Panteleris v Panteleris, 2014 WL 3053211 (N.D.Ohio) [Australia] [Habitual Residence] [Rights of Custody] [Petition granted]

In Panteleris v Panteleris, 2014 WL 3053211 (N.D.Ohio) the district court granted the petition of Anthimos Panteleris for return of  the children of Anthimos and Aalison Panteleris to Australia.    Petitioner Anthimos, was a citizen and resident of Australia. In 2005, while in the United States, Anthimos met and married Respondent Aalison, a United States citizen. Their first child B.P., was born in the United States in November 2006. In March 2007 the family moved to Australia.Their second child, H.P., was born in Australia in November 2008. Their third child, Z.P., was born in Australia in December 2011. All three children were citizens of the United States and Australia.
 The Panteleris family lived in Australia for five years.  In March 2012 the Panteleris family traveled to the United States. At that time, the children were ages five, three, and four months. During the Panteleris family's time in Australia, Aalison was the primarily breadwinner and Anthimos was the primary caregiver of the children.  In March 2012, the Panteleris family arrived in Hawaii, where they remained for approximately four weeks.In April 2012, the Panteleris family came to Salem, Ohio, Aalison's hometown. The couple entered into a 12-month lease on an apartment in the Northern District of Ohio. Anthimos described the Panteleris family's trip to the United States as "an extended, yearlong holiday in the United States, [with he and Aalison] agreeing that the entire family would stay for 6 months, and that, if necessary, Anthimos would then return to Australia to supplement the family's income while the rest of the family remained in the United States for an additional 6 months." At the Hearing, Anthimos testified that the reason for the trip was to allow Aalison to spend time with her family. He explained that, apart from a month-long visit to Ohio in 2008 after the death of her father, Aalison had not seen her family since she moved to Australia. Aalison, for her part, testified that the Panteleris family left Australia with the intention of moving to the United States.

In Ohio, as in Australia, Aalison worked and Anthimos stayed home and cared for the children. Aalison separated from her job in November 2012. Faced with depleted resources, Anthimos returned to Australia to obtain work because he was unable to work in the United States. Anthimos asserted that the couple agreed that, at the end of the year-long holiday in Ohio, Aalison and the children would return to Australia. 
On December 2, 2012, Anthimos began working after arriving in Australia but was
laid off shortly thereafter.  He stated that he and Aalison agreed the family would delay the return to Australia until he secured new employment.  Anthimos began working again in May 2013, at which time he stated that he "contacted [Aalison] to let her know about the job and that he was ready, willing, and able to move the entire family back to their home in Australia." He asserted that Aalison responded that she and the children would not be returning, and that she had met someone else. 

On February 28, 2014, Anthimos filed a verified complaint and petition.The district court pointed out that Anthimos stated that he was exercising custody rights under Australian law. Section 111B(4)(a) of the Australian Family Law Act provides in relevant part that "[f]or the purposes of the [ Hague] Convention, each of the parents of a child should be regarded as having rights of custody in respect of the child...." Anthimos submited that he acquired parental responsibility for each of his children by operation of law pursuant to Sections 61 C (each of the parents of a child who is not eighteen has parental responsibility for the child); 69P (presumption of husband's parentage of wife's child when a child is born to a woman while she is married); and 69R (presumption of parentage to a person named as a parent in the child's birth certificate) of the Family Law Act. He further asserted that "[a]t the time of the Children's wrongful retention," he "was exercising his custody rights and maintaining his relationship with all three of the Children within the meaning of Articles Three and Five of the Hague Convention."     The Court found that Anthimos had established by a preponderance of the evidence that he had custody rights at the time of the alleged wrongful retention, in May 2013. Moreover, Anthimos had shown by a preponderance of the evidence that he was exercising those rights at the time of the wrongful retention. Anthimos regularly communicated with his children prior to May 2013. They spoke on the telephone and they used Skype on a regular basis. The Court found that Anthimos had shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he had custody rights and was validly exercising those rights at the time of the alleged wrongful retention.

The Court observed that  Anthimos also had the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Aalison retained the children away from their habitual residence. See  Friedrich I, 983 F.2d at 1400. When analyzing this, courts look to the time just prior to the alleged wrongful retention, in this case, May 2013. In Friedrich I, the Sixth Circuit set out five principles a Court considers in determining the
habitual residence:  First, habitual residence should not be determined through the "technical" rules  governing legal residence or common law domicile. Instead, courts should look  closely at the facts and circumstances of each case. Second, because the Hague  Convention is concerned with the habitual residence of the child, the court
 should consider only the child's experience in determining habitual residence.
 Third, this inquiry should focus exclusively on the child's past experience. Any
 future plans that the parents may have are irrelevant to our inquiry. Fourth, a
 person can have only one habitual residence. Finally, a child's habitual residence is not determined by the nationality of the child's primary  care-giver. Only a change in geography and the passage of time may combine to  establish a new habitual residence.  In  Robert, 507 F.3d at 989 (citing Friedrich I ) the Sixth Circuit borrowed from the Third Circuit's decision in Feder to build upon the rule established in Friedrich I, to hold that "a child's habitual residence is the nation where [ ] the child has been present long enough to allow acclimatization, and where this presence has a 'degree of settled purpose from the child's perspective.'"Id. (citing  Feder, 63 F.3d at 224 ). The Robert Court explicitly rejected the Ninth Circuit's standard established in  Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067 (2001) that considers the subjective intent of the parents.  Robert, 507 F.3d at 990-992.   In Jenkins, the Sixth Circuit described several factors it adopted from the Third Circuit's opinion in  Karkkainen v. Kovalchuk, 445 F.3d 280 (3d Cir.2006) to consider when determining a child's habitual residence: [T]he Third Circuit held that academic activities are among the most central ...  in a child's life and therefore highly suggestive of acclimatization. The court  also noted that social engagements, participation in sports programs and  excursions, and meaningful connections with the people and places in the child's  [ ] country all point to the child being acclimatized. Additionally, the court  held that the fact that [the child] brought more personal belongings with her  than usual, in anticipation that she would remain [in the United States] was  evidence of a settled purpose to reside in the United States.    Jenkins, 569 F.3d at 556 (quoting  Robert, 507 F.3d at 996).

Anthimos argued that "[b]efore the events that gave rise to the Petition occurred, Petitioner, Respondent, and their Children lived together in Australia for five years. The oldest of the children was enrolled in kindergarten in Australia, and all three Children actively participated in various activities offered by Australian life. “ Anthimos testified that the two older children went to parks daily, participated in play groups, visited the aquarium and the zoo, the botanical gardens, and various state and national parks. He submitted photographs of B.P. and H.P. playing at parks and playing with goats the Panteleris family had for a time.    The eldest child, B.P., was enrolled in "kindergarten," which, in Australia, appears to be similar to nursery school in the United States. He was also part of two play groups, one for over a year. Anthimos would take the second child, H.P., to B.P.'s school for parent volunteer days. H.P. had moderate to severe autism. He was diagnosed in Australia, and had been seeing doctors there for referrals to specialists, although he had not yet commenced treatment there. The youngest child, Z.P., was four months old when the family left Australia, and was present during the family activities or otherwise placed with family or friends.

  Anthimos testified that he has five brothers and sisters living in the Melbourne or Sydney area. He further testified that, when he was in the United States, the children communicated with family members via Skype on a weekly basis. When the Panteleris family was living in Australia, they lived for a year with Anthimos's grandmother, in her home, and spent time interacting with family and friends. He submitted photographs of B.P. and H.P. interacting with friends in Australia.   Aalison presented testimony that Anthimos's family in Australia was not close, and that the children did not see them much. She agreed, however, that the children saw family members. She also agreed that the children had experiences in Australia and that B.P. has memories of Australia. In support of her assertion that the children's habitual residence was in Ohio, Aalison referred to the boys' schooling and H.P.'s therapy-she did not delineate, however, between the time period before the alleged wrongful retention, in May 2013, and the time period after the alleged wrongful retention until the present.

