Benitez v Hernandez, 2017 WL 1404317 (D.NJ, 2017)[Ecuador] [Consent] [Petition denied]

          In Benitez v Hernandez, 2017 WL 1404317 (D. NJ, 2017) J.G.A. Guillermo Albornoz Benitez (“Guillermo”) brought a proceeding against his wife, Kristhel Angelica Diaz Hernandez (“Kristhel”), for the return of their children to Ecuador. Their daughter, “T.A.A.,” was born in 2006, and was 11 years old; their son, “J.G.A.,” was born in 2008 and was 9 years old. Mr. Albornoz alleged that on June 18, 2015, Ms. Diaz removed the children from Ecuador without his consent, and was wrongfully retaining them in the United States. The district court denied the petition.

          The district court accepted as true the evidence that Albornoz and Diaz agreed in 2014 that the sojourn in Ecuador was to be temporary. It accepted the evidence that Diaz’s June 2015 return to the United States with the children was not wrongful, but agreed-to. The picture that emerged was that Diaz had grown increasingly dissatisfied, and at any rate did not want to live in Ecuador. Albornoz wanted to keep the marriage together, and agreed to return to the U.S. in the hope of salvaging it. It appeared that he cooperated fully with the children’s removal from Ecuador, resettlement in the U.S., enrollment in a New Jersey school for the 2015–16 school year, and relocation to their own apartment. It was only later, when the marriage proved unsalvageable, that he began to maintain that moving back to the U.S. had never been his intent. Indeed, it seemed that he brought the petition for return of children either concurrently with, or as a response to, Diaz’s filing for divorce.

Pinto v Barone, 2017 WL 2779700 (S.D. California, 2017)[Brazil] [Grave Risk of Harm] [Petition granted]

          In Pinto v Barone, 2017 WL 2779700 (S.D. California, 2017) Brazilian citizens Luciana and Andre Barone entered a divorce agreement that provided for joint custody and allowed Luciana to travel to Boston with their two children, ages 5 and 11, for a temporary four month visit. The agreement specified that after four months, Andre would travel to Boston, which he did, and return to Brazil with the children.  The agreement also provided that the stay in Boston is “non-extendable,” that the children “shall be delivered” to Andre on January 13, 2017, and that Andre “shall return with them to Brazil” where “they shall be delivered to the mother, for the beginning of the school year in Sao Paulo.” Instead of turning the children over to Andre on January 13, 2017, Luciana fled to San Diego with the children. Applying the Hague Convention to these facts, the court concluded that Luciana breached Andre’s rights of custody as provided in the Brazilian divorce agreement.  Since Luciana wrongfully retained the children in the United States and no grave risk of harm was presented to the children by returning them to Brazil, the Court granted Andre’s petition.

          At the hearing, Luciana suggested that the United States was the children’s habitual residence since they had been present here since September 2016 and two state courts (Massachusetts and California) issued TROs. However, it was undisputed that “immediately before” Luciana retained the children in Boston, and then in San Diego, the children were habitually resident in Brazil. The terms of the divorce agreement made clear that “the settled intention of the parents” was for the children to return to school in Sao Paulo and retain their Brazilian domicile. Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067, 1078 (9th Cir. 2001). Moreover, the argument that the children had acclimated to the United States lacked merit. Luciana was temporarily permitted to be in the United States on a student visa, did not have a job, and did not have a place for the children to stay. She was dependent on financial support from Andre pursuant to the Brazilian divorce agreement. During the course of several months, Luciana moved the children from Brazil, to Boston, and then to San Diego, where the children were staying in a hotel until funds were exhausted.  At the time the TRO issued, Luciana had vacated the hotel and her plans for food and shelter were uncertain The Court stated that it “can say with confidence” that the children’s attachments to the United States have not “changed to the point where requiring return to the original forum would now be tantamount to taking the child out of the family and social environment in which its life has developed.”

          The district court indicated that the only colorable exception to return was whether a “grave risk” of harm exists if the Court orders the children returned to Brazil. Luciana obtained a domestic violence restraining order from a state court in Boston and another one in San Diego. In the restraining order request. Luciana alleged that Andre called her on January 29, 2017, and threatened to kill her and the kids. To overcome the Convention’s imperative that courts return wrongfully retained children under the grave risk exception, “[t]he potential harm to the child must be severe, and the level of risk and danger required to trigger this exception has consistently been held to be very high.” Souratgar v. Lee 720 F.3d 96, 103 (2d Cir. 2013. Some courts, however, have found that a threat to kill the children or a history of domestic violence qualifies as a grave risk. See Van De Sande v. Van De Sande, 431 F 3d 567, 570 (7th Cir. 2005); Ermini v. Vittori, 758 F.3d 153, 164 (2d Cir. 2014). To determine if a grave risk of harm exists, the Court heard testimony from Andre and Luciana. Luciana testified that in twenty years of marriage, Andre never behaved violently except for a fight the day they divorced—she says Andre hit her. Luciana claimed that after she obtained a TRO in Boston, Andre threatened to kill her and the kids. Andre categorically denied both allegations. He also offered a third-party declaration from Carmen Gomide, Luciana’s good Samaritan host for a few weeks in San Diego, who opined Luciana was unstable and said she feared Luciana would kill the kids.

          The Court concludes Luciana has failed to show by clear and convincing evidence a “probability” that Andre will harm the children.  The testimony revealed that both parents deeply loved their children and were highly protective of them. There was no credible evidence that Andre presents a grave risk of harm to the children. Notably, after Andre was alleged to have threatened Luciana in Brazil, Luciana agreed to shared custody of the children. No reports of violence were ever filed. And the Brazilian divorce agreement was thereafter entered, in which joint custody was awarded. In addition, when Luciana refused to comply with the divorce agreement and called the police in Boston, Andre did not react with violence. He returned to Brazil and pursued lawful options through the courts; he filed suit in Brazil to enforce the divorce agreement, contacted the Central Authority (State Department), and retained legal counsel in the United States and filed this petition. Andre’s past actions confirmed that he would l comply with the Court’s order to safely return the children to Brazil and abide by any custody decision in the Brazilian courts, where that determination is properly made.

