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Saturday, June 7, 2014

Neergaard-Colon v Neergaard, --- F.3d ----, 2014 WL 2111307 (C.A.1 (Mass.))[Singapore] [Habitual Residence] [Remanded]



In Neergaard-Colon v Neergaard, --- F.3d ----, 2014 WL 2111307 (C.A.1 (Mass.))
Respondent Lisette Neergaard-Colon ("mother") and Petitioner Peter Moeller Neergaard ( "father") had two young daughters, S.S.N. and L.A.N. Although both girls were born in the United States, they lived abroad with their parents for approximately a year and a half after their father's employer temporarily relocated him to Singapore in June 2012. The family's time in Singapore ended in January 2014 when the mother traveled with the children to the United States and refused to return. As a result, the father filed a petition for the return of the children to Singapore. The District Court granted the father’s petition. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a further hearing, finding that the district court erred by determining that the children's place of habitual residence was Singapore without first considering whether the parties intended to retain their habitual residence in the United States while living abroad for a temporary period of fixed duration.
  
      The mother, a citizen of the United States, and the father, a citizen of Denmark, married in Massachusetts in 2011 and their daughters were born in Massachusetts in February 2011 and February 2012.    At some point in late 2011 or early 2012, the father's employer informed him that it wanted to relocate him temporarily to Singapore for a three-year assignment. In June 2012, the family packed up their things and moved to Singapore, where they rented an apartment. The father obtained an employment pass authorizing him to work in Singapore through 2015, and the mother and children each received a dependant's pass. While in Singapore, the father was paid by the Singapore-based entity Ab Initio Software Private Limited.   The family obtained health insurance in Singapore through the father's employer, and the parties opened a bank account there. They also found pediatricians for their daughters, arranged play dates, and purchased a Singapore Zoo membership. The older daughter, S.S.N., was enrolled in parent-accompanied "EduPlay" classes, and the parents looked at a few Singapore preschools.    During their time in Singapore, the parents retained ownership of their two properties in Boston. Singapore. They rented both properties to tenants on one-year leases. They kept open their bank accounts and retirement accounts in the United States, as well as their credit cards issued by U.S. banks. The mother preserved her position with Boston public schools by requesting a three-year extension of her maternity leave, and the father maintained his green-card status.

The First Circuit Court of Appeals observed that in determining "habitual residence" it begins with the parents' shared intent or settled purpose regarding their child's residence. While intent is the initial focus, evidence of a child's acclimatization to his or her place of residence may also be relevant. In this case the father presented a claim of wrongful retention. It noted that the Hague Convention only provides for the return of a child retained outside of his or her place of habitual residence. If the state in which a child is retained was also the child's place of habitual residence immediately prior to retention, that retention is not wrongful under the Hague Convention. Thus, in order to establish wrongful retention, the father had the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that Singapore was the children's state of habitual residence immediately prior to their retention in the United States. See  Darin, 746 F.3d at 9.
          The Court of Appeals found that  the district court misapplied the legal test for habitual residence by failing to analyze whether the parties ever intended to abandon their habitual residence in the United States, and by placing undue weight on evidence of the children's acclimatization in Singapore. The Court of Appeals pointed out that when the child in question is very young, its habitual-residence inquiry focuses on the parents' shared intent and settled purpose rather than the child's, as a very young child lacks  both the material and psychological means to decide where he or she will reside. In the event that the parents disagree as to their children's place of habitual residence, they look to the intent of the parents "at the latest time that their intent was shared."  Mota v. Castillo, 692 F.3d 108, 112 (2d Cir.2012). It is imperative that the district court distinguish "between the abandonment of a prior habitual residence and the acquisition of a new one. A person cannot acquire a new habitual residence without forming a settled intention to abandon the one left behind. Otherwise, one is not habitually residing; one is away for a temporary absence of long or short duration. 

         The district court-relying upon the parties' affidavits and without the benefit of an evidentiary hearing-found that, "at a minimum, the parties agreed to move to Singapore for three years, and the three-year period has not yet elapsed."Accordingly, the court concluded that the parties' shared intent was that their children reside in Singapore at the time immediately prior to their retention.