The Court held that it could not accept evidence of schooling and therapy that occurred after May 2013 to establish habitual residence. See  Friedrich I, 983 F.2d at 1401 (stating "habitual residence pertains to customary residence prior to removal. The
court must look back in time, not forward."). The record established that in May
2013 the children had been living in Ohio for approximately thirteen months.
Aalison and Anthimos testified that, during the relevant time period in Ohio, B.P.
was enrolled in kindergarten and H.P. was enrolled in pre-school, and underwent
therapy that the school provided. There was testimony that the children had a
relationship with Aalison's sister and mother, whom both lived nearby. The Court found by  a preponderance of the evidence that, from the perspective the children, the
habitual residence of the children was in Australia. and that Aalison wrongfully retained the children in the United States.

   Anthimos testified that Aalison advised she would not return the children in May 2013. He filed the petition less than one year later, on February 28, 2014.  Aalison contended that Anthimos knew that she was not returning to Australia with the children when he left the United States in December 2012. In May 2013 Aalison advised the children would not be returning to Australia.  Aalison alternatively argues that she told Anthimos that their marriage was over "at the end of" February or March, 2013, and that he knew at that time that the children were not coming back to Australia. Telling Anthimos the marriage was over, however, did not necessarily constitute a refusal to return the children. Aalison could not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the petition was untimely. The Court found that the date of the wrongful retention was May 2013, and the petition was timely because it was filed February 28, 2014, less than one year from the date of wrongful retention. Because the Court found that the petition was timely, evidence from the last two years suggesting that the children were well settled in the United States was inapplicable.

Aalison submitted that Anthimos consented or acquiesced to the children living in the United States. Anthimos consented to the children living in the United States from the time of the Panteleris family's arrival in early 2012 until May 2013. Consenting to a year-long visit, however, does not equal consenting or acquiescing to the children living in the United States permanently. The record supported Anthimos's testimony that shortly after he was told, in May 2013, that the children would not be returning to Australia, he began proceedings with International Social Services in Australia to seek a return of the children.

    Aalison argued that Anthimos consented to the children living in the United
States permanently when the family arrived in early 2012. The Court found that Aalison had not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Anthimos consented or acquiesced in the retention of the children in Ohio.

Aalison argued that there was a grave risk that returning the children would
expose them to physical or psychological harm. See Hague Convention, Article 13b.
In support, Aalison presented testimony by a neighbor, Josiah Deeter. Deeter
testified that when Anthimos was alone with the children during the day, H.P., who
was described by more than one witness as a "runner," would bolt out of the house.
Deeter testified that she had seen H.P. run out into the street, and that she had
found him playing inside of the cars belonging to her and her husband that were
parked in her driveway. Aalison's sister, Aarika Denton, testified that she once
saw Anthimos pull H.P. by the hair to "pull him back" on one occasion when H.P.
was walking by, a prelude to his bolting outside. She testified that H.P. "cried
out in pain" but that there was no bleeding. She also testified that she would
sometimes go to the house and find the children "running everywhere" and that Z.P.
needed her diaper changed. Denton testified that she did not think Anthimos was
able to give the children the amount of attention they needed. The Court found that there  was no testimony demonstrating a grave risk to the children and that Aalison had not shown, by clear and convincing evidence, that there was a grave risk of harm to the children if they are returned to Anthimos in Australia.

Aguilera v. De Lara, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2014 WL 3427548 (D.Ariz.)[Mexico] [Grave Risk of Harm] [Petition granted]

In Aguilera v. De Lara, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2014 WL 3427548 (D.Ariz.)
 Petitioner Alger Ivan Rodriguez Aguilera filed a "Petition for Return of Child under the  Hague Convention." Repondent Gabriela Samaniego De Lara opposed the petition.  Petitioner and Respondent were the parents of a nine-year-old daughter, "I.R.," who was born in Aguascalientes, Mexico in 2004. Petitioner and Respondent were not 
married at the time, but began living together in Aguascalientes after I.R. was born. Respondent  and I.R. moved out of the home in 2006, and, after a period of reconciliation, moved out again in 2008.   Respondent continued to live in Aguascalientes with I.R. until July of 2013. The Petitioner maintained a relationship with I.R. Between 2008 and 2013, I.R. attended a private school in Aguascalientes, had medical insurance, was involved with numerous family members on both sides, and had friends. Using a tourist visa, Respondent left Aguascalientes with I.R. on July 5, 2013, telling Petitioner that she and I.R. would visit Respondent's mother in Arizona for one month and would then return. After arriving in Arizona, Respondent informed Petitioner that she and I.R. would not return. 

Counsel for Petitioner and Respondent agreed that I.R. was habitually resident in Mexico immediately before her removal and that Petitioner had custody rights under Mexican law. Petitioner's verified petition and  supporting affidavit made a sufficient showing that Petitioner was exercising his custody rights  at the time of removal. Given these established facts, Respondent's removal of I.R. was  "wrongful" within the meaning of Article 3 of the Hague Convention and the Court had to order I.R.'s return to Mexico unless Respondent has established one or more of the exceptions.

The district court found that Petitioner was exercising sufficient parental rights to satisfy the requirements of the Convention. After Respondent and I.R. moved out of his home in 2008, Petitioner continued to see I.R. regularly, took her to his parents' home, movies, parks, and out to eat, picked her up from school on occasion, accompanied Respondent and I.R. to the child's doctor appointments, provided medical insurance for I.R., and provided at least some additional financial support. These activities satisfied the custody  requirement of the Hague Convention. This exception, therefore, did  not preclude return of I.R. to Mexico.

 Respondent presented evidence that Petitioner struck her on five different occasions. She did not testify that medical treatment was required on these occasions. Respondent also testified that Petitioner struck her father in the mouth during a disagreement over whether I.R. should spend time with Petitioner. Respondent testified that I.R. was present when her grandfather was struck, and the evidence suggested that I.R. was present on at least one  occasion when Petitioner struck Respondent.    Respondent testified that three of the assaults on her occurred before she and Petitioner separated, which would have been in 2008 or earlier. Two assaults apparently occurred after  their separation. Nor could the Court determine when the assault occurred on Respondent's father. Given the narrowness of this 
exception, and for several factual reasons, the Court could not conclude that Petitioner's assaults  on Respondent and her father satisfied the grave risk requirement. The assaults were directed at Respondent and another adult, not I.R.  In addition, at least some of the assaults, and perhaps all, occurred several years ago. The Ninth Circuit has instructed that the focus must be on the present-whether a grave risk will   exist if the child is returned now. Goudin, 415 F.3d at 1036-37.  Moreover,  Petitioner was not asking to be granted physical custody of I.R. He made clear at the  hearing that he believed Respondent was a good mother and should continue to have full-time custody of I.R. Petitioner simply sought to preserve his rights to have a relationship with I.R. Thus, a return of I.R. to Mexico need not result in her being placed in Petitioner's physical custody.

  Respondent and I.R. testified that Petitioner slapped I.R. on one or more occasions and twisted her arm when he was angry. Respondent and I.R. did not testify that these actions caused serious physical injury or required medical attention. Nor did Respondent or I.R. explain whether these actions were disciplinary in nature or simple assaults.   Petitioner's actions toward I.R. clearly were relevant to the "grave risk" inquiry. The question was whether slapping a child or twisting her arm shows a grave risk of  physical or psychological harm. The Ninth Circuit and other authorities have  instructed that the risk of harm must be grave, not merely serious. In addition, Petitioner did not seek custody of I.R. This fact mitigated, to some extent, any risk that might be presented to  I.R. by Petitioner's past tendency to slap or twist arms. Courts have also recognized that many countries of habitual residence have the capacity to protect children, including Mexico. For these reasons, the Court concluded that this evidence did not meet the high threshold of  clear and convincing evidence that a return of I.R. to Mexico would present a grave risk of physical or psychological harm.

