Abouelmagd, v. Semeniuk, 2025 WL 3042413 (United States District Court, E.D. New York, 2025)Canada] [Habitual residence][Petition granted]

In  Abouelmagd, v. Semeniuk, 2025 WL 3042413 (United States District Court, E.D. New York, 2025) Amr Abdelrahman Abouelmagd (“Petitioner”),  petitioned the Court for the return of his three children, Y.A., M.A., and A.A., to Canada Petitioner asserted that the Children had beenwrongfully retained in the United States by their mother, respondent Tetiana Semeniuk (“Respondent”), a citizen of Ukraine, who currently resided in New York. The district  Court found that: (1) the Children were habitual residents of Canada and had been retained in the United States; (2) the retention was in breach of Petitioner’s custody rights; and (3) Petitioner was exercising his rights at the time of the retention. The Court further found that Respondent failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the affirmative defenses that the Children were well settled or that Petitioner consented to the retention. Petitioner also failed to show by clear and convincing evidence the affirmative defenses that return to Canada would put the Children at grave risk or would be barred by the United States’ fundamental principles relating to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Accordingly, the petition for return of the Children to Canada was granted.

Hala v Anteby, 2025 WL 2987448, (E.D. New York, 2025)[Israel][Service of process][Substituted service by email]

 

In Hala v Anteby, 2025 WL 2987448, (E.D. New York, 2025) Uriel Hala (“Petitioner”) brought an action against Esther Bracha Anteby (“Respondent”) pursuant to the Hague Convention seeking the immediate return of a child, LRA, to Israel.  

Petitioner and Respondent were the parents of LRA, who was born on February 21, 2021, in Mishmar Ha’Yarden, Israel. Petitioner was an Israeli citizen. Respondent was a dual American and Israeli citizen who resided in Israel from 2015 until July 2023. Petitioner and Respondent were never married but lived together from 2020 until separating in December 2022.  LRA was born at the parties’ home in Mishmar Ha’Yarden, with the assistance of a midwife, on February 21, 2021. Petitioner and Respondent did not begin the process of legally registering LRA with the Ministry of Interior until June 2022. As part of this process, Petitioner and Respondent submitted DNA samples, along with a DNA sample from LRA, to prove paternity. On June 15, 2022, Petitioner and Respondent also executed a mutual affidavit with the Peace Court in Tzfat, Israel, attesting to the at-home birth of LRA. In a court proceeding before a Family Court in Hadera, Israel, Respondent testified that Petitioner was LRA’s father. Following this proceeding, Respondent was legally registered as LRA’s mother by the Family Court, but Petitioner was not registered as LRA’s father at the time.

After Petitioner and Respondent separated in December 2022, they made an informal agreement to exercise joint custody over LRA and set a schedule whereby LRA would spend an equal number of days with each parent. Petitioner remained fully involved in LRA’s life and care—including arranging and paying for her education, taking her to spend time with his extended family, and paying for her support while she was with Respondent. On July 27, 2023, Petitioner brought LRA to Respondent’s apartment in accordance with the agreed upon schedule. On July 29, 2023, Respondent informed Petitioner that she was traveling on a short vacation to Ein-Hod, Israel and that he would not be able to pick up LRA from day care on July 30, 2023, as previously arranged, but that he could pick up LRA upon her return.  Respondent then stopped communicating with Petitioner. On August 1, 2023, Respondent’s mother, Batia Anteby, informed Petitioner that Respondent brought LRA to Brooklyn, New York and would not return to Israel. Since then, Petitioner has only been in contact with Respondent’s mother, who resides at 1570 East 10th Street, Brooklyn, New York. Respondent’s mother sent Petitioner photos and videos of LRA, which appeared to be taken outside and inside of the home at that address. However, Respondent’s mother has not confirmed the residence of either LRA or Respondent.

 On August 4, 2023, Petitioner filed an application seeking the return of LRA with the Israeli Central Authority (“ICA”). However, Petitioner’s application was delayed because Petitioner was not registered as LRA’s father with the Ministry of Interior. On February 15, 2024, the Family Court in Hadera certified, based on the previously submitted DNA samples, that Petitioner is LRA’s biological father. Months later, the ICA confirmed that Petitioner is LRA’s father. Petitioner then commenced this action on May 20, 2024, filing a Complaint, Verified Petition, and Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order, among other documents.

