difficult. He made no mention of taking JP back to Milan with him in August or any other time. JP then visited petitioner in Italy in March and April of 2012 for Easter break. They booked another trip for JP to go to Italy between July 14, 2012 and August 4, 2012. In April 13, 2012, petitioner informed respondent over the telephone that he wished to end their marriage. Respondent emailed petitioner and told him that she would do anything to make the marriage work, including moving back to Italy, transferring to another city that had more frequent flights to Milan on which she could work or moving somewhere else after petitioner finished his residency. Four days later, she flew to Italy. During her visit, she asked petitioner where she and JP would live. Petitioner told her that "the United States is a big place" and that Arizona would be a good place for her and JP because respondent's friend Michelle could help respondent raise JP. That summer, respondent became convinced that she and JP should no longer live with her parents and should look for a place of their own. On June 6, 2012, respondent emailed petitioner, explaining her concern and her desire to talk to him about moving and whether he would be able to help her financially. Petitioner agreed to help respondent and JP rent their own place. Petitioner and respondent communicated a few more times about the price of a rental, but eventually respondent dropped the issue. Petitioner assumed it was because she had worked things out with her parents. Before petitioner began this action, he did not tell respondent that he wanted JP to return to Italy for school in the fall. JP had a successful spring semester of school in Beloit. Although JP was engaged in life in the United States, respondent emailed petitioner on June 17, 2012 that JP missed "home, the dogs, you, etc." On June 26, 2012, respondent filed for divorce in Cook County, Illinois. The next day, petitioner came to the United States to attend his sister's wedding in Washington D.C. Respondent dropped JP off at the Chicago airport so that she could travel with petitioner to the wedding. She picked up petitioner and JP from the airport when they returned from Washington D.C. The next morning, July 2, 2011, respondent and JP took petitioner to the airport for his return flight to Italy. At some point while petitioner was in Chicago, a private investigator served him with respondent's divorce petition. Despite the pending divorce, the parties continued to communicate about JP.

On July 30-31, 2012, after obtaining legal counsel Petitioner filed a criminal complaint and an action under the Hague Convention in Italy, followed by this action, which he filed on September 5, 2012.

The district court observed that in Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir.2001), the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit undertook a lengthy analysis of the term "habitual residence" that other courts have relied on since then. In this case, the analysis was straightforward. Both parties agreed that their financial difficulties required leaving Milan and taking up residence in the United States, where they could reduce their living expenses and where petitioner would be likely to find a higher paying position than he could obtain in Italy. They agreed that respondent would leave in December 2011 with JP, who would live with respondent's parents while respondent increased her work hours as a flight attendant (and reduced her commuting expenses), and petitioner would come when he finished his residency. With that plan in mind, petitioner applied for a refund of JP's tuition from her expensive international school, saying that the family was moving to the United States; put the couple's home on the market, either for sale or rent; and moved back into a small below ground apartment in Milan. Respondent cleaned out the family home, moved all the family pets to the United States and enrolled JP in a local school in Beloit, Wisconsin, where JP's grandparents lived. This was ample evidence of the parties' settled purpose in December 2011 to establish a new residence in the United States. JP's eight months of residency in this country, her success in the local schools and her involvement in horseback riding supported a finding that her habitual residence was now in the United States. This finding was bolstered by the fact that home environment to which she was accustomed in Italy no longer exists; her home was rented out and she was no longer enrolled in the school she had been accustomed to attending.

Petitioner argued that he never acquiesced in JP's continued residence in the United States. The proof was to the contrary. As explained at length, he made no arrangements for her to come back to Italy to attend school. The record contained nothing in writing to suggest that he ever told respondent that he wanted JP to return to Italy to live with him. The finding that JP's habitual residence was not the United States answered the question whether she was wrongfully removed or retained. She was not. She came here and continued to reside here in accordance with a plan developed by both of her parents at a time when they had a shared intent. Her father's subsequent decision to end his marriage to her mother did not mean that he did not have the settled intent in December 2011 to move his family to the United States for an indefinite period.

As to whether the removal breached petitioner's rights of custody under the law
of the child's habitual residence, that question was moot in view of the finding that the removal was in accordance with the parties' agreement to move to the United States, as was the question whether respondent was exercising his custody rights at the time.

Tuesday, October 23, 2012

Jensie v Jensie, 2012 WL 5178168 (E.D.Ky.) [Sweden] [Habitual Residence]



In Jensie v Jensie, 2012 WL 5178168 (E.D.Ky.) Petitioner Niklas Jensie ("Niklas"), a native and citizen of Sweden, met Respondent Marlena Jensie ("Marlena"), a native and citizen of the United States, in 1998. Marlena moved to Sweden in 2001, and the couple established a residence in Goteborg, Sweden, where Niklas's family lived. Niklas worked as a computer technician and Marlena, after attending Swedish educational courses, became employed as a preschool teacher. The couple married in 2003 while on a visit to Marlena's home state of Utah.

The couple's daughter, L.N.J. was born on January 2, 2009, in Goteborg , and she had dual Swedish and American citizenship. Soon after their daughter's birth, Niklas and Marlena travelled to the United States for approximately four weeks to visit Marlena's family so that they could meet L.N.J. In 2010, Marlena became a Swedish citizen. The couple began raising L.N.J. in Goteborg. In 2010, after Marlena returned to work from maternity leave, L.N.J. began attending a Swedish preschool. L.N.J. also spent time with Niklas's family and engaged in typical childhood activities. Each parent spoke to L.N.J. in their native tongue, but L.N .J. understood Swedish. In the summer of 2011, Niklas and Marlena again travelled with L.N .J. to the United States for vacation for approximately four to five weeks, visiting Marlena's family in several states. Other than these vacations, L.N.J. resided in Goteborg with her parents and attended preschool.

In late 2011, Niklas told Marlena that he wanted to separate. Marlena was upset by this news. The suggestion was made that Marlena travel to the United States to visit with her family and "clear her head." Tickets were purchased for Marlena and L.N.J. to travel to the United States on December 13, 2011, with a booked return for February 5, 2012. Marlena and L.N.J. did not return to Sweden as scheduled and Niklas had not consented to the trip extending past February 5, 2012. When Marlena did not return on February 5, Niklas called her and learned that she was still in the United States. Niklas immediately sought legal advice and contacted the Swedish government for assistance. He also began pleading with Marlena to return to Sweden. Marlena eventually agreed to return to Sweden with L.N.J. on April 5, 2012, using new tickets purchased by Niklas. The return date was not chosen with any intent that Marlena and Lily would actually return to the United States at that time. When Marlena and L.N.J. returned to Sweden in April, Niklas moved out of the apartment they had been sharing and moved in with his sister. During the next few months, Niklas and Marlena shared custody of L.N.J. and began meeting with Swedish social services to mediate their divorce and custody issues. Niklas testified, and Marlena did not dispute, that the mediator cautioned her about the seriousness of her prior refusal to return L.N.J. to Sweden in February.

Marlena testified that she believed that Niklas knew that it was her intention to return to the United States with L.N.J. once they had the custody issues worked out, and that the two had discussed various possible arrangements along those lines. Niklas, however, testified that he never consented for Marlena to take L.N.J. back to the United States to live and that, in fact, he was seeking an equal parenting schedule of every other week with custody of their daughter.

On June 7, 2012, Marlena sent Niklas an email stating, inter alia,:"Please don't turn in the divorce papers just for the sake of getting moving on things. Can we stop fighting? " Niklas nonetheless filed for divorce in early June. The parties had a mediation scheduled for June 25, 2012. The mediation was rescheduled for July 5, 2012. Marlena did not appear for the mediation on July 5. Alarmed, Niklas went to the apartment but Marlena and L.N.J. were not there. L.N.J.'s clothes and toys appeared undisturbed, however, and the apartment appeared normal. Niklas then discovered that Marlena's and L.N.J.'s passports were not in their normal place. . Niklas's eventurally concluded that Marlena had taken L.N.J. to Taylor Mill, Kentucky, where her father now resided. The next day, July 6, 2012, Niklas contacted the Swedish Central Authority and filed an Application for Assistance Under the Hague Convention on Child Abduction requesting L.N.J.'s return to Sweden. Niklas filed his petition on October 5, 2012.. On October 10, 2012, the Goteborg District Court entered an order granting Niklas full custody of L.N.J.