  Respondent testified that she has bonded with I.R. and that separating them would seriously damage I.R. In addition, Respondent presented the testimony of Dr.
Leonard D. Goodstein, a consulting psychologist, that separation of I.R. from Respondent would present a grave risk of psychological harm to I.R.  The Court noted that several courts have held  that separation of a parent and child, although traumatic, is not itself sufficient to satisfy a grave risk exception. See, e.g.,  Charalambous v. Charalambous, 627 F.3d 462, 469-70 (1st Cir.2010);England v. England, 234 F.3d 268, 270-72 (5th Cir.2000) ;   Nunez-Escudero, 58 F.3d at 377. The Court agreed with these decisions. Separation from an abducting parent is a likely consequence in many Hague Convention cases. If the difficulty caused by such separation were deemed sufficient to satisfy the grave risk exception, the purposes of the Convention would be largely frustrated. Parents could carry their children across international borders to obtain an advantage in custody disputes and then defeat return under the Convention by virtue of the fact that return would be traumatic for the child. The Court could not conclude that such a  result was intended by the grave risk exception.

Respondent testified at the hearing that she would not return to Mexico because she did not want to subject herself to the abusive and manipulative actions of Petitioner. The Court asked Dr. Goodstein whether a return of I.R. to Mexico with Respondent would present a grave risk of psychological harm, and he was unable to say that it would. Respondent could choose to separate from her daughter and cause the trauma she claimed was substantial, or she could return to  Mexico and retain physical custody of I.R. (Petitioner testified that he did not seek to obtain physical custody of I.R.). The Court had difficulty concluding that an abducting parent could invoke  the grave risk exception simply by refusing to return to the country of habitual residence with the child. Respondent  failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that an order that I.R. be returned presented a grave risk of physical or psychological harm.

 It was evident during I.R.'s testimony at the hearing that she was bright, capable, and able to  express her views. I.R. stated unequivocally that she did not wish to return to Mexico. When  asked why she said: "I don't like seeing my mom sad and I don't want to be sad  because of that."  When asked leading questions as to 
whether her father frightened her and whether that was a reason she did not want to return to  Mexico, she said yes. When then asked again how she would feel about returning to Mexico, she said: "Really sad and frustrated because my mom would be really sad and I don't want to not be myself. I like being myself." I.R. also testified that she enjoyed her new school, is doing  well, and has many friends, but she did not give these as reasons when asked why she did not want to return to Mexico. The Court concluded that I.R. had not reached the age of maturity sufficient for the Court to rely upon her objection in its ruling.  Her primary reason for not wanting to return to Mexico-that it would make her  mother sad-appeared to be more a reflection of Respondent's feelings than I.R.'s.   It also appeared clear to the Court that I.R. had been influenced in her views by her mother and her mother's parents and other family members.  The Court concluded that Respondent had not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that I.R.'s views were sufficiently independent and based on sufficient age and maturity for the Court  to given them deference. The Petition for Return was granted.

San Martin v. Moquillaza, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2014 WL 3924646 (E.D.Tex.) [Peru] [Habitual Residence] [Petition granted]

In San Martin v. Moquillaza, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2014 WL 3924646 (E.D.Tex.) on July 7, 2014, Petitioner Ana Maria Veronika Mori San Martin filed an action seeking the  return of her nine-year-old and twelve-year-old daughters, both minors ("A.C.C.M.M. and A.A.M.M."), to Peru.   An attorney ad litem was appointed to interview the children, and be present during the in camera interview of the children with the Court.

         A.C.C.M.M. was born in Peru in 2002, when her mother, Petitioner, was 15
years-old and her father, Respondent, was 22 years-old.   In 2005, A.A.M.M. was
born in Peru.   Petitioner and Respondent are the biological parents of both
children.   Petitioner, Respondent, and the children lived in the same familial
home in Comos, Lima, Peru, until October of 2008, when Respondent left Peru and
moved to the United States for work.   He returned to Peru in March of 2009,  and
Petitioner and Respondent were married on April 8, 2009.   Respondent left Peru
again in May of 2009, and returned in December of 2009.   Over the next few  years,
this pattern continued with Respondent returning to Peru for approximately one month out of every year, and returning to the United States where he resided for the remaining eleven months.   Petitioner and Respondent separated, but continued to act as a married couple until 2012.  After their separation, the children continued living with Petitioner in the family home in Comos, Lima, Peru. The children attended school there, and lived close to their aunts and cousins.   When Respondent would visit Peru, he would stay with a cousin, but would visit with the children and they would stay with him
at times.   Until June of 2013, the children had never left Peru.    Petitioner
testified that when Respondent originally left Peru to go to the United States, the plan was to obtain legal resident status for himself, as well as for Petitioner and the children so that the  family could move to live in the United States.

In April of 2013, the parties entered into the Final and Complete Certificate of Conciliation that set forth their voluntary compromise and settlement agreement regarding custody of the children, visitation, alimony, and child support.   The agreement set out a monthly amount for spousal alimony and a monthly amount of support for the children.   The agreement also set out that the children are to reside in the home of their mother in Peru, allowed Respondent to visit the children in Peru as long as he did  not alter the schedule of studies, and provided that the children may visit the home of their father in the United States for two weeks in the mid-year school holidays and in the summer holidays, with Respondent bearing the travel expenses and costs for the visits.   Both parties signed and fingerprinted the agreement, and both agreed that the agreement was entered into voluntarily.

         On June 24, 2013, Petitioner signed an Authorization for Foreign Travel of Children form for both children, which allowed them to travel with Respondent from Peru to the United States beginning on June 25, 2013, and required Respondent to
return the children to Peru on July 10, 2013.   The children left Peru with
Respondent on June 27, 2013, and, as of the date of the bench trial, had not been returned to Peru.   The evidence revealed that Petitioner agreed to a limited extension of the children's visit to the United States, did not agree to the children's permanent removal from Peru, and that at the end of the requested extension Respondent refused to return the children. On February 12, 2014 petitioner submitted a request to the  Central Authority of Peru, and on March 3, 2014,  Petitioner's Request for Return of the Children was submitted to the United States Department of State through the Peruvian Central Authority.

The district court pointed out that although not defined in the Convention, a child's habitual residence is the place one would call his customary residence.   Friedrich v. Friedrich, 983 F.2d 1396, 1401 (6th Cir. 1993) (Friedrich I).   A person can have only one habitual residence .The Court must look back in time and not forward in determining a child's  habitual residence.  It was undisputed that the children were habitual residents of Peru before they left with their father in June of 2013. The Court found that the Peruvian Civil Code titled "Codigo de Los Ninos y Adolescentes" provides that when the parents are separated, "the custody of the children or adolescents is determined by mutual agreement between both parents, taking into consideration the child's and adolescent's opinion."   Codigo de Los Ninos y
Adolescentes, art. 81.   If there is no agreement,  " custody shall be resolved by the specialized judge, ordering the measures required to comply  with such order."  
 Petitioner and Respondent in this case entered into a Certificate of Conciliation, which provided that Petitioner has primary custody of the children, and grants Respondent visitation with the children in the United States.   It was  undisputed that Petitioner had  primary custody of the children, and was exercising her custody rights at the time the children were removed. Petitioner thus, satisfied her burden to show by a 
preponderance of the evidence that she had custody rights, and that the children
were removed from Peru in violation of those rights.  

  Respondent and his witnesses testified that Comos, a county in Lima, Peru, where the children and Petitioner resided was a beautiful, but dangerous place.
Respondent testified that when he was ten-years-old, his cousin was kidnapped and strangled near the school, which was five minutes away from the school where the
children are enrolled.   Respondent testified that the drivers in Comos are negligent, and that the children witnessed a car accident in which a small child was hit and killed by a car.   Respondent testified that there is a lot  of criminal activity, and that on many occasions cell phones and wallets are stolen from Petitioner and other family members.   Ms. Anglas testified that she feared for all children living in Comos.   Ms. Ramirez testified that children are not in danger in Comos, that they live in a suburb area where they have many friends and a police officer that lives nearby.   Ms. Ramirez agreed that some bad things have happened to her family members, but that they were many years ago.    Respondent also testified that returning the children to Peru would be a grave risk to the children because Petitioner often drank alcohol and left the children either unattended or with another adult so that she could go to parties. Respondent testified that the children have seen their mother intoxicated to the point where she could not stand up or take care of the children.   Respondent  also testified that on one occasion Petitioner left A.C.C.M.M. alone in the home while she attended a party.   Petitioner agreed that she had left A.C.C.M.M. in the home while she attended a party, but stated that another adult, Mr. Diaz, stayed overnight with her, and A.C.C.M.M.'s grandmother arrived in the morning to pick her up.   Mr. Diaz agreed that he stayed overnight with A.C.C.M.M. on that occasion, and that he has seen Petitioner consume alcohol at parties.   Respondent also testified that Petitioner hit one of the children with a belt on one occasion.   Petitioner testified that she has never hit the children with a belt or spanked the children.  The court found that this  testimony by Respondent was
simply not enough to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the children would be in  grave risk of physical or psychological harm if returned to Peru, or
that Peru cannot provide adequate protection to the children.

