In Matter of SLC, 2014 WL 2801053 (M.D.Fla.) petitioner Mario Alberto Lopez Morales's filed a Petition against Respondent Nency Castellanos Martinez for Return of Child to the Republic of Mexico on February 14, 2014. The District Court granted the petition.
The parties were married in Mexico on September 6, 2003. Petitioner was a citizen of Mexico and respondent was a citizen of Cuba and Mexico. Their daughter, S.L.C., was born in 2002 and was a citizen of Mexico. In June 2006, respondent removed S.L.C. from Mexico and brought her to Florida to live with respondent's family due to marital troubles. Petitioner was able to convince respondent to return to their marital home in Mexico. Respondent and S.L.C. resided with petitioner in Mexico until April 2012, at which time they again returned to Florida without petitioner's knowledge or consent. Petitioner learned that respondent and S.L.C. were located in Florida, and on May, 16, 2012, petitioner filed a Hague application with the Mexican Central Authority. Petitioner also filed a civil action seeking provisional care and custody over the child in Mexico. In August 2012, petitioner visited his wife and daughter in Florida, and on August 30, 2012, respondent and S.L.C. voluntarily returned to Mexico. As a result, petitioner halted the proceedings under the Hague Convention in Mexico. Prior to leaving the United States, Castellanos, on behalf of herself and S.L.C., applied for asylum as a Cuban immigrant. Lopez, however, was unaware of the application for asylum. Upon their return to Mexico, petitioner and respondent did not live together as a family but were separated. Petitioner rented an apartment for respondent and S.L.C., and arranged for S.L.C. to return to the private school she had attended since prekindergarten. Petitioner paid for their apartment, automobile, food, school, and living expenses. He also deposited money into an account that could only be accessed by respondent.
On September 12, 2012, respondent filed a criminal complaint against petitioner for aggravated family violence. On the same day, Castellanos entered the formal marital residence with the purpose of residing there and took steps to prevent petitioner from entering the premises. Lopez thereafter resided in an apartment. Petitioner testified that he would take S.L.C. to school in the mornings and would take her to dinner and do homework with her two to three times a week. On weekends, petitioner would spend time with his daughter and take her to visit family and friends. This continued until January 2013. Petitioner was able to contact S.L.C. directly on the cell phone that he had provided to her. On February 1, 2013, respondent filed a child custody case in Mexico, to which petitioner filed a countersuit seeking guardianship and custody of the child, as well as an order prohibiting the mother from removing the child from Mexico. On February 26, 2013, the court entered an order prohibiting respondent from leaving the country with S.L.C. during the proceedings. Prior to the entry of the order, respondent decided to return to Florida. Respondent testified that she entered the United States with S.L.C. on February 24, 2013, without petitioner's knowledge or consent.
Petitioner discovered the absence of S.L.C. on March 1, 2013, when the child's teacher advised petitioner that S.L.C. had not attended classes since February 22, 2013. Respondent did not inform petitioner as to S.L.C.'s whereabouts or provide him with any contact information. Petitioner was eventually able to locate S .L.C. with the assistance of federal and local law enforcement agencies.
The evidence showed that S.L.C. was born and raised in Chiapas, Mexico,
attended school in Mexico, and was a citizen of Mexico. Although S.L.C. lived in Florida for a short period in 2012, without the consent of petitioner, and had now spent more than a year in the United States, the Court found that her habitual residence had not changed due to the unilateral actions of respondent. According to the Eleventh Circuit, "in the absence of settled parental intent, courts should be slow to infer from such contacts [with the new residence] that an earlier habitual residence has been abandoned." Ruiz, 392 F.3d at 1253. Respondent has failed to present any evidence indicating that petitioner and respondent intended to abandon their home in Mexico in favor of moving to Florida. The relatively limited period of time S.L.C. spent in Florida in 2012 was without the consent of petitioner, and therefore violated the Hague Convention. The Court found that the habitual residence of S.L.C. at all relevant times was Mexico. The evidence showed that respondent removed the child from her habitual residence in Mexico without petitioner's consent and retained her in the United States without petitioner's permission. The Court found that there was a "removal" and "retention" of S.L.C. within the meaning of the Hague Convention from at least February 24, 2013, forward. The evidence established that petitioner and respondent had not agreed to the terms of exertion of parental authority/responsibility over S.L.C. and that custody proceedings remained pending in Mexico. Thus, the Court found that the rights and obligations provided by the doctrine of patria potestas created a "right of custody" and concluded that the rights and obligations of petitioner had not been severed. Additionally, the Hague Convention specifically provides that "rights of custody" include "the right to determine the child's place of residence." Hague Convention art. 5. One parent may not unilaterally determine the country in which the child will live; this means that "the habitual residence of the child cannot be shifted without mutual agreement." The Court concluded that the evidence established that respondent's removal and retention of the child was wrongful under the Hague Convention. Respondent's unilateral removal and retention of S.L.C., without the consent of petitioner, violated petitioner's custody rights under the law of Mexico. Petitioner established he was exercising his rights of custody at the time the child was wrongfully removed and retained. Petitioner took steps to remain in contact with S.L.C., such as taking her to school, spending time with her on the weekends, and providing her with a cell phone and iPad. Petitioner testified that he paid for S.L.C. to attend a private school as well as numerous other expenses.