The district court granted the Petition. It observed that to determine the habitual residence, the court must focus on the child, not the parents, and examine past experience, not future intentions." Friedrich, 983 F.2d at 1401. "A person can have only one habitual residence. On its face, habitual residence pertains to customary residence prior to removal. The court must look back in time, not forward." Friedrich, 983 F.2d at 1401. Here, the evidence showed that L.N.J. was born in Sweden on January 2, 2009, and, but for family vacations, lived there until December 2011, engaging in normal family activities and attending preschool. Sweden was where she had been "present long enough to allow acclimatization" and where there was "a degree of settled purpose from the child's perspective." In December 2011, L.N.J. traveled to the United States with her mother, with the understanding that they would return in February 2012. The Court concluded that this trip of several months did not alter L.N.J.'s customary residence in Sweden. (Citing Blanc v. Morgan, 721 F.Supp.2d 749, 760 9W.D.Tenn.2010) (holding that fact that mother took child on extended trips to United States did not alter child's habitual residence of France). That Marlena overstayed the February 2012 return by two months was also immaterial because time spent by a child in another country after any wrongful removal or retention does not factor into the "habitual residence". The change in geography must occur before the questionable removal; here, the removal precipitated the change in geography. The same was true with respect to the approximately three and a half months that L.N.J. spent in the United States since her removal from Sweden in July. Moreover, although Marlena insisted that she always intended to return to the United States to live with L.N.J., such parental future intentions generally do not factor into the Sixth Circuit's child-centric analysis. Therefore, the Court concluded that L.N.J.'s habitual residence prior to July 2012 was Sweden.

The Court noted that under Swedish law, married parents have joint custody by operation of law. (Citing Fridlund v. Spychaj-Fridlund, 654 F.Supp.2d 634, 637-38 (E.D.Ky.2009)). Here, at the time of L.N.J.'s removal from Sweden in July 2012, there had been no judicial or administrative decision or agreement that altered Niklas's parental rights, and Marlena admitted this during the evidentiary hearing. Based upon the facts, the Court also concluded that Niklas was exercising his custodial rights when L.N.J. was taken from Sweden. Thus, to defeat a showing that removal was wrongful, Marlena has to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Niklas consented to the removal. The Court had already found as a fact that Niklas did not consent to L.N.J.'s removal to the United States in July 2012, regardless of what the parties' prior discussions were regarding possible solutions to the custody dilemma. A parent's deliberately secretive actions is "extremely strong evidence" that the other parent would not have consented to removal. Simcox v. Simcox, 511 F.3d 594, 603 (6th Cir.2007) Marlena admitted that Niklas did not know she was leaving with L.N.J. when she did, and the surrounding circumstances indicated that she knew that Niklas would not have consented to L.N.J.'s removal to the United States. It was clear that when Niklas responded to Marlena's text message of July 2 confirming that he was seeking a 50/50 shared parenting arrangement, Marlena panicked. Under questioning by the Court, she admitted as much, conceding that she was afraid what a Swedish court might do with respect to custody. As soon as Niklas learned of her departure with L.N.J., he immediately took steps to secure his daughter's return. The Court had no doubt that Niklas did not consent to L.N.J.'s removal from Sweden.

 

 

 

Monday, October 22, 2012

Vujicevic v Vujicevic, 2012 WL 4948640 (S.D.N.Y.) [Croatia] [Federal & State Judicial Remedies] [Notice & Opportunity to Be Heard]

In Vujicevic v Vujicevic, 2012 WL 4948640 (S.D.N.Y.) Petitioner filed his Verified Petition for the Return of the Child to Croatia and his Petition for Warrant in Lieu of Writ
of Habeas Corpus on October 9, 2012. The docket sheet for the case indicated that
respondent had never been served. This lack of service was confirmed by an Affidavit of in support of the Petition for Warrant in Lieu of Writ of Habeas Corpus.

The district court observed that the United States Supreme Court has established that "[b]efore a federal court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the procedural requirement of service of summons must be satisfied." (Citing Omni Capital Int'l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 104 (1987). Service is also specifically required by the International Child Abduction Remedies Act, ("ICARA"), which implemented the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. Under ICARA, "[n]otice of an action brought under subsection (b) of this section shall be given in accordance with the applicable law governing notice in interstate child custody proceedings." (42 U.S.C. 11603(c)). In New York, the laws governing notice in interstate child custody proceedings are the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act ("UCCJEA"), codified in Domestic Relations Law, §§75-78a and the federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A, 42 U.S.C. § 663 ("PKPA"). Both the UCCJEA and the PKPA require that, prior to any child custody determination, notice must be given to, inter alia,"any parent whose parental rights have not been previously terminated[ ] and any person having physical custody of the child." (Dom. Rel. Law § 76-d; 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(e). Accordingly, courts in this district deciding petitions under the Hague Convention have consistently required service on the respondent. [Citing Ebanks v. Ebanks, 2007 WL 2591196, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2007) (ruling that service was necessary for the Court to exercise personal jurisdiction and that petitioner was required to serve respondent in accordance with New York law)].

The District Court declined to grant the Petition for Warrant as it appeared that while the Court had subject matter jurisdiction over the case there was no personal jurisdiction over respondent absent proper service.

Friday, October 19, 2012

Hynes v. Berger, 2012 WL 4889854 (D.Md.) [Germany] [Federal & State Judicial Remedies] [Denial of Notice and Opportunity to be Heard]


In Hynes v. Berger, 2012 WL 4889854 (D.Md.), decided October 12, 2012, Shawn T. Hynes filed a "Hague Convention Article 15 Petition asking the court "to expeditiously decide and determine, in accordance with the ... Hague Convention's provisions, and at the specific request of the District Court in Schleswig, Germany, whether the removal or retention of the parties' minor daughter, K.B., by respondent, Ulrike C. Berger, a/k/a Julie Berger, ... was wrongful within the meaning of Article 3 of the Hague Convention ...." Petitioner also filed a motion to expedite proceedings.

The court observed that it was in "a somewhat awkward position." The District Court in Schleswig, Germany, was scheduled to hold a hearing in this matter on October 23, 2012. Therefore, time was of the essence. Respondent, resided in the Federal Republic of Germany. Respondent had not yet been served, and the time for her to respond to the petition would be a date beyond October 23, 2012. The Court concluded that under the circumstances it should answer the question posed by the District Court in Schleswig, Germany. In doing it recognized that it had been denied the benefit of the adversary system that lies at the heart of the system of justice in the United States and without giving the Respondent notice or an opportunity to be heard, ruled in favor of Petitioner, giving Respondent 45 days after service of process upon her to move to rescind the order.

It ruled based upon the complaint and its attachments, Respondent's removal of K.B. from the child's habitual residence in Montgomery County, Maryland, in the United States of America, was wrongful within the meaning of Article 3 of the Hague Convention. For that reason it entered a judgment responding to the request made by the District Court in Schleswig, Germany that, based upon the information available Respondent's removal of K.B. from Montgomery County, Maryland, in the United States of America, to the Federal Republic of Germany was wrongful. The facts that lead to its conclusion were that Petitioner and Respondent, who were married to one another, were the parents of K.B., a five-year-old girl.. At the time of her removal, K.B.'s habitual residence was located in Montgomery County, Maryland, in the United States of America. Prior to her removal, Petitioner legally exercised his custodial rights by visiting K.B. and having regular telephonic and video conference and contact with her almost daily since the time that she was two years old. He also spent vacation time with K.B.  Petitioner did not consent to removal of K.B. from Montgomery County, Maryland to the Federal Republic of Germany. Under Maryland law, absent a court order to the contrary, parents are deemed to be joint natural guardians of their minor child and neither parent is presumed to have any right to custody that is superior to the right of the other parent.

