Recent Hague Convention District Court Cases - Nisbet v Bridger, 2023 WL 6998081 (D. Oregon, 2023) [Scotland][Petition denied[Habitual residence][Grave risk of harm]

 

 

 

In Nisbet v Bridger, 2023 WL 6998081 (D. Oregon, 2023)  the district court denied the petition for the return to Scotland of the two children, five-year-old ACN and three-year-old KRN.

 In June 2022, the children and their mother, Respondent Spirit Rose Bridger, left Scotland for the United States, and have lived in Oregon ever since. The children’s father, Petitioner Andrew Nisbet, argued that Respondent took their children in violation of the Hague Convention. The evidence compelled two conclusions. First, Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the children’s habitual residence was Scotland. The evidence showed that the children did not have a settled permanent home in Scotland before arriving in the United States. The facts proved that the children lacked a meaningful connection to Scotland, that their caregiving parent had long intended to move to Oregon, and that their absentee parent had coerced their caregiver into remaining longer than she wished. They were unsettled largely because Petitioner killed his mother in August 2019 and then was detained and committed to St. Andrew’s a secure psychiatric facility in England. One of the children was not yet born at the time of those events. The petitioner had been sentenced to an indefinite period of psychiatric confinement. The petitioner has not lived in Scotland since 2017.  The petitioner continued to display behaviors like those he showed in Jersey. On May 18, 2023, a month before filing his Hague Petition, Petitioner threatened to attack staff when he was moved between wards. The petitioner refused treatment recommended by St. Andrew’s, insisting that he receive therapy from his personal therapist, Jane Pointon, whom he has seen since 2017. Petitioner has also decided that mindfulness methods, not intensive therapy, suffice as treatment. This is so although even Petitioner’s expert did not see any document recommending Petitioner go without therapeutic treatment. Finally, in confinement, Petitioner has apparently at times barricaded himself from hospital staff, punched walls, banged his head against a window, and had physical altercations with the staff. The children did not have a habitual residence on June 17, 2022; the Court therefore denied the Petition.

 

Assuming the children’s habitual residence was Scotland before they moved to Oregon, the Convention did not require a return of the children because Respondent had shown by clear and convincing evidence that a return to Scotland would present a grave risk of harm or otherwise place the children in an intolerable situation. The children had no familial support network there. Their father, Petitioner, remained indefinitely committed to a secure in-patient psychiatric health facility. And Petitioner had a history of violent and coercive behaviors that constitute major risk factors for domestic abuse. Although there was no evidence that Petitioner physically abused Respondent or the children, there was evidence of coercive, manipulative, violent, and threatening behavior directed at Respondent and Petitioner’s family. Such long-standing behavior constituted a grave risk of harm to ACN and KRN if they were returned., Petitioner here had a broader history of familial abuse against his mother, father, and brother as well as Respondent. Finally, the grave risk of displacing the children is starker still when juxtaposed with depriving the children of their mother and their support network in Oregon. As the Second Circuit has explained, “the fact that a child is settled may form part of a broader analysis of whether repatriation will create a grave risk of harm,” though it cannot be categorically dispositive. Blondin v. Dubois, 238 F.3d 153, 164 (2d Cir. 2001), abrogated on other grounds by Golan, 142 S. Ct. 1880. Because of the isolation of COVID-19 and Petitioner’s absence from the children’s lives, they developed an especially strong bond with their mother. And in Oregon, the children have family, friends, and social benefits that, if returned to Scotland, they would lose in an extremely short time frame. As Dr. Poppleton testified, losing their mother, family, and support network so quickly could have cascading effects on the children’s development and health. Coupled with the risk posed by Petitioner, this clearly presents an intolerable situation and grave risk to the children. In sum, the children’s return to Scotland posed a grave risk of harm and intolerable situation to them. For this reason, as well as the children’s lack of a habitual residence on June 17, 2022, the Court would not order that the children be returned to Scotland.