       The Court of Appeals found that the  district court failed to differentiate between the abandonment of a prior habitual residence and the creation of a new one as required by Darin. Instead, it merely found that the parents agreed that the children would be present in a particular place for a particular period of time that had yet to elapse. The district court made no factual finding one way or the other as to whether the parents intended to abandon their habitual residence in the United States in favor of Singapore, or whether they intended to retain their habitual residence while simply residing temporarily in Singapore. As a result, the district court overlooked an important factor in the habitual-residence analysis.

The Court of Appeals pointed out that although it has recognized that in certain circumstances, " 'a child can lose its habitual attachment to a place even without a parent's consent ... if the objective facts point unequivocally to a person's ordinary or habitual residence being in a particular place,' "  Darin, 746 F.3d at 11-12 it has also cautioned that in the absence of shared parental intent, the district court should  be slow to infer an earlier habitual residence has been abandoned. In the typical case, evidence of acclimatization is not enough to establish a child's habitual residence in a new country when contrary parental intent exists. Here, the  facts found by the district court in this case did not point so unequivocally towards Singapore being the children's habitual residence that it could conclude the same in the absence of a finding that the parties intended to abandon their habitual residence in the United States. Here, the district  court found that the children spent a substantial amount of time in Singapore and that they had friends, books, and toys there. The children were ages one and two at the time of retention. These ages are important, because acclimatization is rarely, if ever, a significant factor when children are very young. See  Holder, 392 F.3d at 1020-21
(holding that in the case of a ten-month-old child, it is "practically impossible"
for a child so young, "who is entirely dependent on its parents, to acclimatize
independent of the immediate home environment of the parents"). They did not
attend school and did not participate in sports. None of their extended family
lived in Singapore, and they took multiple trips-each several weeks long-to the
United States during the year and a half that they lived in Singapore. The Court of Appeals could not conclude that the record points unequivocally to the children's habitual residence being in a particular place. Accordingly, it remanded the case to the district court for a determination of the children's place of habitual residence that considers whether or not the parents intended to abandon their habitual residence in the United States.

Larrategui v Laborde, 2014 WL 2154477 (E.D.Cal.) [Argentina] [Fees and Costs] [Not clearly inappropriate]



In Larrategui v Laborde, 2014 WL 2154477 (E.D.Cal.) the Court granted Petitioner's petition for the return of S.C. to Argentina pursuant to the Hague Convention.  Petitioner sought $55,372.14 in attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Article 26 of the Hague Convention and 42 U.S.C.§ 11607 of ICARA.

The District Court observed that were a court has ordered the return of the child to her habitual residence, the court must order the respondent-abductor to pay "necessary expenses incurred by or on behalf of the petitioner," unless it would be "clearly inappropriate." 42 U.S.C. §11607(b)(3). The award of fees and costs serves two purposes: (1) "to restore the applicant to the financial position he or she would have been in had there been no removal or retention" and (2) "to deter such removal or retention."Hague International Child Abduction Convention: Text and Legal Analysis, 51 Fed.Reg. 10494-01, 10511 (Mar. 26, 1986).

 Respondent argued that fees were clearly inappropriate because the 
Court's intervention was required to obtain undertakings to protect S.C.; that Respondent was unable to pay for Petitioner's attorney's fees and costs, and
Petitioner did not spend his own funds to retain representation in this matter. 

The Court rejected these arguments. The fact that Petitioner did not spend his own funds does not provide a basis to deny an award to Petitioner. See  Cuellar v. Joyce, 603 F.3d 1142, 1143 (9th Cir.2010) (holding that denying a fee award because petitioner's counsel provided their services pro bono would "encourage abducting parents to engage in improper delaying tactics whenever the petitioning parent is represented by pro bono counsel.")  Second, Respondent made a good faith, but unsuccessful, "grave risk" argument that S.C. had not received, and consequently would not receive, proper medical treatment in Argentina. As a result, the Court granted Petitioner's Petition for Return of Child with narrowly focused undertakings to ensure that S.C. received the necessary medical treatments and ensures that Respondent is allowed access to and visitation with S.C. However, denying an award to Petitioner because the Court issued undertakings would encourage parties to always request undertakings even if the request is meritless in order to avoid paying fees and costs. Finally, entirely denying an award to Petitioner because of Respondent's financial status would not further § 11607(b)(3)'s purposes.  Kufner v. Kufner, CIV.A. 07-046 S, 2010 WL 431762, at *5 (D.R.I. Feb.3, 2010) ("To deny any award to Petitioner [because of respondent's financial status] would undermine the dual
statutory purposes of Section 11607(b)(3)-restitution and deterrence (both general
as to the public and specific as to the Respondent))."  The Court held that it was not "clearly inappropriate" to award attorney's fees and costs to Petitioner.