Thursday, October 4, 2012

Salvidar v Rodella, --- F.Supp.2d ----, 2012 WL 4497507 (W.D.Tex.) [Mexico] [Attorneys Fees]




In Salvidar v Rodella, --- F.Supp.2d ----, 2012 WL 4497507 (W.D.Tex.) the Court considered Petitioner Sonia Eledia Acosta Saldivar's "Application for Reasonable Attorneys' Fees and Costs . Having prevailed on the merits of the underlying action, Petitioner moved for award of expenses, including legal fees and costs, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 11607(b)(3), the fee-shifting provision of ICARA. In her fee application Petitioner sought attorneys' fees in the amount of $60,022 .00, litigation costs in
the amount of $11,718.16, and out-of-pocket expenses in the amount of $1,398.38.
Because Respondent asserted  that he was financially unable to pay any award of fees and costs, the Court issued an order instructing Respondent to submit evidence in support of his assertion. After due consideration, the Court issued a lengthy and instructive opinion granting the application in part.

The Court observed that where, as here, a court has ordered the return of the child to his habitual residence, the court must order the respondent-abductor to pay "necessary expenses incurred by or on behalf of the petitioner," unless to so order would be "clearly inappropriate." 42 U.S.C. 11607(b)(3).The respondent has the burden to show that an award of fees or expenses would be "clearly inappropriate. 

Respondent argued that Petitioner should be denied the statutory attorneys' fees and costs because her attorneys are employed by Texas Rio Grande Legal Aid, Inc. ("TRLA"), a publicly funded legal aid entity. Further, Respondent maintained that because Petitioner or a relative of Petitioner on her behalf had not paid or agreed to pay any attorneys' fees or costs to TRLA, the requested fees and costs have not been incurred on her behalf. Awarding fees under such circumstances, Respondent contended would reward legal aid societies, who are already funded by taxpayers, rather than compensating a petitioner for her legal fees and costs. Respondent invited the Court to interpret §11607(b)(3) as precluding an award where the petitioner is represented for free by a publicly funded legal aid entity. The Court rejected this argument.  Given that the text of § 11607(b)(3) does not in any way limit the scope of the entities who may recover under it, the structure of § 11607(b) suggests that Congress did not intend to cut off from recovery legal aid entities-the very entities on which Congress intended to rely in fulfilling the United States's obligations under the Convention, and the legislative history points to Congress's adoption of the Department of State's broad understanding of the phrase "on behalf of," the Court concluded that under ICARA, an award of expenses, including legal fees and costs, is not inappropriate where the petitioner is represented by a publicly funded legal aid entity, such as TRLA.

Respondent further asserted that an award was clearly inappropriate here because Petitioner had "unclean hands." Given the statutory mandate that the Court "shall order the respondent to pay," it was unclear whether equitable principles such as "unclean hands" should apply to outright deny any recovery of fees and costs. In any event, the Court found that the doctrine of unclean hands did not operate to bar an award of fees in this case. The Court concluded that Respondent has failed to carry his burden to show that an award of necessary expenses, including costs and legal fees, was "clearly inappropriate" in this case. Petitioner, therefore, was entitled to an award.

The court held that to be awardable, the expenses must be "necessary"
to secure the child's return.  Aldinger v. Segler, 157 F. App'x 317, 318 (1st
Cir.2005).  Further, the expenses must be incurred in connection with an action brought under § 11603.Koch v. Koch, 450 F.3d 703, 719 (7th Cir .2006).  To determine an appropriate legal fee award, federal courts typically use the "lodestar" method in Hague Convention cases.  The calculation of attorneys' fees under the lodestar method is a two-step process. In the first step, the court calculates the lodestar amount by multiplying the reasonable number of hours expended on the case by the reasonable hourly rates for the participating lawyers.  In the second step, the court decides whether the lodestar amount should be adjusted upward or downward based on the circumstances of the case using the factors articulated in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir.1974) The attorneys' fees calculus is a fact-intensive one and its character varies from case to case." Hopwood v. Texas, 236 F.3d 256, 281 (5th Cir.2000).   The reasonableness of an attorney's hourly rate "depends on the experience and qualifications of the professional. Hourly rates are to be computed according to the prevailing market rates in the relevant legal market,
not the rates that lions at the bar may command. The relevant market was the
community in which the district court sits. Typically, the reasonable hourly rate for a particular community is established through affidavits of other attorneys practicing there.   Finally, a legal aid counsel, though she does not exact a fee from clients, is awarded the same hourly rate that a counsel in the private bar with the same experience and skills as hers commands. The Court found that the reasonable hourly rate for Brown was $250 and the reasonable hourly rate for Saenz was $150.

The district court pointed out that it must determine whether the hours claimed were "reasonably expended" on the litigation; that is, whether the total number of hours claimed were reasonable and whether specific hours claimed were reasonably expended.. The fee applicant bears the burden of establishing the reasonableness of the number of hours expended on the litigation,  and must present adequately documented time records to the court,  Using this documented time as a benchmark, the court must exclude hours which, though actually expended, are excessive, duplicative, or inadequately documented. The court considered(1) Hours Spent for Petitioner's Hague Application; (2) Hours Spent for State Court Proceedings; 
(3) Hours Spent for the Preliminary Injunction Hearing; (4) Hours Spent for Trial Preparation; (5) Hours Spent on Tasks Performed after the Child's Return; (6) Travel Time (noting that while travel time is not per se excludable, non-working travel time is often compensated at a discounted hourly rate.  In re Babcock & Wilcox Co., 526 F.3d
824, 828-29 (5th Cir.2008): and (7) Fees for Fees, hours spent in preparation of her application for attorney's fees and costs-commonly known as "fees for fees." In the Fifth Circuit, it is settled that a prevailing plaintiff is entitled to attorney's fees for the effort entailed in litigating a fee claim and securing compensation. ; and (8) Hours Inadequately Documented.  The court found that 71.8 hours expended by Brown were reasonable. It noted that if more than one attorney is involved, the possibility of duplication of  effort along with the proper utilization of time should be scrutinized. The time of two or three lawyers in a courtroom or conference when one would do, may obviously be discounted. the Court found that 8.0 hours expended by Saenz are reasonable.

  To arrive at the lodestar amount, the Court multiplied the reasonable hourly
rate by the number of hours reasonably expended. . For Attorney Brown, the Court multiplied 71.8 hours by the rate of $250, to arrive at the lodestar amount of $17,950, and for Attorney Saenz, it multiplied 8.0 hours by the rate of $150 to arrive at the lodestar amount of $1,200. The total lodestar amount therefore was $19,150.  Once the court has calculated the lodestar, it noted that it may adjust upward or downward
after considering following Johnson factors:  (1) the time and labor required to represent the client or clients;  (2) the novelty and difficulty of the issues in the case;  (3) the skill required to perform the legal services properly;  (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney;  (5) the customary fee charged for those services in the relevant community;  (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent;  (7) the time limitations imposed by the client or circumstances;  (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorney;  (10) the undesirability of the case;  (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases.     Johnson, 488 F.2d at 717-19. Of these factors, the court should give special heed to factors (1), (5), (8), and (9). Saizan v. Delta Concrete Prods. Co., 448 F.3d 795, 800 (5th Cir .2006)."    The Court determined that adjustment due to Johnson factors was not warranted. The factors that would warrant an upward or downward adjustment had already been considered when the Court made its determination regarding the reasonable hours expended and the hourly rates.