           At the close of the parties' cases, the Court questioned both children separately in camera.   The attorney ad litem was present for this questioning and given the opportunity to question her client.  The Court found that it was not appropriate to take into account A.A.M.M. or A.C.C.M.M.'s view.   During the in camera interview, due to the young age, immaturity, and timidity of A.A.M.M., the Court did not reach the question of whether she would prefer to live in the United States or Peru.   A.C.C.M.M., twelve-years-old, testified that when she came to the United States with her father, she thought it was a vacation, but that she was thinking about staying in the United States.   Of concern to the Court was that when  asked where she would like to live, A.C.C.M.M. stated that she wanted to live with her father and her mother in the United States as one family in one house. A.C.C.M.M. did not appear to grasp that her mother lived in Peru, and, at least for the present time, was not coming to the United States.  It was  not clear that she understood the purpose of the proceedings, and that gravity of her choice to live in the United States.   A.C.C.M.M.'s stated reason for wanting to live in the United States was because she liked the school here better, and it was not as dangerous as it was in Peru.   The Court found that A.C.C.M.M. was confused by the circumstances producing the litigation, and did not understand the choice she was being asked to make. The Court found that neither of the children understood the proceedings and their right to state their preferences, and did not unequivocally express a desire to remain in the United States for any reason other than generalized affinity for this  country after having lived here for the last year.   Thus, the Court found that Respondent failed to meet his burden to establish that one or more of the affirmative defenses apply to prevent the return of the children in this case.

Matter of SLC, 2014 WL 2801053 (M.D.Fla.) [Mexico] [Habitual Residence] [Petition granted]

In Matter of SLC, 2014 WL 2801053 (M.D.Fla.) petitioner Mario Alberto Lopez Morales's filed a Petition against Respondent Nency Castellanos Martinez for Return of Child to the Republic of Mexico on February 14, 2014. The District Court granted the petition.

The parties were married in Mexico on September 6, 2003. Petitioner was a citizen of Mexico and respondent was a citizen of Cuba and Mexico. Their daughter, S.L.C., was born in 2002 and was a citizen of Mexico.  In June 2006, respondent removed S.L.C. from Mexico and brought her to Florida to live with respondent's family due to marital troubles. Petitioner was able to convince  respondent to return to their marital home in Mexico. Respondent and S.L.C. resided with petitioner in Mexico until April 2012, at which time they again returned to Florida without petitioner's knowledge or consent. Petitioner learned that respondent and S.L.C. were located in Florida, and on May, 16, 2012, petitioner filed a Hague  application with the Mexican Central Authority. Petitioner also filed a civil action seeking provisional care and custody over the child in Mexico. In August 2012, petitioner visited his wife and daughter in Florida, and on August 30, 2012, respondent and S.L.C. voluntarily returned to Mexico. As a result, petitioner halted the proceedings under the Hague Convention in Mexico.  Prior to leaving the United States, Castellanos, on behalf of herself and S.L.C., applied for asylum as a Cuban immigrant. Lopez, however, was unaware of the application for asylum.  Upon their return to Mexico, petitioner and respondent did not live together as a family but were separated. Petitioner rented an apartment for respondent and S.L.C., and arranged for S.L.C. to return to the private school she had attended since prekindergarten. Petitioner paid  for their apartment, automobile, food, school, and living expenses. He also deposited money into an account that could only be accessed by respondent.

         On September 12, 2012, respondent filed a criminal complaint against petitioner for  aggravated family violence. On the same day, Castellanos entered the formal marital residence  with the purpose of residing there and took steps to prevent petitioner from entering the  premises. Lopez thereafter resided in an apartment. Petitioner testified that he would take S.L.C. to school in the mornings and would take her to dinner and do homework with her two to three times a week. On weekends, petitioner would spend time with his daughter and take her to visit family and friends. This continued until January 2013. Petitioner was able to contact S.L.C. directly on the cell phone that he had  provided to her. On February 1, 2013, respondent filed a child custody case in Mexico, to which petitioner filed a countersuit seeking guardianship and custody of the child, as well as an order prohibiting the mother from removing the child from Mexico. On February 26, 2013, the court entered an  order prohibiting respondent from leaving the country with S.L.C. during the proceedings.  Prior to the entry of the order, respondent decided to return to Florida. Respondent testified that she entered the United States with S.L.C. on February 24, 2013, without petitioner's knowledge or consent. 
   
Petitioner discovered the absence of S.L.C. on March 1, 2013, when the child's teacher  advised petitioner that S.L.C. had not attended classes since February 22, 2013. Respondent did not inform petitioner as to S.L.C.'s whereabouts or provide him with any contact information. Petitioner was eventually able to locate S .L.C. with the assistance of federal and local law enforcement agencies.

The evidence showed that S.L.C. was born and raised in Chiapas, Mexico, 
attended school in Mexico, and was a citizen of Mexico. Although S.L.C. lived in Florida for a short period in 2012, without the consent of petitioner, and had now spent  more than a year in the United States, the Court found that her habitual residence had not  changed due to the unilateral actions of respondent. According to the Eleventh Circuit, "in the absence of settled parental intent, courts should be slow to infer from such contacts [with the new residence] that an earlier habitual residence has  been abandoned." Ruiz, 392 F.3d at 1253. Respondent has failed to present any evidence indicating that petitioner and respondent intended to abandon their home in Mexico in favor of moving to Florida. The relatively limited period of time S.L.C. spent in Florida in 2012 was without the consent of petitioner, and therefore violated the Hague Convention. The Court found that the habitual residence of S.L.C. at all relevant times was Mexico. The evidence showed that respondent removed the child from her habitual residence in Mexico without petitioner's consent and retained her in the United States without petitioner's permission. The Court found that there was a "removal" and "retention" of S.L.C. within the meaning of the Hague Convention from at least February 24, 2013, forward. The evidence  established that petitioner and respondent had not agreed to the  terms of exertion of parental authority/responsibility over S.L.C. and that custody proceedings remained pending in Mexico. Thus, the Court found that the rights  and obligations provided by the doctrine of patria potestas created a "right of custody" and  concluded that the rights and obligations of petitioner had not been severed. Additionally, the Hague Convention specifically provides that "rights of custody" include "the right to determine the child's place of residence." Hague Convention art. 5. One parent may not  unilaterally determine the country in which the child will live; this means that "the habitual residence of the child cannot be shifted without mutual agreement."   The Court concluded that the evidence established that respondent's removal and retention of the child was wrongful under the Hague Convention. Respondent's unilateral removal and retention of S.L.C., without the consent of petitioner, violated petitioner's custody rights under the law of Mexico. Petitioner established he was exercising his rights of custody at the time the child was wrongfully removed and retained. Petitioner took steps to remain in contact with S.L.C., such as taking her to school, spending time with her on the weekends, and providing her with a cell phone and iPad. Petitioner testified that he paid for S.L.C. to attend a private school as well as numerous other expenses. 

          The district court noted that a court is not bound to order the return of a child if respondent demonstrates by a  preponderance of the evidence that "the child objects to being returned and has attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of its views." Hague Convention, art. 13; 42 U.S.C. 11603(e)(2)(A). Respondent testified that S.L.C. informed her that she did not want to go back to Mexico and was really happy here. Respondent further testified that S.L.C. was very intelligent and cannot  be manipulated because she knows what she wants. Despite the child's objection, the Court concluded that, under the circumstances of this case, S.L.C.'s opinion on returning to Mexico was not conclusive. S.L.C. was only 12 years old and had been under the exclusive custody of respondent for an extended period of time. Naturally, she preferred to remain here in the United States with her mother instead of moving back to Mexico. The Court found that the return of S.L.C. to Mexico furthered the aims of the Hague Convention, and therefore would exercise its discretion to order her return despite her view.