The Court found that traveling costs are necessary costs because Petitioner's attorney was required to attend the hearings and that file management costs are appropriate as part of the costs associated with litigation. However, the Court denied the costs associated with the uncertified interpreter because Respondent should not be required to pay for Petitioner's error.  The Court also denied the fees recorded in Spanish in the invoices because they were not appropriately documented in English.  The Court denied the costs for a custody order because it was not necessary for this proceeding. The Court awarded all other costs. It reduced the costs and fees by $3,437.50 to $51,934.64.

   The Respondent requested a 30% reduction based on her financial status. The district court noted that although denying an award because of Respondent's financial status would not further §11607(b)(3)'s purposes, courts have recognized that they have discretion to reduce any potential award to allow for the financial condition of the respondent. See, e.g.,  Rydder v. Rydder, 49 F.3d 369, 373-74 (8th Cir.1995) (reducing award from $18,487.42 to $10,000.00 because of respondent's financial status);  Berendsen v. Nichols, 938 F.Supp. 737, 739 (D.Kan.1996) (applying 15% reduction to the fee award because of respondent's financial status);  Salinier v. Moore, No. 10-CV00080-WYD, 2010 WL 3515699, at *4 (D.Colo. Sept.1, 2010) (reducing award by 25% because of respondent's financial condition). Respondent  provided evidence that she was self-employed with limited income, nominal assets, and significant debt. Therefore, the Court exercised its discretion and reduced the total award by 25%. The Court awarded Petitioner $38,950.98 in attorney's fees and costs.

Wednesday, June 4, 2014

Matter of Katz v Katz, --- N.Y.S.2d ----, 2014 WL 2198516 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept.)

Appellate Division Holds Family Court Had Jurisdiction to Determine Father's Petition for Custody Even Though Court of Dominican Republic, Applying Hague Convention, Denied His Petition for Return to the United States. 


In Matter of Katz v Katz, --- N.Y.S.2d ----, 2014 WL 2198516 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept.) the father filed a petition for custody in the Family Court alleging that, on October 2, 2011, the mother took the parties' child, who had been residing in the Bronx, to the Dominican Republic without his permission. The Family Court held the matter in abeyance pending a determination in the Dominican Republic with regard to the father's application there for a return of the child pursuant to the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. On October 5, 2012, the Civil Chamber of the Court of Children and Adolescents of the Judicial District of Santo Domingo rejected the father's request for a return of the child, and directed that the child remain in the company of the mother in the Dominican Republic, finding that if the child were returned to the United States she would be exposed to a violation of her fundamental rights due to issues of domestic violence. Family Court dismissed the father's petition for custody, concluding that it was bound to do so pursuant to the order issued by the court in the Dominican Republic.


The Appellate Division reversed. It observed that the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (Domestic Relations Law art 5-A) governs a New York State court's jurisdiction in international child custody matters. Domestic Relations Law § 76, which establishes initial child custody jurisdiction, provides, inter alia, that a court of this State has jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination if this State is the home state of the child on the date of the commencement of the proceeding (Domestic Relations Law §76[a] ). "Home state" is defined  as the state in which a child lived with a parent for at least six consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a child custody proceeding (Domestic Relations Law § 75-a[7] ). Pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 75-d[1], a "court of this state shall treat a foreign country as if it were a state of the United States".   The Convention provides that a child abducted in violation of rights of custody must be returned to his or her country of habitual residence, unless certain exceptions apply. A decision under the Convention is not a determination on the merits of any custody issue, but leaves custodial decisions to the courts of the country of habitual residence. It was undisputed that the United States was the child's country of habitual residence, and that, at the time the petition was filed, New York was the child's "home state." Thus, the Family Court had jurisdiction to determine the father's petition for custody.  Moreover,  the denial, by the court in the Dominican Republic, of the father's application for a return of the child pursuant to the Convention, did not preempt his custody proceeding (see  In re T.L.B., 272 P3d 1148 [Colo App]. Accordingly, it held that the Family Court erred in dismissing the father's petition.