District Court Cases in Districts other than New York Published in 2025 (Continued, see infra)

 

Gomez v Gonzalez, 2025 WL 1666243, W.D. Washington, 2025]

[Mexico] [Petition granted] [Attorney’s fees] [granted in part] [80% reduction proportionate to Respondent’s inability to pay]

Lee v Curcio, 2025 WL 1549318 (S.D. Florida, 2025)
[Brazil] [Habitual residence] [Petition denied]

Mendez v Brandon, 2025 WL 1532583 (W.D. Kentucky,2025)
[Japan] [State court already ruled on wrongful retention claim] [ Motion to dismiss granted] [ Younger and Colorado River abstention]

Gomez v. Ramirez, 2025 WL 1415905 (E.D. Pennsylvania, 2025).

[Guatemala] [Petition denied] [habitual residence] [well-settled affirmative defense applies]

Edelstein V. Nelson, 2025 WL 1419962 (D. Nevada, 2025).
[Argentina] [Habitual residence] [Report & Recommendation to deny petition adopted]

 Edelstein v Nelson, 2025 WL 1610564 (D. Nevada, 2025)[Argentina] [Habitual residence not established] [consent and acquiescence ][Recommendation that Petition be denied]

 Muehlbauer V. Muehlbauer, 2025 WL 1392571, E.D. Missouri, 2025)[Switzerland][ Motion to Exclude expert Testimony under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) and Federal Rules of Evidence 702, 401, and 403. Rule 702 denied.

Ciampa v Nichols, 2025 WL 1358488 (C.D. California, 2025)

[Italy] [Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs granted as requested, $144,768 in attorney’s fees and costs and $15,328 in personal expenses. Counsel, charged a rate of $650 per hour]

Paplaczyk v Paplaczyk,2025 WL 1296177 (S.D. Georgia, 2025)
[Germany] [Petition for Enforcement of German Order][sua sponte dismissal for lack of federal jurisdiction where children not located in the United States]

Giguere v. Tardif, 2025 WL 1293364 ( D. Massachusetts, 2025)

[Canada][Motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim denied]

Blasi v.Dunnagan, 2025 WL 1262062 (E.D. North Carolina, 2025).
[Thailand] [Motion for abstention under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) denied]

Armand v Armand, 2025 WL 1249420 (E.D. Missouri, 2025)
[France] [Petition granted] [habitual residence] [ Grave risk of harm defense not established]

Kelly v Turner, 2025 WL 1202043 (D. Oregon, 2025)

[Mexico] [Petition denied] [Defense of Grave risk of physical or psychological harm based on spousal abuse established]

Gamboa v Williams, 2025 WL 1195567 ( S.D. Texas, 2025)

[Colombia][Petition granted] [Attorneys fees of $67,647.75 and costs and fees of $5,835.71 awarded with  post-judgment interest]

Loncarevic v Loncarevic, 2025 WL 1167564 (S.D. Texas, 2025)
[Germany] Petition granted] [Attorneys fees of $58,497.14 awarded with post-judgment interest]

Alvarez v Marin, 2025 WL 1091940 (C.D. California (2025)
[Mexico] [Petition granted] [judgment on default]

 Aubert v Poast, 2025 WL 1071672 (W.D. Wisconsin, 2025).
[Norway] Motion to dismiss denied] [Motion for video and in-person visitation during the pendency of the case granted]

 Ballesteros v Ruiz, 2025 WL 1068855 ( N.D. Illinois, 2025)
[Canada][Motion to enforce oral settlement agreement granted]

 Parra v Camargo, 2025 WL 992581, United States District Court, N.D. Texas (2025)
[Chile][Petition granted][Habitual residence][Grave risk of harm defense not established]

Gomez v Gonzalez, 2025 WL 835013 (United States District Court, W.D. Washington, 2025).[Mexico] [Petition granted] [Habitual residence][ Grave risk of harm defense not established]

Basset v. Dana, 2025 WL 742759 (United States District Court, S.D. Florida.,2025)

[Israel] [Petition granted] [ Habitual residence] [Respondent failed to establish consent or acquiescence, grave risk of harm, fundamental principles and mature child defenses]

Elkhaiat v Mawashi, 2025 WL 711949 (United States District Court, D. Arizona, 2025).[Canada][Habitual residence][Consent defense not established] [Grave risk defense not established][ ameliorative mitigation measures appropriate]

 Yuriiovych v Hryhorivna, 2025 WL 660634, United States District Court, D. Montana, 2025)

[Ukraine][Attorneys Fees and Costs] [attorney fees of $82,235.00 and costs of $6,601.84 awarded]

Guevara, v. Castro, 2025 WL 1553209 (Fifth Circuit.,2025)[Mexico] {Habitual residence] [Petition granted] [Well-Settled Defense not established]

 