Respondent stated that he lacked financial means to pay the amount of fees
requested by Petitioner. The court noted that it may reduce a fee award in a Hague Convention case, if it prevents the respondent-parent with straitened financial condition from caring for his child.  Rydder v. Rydder, 49 F.3d 369, 373-74 (8th Cir.1995); Whallon v. Lynn, 356 F.3d 138, 139-40 (1st Cir.2004); see also  Norinder v.
Fuentes, 657 F.3d 526, 536-37 (7th Cir.2011).Such reduction is equitable in nature,  Rydder, 49 F.3d at 374, and the Court has "broad discretion,"  Whallon, 356 F.3d at 140. In determining whether and to what extent a fee award should be reduced on the basis of the respondent's financial situation, the Court inquires "whether respondent has clearly established that it is likely that h[is] child will be significantly adversely affected by the court's award."  Upon due consideration, the Court found that Respondent's financial condition was straitened, particularly in light of the recent termination from his work. This was not to say that his straitened condition was a permanent one, for given his past work history, it was not unreasonable to assume that he would be employed again soon. Since the parties' separation in 2010,
Respondent provided monthly child support and paid for D.I.R.A.'s cost of education. Pursuant to the parties' divorce agreement, Respondent was obligated to pay child support for D.I.R.A. There was nothing to indicate that he would not continue to provide for the child. Therefore, a large fee award in this case would undermine "the ability of [the] respondent to care for [his] child." Whallon, 356 F.3d at 140.    Accordingly, the Court was of the opinion that a reduction of the above-calculated fee award was warranted. However, the Court declined to reduce the fee award to an amount so little as to effectively result in a denial of all fees. To do so would contravene the statutorily mandated award of attorneys' fees and thwart the legislative purpose of deterring future violations of the Hague Convention. Accordingly, the Court reduced the fee award by 55%. A reduction on the account of straitened financial condition, however, would not be applied to litigation costs and out-of-pocket expenses.    Accordingly, the Court ordered Respondent to pay attorneys' fees  of $8,617.50.

Petitioner requested an award of $11,718.16 as litigation costs incurred on her
behalf by TRLA. Federal courts may only award those costs articulated in 28
U.S.C.  1920 absent explicit statutory or contractual authorization to the contrary."  Costs taxable under § 1920 are per se awardable under § 11607(b)(3). Under s 1920, a court may tax the following costs: fees of the clerk and marshal; fees of the court reporter for all or any part of the stenographic transcript necessarily obtained for use in the case; fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses; fees for exemplification and copies of papers necessarily obtained for use in the case; docket fees; compensation of court-appointed experts, interpreters, and special interpretation services. 28 U. S.C.1920. The court allowed the following costs as necessary expenses: fees for filing the action ($350.00), fees for service of summon ($91.30), and compensation of interpreter used at trial ($780 .00).  Petitioner itemized $65.56 for freight/postage expenses, without explaining for what purposes the freight was used. Because the Court was unable to determine their necessity without further elaboration, it disallowed this amount.  Petitioner sought $1075 for translation services. These costs were necessary and  the Court allowed them.  Petitioner itemized $384 as transcript fees. The Court deem these costs as necessary. (28 U.S.C.  1920(2) ("Fees for ... transcripts necessarily obtained for use in the case."). Petitioner asked for $401.50 as costs for a court reporter and $150 for a videographer. The Court allowed the costs for the court reporter, but not the costs for videographer.   Petitioner requested reimbursement of travel expenses incurred for Browns trips between Weslaco and El Paso. Reasonable transportation and lodging costs incurred by an out-of-town attorney are awardable under  11607(b)(3).  A total of $1446.10 was disallowed, resulting in awardable travel expenses in the amount of $2146. Petitioner requested $4828.70 in expert fees for services rendered by Mariano Nunez Arreola. An attorney licensed to practice law in Mexico. Arreola worked for TRLA as its foreign legal advisor and served in this action as an expert on Mexican law. He provided his expert opinions on the issue of whether Petitioner's custody rights under Mexican law are "rights of custody" under the Convention. Hague Convention, art. 3. His services included researching the Federal Civil Code of Mexico, the Chihuahua Civil Code, and Mexican Jurisprudencia, interpreting the relevant law, and preparing two affidavits. Such services were clearly necessary to establish Petitioner's entitlement to the
return remedy, as contemplated by the Convention. Accordingly, costs incurred for services rendered by Arreola were  generally awardable. The Court scrutinized the  claimed expert fees for reasonableness and necessity and disallowed some of his time as well as $748.70 billed as travel expenses incurred for his trip to El Paso
to attend the hearing.

Tuesday, October 2, 2012

Lozano v. Alvarez, --- F.3d ----, 2012 WL 4479007 (C.A.2 (N.Y.)) [United Kingdom] [Well-Settled Defense] [Equitable Tolling]

In Lozano v. Alvarez, --- F.3d ----, 2012 WL 4479007 (C.A.2 (N.Y.)) the Second Circuit observed that Article 12 of the Hague Convention, the “well-settled” defense, requires that a child wrongfully removed from a country be returned to that country in order to undergo a custody determination, unless the child is "now settled in its new environment." The  Second Circuit held that courts cannot equitably toll the one-year period before a parent can raise the now settled defense available under Article 12 of the Convention, and that when making a now settled determination, courts need not give controlling weight to a child's immigration status.

 Diana Lucia Montoya Alvarez ("Alvarez") and Manuel Jose Lozano ("Lozano") met and began dating in London in early 2004. [ See In re Lozano, 809 F.Supp.2d 197, 203 (S.D.N.Y.2011).] They never married. From the child's birth on October 21, 2005, until November 19, 2008, Lozano, Alvarez, and the child lived together in London. In October 2008, Alvarez spoke with the child's doctor regarding a host of concerns, including the child's silence at the nursery, frequent crying, nightmares, and bed-wetting. The child's nursery manager also noted the child's unusual behavior and concluded that the "home 'environment obviously had a negative effect upon [her]. Based on the foregoing, the district court found that the child had been exposed to, and negatively affected by, the problems in the couple's relationship. On November 19, 2008, shortly after visiting her sister Maria in New York, Alvarez left the couple's apartment] to bring the child to nursery school and never returned. For the next seven months, Alvarez and the child resided at a women's shelter. In early July of 2009, Alvarez and the child left the United Kingdom, eventually traveling to New York, where they lived since that time. In New York, Alvarez and the child lived with Alvarez's sister Maria, along with Maria's partner, daughter, and granddaughter. Alvarez had not had a job in the United States, but Maria had been employed as a nanny for the same family for four years and her partner owned a grocery business. Because Alvarez and the child had British passports, they were allowed to enter the United States without a visa" for a stay of ninety days or less. This period expired in October 2009. Alvarez testified that she had spoken with immigration authorities about the possibility of being sponsored by Maria, who was a United States citizen.

 Since her arrival in New York, the child attended the same school and, at the time of the proceedings before the district court, was enrolled in kindergarten. The child's Academic Standards Reports from the 2009-2010 school year indicated that the child has been making progress both socially and academically. Outside of school, in addition to spending time with members of her extended family, the child had friends whom she met at the park and the library. The child was also enrolled in ballet classes and, on the weekends, attended church with Alvarez. After arriving in New York, both the child and Alvarez began receiving therapy from a psychiatric social worker at a family medical clinic. The therapist testified that "when she first met the child, the child was unable to speak, make eye contact, or play in the therapist's office."The therapist further noted that the child "would wet herself, was hypervigilant, and had a very heightened startle response.” By February 2010, the therapist diagnosed the child with post-traumatic stress disorder ("PTSD") caused by her "experience living in the
United Kingdom before coming to New York, including living in a shelter system, having to move to a new country, and knowing that her mother had been harmed or threatened." Within six months of arriving in New York, however, Alvarez reported that the child's behavior had improved. The therapist agreed with this assessment, describing the child as " 'completely different.'