 After being unable to locate Respondent, Petitioner, among other things,  moved for leave for substituted service upon Respondent, pursuant to Rule 4(e)(1). The Court observed that Rule 4(e)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “an individual ... may be served in a judicial district of the United States by ... following state law for serving a summons in an action brought in courts of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located or where service is made.” Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 4(e)(1). In New York State, service may be effected “in such manner as the court, upon motion without notice directs, if service is impracticable under paragraphs one [personal service], two [leave and mail service][,] and four [nail and mail service].” S.E.C. v. HGI, Inc., No. 99 CIV. 3866 (DLC), 1999 WL 1021087, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 1999) (citing N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 308(5)). Although N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 308(5) requires a demonstration of impracticability as to other means of service, it does not require proof of due diligence or of actual prior attempts to serve a party under the other provisions of the statute. Id. (first citing Franklin v. Winard, 592 N.Y.S.2d 726, 727 (1st Dep’t 1993).Any form of service must comport with due process by being “reasonably calculated, under the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” SEC v. Tome, 833 F.2d 1086, 1093 (2d Cir.1987) (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)). Of relevance here, service by email, without more, comports with the requirements of due process “where a [petitioner] demonstrates that the email is likely to reach the [respondent].” Vega v. Hastens Beds, Inc., 110 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1372, 339 F.R.D. 210, 217 (S.D.N.Y. 2021)).

 The district court found that Petitioner demonstrated that email is likely to reach the respondent. Indeed, Petitioner contended that Respondent acknowledged receipt of Petitioner’s papers via email. Specifically, Petitioner argued that, on separate occasions, Respondent, using the email address of ebanteby@gmail.com, emailed Petitioner’s counsel regarding mediation and acknowledging receipt of Petitioner’s papers. As such, service by email was appropriate, and Petitioner was granted leave to effect substituted service, via email, upon Respondent.

 

 

District Court Cases in Districts other than New York Published in 2025 (Continued, see infra ) updated10.19.25

 Khan v Seemab, 2025 WL 2582897 (United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania, 2025)

[Qatar] [Habitual residence] Petition dismissed for lack of jurisdiction] [Qatar not a signatory to Convention]

 

Tsuruta v Tsuruta, 2025 WL 2912271 (United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, 2025)

[Japan] [Motion for Relief from Judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure denied].

 

Higuera v Jiminez, 2023 WL 12156566 (United States District Court, N.D. Georgia, 2023)

[Venezuela] [Petition granted] [habitual residence] [Grave risk of harm not established]

 

Deravil v. Jean ,2025 WL 2906673 (United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, 2025)

[Martinique] [Petition granted] [motion to restore a preliminary injunction after the entry of final judgment while appealing that final judgment denied]

 

Deravil v. Jean, 2025 WL 2904884 (United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, 2025)

[Martinique] [Deravils Motion in limine to exclude these experts’ reports and testimony denied and for summary judgment denied. Jean-Louises motion for Summary Judgment Granted;  Deravils’ Petition for A.D.’s return to Martinique for the pendency of any associated custody claims or determinations Denied.]

Deravil, v. Jean 2025 WL 2903662 (United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, 2025)

[Martinique] [ Motion requesting Court to conduct an in camera interview granted]

 

Boa-Bonsu v. Owusu, 2025 WL 2896377 (United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, 2025)

[Finland] [Petition denied] [Habitual residence] [Wishes of the child defense established]

 

Karlevid v Slotto,  2025 WL 2753549 (United States District Court, D. Massachusetts, 2025)

[Sweden][Petition granted][Habitual residence][Grave risk of harm defense not established][even if such a finding were appropriate, the Court would not exercise its discretion to deny removal on that basis].

 

Peled v Peled, 2025 WL 2711374 (United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, 2025)

[Israel] [Motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction granted] [Children were not located in Ohio, or anywhere in the United States, when Plaintiff initiated this action.]