          The court granted the petition and directed that Andre return to Brazil with Pedro and Luiz Felipe so the important matter of child custody can be determined by the Brazilian courts. Andre was directed to pay all reasonable travel expenses for the children and Luciana to return to Brazil.

Williard v Williard, 2017 WL 3278745 (E.D. Michigan, 2017)[Italy] [Federal & State Judicial Remedies] [Waiver] [Motion to dismiss denied]

          In Williard v Williard, 2017 WL 3278745 (E.D. Michigan, 2017) on May 24, 2017, Billy Joe Willard, Jr. (“Petitioner”) commenced an action against Erika Lynn Willard (“Respondent”). In his Amended Complaint, filed June 7, 2017, he alleged Respondent violated the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.

          Petitioner and Respondent, both American citizens, were married in Tennessee in 2010. In 2013, Respondent gave birth to Petitioner’s two children—“ADW” and “MLW” —in Florida. Petitioner was an active duty member of the United States Air Force and was assigned to a military base in Vicenza, Italy in 2015.  Respondent and the children moved with Petitioner to Italy. In July 2016, Respondent and the children accompanied Petitioner back to the United States. While Petitioner underwent training Respondent and the children visited family in Michigan.  On September 29, 2016, Petitioner arrived in Michigan to fly back to Italy with Respondent and the children.  Respondent refused to return to Italy and would not allow Petitioner to take the children back to Italy. On October 31, 2016, Respondent filed a complaint against Petitioner in Oakland County Circuit Court (“Michigan state court”) seeking a divorce and the custody of the children. Respondent served Petitioner with the Michigan state court case filing on December 22, 2016. In January 2017, Petitioner filed a parallel divorce case against Respondent in Johnson County, Texas (“Texas state court”). The Texas state court conferred with the Michigan state court about which state court had jurisdiction over the proceedings, as Petitioner requested. On April 5, 2017, both state courts determined that the Michigan state court should retain jurisdiction over the custody and divorce proceedings.  Two weeks after the state courts determined jurisdiction was proper in Michigan, Petitioner filed a new custody case in Italy seeking a divorce and custody of the couple’s children.

          On May 24, 2017, Petitioner filed a Complaint in the district Court seeking return of the children to Italy pursuant to the Hague Convention. He amended his Complaint on June 7, 2017. Respondent moved to dismiss. She argued in her Motion to Dismiss that Petitioner waived his rights under the Hague Convention by arguing in Texas state court that Texas was the proper forum in which his claims should be adjudicated. Only after the Texas state court found Michigan was the proper forum did Petitioner invoke his Hague Convention claims in Italy and this Court. The district court observed that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) (6) authorizes dismissal of a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” When considering a Rule 12(b) (6) motion to dismiss, the Court must construe the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept all of his or her factual allegations as true. Lambert v. Hartman, 517 F.3d 433, 439 (6th Cir. 2008). However, the Court need not accept mere conclusory statements or legal conclusions couched as factual allegations. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.  The district court noted that “Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right.” United States v. Fowler, 819 F.3d 298, 306 (6th Cir. 2016). There are very few cases analyzing the concept of waiver in the context of the Hague Convention. In Journe v. Journe, the District of Puerto Rico held that a petitioning parent waived his Hague Convention rights by voluntarily dismissing his action for divorce and custody in France, having believed that he and his spouse had reconciled. 911 F. Supp. 43 (D.P.R. 1995). The petitioning parent’s voluntarily dismissed suit had been brought pursuant to provisions of the Convention. The district court found that this constituted a waiver, having been an “intentional or voluntary relinquishment of a known right” where the relinquishing party had “both knowledge of [the right’s] existence and an uncoerced intent to relinquish it.” (writing that acts constituting waiver “should be so manifestly consistent with and indicative of an intent to relinquish voluntarily a particular right that no other reasonable explanation of this conduct is possible”).  

          The district court noted that several circuits outside of the Sixth Circuit have mentioned waiver while analyzing consent or acquiescence. The Ninth Circuit has not treated a decision to file for custody in state court, without raising Hague Convention claims, as a waiver of Hague Convention rights. See, e.g., Gaudin v. Remis, 415 F.3d 1028, 1034 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that a federal court was not bound by a state court’s custody decision where the state court did not actually adjudicate the Hague Convention claim); Holder v. Holder, 305 F.3d 854, 872–73 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that the petitioner’s suit for custody in California state court did not exhibit an “uncoerced intent to relinquish” rights under the Hague Convention). Respondent failed to submit a single case where the district court dismissed a Hague Convention claim based on waiver at the motion to dismiss stage. Here, neither the Michigan nor the Texas state court issued a final decision on the merits of the parties’ complaints. The Texas state court found the Michigan state court had jurisdiction, and then the Michigan state court stayed its proceedings pending resolution of the present case. Furthermore, the exhibits attached to the motion did not establish that Petitioner knowingly and intentionally relinquished his Hague Convention rights before the Texas or Michigan state courts.

          The Court did not find that Respondent had proven that Petitioner waived his Hague Convention rights, when the Court views the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and denied the motion to dismiss.

Tomynets v Koulik, 2017 WL 2645518 (M.D. Florida, 2017)[Ukraine][Habitual Residence] [Petition granted]

          In Tomynets v Koulik, 2017 WL 2645518 (M.D. Florida, 2017) the Report and Recommendation of the magistrate judge was adopted as the opinion of the Court and the petition for return of S.O.T. to Ukraine under the Hague Convention was granted.