White v. White, 556 Fed. Appx. 10 (2d Cir., 2014) [Fed & State Judicial Remedies] [Petition Denied]

In  White v. White, 556 Fed. Appx. 10 (2d Cir., 2014) the father brought an action against his former wife, pursuant to Hague Convention, for the return of his son from New Jersey. The United States District Court, 2013 WL 1340145, adopted the report
and recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge,  2012 WL 3041660, and
dismissed action as barred by Rooker-Feldman doctrine, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel and for failure to state a claim. The Second Circuit affirmed for substantially the same reasons stated by the district court and by the magistrate judge, whose report and recommendation was adopted by the district court.   This action was in essence a protracted custody dispute on appeal from a state court judgment granting custody of Appellant's son to his ex-wife in New Jersey.   It rejected the father’s argument that the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction and its implementing statute, the International Child Abduction Remedies Act, required the return of his son to his custody in New York and repayment of monies that Appellant has paid to Appellee since 2005. It pointed out that the Hague Convention"does not establish substantive standards for resolving the merits of any underlying custody dispute."   Mota v. Castillo, 692 F.3d 108, 112 (2d Cir.2012) (citing Hague Convention, art. 19).  Rather, the Convention's focus is simply upon whether a child should be returned to her country of habitual residence for custody proceedings.  The German Court's determination of "habitual residence," therefore, did not bear upon the New York state court custody proceedings.   The conduct of such proceedings in New York is entirely consistent with the German Court's order.   Thus, procedural bars aside (all of which the district court correctly found applicable), Appellant's complaint failed to state a claim, and amendment would have been futile.

  

Vilchis v. Hall, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2014 WL 2978378 (N.D.Ill.)[Mexico] [Habitual Residence] [Petition Denied]

In Vilchis v. Hall, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2014 WL 2978378 (N.D.Ill.) Petitioner Carmen Marlyn Solano Vilchis and Respondent Anthoney Wayne Hall were
the parents of two daughters ages five and seven. Solano was born in Mexico and was a citizen of Mexico.   In 1999, when  she was thirteen years old, Solano moved to the United States with her family and settled in Illinois. She resided in the  United States as an undocumented immigrant. Hall was born in Illinois, and was a United States citizen. Solano gave birth to their first daughter in May 2007 and their second daughter in November 2008.  The children were United States citizens.  The couple lived together sporadically in the Chicago area until October 2010.  In October 2010, Solano told Hall that she and her family had to leave Illinois immediately, within a day or two, due to threats made against Solano's sister by the sister's husband, a man named Juan Hacha. The court expressly found that Solano would not have wanted to leave Illinois but for that threat.   Hall did not want to leave Illinois and did not want the children to leave Illinois.  Hall decided to leave Illinois with Solano so that he could remain with their children.  At first, Solano told Hall they were going  to California.    At some point during the trip, which the entire  group took in Hall's truck and two other vehicles, Solano and her family told Hall that they in fact were going to Mexico.  Hall persuasively testified that he never wanted to move himself and the children to Mexico.   At the time he agreed to leave Illinois, Hall did not intend for the children to establish residence in Mexico. Solano, her family, Hall, and the children arrived in Mexico in mid-October 2010.  They spent about two weeks in northern Baja California and  then went to Mexico City.  In late November 2010, Hall went to the United States Embassy in Mexico City to ask for help in getting the children back to the United States. After a brief stay in Mexico City, Solano and the children moved to the Tijuana area, directly across the border from the United States. Hall returned to Illinois in December 2010 and stayed there for several weeks.  

In February 2011, Hall returned to the San  Diego area, directly across the border from Mexico. During the next several months, Hall looked for work in the United States and crossed the border every day to see Solano and the children.  During that time, Solano wanted to cross the border from Mexico to the United States to live in the United States.   Hall visited  lawyers in an effort to help Solano achieve that goal legally, but those efforts were unsuccessful. Solano testified she attempted to change her immigration status so that she could try to return to the United States.     During Summer 2011, with Solano's consent and financial support, Hall took the children for a trip to the Chicago area.  all returned with the children to California, and then brought the children to Mexico to see Solano.  Solano told Hill  that Hacha, her sister's husband, was back in the picture and in the area, which greatly concerned Hill given his belief that Hacha was dangerous and possibly in a gang or cartel. From mid-September 2011 through mid-October 2011, Hill and the children stayed at the Dreams for Change Safe Parking Program, a parking lot in the San Diego area with amenities where homeless persons may spend the night in their cars. From mid-October 2011 through late December 2011, Hill stayed at the YMCA Cortez Hill shelter with the children.  During that time, Hill brought the children to Tijuana to see Solano on some weekends;  the visits to Mexico became more frequent when Hill heard that Solano's sister and Hacha were not around.  Also during that time, the  children were enrolled in Wee Care, a daycare center in Chula Vista, a town between San Diego and the  Mexican border;  they also received medical care through CalWorks, a state medical program in California, and other benefits through the California Women Infants and Children program.  On September 9, 2011, Solano sent an email to Hall stating, in part:  "I want the kids to go to school in California defenetely [sic] not in Mexico not at all."   In October 2011, Hall sent Solano an email stating:  "I will bring them to visit you, i' can't really say when because we are in a program.   We found  a school the girls liked and they start soon [so] they need the[ir] blankets and pillows.   And shoes we go to the park for hours the[ir] shoes wear out  fast." This email  provided confirmation that the children largely stayed with Hall in Fall 2011 and attended school in the United States. Hall brought the children to Mexico for Christmas break in December 2011.  The girls traveled back and forth from the United States to Mexico,  spending nights in both places, from January 2010 through May 2012. In April 2012, Hall signed a month-to-month rental agreement for an apartment in Chula  Vista;  the agreement listed the occupants as Hall and the children.  Each child  had a bed and toys in the apartment. In May 2012, the children began attending Miss Evelyn's Daycare in Chula Vista, and the older child soon began to attend kindergarten at Julian Rice Elementary School in Chula Vista.    From that point through July  2012, the children regularly spent the night with Hall on the United States side of the border.  Hall's mother, father, and sister testified at the hearing that they visited Hall during Summer 2012 for about two weeks and that the children stayed with Hall every night. Solano testified at the hearing that she "release[d] the kids back to" Hall in "around June 2012."    Solano testified that she did this  because Hall told her that he had "a good job" and "an apartment," and she further testified that she and Hall came "to an agreement where the kids will go to school so that they continue to learn their English and keep their language." 

In July 2012, Hall enrolled the children in Medi-Care Managed Care, a state
healthcare program operated by California.   Hall was unable to pay the rent at the Chula Vista apartment and was evicted by order of a California court in early August 2012. Shortly thereafter, Hall started making plans to return with the children
to Illinois, where Hall had a substantial support network of family.   Hall informed Solano, who said that "she was okay with it" and that she just wanted to see the children before they left.   Hall believed at the time that Solano would attempt to cross into the United States, legally or illegally, and meet up with Hall and the children in Illinois.    Hall and the children left the San Diego -Tijuana area in late August 2012
and  lived in Waukegan, Illinois, ever since.  