The district court noted that a court is not bound to order the return of a child if respondent demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that "the child objects to being returned and has attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of its views." Hague Convention, art. 13; 42 U.S.C. 11603(e)(2)(A). Respondent testified that S.L.C. informed her that she did not want to go back to Mexico and was really happy here. Respondent further testified that S.L.C. was very intelligent and cannot be manipulated because she knows what she wants. Despite the child's objection, the Court concluded that, under the circumstances of this case, S.L.C.'s opinion on returning to Mexico was not conclusive. S.L.C. was only 12 years old and had been under the exclusive custody of respondent for an extended period of time. Naturally, she preferred to remain here in the United States with her mother instead of moving back to Mexico. The Court found that the return of S.L.C. to Mexico furthered the aims of the Hague Convention, and therefore would exercise its discretion to order her return despite her view.
In White v. White, 556 Fed. Appx. 10 (2d Cir., 2014) the father brought an action against his former wife, pursuant to Hague Convention, for the return of his son from New Jersey. The United States District Court, 2013 WL 1340145, adopted the report
and recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge, 2012 WL 3041660, and
dismissed action as barred by Rooker-Feldman doctrine, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel and for failure to state a claim. The Second Circuit affirmed for substantially the same reasons stated by the district court and by the magistrate judge, whose report and recommendation was adopted by the district court. This action was in essence a protracted custody dispute on appeal from a state court judgment granting custody of Appellant's son to his ex-wife in New Jersey. It rejected the father’s argument that the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction and its implementing statute, the International Child Abduction Remedies Act, required the return of his son to his custody in New York and repayment of monies that Appellant has paid to Appellee since 2005. It pointed out that the Hague Convention"does not establish substantive standards for resolving the merits of any underlying custody dispute." Mota v. Castillo, 692 F.3d 108, 112 (2d Cir.2012) (citing Hague Convention, art. 19). Rather, the Convention's focus is simply upon whether a child should be returned to her country of habitual residence for custody proceedings. The German Court's determination of "habitual residence," therefore, did not bear upon the New York state court custody proceedings. The conduct of such proceedings in New York is entirely consistent with the German Court's order. Thus, procedural bars aside (all of which the district court correctly found applicable), Appellant's complaint failed to state a claim, and amendment would have been futile.
In Vilchis v. Hall, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2014 WL 2978378 (N.D.Ill.) Petitioner Carmen Marlyn Solano Vilchis and Respondent Anthoney Wayne Hall were
the parents of two daughters ages five and seven. Solano was born in Mexico and was a citizen of Mexico. In 1999, when she was thirteen years old, Solano moved to the United States with her family and settled in Illinois. She resided in the United States as an undocumented immigrant. Hall was born in Illinois, and was a United States citizen. Solano gave birth to their first daughter in May 2007 and their second daughter in November 2008. The children were United States citizens. The couple lived together sporadically in the Chicago area until October 2010. In October 2010, Solano told Hall that she and her family had to leave Illinois immediately, within a day or two, due to threats made against Solano's sister by the sister's husband, a man named Juan Hacha. The court expressly found that Solano would not have wanted to leave Illinois but for that threat. Hall did not want to leave Illinois and did not want the children to leave Illinois. Hall decided to leave Illinois with Solano so that he could remain with their children. At first, Solano told Hall they were going to California. At some point during the trip, which the entire group took in Hall's truck and two other vehicles, Solano and her family told Hall that they in fact were going to Mexico. Hall persuasively testified that he never wanted to move himself and the children to Mexico. At the time he agreed to leave Illinois, Hall did not intend for the children to establish residence in Mexico. Solano, her family, Hall, and the children arrived in Mexico in mid-October 2010. They spent about two weeks in northern Baja California and then went to Mexico City. In late November 2010, Hall went to the United States Embassy in Mexico City to ask for help in getting the children back to the United States. After a brief stay in Mexico City, Solano and the children moved to the Tijuana area, directly across the border from the United States. Hall returned to Illinois in December 2010 and stayed there for several weeks.