 

Gaston v Gutierrez, 2025 WL 2694981 (United States District Court, M.D. Florida, 2025)

[Peru][Motion for Attorneys fees and expenses] [Recommended award attorney’s fees of $6,867.00, court costs of $405.00, and other necessary expenses of $930.58.}

 

Aubert v Poast, 2025 WL 2671697 (United States District Court, W.D. Wisconsin, 2025)

[Norway] [Petition denied] [Grave risk of Harm Defense established].

 

DaSilva v DaSilva, 2025 WL 2607879 (United States District Court, D. Massachusetts, 2025)

[Brazil] [After reversal of return order by First Circuit, upon remand to determine whether Child. should nevertheless be returned to Brazil.(Rodrigues v. Silveira, 141 F.4th 355, 366 (1st Cir. 2025). the Court declined to exercise its discretion to return and denied the petition.]

 

 

Khan v Seemab, 2025 WL 2582897 (United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania, 2025)

[Qatar] [Habitual residence] Petition dismissed for lack of jurisdiction] [Qatar not a signatory to Convention]

 

Arabi v Kerroum, 2025 WL 2267991 (United States District Court, N.D. Georgia, 2025)

[Morocco] [Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs and Expenses granted in part.][ Petitioner awarded $26,610.10 in fees and expenses].

 

Boa-Bonsu, v. Owusu, 2025 WL 2305880 (United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, ,2025)

 [Petitioners) motion to strike the Defendant/Respondent Deborah Owusu’s  fifth affirmative defense. which asserts: “Petitioner is estopped from asserting claims under the Hague Convention due to prior conduct that misled Respondent into believing the removal was permitted.” The Hague Convention provides for limited defenses, and courts hold that estoppel is not among them. Petitioner’s Motion to Strike  was granted]

 

Dhooge v Pronker, 2025 WL 2375385 (United States District Court, E.D. Arkansas, 2025)
[Netherlands] [Petition granted] [Petitioner established that J.D. was wrongfully removed ]. [Respondent failed to establish one of the defenses] [The Court recognized the July 15, 2025 custody determination of the Dutch court,]

Dumitrascu v Dumitrascu, 2025 WL 2223027 (United States District Court, D. Colorado, 2025).

[Romania} [defendant’s motion to transfer venue; motion to transfer the case to another judge; motions seeking relief under Federal rules; motions for criminal and civil contempt; and motion for a preliminary injunction denied].

 

 

Goderth v Yandall- Goderth,  2025 WL 1866307 (United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, 2025)

[Germany] [Petition denied] [Habitual residence established] [Children are well-settled in the U.S.]

Giguere v Tardif, 2025 WL 2452168 (United States District Court, D. Massachusetts, 2025).

[Canada] [Petition granted] [Children’s habitual residence as of August 28, 2024, was Canada] [Consent prior to the time of retention was no defense][ Petitioner’s participation in Massachusetts  divorce action did not constitute subsequent acquiescence in the retention of the Children]

 

Horcajo v Benaye, 2025 WL 2171598(United States District Court, S.D. Florida, 2025)
[Spain] [Petition denied][Removal was wrongful because Spain was the habitual residence of the Children prior to their removal; emoval was in breach of custody rights under Spanish law; and Petitioner was exercising his rights as defined by the Hague Convention. Respondent, proved by clear and convincing evidence that the Children would face a grave risk of danger if returned to Spain because of Llorente’s domestic violence and associational criminal risk, and she had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the Children were well-settled in their new environment.]

 

Pits v Gonzalez,  2025 WL 2434240, United States District Court, N.D. California,2025.
[Germany] [Motions for summary judgment ][ Motions were denied as to the core issue of whether the children were habitual residents of Germany at the time of their removal and return to the United States. Petitioner’s Motion was granted with respect to summary adjudication that if the children were habitual residents of Germany, Petitioner had and was exercising rights of custody under German law immediately prior to the children’s removal.]

 

Schwaneberg, v. Lopez, 2025 WL 2085531 (United States District Court, W.D. Virginia, 2025]  [South Korea][Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs after prevailing on petition.]  The court awarded $73,215.00 in attorney’s fees. Petitioner failed to show that $8,558.77 request for local counsel attorney fees and that the $4,000.00 request for Korean counsel attorney fees was reasonable. As a result, the court discounted the request by 50%, or $2,000.00 and $4,279.39 because not enough information was supplied by petitioner to support the award). The court awarded $12,618.83 in costs.]