          The district court observed that it may accept, reject, or modify a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) (1). In absence of specific objections, there is no requirement that factual findings be reviewed de novo. Garvey v. Vaughn, 993 F.2d 776, 779 n.9 (11th Cir. 1993). Rather, a district court is bound to defer to the factual findings of a magistrate judge unless the findings are clearly erroneous. Cooper-Houston v. Southern Ry. Co., 37 F.3d 603, 604 (11th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). Legal conclusions are reviewed de novo, even in the absence of an objection. See id.; LeCroy v. McNeil, 397 F. App’x 554, 556 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (citing United States v. Warren, 687 F.2d 347, 348 (11th Cir. 1982)).

          The court found that (1) S.O.T. was a “habitual resident” of Ukraine immediately before the wrongful retention by Respondent; (2) the wrongful retention was in breach of Petitioner’s custody rights under the laws of Ukraine; (3) Petitioner had been exercising or would have been exercising custody rights concerning S.O.T. at the time of the wrongful retention of S.O.T.; and (4) S.O.T. has not attained the age of 16.

          The Magistrate Judge also concluded that Respondent failed to establish any of the Hague Convention’s narrow exceptions. (Id. at p. 28). On de novo review, the Court agreed with the Magistrate Judge’s conclusions. LeCroy, 397 F. App’x at 556.

          The district court held that Magistrate Judge’s findings were not clearly erroneous, and establish that S.O.T. was a habitual resident of Ukraine prior to Respondent’s retention of her in the United States. S.O.T.’s trip to the United States was intended to be for a specific, delimited period, and the parties therefore had no shared, settled intention to abandon Ukraine and make the United States S.O.T.’s habitual residence. See Ruiz, 392 F.3d at 1252-53. Further, the six months that S.O.T. was in the United States immediately prior to Respondent’s retention of her was an insufficient amount of time for her to become acclimatized. The absence of the parties’ shared intention to establish a new habitual residence and because S.O.T. did not have sufficient time to become acclimatized during her visit demonstrate that she was habitual resident of Ukraine as of June 3, 2013, the date Respondent retained her in the United States. Petitioner also maintained regular contact with S.O.T. during her six month visit to the United States. After Respondent wrongfully retained S.O.T. past the end of the planned visit, Petitioner continued to maintain or attempt to maintain contact with her via mail, Skype, and telephone calls. Petitioner’s efforts to maintain communication with S.O.T. constituted an exercise of her custody rights. See, e.g. Friedrich, 78 F.3d at 1065; Rodriguez, 817 F.3d at 472. Petitioner, therefore, established a prima facie case that S.O.T. should be returned to Ukraine because of Respondent’s wrongful retention of her in the United States. The Magistrate Judge correctly concluded that Respondent failed to establish any of the exceptions that would prevent S.O.T.’s return to Ukraine, and that the goals of the Hague Convention are furthered by returning S.O.T. to Ukraine. The Magistrate Judge’s findings are not clearly erroneous, and considered together, established that she was not well-settled in the United States. See Cooper-Houston, 37 F.3d at 604; Lops, 140 F.3d at 946. Respondent did not met his burden of establishing that S.O.T. was well-settled in the United States or that any other exception applies to defeat Petitioner’s prima facie case for return of S.O.T. to Ukraine under the Hague Convention.

Rose v Blake, 2017 WL 3601292 (S.D. Florida, 2017)[Belgium][Habitual Residence] [Petition granted]

          In Rose v Blake, 2017 WL 3601292 (S.D. Florida, 2017) a petition was filed by  Damion Samuel Rose, a legal resident of Belgium, to secure the return of his six-year-old son, D.A.R., who was, removed from Belgium and brought Florida by the Child’s Mother, Lee Ann Nicole Blake (“Ms. Blake”). The district court found that the Petitioner was domiciled in Belgium. The parties met in Jamaica and had a relationship of which a child, D.A.R., was born in New York on January 17, 2011.  The parties separated in 2013 and Ms. Blake subsequently settled in the United States for a few months with the child.  Afterwards, Ms. Blake returned to Jamaica, where the applicant asked her to organize the living arrangements of the child in order to enable him to spend some time with his son despite their separation, which Ms. Blake refused.  In 2014, Mr. Rose moved to Belgium and the parties reached a verbal agreement, so as to enable D.A.R. to spend holidays with his father.  On the agreed date however, Ms. Blake opposed the child’s stay in Belgium and threatened to deprive Mr. Rose of any contact with the child if she was not authorized to stay with him in Belgium. In 2014, Ms. Blake and D.A.R. settled in Belgium and the parties decided to give themselves a chance to live together again. On February 10, 2015, they concluded a declaration of legal cohabitation, to which they have not put an end. A few months later, the couple separated again. A verbal agreement was reached according to which the child would have his residence with his mother two weeks per month, including the weekends, and with his father one week per month and two weekends.  Since Ms. Blake could scarcely comply with this agreement, Mr. Rose submitted a request to the Family Court aiming at obtaining a decision on parental responsibility. Ms. Blake informed the Plaintiff on several occasions that she intended to return to Jamaica with the child. The Plaintiff opposed such intention. Both parties and their lawyers agreed to meet on April 24, 2017 prior to the hearing scheduled on May 3, 2017 before the Brussels Family Court. On April 24, 2017 Ms. Blake’s lawyer informed the Mr. Rose’s attorney that Ms. Blake could not be present because she was in the United States with the child, but would be returning. Ms. Blake and the Child did not return on the expected date and the plaintiff did not receive any news of his son since July 22, 2017. Ms. Blake and D.A.R. reside at her cousin’s domicile in Davie, Florida. Subsequent to the removal of the Child by the mother, the Belgium Court issued an Order placing sole custody in the father, Damion Samuel Rose.

          The district court held a hearing and credited the Plaintiff’s testimony. It rejected the Defendant’s testimony and rejected the assertions of the Defendant set forth in her Response to the Verified Complaint and Petition. Because the Court found that Belgium was the habitual residence of the Child, that the Plaintiff never acquiesced in the removal of the Child, that there was no danger to the Child if he is returned to Belgium, and that the Respondent has failed to show cause why the child should not be returned to Belgium, it granted the Petition and directed that the Child be returned to Belgium in the custody of the father.