In February 2011, Hall returned to the San Diego area, directly across the border from Mexico. During the next several months, Hall looked for work in the United States and crossed the border every day to see Solano and the children. During that time, Solano wanted to cross the border from Mexico to the United States to live in the United States. Hall visited lawyers in an effort to help Solano achieve that goal legally, but those efforts were unsuccessful. Solano testified she attempted to change her immigration status so that she could try to return to the United States. During Summer 2011, with Solano's consent and financial support, Hall took the children for a trip to the Chicago area. all returned with the children to California, and then brought the children to Mexico to see Solano. Solano told Hill that Hacha, her sister's husband, was back in the picture and in the area, which greatly concerned Hill given his belief that Hacha was dangerous and possibly in a gang or cartel. From mid-September 2011 through mid-October 2011, Hill and the children stayed at the Dreams for Change Safe Parking Program, a parking lot in the San Diego area with amenities where homeless persons may spend the night in their cars. From mid-October 2011 through late December 2011, Hill stayed at the YMCA Cortez Hill shelter with the children. During that time, Hill brought the children to Tijuana to see Solano on some weekends; the visits to Mexico became more frequent when Hill heard that Solano's sister and Hacha were not around. Also during that time, the children were enrolled in Wee Care, a daycare center in Chula Vista, a town between San Diego and the Mexican border; they also received medical care through CalWorks, a state medical program in California, and other benefits through the California Women Infants and Children program. On September 9, 2011, Solano sent an email to Hall stating, in part: "I want the kids to go to school in California defenetely [sic] not in Mexico not at all." In October 2011, Hall sent Solano an email stating: "I will bring them to visit you, i' can't really say when because we are in a program. We found a school the girls liked and they start soon [so] they need the[ir] blankets and pillows. And shoes we go to the park for hours the[ir] shoes wear out fast." This email provided confirmation that the children largely stayed with Hall in Fall 2011 and attended school in the United States. Hall brought the children to Mexico for Christmas break in December 2011. The girls traveled back and forth from the United States to Mexico, spending nights in both places, from January 2010 through May 2012. In April 2012, Hall signed a month-to-month rental agreement for an apartment in Chula Vista; the agreement listed the occupants as Hall and the children. Each child had a bed and toys in the apartment. In May 2012, the children began attending Miss Evelyn's Daycare in Chula Vista, and the older child soon began to attend kindergarten at Julian Rice Elementary School in Chula Vista. From that point through July 2012, the children regularly spent the night with Hall on the United States side of the border. Hall's mother, father, and sister testified at the hearing that they visited Hall during Summer 2012 for about two weeks and that the children stayed with Hall every night. Solano testified at the hearing that she "release[d] the kids back to" Hall in "around June 2012." Solano testified that she did this because Hall told her that he had "a good job" and "an apartment," and she further testified that she and Hall came "to an agreement where the kids will go to school so that they continue to learn their English and keep their language."
In July 2012, Hall enrolled the children in Medi-Care Managed Care, a state
healthcare program operated by California. Hall was unable to pay the rent at the Chula Vista apartment and was evicted by order of a California court in early August 2012. Shortly thereafter, Hall started making plans to return with the children
to Illinois, where Hall had a substantial support network of family. Hall informed Solano, who said that "she was okay with it" and that she just wanted to see the children before they left. Hall believed at the time that Solano would attempt to cross into the United States, legally or illegally, and meet up with Hall and the children in Illinois. Hall and the children left the San Diego -Tijuana area in late August 2012
and lived in Waukegan, Illinois, ever since.