After Lozano filed his petition for return in December 2010, Alvarez and the child resumed meeting with the therapist.  After Alvarez's departure, Lozano took a number of steps to attempt to find his
child. Immediately after Alvarez left, he reached out to her sister in London, who denied any knowledge of Alvarez's whereabouts. In the summer of 2009, Lozano filed an application with a British court to "ensure that he obtains regular contact with his child.". He also, via court filing, submitted orders to Alvarez's sisters and her former counsel, as well as the child's nursery and doctor and various police and government offices, seeking information on the child's whereabouts. After exhausting all possibility that the child was still in the United Kingdom on March 15, 2010, he filed a Central Authority for England and Wales Application Form seeking to have the child returned to the United Kingdom. On November 10, 2010, Lozano filed a Petition for Return of Child in the United States District Court requesting an order requiring that the child be returned to London to have a British court make a custody determination.


 The district court first held that Lozano had made out a prima facie case of wrongful retention under the Hague Convention because: (1) the child was a habitual resident of the United Kingdom; (2) Alvarez's unlawful removal of the child breached Lozano's custody rights under English law; and (3) Lozano exercised parental rights at the time the child was removed. The court noted that the child must be returned to the United Kingdom unless Alvarez established an affirmative defense. The district court rejected Alvarez's defense that "there is a grave risk" that the child's return to the United Kingdom would expose her to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation. However, it found that she had established the “now-settled” defense and denied the petition.


  On appeal only the now settled defense was at issue. Lozano argued that the one-year period should be tolled until the time Lozano reasonably could have learned of his child's whereabouts. The district court disagreed, concluding that the one-year period is not a statute of limitations and, therefore, it is not subject to equitable tolling. A petitioner is not barred from bringing a petition after the one-year period has lapsed; rather, after that point, a court must consider the countervailing consideration that the child may now be better served remaining where he or she is currently located. Having rejected Lozano's tolling argument, the district court next held that the now settled defense applied and was a sufficient reason to have a United States court, as opposed to an English court, decide the child's custody.


  On appeal, Lozano raised three principal objections to the district court's decision. First, he argued that, as a matter of law, the district court erred in permitting Alvarez to raise the now settled defense because the one-year period in Article 12 should have been equitably tolled until such time as he could have reasonably located his child. Second, Lozano contended that the district court erred in finding that the child was settled in New York despite the fact that neither the child nor her mother had legal status in the United States. Finally, even if lack of legal immigration status "does not preclude a well-settled finding as a matter of law," Lozano argued that "the District Court erred in finding that Alvarez proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the parties' daughter was well-settled in the United States.


 The Second Circuit reiterated that in cases arising under the Convention and ICARA, it reviews a district court's factual determinations for clear error." Interpretation of the Convention, however, is an issue of law, which it reviews de novo. It also reviews de novo "the district court's application of the Convention to the facts it has found.
It noted that in interpreting a treaty, it is well established that it begins with the text of the treaty and the context in which the written words are used. The clear import of treaty language controls unless application of the words of the treaty according to their obvious meaning effects a result inconsistent with the intent or expectations of its signatories. General rules of statutory construction may be brought to bear on difficult or ambiguous passages, but it also looks beyond the written words to the history of the treaty, the negotiations, and the practical construction adopted by the signatory parties in determining the meaning of a treaty provision. While the interpretation of a treaty is a question of law for the courts, given the nature of the document and the unique relationships it implicates, the Executive Branch's interpretation of a treaty is entitled to great weight.

 The Second Circuit agreed with the district court and held that while an abducting parent's conduct may be taken into account when deciding whether a child is settled in his or her new environment, the one-year period set out in Article 12 is not subject to equitable tolling. Neither Article 12 of the Hague Convention nor its implementing legislation, ICARA, explicitly permit or prohibit tolling of the one-year period before a parent can raise the now settled defense. Article 12 provides, in relevant part: Where a child has been wrongfully removed or retained in terms of Article 3 and, at the date of the commencement of the proceedings before the judicial or administrative authority of the Contracting State where the child is, a period of less than one year has elapsed from the date of the wrongful removal or retention, the authority concerned shall order the return of the child forthwith. The judicial or administrative authority, even where the proceedings have been commenced after the expiration of the period of one year referred to in the proceeding paragraph, shall also order the return of the child, unless it is demonstrated that the child is now settled in its new environment.  


Accordingly, the default presumption under the Convention is that a child shall be returned to the state from which she originally was wrongfully removed unless both of two conditions are met: (1) one year has elapsed between the date of wrongful removal and the date proceedings commence; and (2) the child is found to be "now settled in its new environment." Even if these two conditions are met, Article 12 does not bar the Central Authority of a Contracting State from ordering the return of a settled child. If more than one year has passed, a demonstration that the child is now settled in its new environment' may be a sufficient ground for refusing to order repatriation." Thus, while the text of Article 12 does not prohibit equitable tolling, the way the provision functions renders this sort of equitable relief unnecessary. Unlike a statute of limitations prohibiting a parent from filing a return petition after a year has expired, the settled defense merely permits courts to consider the interests of a child who has been in a new environment for more than a year before ordering that child to be returned to her country of habitual residency. This interpretation of Article 12 was bolstered by Article 18, which provides that none of the provisions in the Convention "limit the power of a judicial or administrative authority to order the return of the child at any time."Convention. The Convention's drafting history strongly supported Alvarez's position that the one-year period in Article 12 was designed to allow courts to take into account a child's interest in remaining in the country to which she has been abducted after a certain amount of time has passed. If this understanding of the second paragraph of Article 12 was correct, allowing equitable tolling of the one-year period would undermine its purpose.
After the Second Circuit determined that the district court properly permitted Alvarez to raise the Article 12 now settled defense, it considered whether the district court erred in finding the child to be settled in New York. Lozano primarily argued that "[w]here an abducted child resides in the abducted-to country illegally, a well-settled finding should be barred as a matter of law." Given the Convention's text and purpose, the Second Circuit held that immigration status should only be one of many factors courts take into account when deciding if a child is settled within the meaning of Article 12.


Additionally, it held that, in any given case, the weight to be ascribed to a child's immigration status will necessarily vary. Neither the Convention nor ICARA defines "settled" or states how a child's
settlement is to be proved. It held that "settled" should be viewed to mean that the child has significant emotional and physical connections demonstrating security, stability, and permanence in its new environment. In making this determination, a court may consider any factor relevant to a child's connection to his living arrangement. Such an approach is in line with the Convention's overarching focus on a child's practical well-being. Factors that courts consider should generally include: (1) the age of the child; (2) the stability of the child's residence in the new environment; (3) whether the child attends school or day care consistently; (4) whether the child attends church [or participates in other community or extracurricular school activities] regularly; (5) the respondent's employment and financial stability; (6) whether the child has friends and relatives in the new area; and (7) the immigration status of the child and the respondent. 


The Second Circuit rejected Lozano’s contention that the district court erred because it discounted the significance of the child's lack of immigration status once it found that the child did not face an immediate threat of deportation. For example, a child might be ineligible for certain government-conferred benefits. It noted that the importance of a child's immigration status will inevitably vary for innumerable reasons, including: the likelihood that the child will be able to acquire legal status or otherwise remain in the United States, the child's age, and the extent to which the child will be harmed by her inability to receive certain government benefits. Moreover, rather than
considering the weight to be given to a child's immigration status in the abstract, courts deciding whether a child is settled must simultaneously balance many factors which, as in this case, may not support the same determination.


  The Court found that the district court's analysis was largely compatible with the approach it prescribed Lozano contended that the district court's finding were not backed by a preponderance of the evidence because "most of the evidence on the well-settled issue should not be given much weight because it came from [Alvarez's] own self-interested hearsay testimony, and to a lesser extent, from the therapist and child's school records.". Relatedly, Lozano claimed that Alvarez should have provided "corroborating testimony ... and other evidence of the child's connections to her new environment ." .These arguments were rejected.. None of Lozano's challenges to these findings left the Court with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. The judgment of the district court was affirmed.  