In Guevara, v. Castro, 2025 WL 1553209 (Fifth Circuit.,2025) A.F. was born May 3, 2018 to Jose Leonardo Brito Guevara and Samantha Estefania Francisco Castro. Castro and Brito lived together with A.F. in the home of Brito’s mother in Venezuela until they separated in July 2019. Following their separation, Brito was granted custody rights over A.F. In August 2021, Brito relocated to Spain for a better-paying job. While in Spain, Brito continued to support A.F. financially, maintained regular contact through video calls and voice messages, and stayed in close contact with A.F.’s grandmother. The district court found that Brito was exercising his custody rights throughout his time in Spain. Until late 2021, A.F. had lived exclusively in Venezuela^.. In November 2021, Castro removed A.F. from Venezuela without Brito’s consent and unlawfully entered the United States. After presenting herself and A.F. to U.S. Border Patrol in San Luis, Arizona, Castro relocated to Lewisville, Texas. There, she lived with Castro’s boyfriend, Otton Rodriguez, for eleven months. In October 2022, Castro, A.F., and Rodriguez moved together to Dallas. Brito remained in contact with A.F. during this time and attempted to visit her in the United States, though his visa application was denied.

The district court found that Castro “has been gainfully employed since arriving in the United States and provided for A.F.” Since arriving in the United States, Castro worked for four different companies, averaging 40–45 hours a week, with hourly wages ranging from $12 to $16. Castro and A.F. lacked permanent residence status in the United States. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services issued them employment authorization documentation, but their asylum applications remained pending. Immediately upon learning that Castro had taken A.F. to the United States, Brito contacted the family attorney, Venezuelan authorities, and both the United States and Venezuelan embassies in Spain. He authorized his mother to file an application under the Hague Convention seeking A.F.’s return. Venezuelan authorities received the application on January 20, 2022—just under two months after Castro removed A.F. to the United States.  After efforts to reach an agreement with Castro failed, Brito filed a petition in the Eastern District of Texas in April 2023. In June 2023, Castro—through counsel—accepted service and disclosed her address, which was located within the Northern District of Texas. By agreement of the parties, the action was transferred to the Northern District on August 1, 2023. The Northern District did not hold a bench trial until March 2024—eight months after the transfer. Six weeks later, the court denied Brito’s petition, concluding that although he had established a prima facie case for A.F.’s return, Castro had sufficiently shown that A.F. was well-settled in Dallas and that remaining there was in her best interest. The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions that the district court enter an order that A.F. be returned to Venezuela.

  The Court observed that the Hague Convention mandates the return of “a child wrongfully removed from her country of habitual residence ... upon petition.” The Convention’s default rule is that the child should be returned to her country of habitual residence. But the Convention provides ‘several narrow affirmative defenses to wrongful removal.’ This case concerned the “well-settled” exception found in Article 12. Article 12 provides that, “when a court receives a petition for return within one year after the child’s wrongful removal, the court ‘shall order the return of the child forthwith.” But “where the proceedings have been commenced after the expiration of the period of one year,” the court “shall also order the return of the child, unless it is demonstrated that the child is now settled in its new environment.” To assess whether the well-settled defense applies, the Court considers seven factors:(1) the child’s age; (2) the stability and duration of the child’s residence in the new environment; (3) whether the child attends school or day care consistently; (4) whether the child has friends and relatives in the new area; (5) the child’s participation in community or extracurricular activities; (6) the respondent’s employment and financial stability; and (7) the immigration status of the respondent and child. The Court examines the district court’s factual findings for clear error, and we review de novo the legal question whether, in light of holistic balance of the seven nondispositive factors, the evidence supports the district court’s conclusion.

 The parties did not dispute the district court’s finding that Brito established a prima facie case for A.F.’s return. The sole question on appeal was whether the well-settled defense barred that return. The Court concluded that the district court erred in both its legal framing and application of the well-settled exception. Balancing the relevant factors de novo, it was not persuaded that A.F. has formed such deep or enduring ties to her new environment that returning to her home in Venezuela would contravene her best interests.

 The first factor was A.F.’s age. She was seven years old—and was five at the time of the bench trial. The district court acknowledged, citing precedent in Hernandez, that a child of this age is “a very young child not able to form the same level of attachments and connections to a new environment as an older child.” Yet the district court described this factor as “lukewarm”—a characterization unsupported by the record. A.F.’s young age meant it will take more time for her to become “so settled” in the United States that her best interests lie in remaining here rather than returning home to Venezuela. At age seven, A.F. was not yet capable of forming the kind of enduring attachments that the Convention deems sufficient to override its default return remedy.