The district court noted that unlike the situation in most Hague Convention cases, the children moved fluidly and regularly (at times daily) between United States and Mexico, with the consent of both parents. This made it difficult to determine whether Hall removed the children from Mexico or retained them in the United States when he took them from the San Diego -Tijuana area to Illinois. In addition the parties' briefs recognized no distinction between the habitual residence analysis in retention versus removal cases. The court held that the parties therefore waived any argument that this case involved retention as opposed to removal (or vice versa) or that the habitual residence analysis differed in any material respect between those two scenarios. The district court noted that the parties agreed that Solano could prevail only if she showed that Mexico was the children's habitual residence in late August 2012, when the alleged wrongful removal/retention occurred. "The determination of 'habitual residence' is to be made on the basis of the everyday meaning of these words rather than the legal meaning that a particular jurisdiction attaches to them ...." Kijowska, 463 F.3d at 586. "The determination of habitual residence under the Hague Convention is a practical, flexible, factual inquiry that accounts for all available relevant evidence and considers the individual circumstances of each case." Redmond, 724 F.3d at 732. "Determining a child's habitual residence ... requires an assessment of the observable facts on the ground, not an inquiry into the child's or the parent's legal status in a particular place." The district court pointed out that the Seventh Circuit had loosely adopted the framework set forth in Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2001), for determining habitual residence. "In the case of young children, the [Mozes] court found it most prudent to focus on the intent of the parents rather than the intent of the child in determining the child's habitual residence." Koch, 450 F.3d at 713. The district court must "determine whether the parents intended to abandon their previous habitual residence, judging that intent at the last time the parents had a shared intent." As the Seventh Circuit made clear, the district court also must consider, in addition to the parents' last shared intent, "the child's acclimatization" to one country or another. Redmond, 724 F.3d at 746.
It was undisputed that until Solano, Hall, and the children left Illinois in October 2010, the children's habitual residence was the United States. The question was wether their habitual residence changed to Mexico at any point between October 2010 and late August 2012. The court held that answer to that question was "no". Hall never intended that his children would reside indefinitely in Mexico. Hall allowed the children to leave Illinois in October 2010, and he agreed during the trip to the West Coast that the children would go to Mexico. But the circumstances of the group's departure from Illinois were extenuating, prompted by threats from Hacha that were sufficiently dire and credible to compel the family to pick up and leave Illinois on such short notice. It was always Hall's intention that the children would return with him to the United States, albeit in southern California rather than Illinois, so that the children (and possibly Hall) could remain close to Solano, who could not legally cross the border into the United States. These conclusions were proven by, among other things, the fact that Hall asked the United States Embassy in Mexico City in November 2010, shortly after the group's arrival in Mexico, for help in getting the children back to the United States; Hall's extraordinary efforts to have the children live with him in California, even if it meant living in a parking lot for homeless families or a YMCA shelter; Hall's seeking legal assistance in an effort to obtain legal status for Solano in the United States; and Hall's enrolling the children in daycare, school, and the state medical assistance program in California. This showed that Hall never intended for the children to relocate indefinitely from the United States to Mexico. This was significant because precedent required the court "to determine whether the parents intended to abandon their previous habitual residence, judging that intent at the last time the parents had a shared intent." Koch, 450 F.3d at 709. Thus, even if Solano had intended for the children to reside indefinitely in Mexico, that intent was not shared with Hall, which meant that their last shared intent was for the children to reside indefinitely in the United States, which in turn favored the conclusion that their habitual residence was the United States.
The evidence showed that Solano herself did not intend for the children to reside indefinitely in Mexico. This was proven by, among other things, Solano's testimony that she has made efforts to obtain legal immigration status in the United States in order to return there; Solano's September 2011 email to Hall stating, "I want the kids to go to school in California defenetely [sic] not in Mexico not at all"; Solano's admission that she "release[d] the kids back to" Hall in "around June 2012" upon learning that he had "a good job" and "an apartment"; her further admission that she and Hall came "to an agreement where the kids will go to school so that they continue to learn their English and keep their language"; and Solano's deposition testimony that she did not want the children to go to school in Mexico and that she preferred that they attend school in California "to keep their English." Solano's efforts to obtain legal status in the United States reflected a desire to return to the United States to be with the children and possibly Hall. Solano's strong desire for the children to attend school in the United States and not Mexico, and for the children to keep their English skills, reflected an intent that her children make the United States their home; if she wanted the children to live in and become acclimated to Mexico then it would have been important for them to attend school in Mexico. The fact that Solano agreed to "release" the children to Hall once she was assured that Hall had a job and an apartment showed that her intent was not that the children reside indefinitely in Mexico, but that the children stay in Mexico until Hall had an acceptable place for them to live in the United States.