Valero v De Nevi, 2017 WL 3917161 (S.D. Florida, 2017)[Canada][Habitual Residence] [Petition granted]

           In Valero v De Nevi, 2017 WL 3917161 (S.D. Florida, 2017) the father was a Cuban national who had become a resident in Quebec, Canada. The mother was a Cuban national who now sought political asylum in the United States, but previously lived with the father and their son in Quebec, Canada from March 25, 2016 to September 20, 2016 before she removed the child to the United States.

          The district court found that the habitual residence of the child before his removal by the mother in late September 2016 was Quebec, Canada. The mother’s attorney argued that the mother’s habitual residence at the time of the alleged removal was in Cuba. It was undisputed that the mother had a physical residence in Cuba and received medical treatment in Cuba, where both parents and the child were born. But, both parties agreed that Cuba, which is not a signatory to the Hague Convention, was a country that both parents abandoned and a country where neither parent wanted to exercise parental rights. The mother’s counsel argued that since the alleged habitual residence of the child was Cuba at the time of the removal from Canada, then the Court is powerless to rule under the Hague Convention. However, the Court did not reach the issue of the residency in Cuba because neither the mother nor the father exercised custodial rights there. Both parents were Cuban political refugees who abandoned Cuba. The Court concluded that consistent with Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2001), the child’s habitual residence was Canada and the Court did not decide the hypothetical issue of possible dual habitual residence. The Court also found that the child’s removal by the mother in September 2016 was in breach of the father’s custody rights.  Having found that the child was wrongfully removed by the mother, the Court foud that the mother had not proven by clear and convincing evidence the grave risk exception. The higher number of therapists and medical professionals in Miami when compared to the village of Saint-Guillaeime or the larger town of Drummondville in Quebec is not enough to preclude the prompt return of the child to Quebec. Nor was the payment for or availability of insurance in one province versus another or in one state versus another.

Hernandez v Ochoa, 2017 WL 3575487 (D. New Mexico, 2017[Mexico][Temporary Restraining Order])

          In Hernandez v Ochoa, 2017 WL 3575487 (D. New Mexico, 2017) the district court granted a temporary restraining order based on the facts alleged in the Verified Complaint which the Court accepted as true for the purposes of the motion only. The Court found that Plaintiff Luis Rene Quintana Hernandez (“Hernandez”) and Ochoa were married in Mexico on May 15, 2009.] On November 1, 2009, Ms. Ochoa gave birth to the Child in Mexico. Mr. Hernandez and Ms. Ochoa entered into a “Voluntary Agreement of Divorce” on November 13, 2015. A Final Decree was entered and is dated December 1, 2015. According to the Final Decree and the Voluntary Agreement of Divorce the parties agreed to shared custody of the Child in which the Mr. Hernandez has the Child every weekend from Friday at 1:00 p.m. to Sunday at 8:00 p.m. The Agreement further provides that “the weekly schedule” for visitations “shall be strictly followed.” On or about November 23, 2015, Ms. Ochoa informed Mr. Hernandez that she wanted to spend Thanksgiving with her daughters, from a previous marriage, in Albuquerque, New Mexico, and she wanted to take the Child with her. Ms. Ochoa informed Mr. Hernandez that she and the Child would be returning to Mexico on November 30, 2015. With this understanding, Mr. Hernandez submitted a Form I-94 (Arrival/Departure Record) for the Child to temporarily travel to the United States with a return date of November 30, 2015. On November 30, 2015, Mr. Hernandez filed a criminal complaint against Ms. Ochoa for her “unlawful removal from the country or abduction” of the Child. In the Complaint Mr. Hernandez states that on November 28, 2015, he went for visitation with his son as the parties had agreed in their Voluntary Agreement of Divorce entered on November 13, 2015.  Mr. Hernandez was informed by his bother-in-law that Ms. Ochoa had “decided not to return to the country [Mexico] and to prevent our son ... from returning to the country [Mexico]”.  Further, Mr. Hernandez averred that his brother-in-law informed him that Ms. Ochoa had “disposed of most of the home furniture, she sold it in order to leave the country, without intending to return and unlawfully abducting our son,”  Mr. Hernandez provided the police with the above-referenced facts under penalty of “imprisonment of six months to six years”. Hernandez avered that without his consent or agreement, Ochoa continues to wrongfully retain the Child in the United States—specifically, in Albuquerque, New Mexico. [Doc. 1 at 1, 2, 6 of 11]. He asks for an ex parte TRO prohibiting the removal of the Child from the jurisdiction of this Court pending a hearing the merits of the Verified Complaint.

          The district court observed that Rule 65(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the Court may grant a temporary restraining order (TRO) without notice to the other side only when (1) “specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition,” and (2) “the movant’s attorney certifies in writing any efforts made to give notice and the reasons why it should not be required.” An ex parte TRO has a limited life: Rule 65(b)(2) provides that a TRO may not extend beyond 14 days, “unless before that time the court, for good cause, extends it for a like period or the adverse party consents to a longer extension.” Further, “[i]f the order is issued without notice, the motion for a preliminary injunction must be set for hearing at the earliest possible time, taking precedence over all other matters except hearings on older matters of the same character.” Rule 65(b)(3). Finally, a TRO must state the reasons why it issued, state its terms specifically, and describe in reasonable detail—and not by referring to the complaint or other document—the act or acts restrained or required. Rule 65(d)(1). In order for a party to be entitled to a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction, that party must show “(1) he or she will suffer irreparable injury unless the injunction issues; (2) the threatened injury outweighs whatever damage the proposed injunction may cause the opposing party; (3) the injunction, if issued, would not be adverse to the public interest; and (4) there is a substantial likelihood of success on the merits.” Schrier v. Univ. of Colo., 427 F.3d 1253, 1258 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting Heideman v. S. Salt Lake City, 348 F.3d 1182, 1188 (10th Cir. 2003)) (alterations omitted).