Monday, October 1, 2012

Felder v. Wetzel, --- F.3d ----, 2012 WL 4465591 (C.A.1 (Mass.)) [Switzerland][Rights of Custody]



         In Felder v. Wetzel, --- F.3d ----, 2012 WL 4465591 (C.A.1 (Mass.)) on May 19, 2012, K.W., a fourteen-year-old Swiss citizen, attempted to harm herself by ingesting pills while living in the United States with her godmother, Alexandra Ponder. She was then hospitalized at Children's Hospital Boston. On June 7, 2012, the Hospital declined to release K.W. to her mother, petitioner Claudia Felder, a Swiss resident, absent evidence such a release would comply with the child's treatment plan. It was undisputed that the mother had full custody of her daughter K.W. and that Switzerland was the country of habitual residence. Before these medical events Felder had signed an "Authorization for Medical Treatment of [K.W.]" giving "my authorization and consent for Alexandra Ponder to authorize necessary medical or dental care for this child." The form stated that Felder was the parent and legal guardian, and the authorization was limited. This was done because K.W. was attending school in Massachusetts in the Fall of 2011. Felder bought K.W. a July 12, 2012 return ticket to Switzerland at the end of the school year. K.W. flew back to Switzerland for the holiday break and then returned to Massachusetts on January 3, 2012.


         Felder's Hague Convention petition stated that "on or about May 19, 2012 ... KW stated that she tried to hurt herself by ingesting certain medications belonging to Ponder." K.W. was initially taken to the emergency room at Holy Family Hospital in Methuen, Massachusetts, but was then transferred to the inpatient psychiatric unit of  Boston Children's Hospital on May 23, 2012. Ponder informed Felder of K.W.'s hospitalization and Felder agreed that K.W. should receive immediate medical care; during the next three weeks, Felder monitored K.W.'s progress via Ponder and the staff at the Hospital while consulting with Swiss medical professionals. After K.W. had been hospitalized for three weeks, Felder and Dr. Andreas Schmidt, K.W.'s Swiss physician, proposed to the staff of the Hospital that K.W. be transferred to Zurich for further treatment. Felder's petition stated that she and Schmidt advised the staff at the Hospital that "they would take responsibility for KW's health and safety and would both personally accompany KW back to Switzerland."
  On June 7, 2012, a social worker at the Hospital contacted Felder and advised her that the Hospital would not permit K.W.'s immediate return to Switzerland. On June 11, 2012, Hospital staff sent an email to Dr. Daniel Marti of the Kinderspital Zurich outlining the conditions under which K.W. could be safely returned to Switzerland. Felder contended that, at about this time, "Ponder stopped providing Mother with  information about her daughter and, in conjunction with the staff at the Hospital,
prevented Mother and KW's sisters from having contact with KW." On June 17, 2012,
Felder told Ponder that she was terminating the medical authorization for K.W. she had signed. On June 20, 2012, Felder traveled to Boston and again told Ponder that she was revoking Ponder's authorization for medical care. Felder alleged that she did not know that K.W.'s father, Wetzel, had by this time filed an ex parte petition as to K.W. in the Guardianship Authority of the City of Lucerne. The Guardianship Authority may take appropriate measures to protect a child's welfare. See id. arts. 307, 315a.


        On June 21, 2012, the Swiss Authority ex parte issued a precautionary order to Felder saying that "[a]t present, the existing endangerment of your daughter can only be avoided by withdrawing your right to determine the place of residence of [K.W.] or concretely the parental custody right."The order prohibited Felder from removing K.W. from the Hospital clinic and said she would be given a full hearing later. On June 25, 2012, Ponder filed a motion to be appointed as K.W.'s temporary guardian with the Essex Division of the Probate and Family Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Ponder's motion was made with the consent of K.W.'s non-custodial biological father, Patrick Wetzel. Felder did not appear. The state Family Court acted based on Ponder's representations. On June 25, 2012, the state Family Court appointed Ponder as K.W.'s guardian until September 24, 2012, a date that had since been extended to October 26, 2012. On July 10, 2012, Felder filed her petition under the Hague Convention in federal district court. Respondents Ponder and Wetzel, in addition to seeking the dismissal of Felder's petition, raised two Article 13 defenses under the Convention: that K.W.'s return to Switzerland would present a grave risk of harm to her, and that K.W. was of sufficient age and maturity that her objections to being returned to Switzerland should be heeded. Felder had by this time also sought recourse from the Swiss Guardianship Authority. On July 11, 2012, the Swiss Authority issued a "Decree" subtitled "Repeal of  precautionary order of June 21, 2012," in which it observed that by "letter dated June  27, 2012, the biological mother ... requested reconsideration of the precautionary  decision of June 21, 2012 and its complete repeal." The decree did in fact repeal the
precautionary order, with an explanation. On July 11, 2012, Felder filed an "Emergency Motion by Mother Claudia Felder to Vacate Temporary Guardianship" in the Massachusetts Family Court. Apparently, K.W. had been discharged from the Hospital and was staying with Ponder. At the close of the hearing, the Family Court "enter[ed] a finding, that the most recent order from the Swiss courts [i.e., the June 21, 2012 precautionary injunction], quote, withdraws mother's custody rights" and stated that "it is not clear to me ... that it is-it had been reinstated."Explaining that "I have to do what's in [K.W.'s] best interest and right now, I need to preserve the status quo," the court, in a handwritten order, denied Felder's emergency petition "pending the hearing in Federal Court." On July 2, 2012, Felder had also filed a court complaint in Switzerland seeking to reverse the Guardianship Authority's June 21, 2012 precautionary order. The July 11, 2012 decree was issued in the interim. On July 12, 2012 the District Court of Lucerne ruled on Felder's petition, concluding that "[w]ith the [Authority's] repeal of the precautionary ruling handed down June 21, 2012, the revocation of the complainant's parental custody ordered by the custodianship authorities of Lucerne becomes obsolete. The complainant no longer has any legally protected interests in continuing the proceedings before the Lucerne District Court."


       On July 20, 2012, the federal court conducted oral argument on Wetzel's motion to dismiss Felder's petition under the Convention but did not take evidence. On July 30, 2012, the federal district court dismissed Felder's petition. Felder, 2012 WL 3128570, at *1. The district court concluded that K.W.'s state of habitual residence was Switzerland. It looked to Swiss law and the orders of the Swiss authorities to determine that "as of June 21st, the Guardianship Authority took the action that it was empowered to take and revoked Felder's parental custody," and that "the Guardianship Authority's subsequent rulings did not unequivocally reinstate her custody rights," The district court reasoned that "the one authority, the Guardianship Authority, that has the power to determine custody rights, did not decline to take further action, but instead deferred to the actions of the Probate and Family Court in the United States." The court concluded that "Felder has failed to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, the wrongful retention of K.W. in the United States."


         The First Circuit reversed. It observed that the district court's reasoning in dismissing Felder's petition was based on its reading of the various orders of the Swiss authorities and court. It concluded that these orders were not designed to nor did they terminate the mother's rights. It analyzed each order and reached the conclusion that there was an attempt to do no more than cope with an emergency situation as to K.W., which the Guardianship Authority concluded required prompt action and which was better not taken from abroad, but immediately addressed by courts, doctors, and others concerned on the scene. The first Swiss Authority order, the June 21, 2012 order, was, as it stated, only a "precautionary injunction"; it was ex parte and in the nature of a temporary emergency order. The June 25, 2012 Guardianship Authority letter to the Hospital explained its June 21, 2012 order as being based on "the [present] urgent need for action" and a fear the American authorities would otherwise not act as needed in the best interests of the child. In light of the emergency nature of the measures taken, it would be incorrect to conclude that these decisions decisively and permanently altered Felder's custody rights over K.W. under Swiss law. They did not strip Felder of her right under the Convention to seek K.W.'s return and to have custody over her child decided by K.W .'s state of habitual residence. It was clear from the Swiss Guardianship Authority's July 11, 2012 decree that the prior order, the Authority's June 21, 2012 temporary revocation of some of Felder's custody rights, had itself been revoked. The decree expressly stated that: * Felder is "entitled to custody" of K.W.; both Felder and K .W. reside in Switzerland. This reading was strongly buttressed by the authoritative Swiss District Court's July 12, 2012 order dismissing Felder's complaint that the June 21, 2012 precautionary order should be reversed. The Lucerne District Court's July 12, 2012 order stated that "the revocation of the complainant's parental custody ordered by the custodianship authorities of Lucerne [has] become[ ] obsolete. The complainant no longer has any legally protected interests in continuing the proceedings before the Lucerne District Court." These later orders established that as of July 12, 2012, any temporary revocation by the Swiss authorities of some of Felder's custody rights over K.W. had itself been revoked. Felder had custody rights under the Convention.