Because "the parents' last shared intent" is not "a kind of fixed doctrinal test for
determining a child's habitual residence," Redmond, 724 F.3d at 732, the court also
considered the children's "acclimatization" to the United States and Mexico, respectively. The children moved fluidly across the border and spent nights with Solano in Mexico and Hall in the United States, so their actual location during the relevant time frame was a wash. Most significant in terms of acclimatization was that the children were enrolled in daycare and school and received healthcare services in the United States. It could not be said that the children acclimated to Mexico while attending daycare and school in the United States, even granting that Solano's family resided largely if not exclusively in Mexico. Solano's acknowledged goal of obtaining legal status in the United States reflected her desire to come back to the United States and thus her understanding that the children would remain acclimated in and make their home there.
The Court found that Solano did not prove that the children's habitual residence in late August 2012 was Mexico, and therefore she did not prove that Hall's removal of the children from Mexico or retention of the children in the United States was wrongful within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention. Given this conclusion, there was no need to determine whether Solano consented to the retention or removal within the meaning of Article 13(a).
In Bobadilla v Cordero, 2014 WL 3869998 (M.D.N.C.) Ms. Ramos and Mr. Cordero were citizens of Mexico. They never married. Their child, B.F.S.R., was born in Cabarrus County, North Carolina, in 2006, and was a citizen of both Mexico and the United States. Neither Ms. Ramos nor Mr. Cordero had legal immigration status in the United States. In December 2009, Ms. Ramos and B.F.S.R. moved to Zacatecas, Mexico, where the parties had planned to build a small house on Mr. Cordero's parents' land. Mr. Cordero paid for the airplane tickets. The parties agreed that Mr. Cordero would join Ms. Ramos and the child after he earned more money in North Carolina to fund the construction. Ms. Ramos and the child lived with Mr. Cordero's family, and Ms.Ramos oversaw the construction of the parties' new home, the exterior of which was completed in March or April of 2010. Ms.Ramos and B.F.S.R. travelled to Tijuana to stay with her family. At some point while Ms. Ramos was in Tijuana, the parties ended their romantic relationship because of Mr. Cordero's refusal to come to Mexico. In August 2010, the parties agreed that B.F.S.R. would travel to North Carolina to stay with Mr. Cordero for a visit. Before B.F.S.R. left Mexico, Mr. Cordero signed a notarized statement agreeing to return B.F.S.R. to Ms. Ramos in Tijuana on January 14, 2011, and provided the statement to Ms. Ramos. Mr. Cordero paid for B.F.S.R.'s travel expenses. Mr. Cordero did not return B.F.S.R., despite Ms. Ramos's requests and demands. Since then, B.F.S.R. has lived with Mr. Cordero, Mr. Cordero's brother, and Mr. Cordero's sister, her husband, and her daughter. He attends school in Concord, North Carolina, he plays soccer, and he sees friends and Mr. Cordero's family regularly. Mr. Cordero has allowed only intermittent telephone and internet-video contact between the child and Ms. Ramos. In September 2011, Ms. Ramos attempted to cross over the United States border using a false passport and was arrested and deported.
In March 2012, Mr. Cordero filed a custody petition in North Carolina district court. That same month, Ms. Ramos filed a Hague application to the Mexican authorities, for which the custody suit was stayed. Petitioner Rosa Ramos Bobadilla sought the return of her minor child, B.F.S.R., to Mexico. Ms. Ramos, who was not employed, searched for an attorney to assist her, eventually obtaining representation pro bono from Legal Aid of North Carolina. She filed this petition on March 11, 2014.
The Court held an evidentiary hearing at which Mr. Cordero appeared in person and Ms. Ramos appeared by video feed. The Court found that B.F.S.R. was habitually residing in Mexico as of January 14, 2011, as the shared intent of the parents was to settle in Zacatecas. The parties agreed that they would move to Zacatecas and build a house on Mr. Cordero's parents' land. Mr. Cordero purchased one-way tickets for Ms. Ramos and the child. Ms. Ramos and the child traveled to Mr. Cordero's parents' home, and they began building the house, for which Mr. Cordero sent money. Even Mr. Cordero testified that he intended to join Ms. Ramos and the child in Zacatecas. They had no specific plans to return to the United States; indeed, return would have been difficult since neither parent could do so legally. Because Mexico was the habitual residence of the child and the other elements of a prima facie case were
established without dispute, the Court concluded that Mr. Cordero wrongfully retained B.F.S.R.
within the meaning of the Hague Convention.