The district court noted that unlike the situation in most Hague Convention cases, the children moved fluidly and regularly (at times daily) between  United States and Mexico, with the consent of both parents.   This made it difficult to determine whether Hall removed the children from  Mexico or retained them in the United States when he took them from the San Diego -Tijuana area to Illinois.   In addition the parties' briefs recognized no distinction between the habitual residence analysis in retention versus removal cases. The court held that the parties  therefore waived any argument that this case involved retention as opposed to removal (or vice versa) or that the habitual residence analysis differed in any material respect between those two scenarios. The district court noted that the parties agreed that Solano could prevail only if she showed that Mexico was the children's  habitual residence in late August 2012, when the alleged wrongful removal/retention occurred.   "The determination of 'habitual residence' is to be made on the basis of the everyday meaning of these words rather than the legal meaning that a particular jurisdiction attaches to them ...."   Kijowska, 463 F.3d at 586.    "The determination of habitual residence under the Hague Convention is a practical, flexible, factual  inquiry that accounts for all available relevant evidence and considers the individual circumstances of each case."   Redmond, 724 F.3d at 732. "Determining a child's habitual residence ... requires an assessment of the observable facts on the ground, not an inquiry into the child's or the parent's legal status in a particular place."  The district court pointed out that the Seventh Circuit had loosely adopted the framework set forth in  Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2001), for determining habitual residence. "In the case of  young children, the [Mozes] court found it most prudent to focus on the intent of the parents rather than the intent of the child in determining the child's habitual residence."   Koch, 450 F.3d at 713.   The district court must "determine  whether the parents intended to abandon their previous habitual residence, judging that intent at the last time the parents had a shared intent."    As  the Seventh Circuit made clear, the district court also must consider, in addition to the  parents' last shared intent, "the child's acclimatization" to one country or another.   Redmond, 724 F.3d at 746.

        It was undisputed that until Solano, Hall, and the children left Illinois in  October 2010, the children's habitual residence was the United States.   The question was wether their habitual residence changed to Mexico at any point between October 2010 and late August 2012.   The court held that answer to that question was "no".  Hall never intended that his children would reside indefinitely in Mexico.  Hall allowed the children to leave Illinois in October 2010, and he agreed during the trip to the West Coast that the children would go to Mexico.   But the circumstances of the group's departure from Illinois were extenuating, prompted by threats from Hacha that were sufficiently dire and  credible to compel the family to pick up and leave Illinois on such short notice.   It was always Hall's intention that the children would return with him to the United States, albeit in southern California rather than Illinois, so that the children (and possibly Hall) could remain close to Solano, who could not legally cross the border into the United States.  These conclusions were proven by, among other things, the fact that Hall asked the United States Embassy in Mexico City in November 2010, shortly after the group's arrival in Mexico, for help in getting the children back to the United States;  Hall's extraordinary efforts to have the children live with him in California, even if it meant living in a parking lot for homeless families or a YMCA  shelter;  Hall's seeking legal assistance in an effort to obtain legal status for Solano in the United States;  and Hall's enrolling the children in daycare, school, and the state medical assistance  program in California.  This showed that Hall never intended for the children to relocate indefinitely from the United States to Mexico.   This was significant because precedent required the court "to determine whether the parents intended to abandon their previous habitual residence, judging that intent at the last time the parents had a shared intent."   Koch, 450 F.3d at 709.   Thus, even if Solano had intended for the children to reside indefinitely in Mexico, that intent was not shared with Hall, which meant that their last shared  intent was for the children to reside indefinitely in the United States, which in turn favored the  conclusion that their habitual residence was the United States.  

The evidence showed that Solano herself did not intend for the children to reside indefinitely in Mexico.   This was proven by, among other things, Solano's testimony that she has made efforts to obtain legal immigration status in the United States in order to return there;  Solano's September 2011 email to Hall stating, "I want the kids to go to school in California defenetely [sic] not in Mexico not at all";  Solano's admission that she "release[d] the kids back to" Hall in "around June 2012" upon learning that he had "a good job" and "an apartment";  her further admission that she and Hall came "to an agreement where the kids will go to school so that they continue to learn their English and keep their language";  and Solano's deposition testimony that she did not want the children to go to  school in Mexico and that she preferred that they attend school in California "to keep their English."   Solano's efforts to obtain legal status in the United States reflected a desire to return to the United States to be with the children and possibly Hall.  Solano's strong desire for the children to attend school in the United States and not Mexico, and for the  children to keep their English skills, reflected an intent that her children make the United States their home;  if she wanted the children to live in and become acclimated to Mexico then it would have been important for them to attend school in Mexico.  The fact that Solano agreed to "release" the children to Hall once she was assured that Hall had a job and an apartment showed that her intent was not that the children reside indefinitely in Mexico, but that the children stay in Mexico until Hall had an acceptable place for them to live in the  United States.

         Because  "the parents' last shared intent" is not "a kind of fixed doctrinal test for 
determining a child's habitual residence," Redmond, 724 F.3d at 732, the court  also 
considered the children's "acclimatization" to the United States and Mexico, respectively. The children moved fluidly  across the border and spent nights with Solano in Mexico and Hall in the United States, so their actual location during the relevant time frame was a wash.   Most significant in terms of acclimatization was that the children were enrolled in daycare and school and received healthcare services in the United States. It could not be said that the children acclimated to Mexico while attending daycare and school in the United States, even granting that Solano's family resided largely if not exclusively in Mexico. Solano's acknowledged goal of obtaining legal status in the United States reflected her desire to come back to the United States and thus her  understanding that the children would remain acclimated in and make their home there.

    The Court found that Solano did not prove that the children's habitual residence in late August 2012 was Mexico, and therefore she did not prove that Hall's removal of the children from Mexico or retention of the children in the United States was wrongful within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention.   Given this conclusion, there was no need to determine whether Solano consented to the retention or removal within the meaning of Article 13(a).  

Bobadilla v Cordero, 2014 WL 3869998 (M.D.N.C.) [Mexico] [Now Settled] [Discretion to Order Return] [Petition granted]

In Bobadilla v Cordero, 2014 WL 3869998 (M.D.N.C.)   Ms. Ramos and Mr. Cordero were citizens of Mexico. They never married. Their child, B.F.S.R.,  was born in Cabarrus County, North Carolina, in 2006, and was a citizen of both Mexico and the United States. Neither Ms. Ramos nor Mr. Cordero had legal immigration status in the United  States.   In December 2009, Ms. Ramos and B.F.S.R. moved to Zacatecas, Mexico, where the parties had planned to build a small house on Mr. Cordero's parents' land. Mr. Cordero paid for the airplane tickets. The parties agreed that Mr. Cordero would join Ms. Ramos and the child after he earned more money in North Carolina to fund the construction. Ms. Ramos and the child lived with Mr. Cordero's family, and Ms.Ramos oversaw the construction of the parties' new home, the exterior of which was completed in March or April of 2010. Ms.Ramos and B.F.S.R. travelled to Tijuana to stay with her family. At some point while Ms. Ramos was in Tijuana, the parties ended their romantic relationship because of Mr. Cordero's refusal  to come to Mexico. In August 2010, the parties agreed that B.F.S.R. would travel to North Carolina to stay with Mr. Cordero for a visit. Before B.F.S.R. left Mexico, Mr. Cordero signed a notarized statement agreeing to return B.F.S.R. to Ms. Ramos in Tijuana on January 14, 2011,  and provided the statement to Ms. Ramos. Mr. Cordero paid for B.F.S.R.'s travel expenses.   Mr. Cordero did not return B.F.S.R., despite Ms. Ramos's requests and demands. Since then, B.F.S.R. has lived with Mr. Cordero, Mr. Cordero's brother, and Mr. Cordero's sister, her husband, and her daughter. He attends school in Concord, North Carolina, he plays soccer, and he sees friends and Mr. Cordero's family regularly. Mr. Cordero has allowed only intermittent telephone and internet-video contact between the child and Ms.  Ramos. In September 2011, Ms. Ramos attempted to cross over the United States border using a false passport and was arrested and deported.