 

Petitioner argued that the Court should order the children’s return to Scotland so that he can visit them while they live under the supervision of either a live-in nanny or Petitioner’s friend, Mr. Harper (who testified). This Court found these ameliorative measures unworkable. Golan, 142 S. Ct. at 1892–94 (giving district courts broad discretion to consider such measures).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Recent Hague Convention District Court Cases - Maduhu v Maduhu, 2023 WL 6979606 (WD Texas, 2023)[United Kingdom][Petition granted][Necessary Costs and Expenses]

 

In Maduhu v Maduhu, 2023 WL 6979606 (WD Texas, 2023) the Court granted the petition of  Sonda Jonathan Maduhu seeking the return of his two minor children, R.A.M. and M.H.M., to the United Kingdom. The Court concluded that R.A.M. and M.H.M. had been wrongfully removed and that a return order was warranted. A Final Judgment was issued on June 6, 2023 (ECF No. 30), and Petitioner timely moved for an award of fees and costs on June 28, 2023, seeking $19,057.50 in attorney’s fees and $10,733.85 in costs^.  No response had been filed.

 The Court observed that the lodestar method is an accepted approach for determining attorney’s fees in Hague Convention cases. Velarde, 2017 WL 11663478, at *1. In calculating attorney’s fees under the lodestar method, the Court engages in a three-step process: (1) determine the nature and extent of the services provided; (2) set a value on those services according to the customary fee and quality of the legal work; and (3) adjust the compensation based on other Johnson factors that may be relevant to the case. Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 684 F.2d 1087, 1092 (5th Cir. 1982); Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717–19 (5th Cir. 1974). The “lodestar” amount—which is the “appropriate fee award [ ] determined by multiplying the number of hours reasonably worked on litigation by a reasonable hourly rate”—is calculated by steps one and two. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). Both the hours worked, and the hourly rate must be reasonable, and the Court considers only the hours spent on successful claims. See id. at 433–34. Reasonable hourly rates “are to be calculated according to the prevailing market rates in the relevant community” for the purposes of the lodestar calculation. McClain v. Lufkin Indus., Inc., 649 F.3d 374, 381 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing Blum v. Stevenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 (1983)). The relevant market to determine the prevailing rate to be used in the lodestar calculation is the market in which the district court sits. Tollett v. City of Kemah, 285 F.3d 357, 368 (5th Cir. 2002). The third step of the reasonable attorney fee calculation is reserved for the adjustment of the lodestar using the twelve Johnson factors. That is, once the basic fee is calculated, the Court may adjust the amount upward or downward. Rarely are all factors applicable, however, and a trial judge may give them different weights. Id. The “Johnson factors” are (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the legal questions; (3) the requisite skill to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee for similar work in the community; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) the time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the “undesirability” of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases. Johnson, 488 F.2d at 717–19. The court may not consider Johnson factors it already used to calculate the lodestar amount. Black v. SettlePou, P.C., 732 F.3d 492, 503 (5th Cir. 2013).

 

The Court found that the lodestar need not be modified in this case based on the twelve factors, and therefore finds that an award of attorney’s fees of $19,057.50 was reasonable. Petitioner sought $9,149.08 in costs under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) and Section 9007(b)(3) of ICARA. Rule 5 4(d) provides that costs “shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party.” Section 1920 defines the term “costs” as used in Rule 54(d) and enumerates the expenses that a federal court may tax as a cost under the authority found in Rule 54(d). Gaddis v. United States, 381 F.3d 444, 450 (5th Cir. 2004); see also Crawford Fitting Co. v. Gibbons, 482 U.S. 437, 441 (1987). Thus, unless otherwise authorized by statute, the types of costs that may be awarded under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) are limited to those enumerated in 28 U.S.C. § 1920. Id. Section 1920 provides: A judge or clerk of any court of the United States may tax as costs the following: (1) Fees of the clerk and marshal; (2) Fees for printed or electronically recorded transcripts necessarily obtained for use in the case; (3) Fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses; (4) Fees for exemplification and the costs of making copies of any materials where the copies are necessarily obtained for use in the case; (5) Docket fees under section 1923 of this title; (6) Compensation of court appointed experts, compensation of interpreters, and salaries, fees, expenses, and costs of special interpretation services under section 1828 of this title. 28 U.S.C. § 1920.