 Harvey v Means, 2025 WL 2443151 (United States District Court, W.D. Washington, 2025). [Scotland] [Motion for appellate attorneys’ fees.] [ Harvey prevailed in the district court and on appeal, and was awarded $50,000 in appellate attorneys’ fees.]

 Torres v Pastor, 2025 WL 2425278 (United States District Court, W.D. Louisiana, 2025)[Brazil] [Motion for Necessary Fees and Expenses] 9Petitioner’s attorney’s fees and costs of $33,865.12 are reasonable. Considering the financial status of both parties and the facts in this case, Respondent’s obligation was reduced to 90% of Petitioner’s attorney’s fees and costs, or $30,478.61]

Gomez v Gonzalez, 2025 WL 1666243, W.D. Washington, 2025]
[Mexico] [Petition granted] [Attorney’s fees] [granted in part] [80% reduction proportionate to Respondent’s inability to pay]

Lee v Curcio, 2025 WL 1549318 (S.D. Florida, 2025)
[Brazil] [Habitual residence] [Petition denied]

Mendez v Brandon, 2025 WL 1532583 (W.D. Kentucky,2025)
[Japan] [State court already ruled on wrongful retention claim] [ Motion to dismiss granted] [ Younger and Colorado River abstention]

Gomez v. Ramirez, 2025 WL 1415905 (E.D. Pennsylvania, 2025).

[Guatemala] [Petition denied] [habitual residence] [well-settled affirmative defense applies]

Edelstein V. Nelson, 2025 WL 1419962 (D. Nevada, 2025).
[Argentina] [Habitual residence] [Report & Recommendation to deny petition adopted]

 Edelstein v Nelson, 2025 WL 1610564 (D. Nevada, 2025)[Argentina] [Habitual residence not established] [consent and acquiescence ][Recommendation that Petition be denied]

 Muehlbauer V. Muehlbauer, 2025 WL 1392571, E.D. Missouri, 2025)[Switzerland][ Motion to Exclude expert Testimony under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) and Federal Rules of Evidence 702, 401, and 403. Rule 702 denied.

Ciampa v Nichols, 2025 WL 1358488 (C.D. California, 2025)

[Italy] [Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs granted as requested, $144,768 in attorney’s fees and costs and $15,328 in personal expenses. Counsel, charged a rate of $650 per hour]

Paplaczyk v Paplaczyk,2025 WL 1296177 (S.D. Georgia, 2025)
[Germany] [Petition for Enforcement of German Order][sua sponte dismissal for lack of federal jurisdiction where children not located in the United States]

Giguere v. Tardif, 2025 WL 1293364 ( D. Massachusetts, 2025)

[Canada][Motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim denied]

Blasi v.Dunnagan, 2025 WL 1262062 (E.D. North Carolina, 2025).
[Thailand] [Motion for abstention under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) denied]

Armand v Armand, 2025 WL 1249420 (E.D. Missouri, 2025)
[France] [Petition granted] [habitual residence] [ Grave risk of harm defense not established]

Kelly v Turner, 2025 WL 1202043 (D. Oregon, 2025)

[Mexico] [Petition denied] [Defense of Grave risk of physical or psychological harm based on spousal abuse established]

Gamboa v Williams, 2025 WL 1195567 ( S.D. Texas, 2025)

[Colombia][Petition granted] [Attorneys fees of $67,647.75 and costs and fees of $5,835.71 awarded with  post-judgment interest]

Loncarevic v Loncarevic, 2025 WL 1167564 (S.D. Texas, 2025)
[Germany] Petition granted] [Attorneys fees of $58,497.14 awarded with post-judgment interest]

Alvarez v Marin, 2025 WL 1091940 (C.D. California (2025)
[Mexico] [Petition granted] [judgment on default]

 Aubert v Poast, 2025 WL 1071672 (W.D. Wisconsin, 2025).
[Norway] Motion to dismiss denied] [Motion for video and in-person visitation during the pendency of the case granted]

 Ballesteros v Ruiz, 2025 WL 1068855 ( N.D. Illinois, 2025)
[Canada][Motion to enforce oral settlement agreement granted]