In March 2012, Mr. Cordero filed a custody petition in North Carolina district court. That same month, Ms. Ramos filed a Hague application to the Mexican authorities, for which the custody suit was stayed. Petitioner Rosa Ramos Bobadilla sought the return of her minor child, B.F.S.R., to Mexico. Ms. Ramos, who was not employed, searched for an attorney to assist her, eventually obtaining representation pro bono from Legal Aid of North Carolina. She filed this petition on March 11, 2014.
The Court held an evidentiary hearing  at which Mr. Cordero appeared in  person and Ms. Ramos appeared by video feed.  The Court found that B.F.S.R. was habitually residing in Mexico as of January 14, 2011, as the  shared intent of the parents was to settle in Zacatecas. The parties agreed that they would move to Zacatecas and build a house on Mr. Cordero's parents' land. Mr. Cordero purchased one-way tickets for Ms. Ramos and the child. Ms. Ramos and the child traveled to Mr. Cordero's parents' home, and they began building the house, for which Mr. Cordero sent money. Even Mr. Cordero testified that he intended to join Ms. Ramos and the child in Zacatecas. They had no specific plans to return to the United States; indeed, return would have been difficult since neither parent could do so legally. Because Mexico was the habitual residence of the child and the other elements of a prima facie case were 
established without dispute, the Court concluded that Mr. Cordero wrongfully retained B.F.S.R. 
within the meaning of the Hague Convention.

         Mr. Cordero asserted the "well-settled" affirmative defense. Ms. Ramos did not dispute that she failed to file her Hague petition within one year of the removal, but she contended  that B.F.S.R. was not well-settled in North Carolina. The district court concluded that a preponderance of the evidence did not show that B.F.S.R. was well-settled and that application of this narrow defense was not warranted. Mr. Cordero testified at the hearing in Spanish through an interpreter and the child's report cards from school were sent home in Spanish, establishing that B.F.S.R. lives in a Spanish-speaking household and community. Mr. Cordero also testified that the child's English gets better every day, making it clear that Spanish was his primary language. This indicated both that the child had not completely acclimated to a culture in which English is the predominant language and that a return to Mexico would not cause language problems common in many cases where the "well-settled" defense is applied. The child's life in North Carolina was not so different from his life in Mexico 
that it would be "worse to order the child to be uprooted."     Belay v. Getachew, 272 
F.Supp.2d 553, 562 (D.Md.2003). Moreover, there were significant aspects of the child's life in North Carolina that were not stable.  The child had required therapy in North Carolina to deal with sadness over his parents' separation. Despite this, Mr. Cordero had not allowed the child to have contact with his  maternal grandparents and uncle in Cabarrus County and had not allowed the child to have  regular telephone or video-internet contact with his mother. This interference with family relationships is inherently disruptive and was particularly disruptive here. See  Lozano, ---U.S. at ----, 134 S.Ct. at 1236 (noting with approval that "American courts have found as a factual matter that steps taken to promote concealment can also prevent the stable attachments that make a child 'settled' " and citing cases.) This compared negatively to B.F.S.R.'s situation when he resided in Mexico, where he maintained relationships with both parents' families in that country. Finally, Mr. Cordero's immigration status made B.F.S.R.'s living situation tenuous, as his primary caretaker could be arrested and deported to Mexico at any time. See  In re R. V.B., --- F.Supp.2d ----, 2014 WL 3058250 at *12 (E.D.N.Y.July 7, 2014) (noting that "the immigration status of [the abducting parent] is a factor that disfavors finding the Child is settled"). Weighing all of these considerations, the Court found that Mr. Cordero had not established the  "well-settled" defense by a preponderance of the evidence.

          The district court observed that a Federal court retains the discretion to return a child, despite the existence of a defense, if return would further the aims of the Convention. (See  Miller, 240 F.3d at 402; England v. England, 234 F.3d 268, 270–71 (5th Cir.2000); Friedrich II, 78 F.3d at 1067 (citing Feder, 63 F.3d at 226) (citing Pub. Notice 957, 51 Fed.Reg. 10494, 10509 (1986)); Antunez-Fernandes v. Connors-Fernandes, 259 F. Supp. 2d 800, 812 (N.D. Iowa 2003) , the Court  found that equitable justifications warranted the Court's exercise of its discretion even if  B.F.S.R. was well-settled. Ms. Ramos was unable to legally come to the United States for a custody hearing, whereas there were no legal impediments to Mr. Cordero's return to Mexico, where he was a citizen, for participation in a custody hearing there. Mr. Cordero also limited or even prevented opportunities for Ms. Ramos and her family to maintain a relationship with B.F.S.R. after the wrongful abduction. Antunez-Fernandes v. Connors-Fernandes, 259 F.Supp.2d 800, 815 (N.D.Iowa 2003) (considering abducting parent's attempts to sever meaningful relationship with petitioner in exercising discretion to return child).   Ms. Ramos had convincingly shown that her delay in filing the petition should not weigh against her as the Court balances the equities. Ms. Ramos initiated efforts to retrieve B.F.S.R. soon after he was  wrongfully retained and even attempted to illegally re-enter the country so she could see her son. Moreover, Mr. Cordero was financially supporting Ms. Ramos up until their breakup, Ms. Ramos was indigent, and she diligently pursued pro bono representation. Mr. Cordero abducted B.F.S.R. with knowledge that Ms. Ramos did not have the legal or financial means to  enforce her rights. See, e.g .,  Belay 272 F.Supp.2d at 561;cf.  Lozano, — U.S. at ----, 134 S.Ct. at 1236-1240 (Alito, J., concurring) (approving consideration of concealment in exercise of equitable discretion.)

Murphy v Sloan, --- F.3d ----, 2014 WL 4179961 (C.A.9 (Cal.))[Ireland] [Habitual Residence] [Petition Denied]

In Murphy v Sloan, --- F.3d ----, 2014 WL 4179961 (C.A.9 (Cal.))   Sloan, a citizen of the United States, and Murphy, a citizen of Ireland, were married in California in 2000. They lived together in Mill Valley, in California, and had a daughter, E.S., in 2005. In October 2009, Sloan told Murphy that he felt their marriage was at an end, and moved to a different bedroom in their house. In January 2010, Murphy and Sloan enrolled E.S. in a private California preschool for the next fall. These plans changed in the spring of 2010, after Murphy proposed moving to Ireland so that she could get a master's degree in fine arts from University College Cork and so that E.S. "could experience going to school" there. Murphy and Sloan discussed the move to Ireland as a "trial period," and Sloan wrote to both the private preschool and the public school district to inform them of E.S.'s move and the temporary nature of the plan. ("This was very last minute, but we decided to try living in Ireland for a year[.]").

  In early 2010, Sloan had purchased a second home in Mill Valley so that E.S.
could live easily with both parents. Sloan and Murphy agreed to store Murphy's belongings there during Murphy's time in Ireland, and to rent, rather than sell, this home during her absence so that she would have a place to live when she returned. Murphy moved with E.S. to Ireland in August, and Sloan paid the rent on that home as well. Sloan filed for divorce in October 2010, and served Murphy shortly thereafter.   Over the next three years, E.S. attended school in Ireland, but returned to the United States each February, April, summer, Halloween and Thanksgiving to spend time with her father and his extended family. Sloan visited Ireland each December to spend Christmas with E.S. and Murphy. Throughout E.S.'s time in Ireland, she continued to receive her medical and dental care in California rather than in Ireland.    In April 2013, without Sloan's knowledge or consent, Murphy took E.S. out of school before the term had ended to visit her boyfriend in the Maldives.  She did not respond to Sloan's inquiries for five days. On May 1, Sloan wrote to Murphy asking when E.S. would return to Ireland to resume school, and stated, "If you do not tell me when you are going to get back to Ireland, I am going to start looking into getting her into school here in California for the remainder of the year, and I will come pick her up if I have to."  Sloan wrote to Murphy twice the following day, still attempting to find out when she planned to return to Ireland and sending her links to furnished rental units near E.S.'s school. Murphy's only response was to ask Sloan to review the draft of a paper she had written for graduate school. She did not return with E.S. to Ireland until May 7, 2013, by which time E.S. had missed nineteen days of school.

  Sloan arrived in Ireland on June 12, 2013, planning to celebrate E.S.'s birthday on June 13, depart on June 16, and return to Ireland on June 26 to bring E.S. back to California for the summer. On the day of Sloan's arrival, Murphy informed him that her landlord had terminated her lease, and that she was planning to leave again for Asia with E.S.   Sloan, concerned about E.S.'s absences from school, objected strenuously and begged Murphy to allow E.S. to finish her last two weeks of school in Ireland, offering to pay for a hotel. When Murphy refused to consider this option, and because Sloan's work commitments prevented him from remaining in Ireland until E.S.'s semester was complete two weeks later, Sloan took E.S. with him to the United States when he left Ireland on June 16. Murphy did not object, and told Sloan she was applying to graduate programs in England and the United States. The next day, Murphy flew to the Maldives, and spent much of the summer there and in Sri Lanka with her boyfriend.