Mr. Cordero asserted the "well-settled" affirmative defense. Ms. Ramos did not dispute that she failed to file her Hague petition within one year of the removal, but she contended that B.F.S.R. was not well-settled in North Carolina. The district court concluded that a preponderance of the evidence did not show that B.F.S.R. was well-settled and that application of this narrow defense was not warranted. Mr. Cordero testified at the hearing in Spanish through an interpreter and the child's report cards from school were sent home in Spanish, establishing that B.F.S.R. lives in a Spanish-speaking household and community. Mr. Cordero also testified that the child's English gets better every day, making it clear that Spanish was his primary language. This indicated both that the child had not completely acclimated to a culture in which English is the predominant language and that a return to Mexico would not cause language problems common in many cases where the "well-settled" defense is applied. The child's life in North Carolina was not so different from his life in Mexico
that it would be "worse to order the child to be uprooted." Belay v. Getachew, 272
F.Supp.2d 553, 562 (D.Md.2003). Moreover, there were significant aspects of the child's life in North Carolina that were not stable. The child had required therapy in North Carolina to deal with sadness over his parents' separation. Despite this, Mr. Cordero had not allowed the child to have contact with his maternal grandparents and uncle in Cabarrus County and had not allowed the child to have regular telephone or video-internet contact with his mother. This interference with family relationships is inherently disruptive and was particularly disruptive here. See Lozano, ---U.S. at ----, 134 S.Ct. at 1236 (noting with approval that "American courts have found as a factual matter that steps taken to promote concealment can also prevent the stable attachments that make a child 'settled' " and citing cases.) This compared negatively to B.F.S.R.'s situation when he resided in Mexico, where he maintained relationships with both parents' families in that country. Finally, Mr. Cordero's immigration status made B.F.S.R.'s living situation tenuous, as his primary caretaker could be arrested and deported to Mexico at any time. See In re R. V.B., --- F.Supp.2d ----, 2014 WL 3058250 at *12 (E.D.N.Y.July 7, 2014) (noting that "the immigration status of [the abducting parent] is a factor that disfavors finding the Child is settled"). Weighing all of these considerations, the Court found that Mr. Cordero had not established the "well-settled" defense by a preponderance of the evidence.
The district court observed that a Federal court retains the discretion to return a child, despite the existence of a defense, if return would further the aims of the Convention. (See Miller, 240 F.3d at 402; England v. England, 234 F.3d 268, 270–71 (5th Cir.2000); Friedrich II, 78 F.3d at 1067 (citing Feder, 63 F.3d at 226) (citing Pub. Notice 957, 51 Fed.Reg. 10494, 10509 (1986)); Antunez-Fernandes v. Connors-Fernandes, 259 F. Supp. 2d 800, 812 (N.D. Iowa 2003) , the Court found that equitable justifications warranted the Court's exercise of its discretion even if B.F.S.R. was well-settled. Ms. Ramos was unable to legally come to the United States for a custody hearing, whereas there were no legal impediments to Mr. Cordero's return to Mexico, where he was a citizen, for participation in a custody hearing there. Mr. Cordero also limited or even prevented opportunities for Ms. Ramos and her family to maintain a relationship with B.F.S.R. after the wrongful abduction. Antunez-Fernandes v. Connors-Fernandes, 259 F.Supp.2d 800, 815 (N.D.Iowa 2003) (considering abducting parent's attempts to sever meaningful relationship with petitioner in exercising discretion to return child). Ms. Ramos had convincingly shown that her delay in filing the petition should not weigh against her as the Court balances the equities. Ms. Ramos initiated efforts to retrieve B.F.S.R. soon after he was wrongfully retained and even attempted to illegally re-enter the country so she could see her son. Moreover, Mr. Cordero was financially supporting Ms. Ramos up until their breakup, Ms. Ramos was indigent, and she diligently pursued pro bono representation. Mr. Cordero abducted B.F.S.R. with knowledge that Ms. Ramos did not have the legal or financial means to enforce her rights. See, e.g ., Belay 272 F.Supp.2d at 561;cf. Lozano, — U.S. at ----, 134 S.Ct. at 1236-1240 (Alito, J., concurring) (approving consideration of concealment in exercise of equitable discretion.)