 Parra v Camargo, 2025 WL 992581, United States District Court, N.D. Texas (2025)
[Chile][Petition granted][Habitual residence][Grave risk of harm defense not established]

Gomez v Gonzalez, 2025 WL 835013 (United States District Court, W.D. Washington, 2025).[Mexico] [Petition granted] [Habitual residence][ Grave risk of harm defense not established]

Basset v. Dana, 2025 WL 742759 (United States District Court, S.D. Florida.,2025)

[Israel] [Petition granted] [ Habitual residence] [Respondent failed to establish consent or acquiescence, grave risk of harm, fundamental principles and mature child defenses]

Elkhaiat v Mawashi, 2025 WL 711949 (United States District Court, D. Arizona, 2025).[Canada][Habitual residence][Consent defense not established] [Grave risk defense not established][ ameliorative mitigation measures appropriate]

 Yuriiovych v Hryhorivna, 2025 WL 660634, United States District Court, D. Montana, 2025)

[Ukraine][Attorneys Fees and Costs] [attorney fees of $82,235.00 and costs of $6,601.84 awarded]

Guevara, v. Castro, 2025 WL 1553209 (Fifth Circuit.,2025)[Mexico] {Habitual residence] [Petition granted] [Well-Settled Defense not established]

 

In Guevara, v. Castro, 2025 WL 1553209 (Fifth Circuit.,2025) A.F. was born May 3, 2018 to Jose Leonardo Brito Guevara and Samantha Estefania Francisco Castro. Castro and Brito lived together with A.F. in the home of Brito’s mother in Venezuela until they separated in July 2019. Following their separation, Brito was granted custody rights over A.F. In August 2021, Brito relocated to Spain for a better-paying job. While in Spain, Brito continued to support A.F. financially, maintained regular contact through video calls and voice messages, and stayed in close contact with A.F.’s grandmother. The district court found that Brito was exercising his custody rights throughout his time in Spain. Until late 2021, A.F. had lived exclusively in Venezuela^.. In November 2021, Castro removed A.F. from Venezuela without Brito’s consent and unlawfully entered the United States. After presenting herself and A.F. to U.S. Border Patrol in San Luis, Arizona, Castro relocated to Lewisville, Texas. There, she lived with Castro’s boyfriend, Otton Rodriguez, for eleven months. In October 2022, Castro, A.F., and Rodriguez moved together to Dallas. Brito remained in contact with A.F. during this time and attempted to visit her in the United States, though his visa application was denied.

The district court found that Castro “has been gainfully employed since arriving in the United States and provided for A.F.” Since arriving in the United States, Castro worked for four different companies, averaging 40–45 hours a week, with hourly wages ranging from $12 to $16. Castro and A.F. lacked permanent residence status in the United States. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services issued them employment authorization documentation, but their asylum applications remained pending. Immediately upon learning that Castro had taken A.F. to the United States, Brito contacted the family attorney, Venezuelan authorities, and both the United States and Venezuelan embassies in Spain. He authorized his mother to file an application under the Hague Convention seeking A.F.’s return. Venezuelan authorities received the application on January 20, 2022—just under two months after Castro removed A.F. to the United States.  After efforts to reach an agreement with Castro failed, Brito filed a petition in the Eastern District of Texas in April 2023. In June 2023, Castro—through counsel—accepted service and disclosed her address, which was located within the Northern District of Texas. By agreement of the parties, the action was transferred to the Northern District on August 1, 2023. The Northern District did not hold a bench trial until March 2024—eight months after the transfer. Six weeks later, the court denied Brito’s petition, concluding that although he had established a prima facie case for A.F.’s return, Castro had sufficiently shown that A.F. was well-settled in Dallas and that remaining there was in her best interest. The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions that the district court enter an order that A.F. be returned to Venezuela.