    On June 21, 2013, Sloan told Murphy that he did not intend to return E.S. to Ireland, to which Murphy responded that if E.S. was going to live in the United States, Murphy would move next to him in Mill Valley. Murphy took no action to compel E.S.'s return to Ireland for nearly three months, until September 2013, when she filed the petition for return.   E.S. began third grade in Mill Valley in August 2013. In October 2013, the Marin County Superior Court entered a judgment dissolving the marriage, but left pending the state court action for purposes of issuing further orders regarding child custody, child support and spousal support.

    Murphy brought suit under the Hague Convention to compel E.S.'s return to Ireland, contending that Ireland was E.S.'s "habitual residence." The district court denied Murphy's petition. It determined with a "high degree of conviction" that "Murphy and Sloan never had the shared, settled intent to shift E.S.'s habitual residence from the United States to Ireland," and found that the spring of 2010 was the last time that Sloan and Murphy had a shared, settled intent, which was that E.S. reside in California. The court concluded that "E.S. was, at the time of the alleged wrongful retention, and now remains, a habitual resident of the United States."

The Ninth Circuit affirmed. It  observed that "  To determine a child's habitual residence, we "look for the last shared, settled intent of the parents." Valenzuela v. Michel, 736 F.3d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir.2013). Where a child has a "well-established habitual residence, simple consent to [her] presence in another forum is not usually enough to shift" the habitual residence to the new forum.  Mozes, 239 F.3d at 1081."Rather, the agreement between the parents and the circumstances surrounding it must enable the court to infer a shared intent to abandon the previous habitual residence, such as when there is effective agreement on a stay of indefinite duration."  The parents' intent is not the only factor to consider. As  explained in Mozes, the question is "whether we can say with confidence that the child's relative attachments to the two countries have changed to the point where requiring return to the original forum would now be tantamount to taking the child out of the family and social life in which its life has developed."

The Court declined to accept Murphy’s argument that the Court should adopt a habitual residence standard that would focus on the subjective experiences of the child. It noted that  nearly every circuit has adopted its view of the proper standard for habitual residence, which takes into account the shared, settled intent of the parents and then asks whether there has been sufficient acclimatization of the child to trump this intent. (citing Darin v.  Olivero-Huffman, 746 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir.2014);  Gitter v. Gitter, 396 F.3d 124, 134 (2d Cir.2005);  Karkkainen v. Kovalchuk, 445 F.3d 280, 292 (3d Cir.2006); Maxwell v. Maxwell, 588 F.3d 245, 253-54 (4th Cir.2009);  Larbie v. Larbie, 690 F.3d 295, 310-11 (5th Cir.2012);  Koch v. Koch, 450 F.3d 703, 717-18 (7th Cir.2006);  Ruiz v. Tenorio, 392 F.3d 1247, 1252-54 (11th Cir.2004) (per curiam).  But see  Robert v. Tesson, 507 F.3d 981, 991 (6th Cir.2007) (focusing "solely on the past experiences of the child, not the intentions of the parents").

    Murphy argued that in foreign courts, parental intent is "only one of the factors that may be relevant" to the habitual residence inquiry. She pointed to decisions of courts other countries which placed a greater emphasis on a child's surroundings or "actual centre of interests" in determining habitual residence. The Court held that in this  regard, its decision in Mozes, by which it was bound, was not inconsistent with recent decisions of international courts. It was not persuaded that there had been a worldwide sea change since Mozes, let alone a new worldwide consensus, that would warrant a suggestion to reconsider its decision.

The Ninth Circuit found that it was undisputed that before she left for Ireland, E.S.'s habitual residence was the United States. In concluding that "the parties never had a 'shared settled intent' that E.S.'s habitual residence would be Ireland," and that "E.S. never abandoned her habitual residence in the United States," the district court made a number of factual findings. These included the finding that the last "shared, settled intent regarding E.S.'s habitual residence" was in the spring of 2010 (United States); that "Murphy's move to Ireland with E.S. was intended as a 'trial period,' and that E.S. never abandoned her habitual residence in the United States"; that E.S. retained strong ties to community and family in California and elsewhere in the United States; that Murphy had no fixed residence in Ireland as of the date of the wrongful retention; that many of Murphy's and E.S.'s possessions remained in California; and that E.S. was continuing to spend part of the year in California with Sloan. The district court further noted that E.S. retained both U.S. and Irish citizenship; that Murphy had a California driver's license, but not an Irish one; and that Murphy had no permanent home or longer-term lease or means of support in Ireland, and no longer had any attachment to Ireland in terms of work or schooling after she completed her master's degree in October 2013.

  The Court noted that in cases in which parents "have shared a settled mutual intent that [a] stay [abroad] last indefinitely,""we can reasonably infer a mutual abandonment of the child's prior habitual residence." Mozes, 239 F.3d at 1077. But this was not such a case. This case fell in the alternative category identified in Mozes: one in which the "circumstances are such that, even though the exact length of the [child's] stay was left open to negotiation, the court is able to find no settled mutual intent from which abandonment can be inferred." There was never any discussion, let alone agreement, that the stay abroad would be indefinite. As the district court expressly found, the move to Ireland was "intended as a 'trial period,' " not as a permanent relocation. The facts did not evince a shared, settled intent to abandon the United States as E.S.'s residence. Instead, they pointed  to the opposite conclusion. Sloan never intended that the stay in Ireland be anything but a "trial period." Murphy, moreover, did not have a settled intent to remain in Ireland, either alone or with E.S., as in the last two years she had applied or had considered applying to graduate schools outside of Ireland, including in the United States, and had not enrolled E.S. in school in Ireland for the fall of 2013. When Sloan took E.S. back to California and told Murphy that E.S. would be enrolling in school in Mill Valley, Murphy did not object, and instead stated "th[at] she was applying to graduate programs."Murphy told Sloan on June 21, 2013 that if E.S. was moving back to the United States, she would move next to him in Mill Valley. The Ninth Circuit found that the district court's factual findings were not clearly erroneous, nor do it disagree with its conclusion that E.S. never abandoned her habitual residence in the United States.

The Ninth Circuit noted that shared parental intent is not always dispositive. Certain circumstances related to a child's residence and socialization in another country, a process called "acclimatization", may change the calculus. To infer abandonment of a habitual residence by acclimatization, the "objective facts [must] point unequivocally to [the child's] ordinary or habitual residence being in [the new country]." Mozes, 239 F.3d at 1081. It has cautioned that "courts should be slow to infer from ... contacts [with the new country] that an earlier habitual residence has been abandoned,", both because the inquiry is fraught with difficulty, and because readily inferring abandonment would circumvent the purposes of the Convention.
Determinations regarding acclimatization are highly fact-bound, and there is no bright line as to the temporal limits for such adjustment. Nor should "acclimatization ... be confused with acculturation."  It agreed with the  district court that the facts here did not point "unequivocally" to the conclusion that Ireland had become E.S.'s habitual residence. Although E.S. developed strong ties to Ireland through school, extracurricular activities, and contacts with Murphy's family, she also maintained broad and deep "family, cultural, and developmental ties to the United States,"
spent Halloween, Thanksgiving, Easter and summers in the United States while living in Ireland, "maintain[ed] a relationship with Sloan's extended family,""maintain[ed] a community in Mill Valley" and "receive[d] her dental and medical care in California" while living overseas. The district court characterized her ties to the United States as "robust." In light of these substantial ties to the United States and our traditional caution about inferring abandonment, E.S.'s time in Ireland, though significant, did not "unequivocally" establish that she had abandoned the United States as her habitual residence. It agreed with the district court's finding that E.S.'s attachments to Ireland "did not shift the locus of [E.S.'s] development[,] and ... any acclimatization did not overcome the absence of a shared settled intention by the parents to abandon the United States as a habitual residence."