          After considering the evidence in the record, the Court concluded it was sufficient to show that Hernandez was entitled to a temporary restraining order. The evidence presented for purposes of this TRO showed that the Child was a habitual resident of Mexico, at the time of his abduction; that the parties were in agreement that Hernandez had custodial rights under Mexican law, and that he had made a decision to have a meaningful role in the Child’s life. Thus, it appeared that at the time of the abduction, Hernandez had custody rights under Mexican law. Further, there was no evidence that Hernandez failed to exercise those custody rights or otherwise abandoned the Child. the evidence in the record showed that it was through an attempt to exercise those rights that Hernandez discovered that Ochoa had taken the Child to the United States, and that he notified Mexican authorities immediately. As it appeared that defendant will not suffer any costs and/or damages in the event the Court determines the defendant was wrongfully restrained (see Rule 65(c), no security was required. The Court therefore ordered, inter alia, that  Ms. Ochoa be prohibited from removing the Child from the jurisdiction of the Court pending a hearing on the merits of the Verified Complaint, and no person acting in concert or participating with Ms. Ochoa, shall take any action to remove the child from the jurisdiction of this Court pending a determination on the merits of Mr. Hernandez’s Verified Complaint.

Calixto v Lesmes, 2017 WL 3877650 (M.D. Florida, 2017) [Colombia] Temporary Restraining Order]

          In Calixto v Lesmes, 2017 WL 3877650 (M.D. Florida, 2017)  the Petitioner filed a verified petition in which he alleged that the mother of his child, Hadylle Yusuf Lesmes, the Respondent, has wrongfully retained their five-year old daughter in Manatee County, Florida since November 24, 2016. He claimed he gave his permission for Respondent to travel to Florida with the child, but he only authorized Respondent to stay in Florida with the child for a one-year period. That one-year period has now expired and Petitioner demanded return of the child to Colombia. Petitioner does not know the whereabouts of the Respondent or the child, but believed that they are located in Manatee County, Florida. Petitioner has filed the Motion and Petition on an ex parte basis. The district court observed that pursuant to Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court may enter a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order. To obtain a temporary restraining order, the movant must demonstrate “(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable injury will be suffered if the relief is not granted; (3) that the threatened injury outweighs the harm the relief would inflict on the non-movant; and (4) that the entry of the relief would serve the public interest.” Schiavo v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223, 1225-26 (11th Cir. 2005). To obtain ex parte relief, a party must strictly comply with these requirements. Levine v. Comcoa Ltd., 70 F.3d 1191, 1194 (11th Cir. 1995) (“An ex parte temporary restraining order is an extreme remedy to be used only with the utmost caution.”). Based on the record, the Court granted a Temporary Restraining Order as follows: “(1) Respondent is hereby prohibited from removing the child from the jurisdiction of this Court pending a hearing on the merits of the Verified Petition, and no person acting in concert or participating with Respondent shall take any action to remove the child from the jurisdiction of this Court pending a determination on the merits of the Verified Petition to Return the Child to Colombia.(2) Respondent shall surrender to and the United States Marshal is directed to secure any and all passports, visas, or other travel documents of the child, M.A.Y., and of the Respondent. Respondent is prohibited from directly or indirectly securing substitute travel documents, including a passport, for M.A.Y., or for Respondent pending final adjudication of the Verified Petition.

Blackledge v.Blackledge, --- F.3d ----, 2017 WL 3298449 (3rd Cir., 2017) [Germany] [Habitual residence] [Petition denied]

In Blackledge v.Blackledge, --- F.3d ----, 2017 WL 3298449  (3rd Cir., 2017) the Third Circuit affirmed an order of the district court which denied the Petition of Charles Blackledge, a United States citizen who currently resided in Berlin, Germany, for the return of his then-eight-year-old son to Germany. 

J.B., a United States citizen, was born in the Ukraine in 2008 to Petitioner and Respondent Olga Blackledge, a Ukrainian citizen and lawful permanent resident of the United States who currently resided in Pittsburgh, United States. In the spring of 2011, Petitioner secured a job as a patent agent in Germany at about the same time Respondent was accepted to a Ph.D. program at the University of Pittsburgh. In the summer of 2013, after Respondent and J.B. had lived in Pittsburgh for two years, J.B. underwent cardiac surgery at the Children’s Hospital in Pittsburgh. Petitioner went to Pittsburgh to be with J.B. during his recuperation and to seek jobs in the United States. When those efforts proved fruitless, Petitioner decided to return to Germany and Respondent agreed to join him, both because she had agreed, before the initial move to Pittsburgh, to move to Germany for two years and because she was financially unable to support herself at that point. After the move, Respondent continued to pursue her Ph.D. studies at the University of Pittsburgh, remotely, and J.B. was enrolled in the J.F.K. School in Germany .In August 2015, when J.B. was seven years old, Respondent sought to return to Pittsburgh to complete the final phase of her Ph.D. program. By this point, according to both parties, the marriage had become acrimonious, and, according to Respondent, they had “agreed that [they would] divorce. Petitioner initially agreed that Respondent and J.B. would return to Pittsburgh, and they requested a one-year leave of absence for J.B. from the J.F.K. School. In Pittsburgh, J.B. attended second grade in the 2015-2016 school year and, according to his teacher, “performed as a wonderful second grader.” In February 2016, Petitioner initiated a series of emails with Respondent that formed the bulk of the record of the parties’ shared intent as to J.B.’s habitual residence. These began with Petitioner’s request that Respondent “confirm [her] commitment to our agreement” that J.B. would return to Germany for the 2016-17 academic year. Respondent did not deny the existence of an agreement but asked the Petitioner to “reconsider it,” explaining, “I do not think ... it is a good idea for a child [J.B.’s] age to live with one parent for a year, and with the other for a year”. That agreement, Respondent stated, “presupposes ... yearly adaptation to living with different parents [which] is psychologically disadvantageous” to J.B., and urged Petitioner to consider J.B.’s well-being, suggesting that Petitioner move “somewhere close” so that they could both “take care of [J.B.] on a permanent basis” and not “change [J.B.’s] permanent caregiver every year.” In response, Petitioner observed that Respondent had not expressed any concerns about J.B. “spend[ing] alternate years with us when the agreement was made.”  And while Petitioner acknowledged Respondent’s “concerns about stability of dwelling,” he explained that he did not “think there [we] re better options than maintaining [their] previous agreement,” which he characterized as: “[J.B.] would go with you to Pitt [sburgh] and return to me for 2016-2017 academic year. Then back to you ....”  In subsequent correspondence, Petitioner advised Respondent to “prepare [herself] for fulfillment of [the] agreement that [J.B.] returns to [Respondent] for 2016-2017,” reassuring her, “You’ll have him again in 2017,”  And in May, the parties again discussed the prospect of J.B. alternating years between his parents, with Petitioner documenting in his notes of their call that Respondent continued to oppose “any plan for [J.B.] to alternate between Germany and [the] USA,” because she believed that it “put [ ] too much pressure on [J.B.] to go back and forth” and “insist[ed] upon more consistency.” 