  The Court observed that the Hague Convention mandates the return of “a child wrongfully removed from her country of habitual residence ... upon petition.” The Convention’s default rule is that the child should be returned to her country of habitual residence. But the Convention provides ‘several narrow affirmative defenses to wrongful removal.’ This case concerned the “well-settled” exception found in Article 12. Article 12 provides that, “when a court receives a petition for return within one year after the child’s wrongful removal, the court ‘shall order the return of the child forthwith.” But “where the proceedings have been commenced after the expiration of the period of one year,” the court “shall also order the return of the child, unless it is demonstrated that the child is now settled in its new environment.” To assess whether the well-settled defense applies, the Court considers seven factors:(1) the child’s age; (2) the stability and duration of the child’s residence in the new environment; (3) whether the child attends school or day care consistently; (4) whether the child has friends and relatives in the new area; (5) the child’s participation in community or extracurricular activities; (6) the respondent’s employment and financial stability; and (7) the immigration status of the respondent and child. The Court examines the district court’s factual findings for clear error, and we review de novo the legal question whether, in light of holistic balance of the seven nondispositive factors, the evidence supports the district court’s conclusion.

 The parties did not dispute the district court’s finding that Brito established a prima facie case for A.F.’s return. The sole question on appeal was whether the well-settled defense barred that return. The Court concluded that the district court erred in both its legal framing and application of the well-settled exception. Balancing the relevant factors de novo, it was not persuaded that A.F. has formed such deep or enduring ties to her new environment that returning to her home in Venezuela would contravene her best interests.

 The first factor was A.F.’s age. She was seven years old—and was five at the time of the bench trial. The district court acknowledged, citing precedent in Hernandez, that a child of this age is “a very young child not able to form the same level of attachments and connections to a new environment as an older child.” Yet the district court described this factor as “lukewarm”—a characterization unsupported by the record. A.F.’s young age meant it will take more time for her to become “so settled” in the United States that her best interests lie in remaining here rather than returning home to Venezuela. At age seven, A.F. was not yet capable of forming the kind of enduring attachments that the Convention deems sufficient to override its default return remedy.

The second factor considers the stability and duration of A.F.’s residence in the United States. The district court found that over the past three years, Castro and A.F. lived in two separate residences in the United States. It characterized this arrangement as stable and weighed the factor in favor of Castro. That conclusion was error. That A.F. has already moved multiple times in her brief time here undermined any claim of residential stability. So too does the fact that Castro and A.F. currently resided in the home of Castro’s boyfriend. Should that relationship falter, Castro and A.F. would be forced to relocate once more. Castro conceded that if the relationship were to end, she and A.F. would need to downgrade to a cheaper apartment, as they relied—at least in part—on her boyfriend’s income. Even if A.F.’s present living situation appeared stable, its long-term viability was far from assured.

The third factor examines whether the child attends school consistently. The district court rightly found that A.F. was enrolled in kindergarten and performing well. But that fact must be viewed in context and alongside the other factors. At her young age, A.F. had ample time and opportunity to integrate into a new school community in Venezuela. Moreover, A.F.’s school environment in United States was not especially secure, given the uncertainty of her immigration status, the nature and impermanence of Castro’s transient employment, and their reliance on Castro’s boyfriend for housing. These circumstances suggested a real possibility of future moves, which could disrupt A.F.’s schooling and undercut any sense of educational continuity.

 The fourth factor considers whether the child has formed meaningful relationships with friends and family in her new environment. A.F. had at least six close relatives in the United States, as well as several friends she saw regularly. Still, most of A.F.’s extended family—including Castro’s parents, two brothers, a cousin, an aunt and uncle, and Brito’s mother, siblings, and additional relatives—remained in Venezuela. Most notably, A.F. could not see her father in the United States. Brito attempted to visit her but was denied a visa. While the inquiry is not a numbers game, the fact that A.F. had a “large extended family” in Venezuela remained significant—particularly because her relationships in the United States were entirely derivative of her mother’s. In addition, Castro’s boyfriend lacked lawful permanent resident status, and none of A.F.’s relatives in the United States were U.S. citizens. The unsettled immigration status of A.F.’s family here casted doubt on durability of those relationships and weighed against a finding that they are well-settled.

The fifth factor examines A.F’s participation in community activities. The district court found that A.F. regularly attended church, visited a primary care physician, goes on family vacations, has playdates with friends, uses community playgrounds, goes swimming, and attends birthday parties. The district court deemed this evidence “overwhelming” support for the well-settled defense. Though it certainly weighed in Castro’s favor, this factor on its own did not demonstrate that A.F. is “so settled” in the United States that returning to Venezuela would be contrary to her best interests—especially since she could engage in many of these same activities there.