Article 26 of the Hague Convention further provides the judiciary with the discretionary authority to direct an award of costs upon ordering the return of the child. “ICARA goes beyond the discretion bestowed by the Hague Convention and includes a mandatory obligation to impose necessary expenses, unless the respondent establishes that to do so would be ‘clearly inappropriate.’ ” Salazar, 750 F.3d at 519 (quoting Sealed Appellant v. Sealed Appellee, 394 F.3d 338, 346 (5th Cir. 2004)). Specifically, ICARA provides that, in connection with “[c]osts incurred in civil actions”:

The Court awarded:  $402.00 for the fees of the clerk;  $65.00 of the $141.60 requested for service of summons;  $342.28 for “fees and disbursements for printing; $3,416.06 in transportation costs under ICARA. Post-judgment interest shall accrue at a rate of 5.18% per annum.

 Petitioner sought an award of $29.35 for postage and $19.43 for wire transfer fees (charged in connection with payments to his counsel). Postage is not included in section 1920 and is not recoverable as a cost. Embotelladora Agral Regiomontana, S.A. de C.V. v. Sharp Capital, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 415, 418 (N.D. Tex. 1997). Similarly, the Court can find no basis for an award of wire transfer fees in § 1920. Because they were not necessarily incurred to secure the return of the children, these costs in the total amount of $48.78 were denied, and Petitioner’s award of costs is reduced by this amount.

 

Petitioner was awarded a total of $23,282.84 in attorney’s fees and costs, together with post-judgment interest thereon at the rate of 5.18% thereon,

 

Brandt v Caracciolo, 2023 WL 7015680 (Fourth Circuit, 2023) [Sweden][Petition denied[[Wrongful retention not established]

 

[Sweden][Petition denied[[Wrongful retention not established]

 

In Brandt v Caracciolo, 2023 WL 7015680 (Fourth Circuit,2023) the Fourth Circuit affirmed by unpublished opinion (Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.) the denial of the petition of Minna-Marie Brandt (“Appellant”) for return of her minor children to Sweden. It held that the Appellant failed to demonstrate wrongful retention of the minor children in violation of her custody rights.  

Appellant, a Swedish citizen, met Appellee, a United States citizen, in 2015 while Appellee was in Sweden. The two began an on-again, off-again relationship that continued through 2021. Throughout their relationship, the parties sometimes resided together in Sweden. Although they never married, Appellant and Appellee have two children together: a son, S.C., and a daughter, J.C. The children were born in Örebro, Sweden, in 2016 and 2019 respectively, and were Swedish citizens. Until April 16, 2021, the children lived continuously in Sweden with Appellant. Appellee also resided with them intermittently. During this time, the children took a few short trips to visit Appellee’s family in the United States. Appellant maintained sole custody until March 2020, when the parties reached a custody agreement. Appellant agrees the parties held joint custody pursuant to their agreement. On December 30, 2020, social services in Sweden (“social services”) began an investigation into the safety of Appellant’s home and the children’s’ welfare. According to Appellant, social services advised that the children may be moved to foster care. Appellant contends that the parties then discussed Appellee taking the children to the United States for a three-month trip. In contrast, Appellee claims the parties agreed that the entire family would move to the United States and Appellee would obtain citizenship for the children. On April 16, 2021, Appellee and the children traveled to North Carolina, where they have remained. Appellee brought along the children’s passports, as well as most of their clothing and toys. On July 3, 2021, Swedish Social Services sent a letter to the parties stating that “[s]ocial services were planning to place the children in temporary care,” but that the parties had “finally [come] to the agreement that the children could live with [Appellee] and [his] family in the U.S. for some time.” On July 6, 2021, as part of the ongoing custody dispute in Sweden, a Swedish district court entered an “interim decision” confirming that the parties had joint custody of the children, pending resolution of the custody dispute. And while it acknowledged that the children resided with Appellee in the United States, the Swedish district court’s interim order did not require Appellee to return the children to Sweden. Nevertheless, on July 7, 2021, when the children did not return to Sweden, Appellant reported that they had been kidnapped by their father. On July 21, 2021, Appellant filed an application with the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs pursuant to the Hague Convention, seeking return of the children to Sweden. *2 On March 31, 2022, the Swedish district court entered a final order awarding Appellee sole custody of the children and providing Appellant with a right of contact in the form of a weekly call. Thereafter, on July 6, 2022, Appellant filed a petition in the Western District of North Carolina, for return of the children. After considering the evidence, the district court denied Appellant’s petition.