The second factor considers the stability and duration of A.F.’s residence in the United States. The district court found that over the past three years, Castro and A.F. lived in two separate residences in the United States. It characterized this arrangement as stable and weighed the factor in favor of Castro. That conclusion was error. That A.F. has already moved multiple times in her brief time here undermined any claim of residential stability. So too does the fact that Castro and A.F. currently resided in the home of Castro’s boyfriend. Should that relationship falter, Castro and A.F. would be forced to relocate once more. Castro conceded that if the relationship were to end, she and A.F. would need to downgrade to a cheaper apartment, as they relied—at least in part—on her boyfriend’s income. Even if A.F.’s present living situation appeared stable, its long-term viability was far from assured.

The third factor examines whether the child attends school consistently. The district court rightly found that A.F. was enrolled in kindergarten and performing well. But that fact must be viewed in context and alongside the other factors. At her young age, A.F. had ample time and opportunity to integrate into a new school community in Venezuela. Moreover, A.F.’s school environment in United States was not especially secure, given the uncertainty of her immigration status, the nature and impermanence of Castro’s transient employment, and their reliance on Castro’s boyfriend for housing. These circumstances suggested a real possibility of future moves, which could disrupt A.F.’s schooling and undercut any sense of educational continuity.

 The fourth factor considers whether the child has formed meaningful relationships with friends and family in her new environment. A.F. had at least six close relatives in the United States, as well as several friends she saw regularly. Still, most of A.F.’s extended family—including Castro’s parents, two brothers, a cousin, an aunt and uncle, and Brito’s mother, siblings, and additional relatives—remained in Venezuela. Most notably, A.F. could not see her father in the United States. Brito attempted to visit her but was denied a visa. While the inquiry is not a numbers game, the fact that A.F. had a “large extended family” in Venezuela remained significant—particularly because her relationships in the United States were entirely derivative of her mother’s. In addition, Castro’s boyfriend lacked lawful permanent resident status, and none of A.F.’s relatives in the United States were U.S. citizens. The unsettled immigration status of A.F.’s family here casted doubt on durability of those relationships and weighed against a finding that they are well-settled.

The fifth factor examines A.F’s participation in community activities. The district court found that A.F. regularly attended church, visited a primary care physician, goes on family vacations, has playdates with friends, uses community playgrounds, goes swimming, and attends birthday parties. The district court deemed this evidence “overwhelming” support for the well-settled defense. Though it certainly weighed in Castro’s favor, this factor on its own did not demonstrate that A.F. is “so settled” in the United States that returning to Venezuela would be contrary to her best interests—especially since she could engage in many of these same activities there.

The sixth factor considers Castro’s economic and employment stability. The district court found that Castro “has been gainfully employed since arriving in the United States and provides for A.F.” But while the court acknowledged that Castro had changed jobs four times since her arrival, it failed to give appropriate weight to other facts that cast doubt on the stability of her employment. For instance, the court found that Castro was unemployed for at least two months between jobs. Nor did the record show that any of her jobs were permanent positions offering reliable income or benefits. The court further acknowledged that Castro shared both a car and an apartment with her boyfriend but overlooked the precariousness of that arrangement—namely, that if the relationship ended, Castro and A.F. would have to relocate. The end of the relationship would also leave them without transportation, impairing A.F.’s ability to attend school and participate in community life. While Castro was currently meeting A.F.’s basic needs, her financial circumstances were not “so settled” that it would be against A.F.’s best interest to return to her life in Venezuela.

The seventh and final factor concerns immigration status. The district court acknowledged that neither Castro nor A.F. has lawful permanent residence status in the United States and that both had pending asylum applications. But the court deemed this factor merely “lukewarm.” That conclusion was error. Castro presented no evidence suggesting their asylum claims were likely to succeed. The court found no evidence that A.F. would face a “grave risk of harm” if returned to Venezuela—a finding that undercut any suggestion that her asylum claim will succeed. “immigration status is not dispositive” and  lacking lawful permanent resident status “does not necessarily prevent a child from developing significant connections in a new environment.” Still, “immigration status should not be analyzed in the abstract,” and the Convention requires “an individualized, fact-specific inquiry.” The district court erred by evaluating immigration status in isolation, rather than assessing how it interacts with and undermines the other well-settled factors. Here, the uncertainty surrounding Castro’s and A.F.’s immigration status permeates every aspect of their life in the United States, rendering it fundamentally unstable. This factor weighs heavily against finding that A.F. is well-settled.

Overall, balancing the factors de novo, it disagreed with the district court’s assessment that factors one and seven are merely “lukewarm,” and that the remaining factors “overwhelmingly” supported a “well-settled” finding. The court failed to give due weight to A.F.’s young age—which favored her ability to readjust to life in Venezuela—and to her uncertain immigration status, which eroded any stability she may have developed in the United States. The district court also gave more weight to the remaining factors than supported by the record. The factors did not support the conclusion that A.F. was so deeply rooted in the United States that returning her to Venezuela would contravene her best interests.