The sixth factor considers Castro’s economic and employment stability. The district court found that Castro “has been gainfully employed since arriving in the United States and provides for A.F.” But while the court acknowledged that Castro had changed jobs four times since her arrival, it failed to give appropriate weight to other facts that cast doubt on the stability of her employment. For instance, the court found that Castro was unemployed for at least two months between jobs. Nor did the record show that any of her jobs were permanent positions offering reliable income or benefits. The court further acknowledged that Castro shared both a car and an apartment with her boyfriend but overlooked the precariousness of that arrangement—namely, that if the relationship ended, Castro and A.F. would have to relocate. The end of the relationship would also leave them without transportation, impairing A.F.’s ability to attend school and participate in community life. While Castro was currently meeting A.F.’s basic needs, her financial circumstances were not “so settled” that it would be against A.F.’s best interest to return to her life in Venezuela.

The seventh and final factor concerns immigration status. The district court acknowledged that neither Castro nor A.F. has lawful permanent residence status in the United States and that both had pending asylum applications. But the court deemed this factor merely “lukewarm.” That conclusion was error. Castro presented no evidence suggesting their asylum claims were likely to succeed. The court found no evidence that A.F. would face a “grave risk of harm” if returned to Venezuela—a finding that undercut any suggestion that her asylum claim will succeed. “immigration status is not dispositive” and  lacking lawful permanent resident status “does not necessarily prevent a child from developing significant connections in a new environment.” Still, “immigration status should not be analyzed in the abstract,” and the Convention requires “an individualized, fact-specific inquiry.” The district court erred by evaluating immigration status in isolation, rather than assessing how it interacts with and undermines the other well-settled factors. Here, the uncertainty surrounding Castro’s and A.F.’s immigration status permeates every aspect of their life in the United States, rendering it fundamentally unstable. This factor weighs heavily against finding that A.F. is well-settled.

Overall, balancing the factors de novo, it disagreed with the district court’s assessment that factors one and seven are merely “lukewarm,” and that the remaining factors “overwhelmingly” supported a “well-settled” finding. The court failed to give due weight to A.F.’s young age—which favored her ability to readjust to life in Venezuela—and to her uncertain immigration status, which eroded any stability she may have developed in the United States. The district court also gave more weight to the remaining factors than supported by the record. The factors did not support the conclusion that A.F. was so deeply rooted in the United States that returning her to Venezuela would contravene her best interests.

 

 

 

 

Harvey v Means, Not Reported in Fed. Rptr., 2025 WL 1189565, (Ninth Circuit, 2025) [Scotland][Petition granted][Affirmed]

 

In Harvey v Means, Not Reported in Fed. Rptr., 2025 WL 1189565, (Ninth Circuit, 2025) Garann Rose Means appealed a district court order granting Dale Harvey’s Hague petition for the return of their two children to Scotland. The Ninth Circuit affirmed.

The Ninth Circuit rejected means argument that the district court abused its discretion by failing to order a psychological examination of the children or by failing to grant her another continuance to obtain one. “It held that a district court does not abuse its discretion by denying a psychological exam when a movant fails to make “specific, corroborated allegations of domestic violence and child abuse.” Means failed to make a proffer to the district court that would justify ordering a psychological evaluation or, alternatively, granting a continuance for Means to obtain one. Means accused Harvey of sexually abusing their child, Z, which, if substantiated, would make the children’s return to Harvey in Scotland an “intolerable situation” under the Convention.. Means also alleged that Harvey abused her, which might also pose a grave risk to the children if true. See Colchester, 16 F.4th at 718. But Means acknowledged that the Scottish authorities investigated her claims and found no evidence that Harvey abused Z. And the district court found that Means’s sexual abuse allegations were “less than credible.” Because Means failed to point to specific, corroborated allegations of abuse or domestic violence, it concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to order a psychological evaluation for the children or refusing to grant a continuance for Means to obtain one.

 The district court denied Means’s request to interview the children in camera because it concluded that an interview about “such serious allegations” might do “more harm than good[.]” The Ninth Circuit held this was not an abuse of discretion.