 

Appellant argued that the district court erred by ignoring her joint custody rights and improperly placing exclusive reliance on the March 31, 2022 order from the Swedish district court, which, despite being issued nearly a year after the alleged wrongful retention, awarded Appellee sole custody. However, this is not what the district court did.

 The district court began by correctly identifying “the relevant time period [a]s April through July 2021,” the period when the children traveled to the United States. As this court has explained, “the only reasonable reading of the [Hague] Convention is that a removal’s wrongfulness depends on rights of custody at the time of removal.” White v. White, 718 F.3d 300, 306 (4th Cir. 2013) (emphasis is original). Thereafter, the district court explicitly stated that “[t]he March 2022 custody order is not dispositive as a matter of law on the issue of wrongful retention ... [b]ut the [c]ourt [did] consider that order as evidence.”

While the Hague Convention prevents a person from “insulat[ing] the child from the ... return provisions merely by obtaining a custody order in the country of new residence, or by seeking there to enforce another country’s order,” it does not preclude the court from considering the facts and circumstances surrounding any such order. 51 Fed. Reg. 10494-01, 10504. To the contrary, the Hague Convention expressly permits “the judicial or administrative authorities of the requested State⁷ [to] take account of the reasons for [a decision relating to custody] in applying this Convention.” Hague Convention art. 17, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 5. Moreover, nothing in the Courts precedent prevents the district court from considering the full panoply of circumstances surrounding the alleged retention. This included the March 31, 2022 order. Therefore, the district court did not err in considering the March 31, 2022 final custody order.

 

“Rights of custody” as defined by the Hague Convention arise by: (1) operation of law; (2) judicial or administrative decision; or (3) an agreement having legal effect pursuant to the law of the state of habitual residence of the child prior to the wrongful abduction. 51 Fed. Reg. 10494-01, 10506 (citing Hague Convention, art. 3, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 2). And, pursuant to Article 14 of the Hague Convention, a court “may take notice directly of the law of, and of judicial or administrative decisions, formally recognized or not in the State of habitual residence” in order to determine whether the removal breached Appellant’s custodial rights. Hague Convention art. 14, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 5. Appellant contended that, as joint custodian of the minor children at the time of retention, Swedish law provides her with the right to “make decisions concerning the child[ren’s] personal affairs,” including determining where the children reside. J.A. 270; Föräldrabalk [FB] [Children and Parents Code] 1983:47 (Swed.). In support, Appellant directed this court to section 14a of the Swedish Children and Parents Code. But nothing in section 14a suggests Appellee violated Appellant’s joint custody rights. Section 14a merely states, “[i]f both parents have custody of the child the court may, on application of one or both of them, decide which of the parents the child is to live with.” Föräldrabalk [FB] [Children and Parents Code] 2006:458 (Swed.). Here, the parties both presented evidence that a Swedish custody dispute and child welfare investigation was ongoing during the time period preceding the purported retention. And to prevent the children from being placed in foster care, the parties agreed that Appellee would take the children to the United States. While the parties dispute the permanency of this stay, Appellant bore the burden of proving that Appellee wrongfully retained the children. She failed to do so.  In reaching its conclusion that Appellant had failed to meet her burden to demonstrate wrongful retention, the district court relied on Appellant’s own testimony that she, as a joint custodian, had consented to the children taking an indeterminate trip to the United States to live with Appellee. Specifically, the district court relied upon Appellant’s testimony at the evidentiary hearing that “it was up to [Appellee] to decide [the departure and return dates] himself.” Thus, by Appellant’s own concession, there was not a meeting of the minds that Appellee would return the children on a specific date -- or at all. “Appellee possessed physical and legal custody of the children at the time of the alleged retention. And since a primary purpose of the Hague Convention is to “preserve the [pre-removal or pre-retention] status quo,” it  concluded that the children indefinitely staying with the joint custodial father, in the United States, was the status quo. White, 718 F.3d at 306 (quoting Miller v. Miller, 240 F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir. 2001)). As such, there was no wrongful retention in the first instance.