         Two defenses were raised under Article 13 of the Convention: (1) that K.W .'s return to Switzerland would present a grave risk of harm to her, and (2) that K.W. was of sufficient age and maturity (she was almost fifteen) that her objections to being returned to Switzerland had to be heeded. The First Circuit directed that these exceptions to return, must be heard on remand. It reversed the dismissal of Felder's petition under the Convention, reinstated the case, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.


Saturday, September 22, 2012

Reyes v Jeffcoat, 2012 WL 4009641 (D.S.C.) [Venezuela] [Federal & State Judicial Remedies] [Evidence]

 

In Reyes v Jeffcoat, 2012 WL 4009641 (D.S.C.) Maritza Meszaros Reyes, filed a petition seeking a declaration that respondent, Harry Lee Langford Jeffcoat,
had wrongfully retained the parties' two minor children in the United States and that
Venezuela, not the United States, was the "habitual residence" of the children pursuant to the Hague Convention. In an order dated June 27, 2012, the court disagreed with the petitioner, determining that the respondent had not wrongfully retained the children and that the United States was the habitual residence of the children involved in this case.

After the court rendered its decision adversely to the petitioner, the petitioner filed a
motion to alter or amend the judgment on the ground that the court had neglected to rule upon one set of evidentiary submissions advanced by the petitioner during her case-in-chief. The court now made an order memorializing the court's ruling on the
disputed evidence.

Near the end of her case-in-chief, the petitioner offered "the amended verified
petition" in evidence. Respondent objected, arguing that "it contains hearsay within hearsay." Petitioner's counsel argued that "under the Hague Convention and under ICARA, the petition and the attachments were admissible." Respondent argued that the Hague Convention merely provides for a waiver of all authentication requirements but does not render documents admissible, without further inquiry simply because they are attached to the petition filed under the Hague Convention. The Court rejected the Petitioner’s argument and held that in any event, had the evidence been admitted, it would not have affected this court's ultimate conclusion in the case.

The Court concluded that respondent was correct as to the legal matter presented. ICARA provides that documents attached to the Hague Convention petition need not be authenticated, but it does not indicate that all such documents are therefore automatically admissible. And, while it could be argued that the emails between the parties would be admissible in any event either as an admission by a party opponent or a hearsay statement admissible under the state of mind exception of Rule 803(3), there were other portions of the email that contained hearsay within hearsay, and the court was not aware of any authority that would admit these second level hearsay statements. Accordingly, the respondent's objection to the documents attached to the verified amended petition was sustained.

Sunday, September 9, 2012

Tlustochowicz v. Tlustochowicz, 2012 WL 3779071 (N.D.Ill.) [Poland][Article 15] [Habitual Residence]