         While the dispute between the parties over J.B.’s long-term residency arrangements was ongoing, Respondent filed petitions for divorce and custody.  On July 6, 2016, Petitioner filed a petition in the United States District Court seeking J.B.’s return to Germany. The District Court held a two-day bench trial and entered an order denying the petition. The District Court calculated the retention date as August 2016.  The District Court correctly recognized that it was required to consider both the parents’ shared intent and the child’s acclimatization. As to shared parental intent, it concluded there was “no credible evidence” that the parties agreed that J.B.’s stay would be for a “specific duration.” And, considering evidence of J.B.’s activities and expectations up until the August retention date, the Court concluded that J.B. was acclimatized to Pittsburgh. 

The Third Circuit concluded that the proper retention date was July 6, the date petitioner filed his Hague Convention petition.  The Third Circuit held that the retention date is the date beyond which the noncustodial parent no longer consents to the child’s continued habitation with the custodial parent and instead seeks to reassert custody rights, as clearly and unequivocally communicated through words, actions, or some combination thereof. That determination is, by necessity, fact-intensive and will vary with the circumstances of each case. While in some cases the notice date and actual expiration date will coincide, in other cases the notice will indicate a future date as the date consent will be withdrawn, in which case that latter date, depending on the facts of the case, will constitute the expiration date and, hence, the retention date.

  In determining the retention date here, it concluded  that the District Court erred by looking solely to Petitioner’s original consent for J.B. to reside in Pittsburgh through August 2016 and failing to assess whether Petitioner’s subsequent communications, up to and including the filing of his Hague Convention petition, effected a withdrawal of that consent. Consistent with Karkkainen, it also rejected Petitioner’s argument in favor of a June 9, 2016 retention date, as that date reflected merely Petitioner’s notice of a possible expiration of consent on June 19, 2016. Distinguishing the facts in Karkkainen it noted that Petitioner only researched the possibility of purchasing a ticket; Respondent, not Petitioner, flagged a concern about “abduct [ion],” and Petitioner left open the possibility of further negotiations, stating after his demand email that he was “still waiting to hear anything more from the mediators.”  Under these circumstances, it concluded neither June 9 nor June 19 was the retention date, and in the absence of any earlier communication in which Petitioner clearly and unequivocally withdrew his prior consent and sought to reassert his custody rights, it held that consent expired and J.B. was therefore “retained” on the date Petitioner filed his Hague Convention petition, i.e., July 6.

       The Court explained that a child’s habitual residence is “the place where [the child] has been physically present for an amount of time sufficient for acclimatization and which has a degree of settled purpose from the child’s perspective.” Baxter v. Baxter, 423 F.3d 363, 368 (3d Cir. 2005) To assess whether a child’s habitual residence meets this threshold it analyzes both the child’s acclimatization and the “shared parental intent”—a factor that is relevant because “the child’s knowledge of [his parents’] intentions is likely to color [his] attitude to the contacts [he] is making” and “affect the length of time necessary for a child to become habitually resident or otherwise influence a child’s ability to acclimatize,” and, in addition, because it bears on the parents’ own intentions “regarding their child’s presence in a particular place.” Karkkainen, 445 F.3d at 292, 296.  As a general matter “courts will find no change in habitual residence” where the evidence of shared parental intent reflects that the “child’s initial move from an established habitual residence was clearly intended to be for a specific, limited duration.” Whiting v. Krassner, 391 F.3d 540, 549 (3d Cir. 2004). However, it has recognized an exception to this general rule where a move, though temporary, carries “a degree of settled purpose ..., even if such purpose is only for a limited period.”  The concept of “settled purpose,” does not require an intention “to stay ... indefinitely,” and may in fact be for a “limited period,” precipitated by various motivations, including “[e]ducation, business or profession, employment, health, family or merely love of the place.” Feder, 63 F.3d at 223-24. Regardless of the motivation for the location selected, or whether the stay was meant to be permanent or temporary, “[a]ll that is necessary is that the purpose of living where one does has a sufficient degree of continuity to be properly described as settled.” 

  As to the relative weight given the parents’ shared intent and the child’s acclimatization, the Court has held that when a child is very young, he “cannot possibly decide the issue of residency,” and the parents’ shared intent is, thus, “of paramount importance,” while acclimatization is secondary, Karkkainen, 445 F.3d at 296. However, once a child is old enough “to develop a certain routine and acquire a sense of environmental normalcy,” acclimatization becomes the central inquiry. Whiting, 391 F.3d at 550-51. Although it has not fixed the age when acclimatization takes on this greater significance, and it necessarily will vary depending on the maturity and cognitive and social abilities of the child in question, it has recognized that a typical four-year-old child “certainly has this ability” because he is “able to develop a certain routine and acquire a sense of environmental normalcy” and is “not only aware of those around him, but is able to form meaningful connections with the people and places he encounters each day.” At that point, because the child has “reached an age where [he is] capable of becoming firmly rooted in a new country,” it attaches greater significance to acclimatization and give “less weight to shared parental intent.” Karkkainen, 445 F.3d at 296.
  The District Court declined to apply the presumption that there is, ordinarily, no change in habitual residence when the child’s move is for a “specific, limited duration” because it found that there was “no credible evidence” that the parties had an agreement that J.B.’s stay in Pittsburgh would be for a “specific duration.” It agreed with Petitioner that this finding was clearly erroneous, given the evidence that there was such an agreement. But because that evidence overwhelmingly demonstrated the parties intended J.B.’s residence in Pittsburgh, albeit of specific, limited duration, to carry “a degree of settled purpose,” Whiting, 391 F.3d at 549, it nonetheless concluded that the “shared parental intent” factor favored the United States as J.B.’s habitual residence.