 Although Means argued that the district court should have appointed an attorney or guardian ad litem to represent the children, she did not state that she moved for such an appointment in the district court. The Ninth Circuit held that Means likely forfeited this issue.

 Means argued that the three-hour limit to present her case deprived her of due process. The Ninth Circuit  held that Courts must “act expeditiously in proceedings for the return of children” and may “order the return of the child at any time[.]”District courts therefore have “a substantial degree of discretion in determining the procedures necessary to resolve a petition filed pursuant to the Convention.” The Ninth Circuit held that the district court gave Means the opportunity to submit evidence, cross-examine Harvey’s witnesses, and present her own testimony, even giving her extra time to do so. The district court appropriately balanced the need for expeditious proceedings with the need to afford Means a meaningful opportunity to be heard.

 Means asserted that the district court abused its discretion by failing to appoint an attorney to represent her. The Ninth Circuit held  that there is no constitutional right to counsel in a civil case. Nevertheless, a district “court may request an attorney to represent any person unable to afford counsel.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). “The decision to appoint such counsel ... is granted only in exceptional circumstances.” Courts consider three factors when deciding whether exceptional circumstances exist: (1) the individual’s ability to articulate his or her claims pro se, (2) “the complexity of the legal issues involved,” and (3) “the possible merit of [the individual’s] claims.” Byrd v. Maricopa Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 845 F.3d 919, 925 (9th Cir. 2017). Even assuming that Means was unable to afford counsel, the district court did not abuse its discretion by not appointing counsel to represent her. Means showed that she understood the fundamental requirements of the Hague Convention by arguing that the children were not habitually resident in Scotland and by raising a grave-risk defense. And, although the case involved the parties’ children, it was otherwise straightforward because Means conceded most of the elements of Harvey’s case. Finally, Means’s grave-risk defense was meritless because her allegations of abuse were not credible.

 

Morales v. Restrepo, 2025 WL 1070234, (E.D. New York.2025)[Colombia][Petition granted] [Motion for stay pending appeal denied]

 In Morales v. Restrepo, 2025 WL 1070234, (E.D. New York.2025) the respondent moved to stay the Court’s order granting the petition for return of the parties’ child, L.C., to Colombia. Tthe Court denied the Motion but issued an administrative stay until April 14, 2025, to allow respondent to seek a stay from the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

Petitioner filed this action against respondent pursuant to the Convention on November 15, 2024, seeking the return of L.C. to Colombia. After a hearing on the Petition, the Court determined that respondent wrongfully retained L.C. in New York on May 16, 2024, in violation of the Convention. Specifically, the Court found that petitioner had established a prima facie case and respondent failed to establish a consent defense. The Court granted the petition, ordered L.C. returned to Colombia, and directed the parties to submit a joint proposed order of return by April 4, 2025. The Clerk of Court entered judgment in favor of petitioner on March 31, 2025. Thereafter, the parties filed a letter indicating that they were unable to agree on the mechanics of L.C.’s return to Colombia: petitioner proposed return by April 13, 2025, so that L.C. can attend school at the close of spring break,¹ whereas respondent proposed L.C. return on June 28, 2025, after the conclusion of his academic year in New York. On April 4, respondent moved the Court for a stay to allow respondent time to appeal the Court’s Order. On April 7, 2025, respondent filed a notice of appeal of the Court’s Order to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

 The district court observed that a stay is not “guaranteed” as a matter of right in cases under the Convention, Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U.S. 165, 179 (2013), but instead rests within the Court’s discretion, DiMartile v. Hochul, 80 F.4th 443, 456 (2d Cir. 2023). Courts must consider the traditional stay factors in assessing a stay request: (1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies. Chafin, 568 U.S. at 179 (citing Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009)). The “first two of the four factors are the most critical,” and the movant bears the burden to show that a stay is warranted. Tereshchenko v. Karimi, No. 23-cv-02006, 2024 WL 195547, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2024) (citing New York v. U.S. Dep’t. of Homeland Sec., 974 F.3d 210, 214 (2d Cir. 2020)).  After analyzing the factors the court found that respondent did not establish that the Chafin factors warranted a stay of the Court’s Order pending appeal.