        
In Tlustochowicz v. Tlustochowicz, 2012 WL 3779071 (N.D.Ill.) on September 22, 2011, Respondent Emilia Tlustochowicz left Illinois for Poland, taking along her child without the consent of Petitioner Marcin Tlustochowicz, who was Emilia's husband and the child's father. Marcin brought a petition in the Regional Court for Szczecin Prawobrzeze and Zachod, in the Republic of Poland, seeking return of the child to the United States pursuant to the Hague Convention. Article 15 of the Convention permits a court of a nation that is party to the Convention to "request that the applicant obtain from the authorities of the State of the habitual residence of the child a decision or other determination that the removal or retention was wrongful within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention." Convention Art. 15; see Sorenson v. Sorenson, 563 F.Supp.2d 961 (D.Minn.2008), aff'd, 559 F.3d 871 (8th Cir.2009). On April 12, 2012, the Polish court issued an Article 15 order requesting Marcin "to submit [to] the authorities of the state of the habitual residence of the child a decision or other determination that the removal of a minor child [first name] Tlustochowicz was wrongful within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention." On July 11, 2012, Marcin filed an Article 15 petition with the court. The Court reiterated that Article 15 was strictly limited to determining whether the removal was wrongful under Article 3. Any further proceedings that may be necessary under the Convention, including any affirmative defenses Emilia could wish to assert, were beyond the scope of the Polish court's referral to this court and are reserved for the Polish court to consider as it deems fit. (Citing Khan v. Fatima, 680 F.3d 781, 784 (7th Cir.2012); Altamiranda Vale v. Avila, 538 F.3d 581, 587 (7th Cir.2008); Fabri v. Pritikin-Fabri, 221 F.Supp.2d 859, 863-64 (N.D.Ill.2001). Marcin was born in Poland in 1972 and moved to the United States in 1992. Although he initially came to the United States to study, he decided soon thereafter to remain permanently. He was a dual citizen of the United States and Poland. Emilia was born in Poland in 1979. She was a Polish citizen and a permanent resident of the United States. Marcin and Emilia met in Poland in November 2008 when Marcin was there visiting members of his family. Marcin and Emilia were married in a religious ceremony in Poland in November 2009, followed by a civil ceremony in Illinois in December 2009. The purpose of the civil ceremony was to facilitate Emilia's becoming a permanent resident of the United States. In December 2009, Marcin and Emilia settled together at the house Marcin owned in Plainfield, Illinois. Emilia brought with her from Poland to Illinois several heavy suitcases containing many of her possessions and personal effects, including the majority of her photographs and of the wedding gifts the couple received. Both Marcin and Emilia agreed and intended to live together in Illinois. After going through the application process with Marcin's assistance, Emilia became a permanent resident of the United States in May 2010. On December 30, 2010, the child was born to Marcin and Emilia in Naperville, Illinois. The child was a citizen of both the United States and Poland. Marcin assisted with the care of the child, would feed and play with the child, and would purchase items for the child. From mid-July to September 7, 2011, Emilia and the child took a vacation to Poland to visit Emilia's family, while Marcin remained in the United States. Marcin paid for the trip by purchasing a round-trip ticket for Emilia. Both Marcin and Emilia viewed the trip to Poland as a temporary vacation; neither intended that Emilia or the child would remain in Poland permanently or indefinitely. Emilia and the child returned to Illinois on September 7, 2011. Around that time, Marcin and Emilia discussed buying a new house closer to Marcin's workplace to reduce his commute to work, which at that point exceeded two hours daily. Emilia preferred not to move because she had recently become accustomed to the Plainfield neighborhood in which they then lived and did not want to have to become accustomed to a new neighborhood. Also around that time, Marcin and Emilia discussed buying a new car for Emilia, and Marcin bought Emilia a new car, a station wagon, which Emilia drove. On September 9, 2011, Emilia sent an email to Marcin. Although the email addressed an apparent disagreement between the couple regarding how the child would be fed, the email was very affectionate and provided no indication that Emilia had any intention to return to Poland permanently or indefinitely either alone or with the child. On or around September 13, 2011, Emilia contacted her parents, who lived in Poland, and asked them to buy her a plane ticket to return to Poland. Emilia's motivation in leaving Illinois was strife she was experiencing in her marital relationship with Marcin. Emilia did not inform Marcin of her desire and intent to return to Poland permanently or indefinitely at any time prior to her departure on September 22, 2011. Using a ticket purchased by her parents, Emilia left for Poland on September 22, 2011, taking the child with her. Marcin never consented to Emilia's taking the child back to Poland. Had Marcin been aware of Emilia's plan to take the child to Poland, he would not have consented. When Marcin returned from work on September 22, he discovered a letter from Emilia informing him that she had decided to leave. The following morning he received a text message from Emilia informing him that she had arrived in Poland with the child. These were the first indications that Marcin received that Emilia no longer intended to live with him and raise their child in Illinois. Marcin soon consulted the U.S. State Department website for advice on regaining custody of the child. Marcin reported the child missing to local authorities on September 23, 2011. Marcin had multiple contacts with Emilia in the months after she arrived in Poland by phone and over the internet. Marcin visited Emilia and the child in Poland and attempted to persuade Emilia to return. Marcin filed a petition with the Polish courts to have the child returned to Illinois pursuant to the Convention. That petition precipitated the reference by the Polish court of the Article 3 determination to the United States courts. Emilia and the child remained in Poland as of August 31, 2012. The District court found that Emilia removed the child from Illinois to Poland on September 22, 2011 and that Illinois was the child's habitual residence immediately prior to the removal. It observed that the determination of 'habitual residence' is to be made on the basis of the everyday meaning of these words rather than the legal meaning that a particular jurisdiction attaches to them. Kijowska v. Haines, 463 F.3d 583, 586 (7th Cir.2006). The Seventh Circuit approved the standard set forth in Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir.2001). Koch v. Koch, 450 F.3d 703, 715 (7th Cir.2006) In the case of young children, the Mozes court found it most prudent to focus on the intent of the parents rather than the intent of the child in determining the child's habitual residence. The standard requires courts to determine whether the parents intended to abandon their previous habitual residence, judging that intent at the last time the parents had a shared intent. The establishment of a habitual residence requires an actual change in geography, as well as the passage of an appreciable amount of time." The facts showed that when Marcin and Emilia married and moved to Illinois, they intended to live together in Illinois on a permanent or long-term basis. Emilia brought several suitcases worth of possessions and personal effects to the United States and moved into Marcin's house; she and Marcin also began the application process that culminated in her receiving United States permanent resident status. Their intent had not changed as of December 2010, when they had been in the United States for a year and Emilia gave birth to the child. And Emilia and the child's vacation to Poland in the summer of 2011 only confirmed that Marcin and Emilia still both intended to stay in the United States and raise the child there: Marcin bought Emilia a round-trip ticket and stayed behind, and when the length of the trip was extended, the extension was short (about a week) rather than lengthy or indeterminate. When Emilia returned on September 7, she and Marcin discussed buying and moving to a new house, also in Illinois, and actually bought a new car for Emilia-further indications that they shared an intent to remain permanently with the child in the United States. And Emilia's September 9 email to Marcin was affectionate and offered no suggestion of any intent or desire to return with the child to Poland permanently or indefinitely. Emilia's intent changed around September 13, when troubles in her marital relationship led her to ask her parents to help fly her back to Poland. At that point, the parents' intent regarding the child's habitual residence was no longer shared, for Marcin still intended and expected that the family would remain in Illinois. Thus, the parents' last shared intent was that the child's habitual residence be the United States. Emilia of course could not change the child's habitual residence by unilaterally removing him to Poland; as the Seventh Circuit has held, a parent cannot create a new 'habitual residence' by the wrongful removal and sequestering of a child. The court held that Marcin had rights of custody over the child under Illinois law at the time of the removal. At the time of removal, there had been no court or administrative order concerning custody of the child. The Illinois Probate Act provided at the time of the child's birth, as follows: Parental rights to custody. If both parents of a minor are living and are competent to transact their own business and are fit persons, they are entitled to the custody of the person of the minor and the direction of his education.... The parents have equal powers, rights and duties concerning the minor. 755 ILCS 5/11-7 (2010). When the child was born Marcin indisputably had legal custody of the child, together with Emilia. Emilia noted that this provision was repealed effective January 1, 2011, months before the child's removal to Poland, see Illinois Pub. Act 96-1338, s 10, and argued that its repeal meant that Marcin had lost legal custody of the child as of the date the child was removed to Poland. The argument was wholly without merit. The court held that Illinois law gave Marcin and Emilia custody rights over the child as of the time of removal. The court held that Emilia's removal of the child from Illinois to Poland was in breach of Marcin's custody rights. Emilia took the child to Poland without obtaining consent from or even notifying Marcin, and her intent in doing so was to deprive Marcin of the ability to exercise his right of custody. It held that Marcin exercised and sought to exercise his rights of custody as of the time of removal. Prior to and after the child's birth, Marcin took part in his upbringing by reading books on child -rearing, attending parenting classes with Emilia, and taking time off from work to help care for the newborn. Prior to the removal, Marcin cared for the child by acting as his father. Immediately following the removal, Marcin filed a missing person report and initiating a police investigation, and he continued seeking to regain custody by visiting Emilia, attempting to persuade her to return, and filing his Hague Convention petition. Given these facts, Marcin was exercising his custody rights at the time of removal and thereafter attempted to restore his custody over the child. Given these circumstances, Emilia's removal of the child to Poland was "wrongful" within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention. See Kijowska, 463 F.3d at 588; Feder v. Evans-Feder, 63 F.3d 217, 222-26 (3d Cir.1995).

Demaj v. Sakaj, Slip Copy, 2012 WL 3822015 (D.Conn.) [Federal and State Judicial Remedies] [Evidence of Parental Alienation]

 

In Demaj v. Sakaj, 2012 WL 3822015 (D.Conn.) respondent moved to exclude any testimony or other evidence relating to "parental alienation syndrome," in that "[d]isclosures by ...Petitioner as to the testimony expected from Dr. Benjamin Garber indicate that he will testify about the concept of parental alienation syndrome."

The District Court observed that under ICARA and the Hague Convention, there was not one published decision that relied to any degree on the "parental alienation syndrome." It concluded that "parental alienation" was not, and will not be, permitted.

The Court pointed out that in Karkkainen v. Kovalchuk, 445 F.2d 280, 288 (3d Cir.2006), the petitioner-mother argued on appeal that the district court had abused its discretion by appointing an expert to evaluate the daughter's "level of maturity [who] lacked sufficient experience in 'parental alienation syndrome.' " The petitioner-mother contended that her daughter's desires to remain permanently in the United States were the result of the respondent-father and his second wife having alienated the child from the petitioner, including referring to her as the child's aunt. The issue of parental alienation was irrelevant because the district court held that the United States was the child's habitual residence.

Similarly, in Haimdas v. Haimdas, 720 F.Supp. 183, 207, n. 17 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd on other grounds, 401 Fed. Appx. 567 (2d Cir.2010), the district court categorically rejected the report and testimony of the petitioner-mother's expert regarding the children's maturity level and any other matter in controversy giving the report and testimony no weight. The district judge described the expert's opinions regarding the potentially distorting effects of the protracted custody battle, parental alienation and ping-pong lifestyle that A.H. and S.H. have experienced, as well as their notable verbal abilities and overall intelligence, essentially confirmed the obvious. The district court observed, Frankly, short of opining as to a mental or emotional pathology, it is hard to fathom what a child psychologist in a Hague Convention case could opine that is not already within the ken of an ordinary finder of fact.

In Garcia v. Angarita, 440 F.Supp.2d 1364,1368 (S.D . Fla.2006), like here, the court had ordered a psychological evaluation of the child, which report the  petitioner-father introduced into evidence. In this report, the expert opined, in rejecting the respondent-mother's defense of grave risk, that any psychological harm to their son would be reduced by the close relationship the children with his paternal relatives, and the "support system" that the petitioner-father had in Colombia. The Court
observed that: "Significantly, Respondent is in a position to greatly reduce this risk, if  she so chooses, by discontinuing the activities which [the expert] believes have resulted in a degree of parental alienation toward Petitioner, and if Respondent returns with the  children to Colombia." The issue of parental alienation was hardly the central focus of that trial.