The Court could not agree with the District Court that there was no credible evidence that the parties had agreed J.B.’s stay in Pittsburgh was intended to be for a specific duration.  Although the District Court was correct that the parties’ emails stop short of identifying a date certain that was originally agreed for J.B.’s return, or similarly “specific terms of the agreement,” they made clear that the parties intended J.B.’s stay in Pittsburgh to be of a “specific, limited duration,”  Notwithstanding such error, “we may affirm on any grounds supported by the record,” and “[w]hen the outcome is clear as a matter of law ... remand is not necessary,” Mahmood v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d 248, 253 (3d Cir. 2005). Here, it concluded such an outcome was clear as a matter of law because this case was on all fours with its decision in Whiting v. Krassner, 391 F.3d 540 (3d Cir. 2004).  Here it was evident that J.B.’s move to the United States, although of limited duration, was intended by both Petitioner and Respondent to be accompanied by a degree of “settled purpose.” The record reflected that J.B. moved to Pittsburgh in August 2015 for the purpose of assuming a full and normal life of an eight-year-old boy during the intended period of his stay, making long-term friends and plans, developing routines and a sense of environmental normalcy, exploring his city and other parts of the Commonwealth, and putting down roots, not only for the 2015-2016 school year, but also, per the parents’ express agreement, for future alternating years, interspersed with the years he would be living with Petitioner in Germany. Under these circumstances, as in Whiting, the fact that the parties understood that J.B. would return to Germany “d [id] not in any way diminish ... the parties’ settled intention” that he was to remain in the United States for at least a year, settling into a normal routine, and the fact that J.B.’s stay was intended to be of a limited duration “in no way hinder [ed]” a finding that the United States was his habitual residence during that time. 

The Court emphasized that the parents’ shared intent as to the custody arrangement between them is probative—but not dispositive—in the determination of habitual residence. It views a parental agreement that a child will split time between the parents’ countries of residence as a significant consideration, but as one among others, informing the “necessarily fact-intensive and circumstantially based” inquiry a court must undertake to determine whether a child’s move was accompanied by a “degree of settled purpose.” Undertaking that inquiry here, it considered, in addition to the other record evidence discussed above concerning the parents’ shared expectations for J.B.’s move to Pittsburgh in 2015, the parents’ agreement that J.B. would “alternate between Germany and [the] USA” going forward, and, hence, that J.B. would be returning to Germany for only a single academic year before resuming his residence in Pittsburgh for the 2017-2018 year. In view of that agreement and the totality of the record in this case, was apparent that J.B.’s 2015 move to Pittsburgh was accompanied, through at least the July 6, 2016 retention date, by the requisite “degree of settled purpose” and that the element of shared parental intent thus supports the United States as J.B.’s then-habitual residence.10 Whiting, 391 F.3d at 549. The evidence of J.B.’s acclimatization to Pittsburgh as of July 6, 2016 was overwhelming. He had a tremendously successful academic year. The record demonstrated that J.B. was sufficiently mature to form “meaningful connections with the people and places he encounter[ed]” in Pittsburgh. and “ha[d] attained a sufficient degree of continuity to be properly described as settled,”  Given the extensive record evidence of J.B.’s success in school, his participation in various activities and sports, his many friendships, his experiences at cultural, entertainment, and sporting events, and his own stated preference for the United States, to which the District Court afforded “significant weight” because of “the degree of maturity and situational awareness” J.B. exhibited,  the District Court did not clearly err in its fact-finding related to J.B.’s acclimatization, nor did it commit legal error in its determination that J.B. was acclimatized to the United States at the time of retention.

  Because the parents’ shared intent was for J.B. to move to the United States with a “degree of settled purpose,” and because J.B. had acclimatized to the United States by the date of retention, it agreed with the District Court’s holding that the United States was J.B.’s habitual residence immediately prior to the retention date and that the retention therefore was not wrongful under the Hague Convention. 

Ahmed v Ahmed, 2017 WL 3497411 (6th Cir., 2017) [United Kingdom] Habitual Residence] [Petition denied]

         In Ahmed v Ahmed, 2017 WL 3497411 (6th Cir., 2017) the Father Faisal Ahmed claimed that his wife, Mardia Mohsin Ahmed wrongfully retained their daughters in Knoxville, Tennessee, from the infants’ habitual residence in the United Kingdom, and filed a petition for their return. The district court held that he failed to establish that the the United Kingdom was the children’s habitual residence at the time Mrs. Ahmed retained them. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.  

Mr. Ahmed was a citizen of the United Kingdom and resided in London. Mrs. Ahmed was a United States citizen and resided in Knoxville, Tennessee. The couple married in Bangladesh in December 2009. At the time, Mr. Ahmed lived in London and Mrs. Ahmed was an optometry student in Michigan. After the wedding, Mrs. Ahmed remained in Michigan to complete her studies. Mr. Ahmed visited periodically from London. In August 2011, Mrs. Ahmed moved to London to live with her husband. She obtained a visa, began working, and took steps to become licensed to practice optometry in the United Kingdom. Mrs. Ahmed returned to the United States in December 2011 for additional training needed to practice optometry in the United Kingdom. Mrs. Ahmed did not return to London until August 2013, which she considered a permanent move. That October she applied for Indefinite Leave to Remain (“ILR”) in the United Kingdom, stating in the application that she had considered London her permanent home for the previous two years. Mrs. Ahmed received her ILR the next year. In February 2014, Mrs. Ahmed became pregnant and was put on bed rest by her doctor for months. In April, she registered for an exam required to practice optometry in the United Kingdom. The couple had a bitter argument in May 2014. Mrs. Ahmed then traveled to Knoxville, where she had lived previously. Mrs. Ahmed maintained she did not plan to return. She contended that she did not return to the United Kingdom because of her high-risk pregnancy and the acrimony in her marriage. Mr. Ahmed traveled to Knoxville in October 2014 on a three-month visa in anticipation of the birth of their children. November 2014, Mrs. Ahmed gave birth to twins in Knoxville. After a few days, the family moved into a local apartment, where Mr. Ahmed cared for the children as his wife recovered from childbirth. 

         In January 2015, Mr. Ahmed’s visa expired and he returned to London. Mrs. Ahmed insisted she told Mr. Ahmed then that she intended to remain in the United States with the children indefinitely. Mrs. Ahmed moved with the children to her parents’ home in Knoxville, where they live today. The children received medical care in Knoxville from birth until May 2015. Mr. Ahmed returned to the United States in April 2015. The next month, the entire family traveled to the United Kingdom. Once there, they moved into Mr. Ahmed’s parents’ home for one or two months. Mrs. Ahmed asserted that she left Knoxville “for a short summer visit” “to see if [their] marriage was going to work.” Mr. Ahmed believed this to be a permanent move. Mrs. Ahmed traveled on a round-trip ticket with a return scheduled for November 2015. Mrs. Ahmed states she left her valuables in Knoxville, including her optometry instruments, jewelry and diplomas. Mr. Ahmed insists that his wife took nearly everything important to London. Mrs. Ahmed’s friend testified that Mrs. Ahmed planned to return to Knoxville to live, and the children’s medical records from May 2015 reflect appointments for that fall. Mrs. Ahmed did not sell her car or cancel her auto insurance in the United States, retained American medical insurance for herself and the children, renewed her Tennessee optometry license and professional liability insurance, and paid her Tennessee professional privilege tax before leaving for London. Once in London, however, Mrs. Ahmed took the exam required to practice optometry in the United Kingdom. She also registered the children with the National Health Service and took them for a check-up in London. In July 2015, Mrs. Ahmed traveled with the children to a wedding in Bangladesh. Their tickets indicated they were scheduled to return to London on August 5. Mrs. Ahmed claimed she told her husband upon leaving London that she would not return. Mr. Ahmed claimed he did not learn her plans until August 4, when she flew to Knoxville with the children.

In March 2016, Mr. Ahmed filed this action in the district court. The district court denied Mr. Ahmed’s petition for return. The Sixth Circuit noted that the question of which standard should be applied in determining a child’s habitual residence under the Hague Convention is one of law, and is reviewed de novo. But the determination of habitual residence is “one of fact, and is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” It reviews underlying legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for clear error. “Under the clear-error standard, we abide by the court’s findings of fact unless the record leaves us with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” The only issue on appeal was whether Mr. Ahmed had shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the United Kingdom was their habitual residence on August 4, when she traveled from Bangladesh to the United States.

           The district court concluded that it was bound by circuit precedent to apply the “acclimatization standard” to determine the children’s habitual residence under the Hague Convention. Under this standard, “a court should consider whether the child has been physically present in the country for an amount of time sufficient for acclimatization and whether the place has a degree of settled purpose from the child’s perspective.” Simcox, 511 F.3d at 602 “[A]cademic activities” are “highly suggestive of acclimatization” and “social engagements, participation in sports programs and excursions, and meaningful connections with the people and places in the ... country all point to the child being acclimatized.” Jenkins v. Jenkins, 569 F.3d 549, 556 (6th Cir. 2009). Because the children were infants, however, its analysis boiled down to a simple comparison between the length of stay in each country—six months in the United States and seven to eight weeks in the United Kingdom. The district court concluded the latter was insufficient to establish a habitual residence and thus denied Mr. Ahmed’s petition. At the same time, the court noted the infants’ inability to partake in “school, sports or other extra-curricular activities, or meaningful friendships.” The district court devoted most of its analysis to any shared parental intent between the Ahmeds and made factual findings under that standard. In sum, the district court found “no settled mutual intent during the children’s lives and much of Mrs. Ahmed’s pregnancy.” 

           The Sixth Circuit considered the parties settled mutual intent in disposing of Mr. Ahmed’s petition. It observed that it generally preferred the acclimatization standard because it serves one of the main purposes of the Hague Convention: ensuring a child is not kept from her family and social environment. This ceases to be a concern, of course, if a child never forms such ties or is incapable of doing so. It did not reach the issue of especially young children in Friedrich I. Consequently, incorporating the shared parental intent standard in cases concerning especially young children would mean addressing a gap, not overturning precedent. The most compelling reason for applying the settled mutual intent standard is the difficulty, if not impossibility, of applying the acclimatization standard to especially young children. The period a child spends in a given location is but one component of acclimatization. Not only must the child have “been present long enough,” but he or she must have developed a “degree of settled purpose [there] from [her own] perspective.” What a child does in a country and how she feels about it are as important as the length of her stay there. As a result, virtually all children who lack cognizance of their surroundings are unable to acclimate, making the standard generally unworkable. It held that it is appropriate to consider the shared parental intent of the parties in cases involving especially young children who lack the cognizance to acclimate to any residence. This is not a bright-line rule, and the determination of when the acclimatization standard is impracticable must largely be made by the lower courts, which are best positioned to discern the unique facts and circumstances of each case. It made no changes to the acclimatization standard itself, which lower courts should continue to apply in accordance with its precedent.
 Beginning with the acclimatization standard, the district court properly found that the twins’ seven-to-eight-week stay in the United Kingdom hardly allowed them to acquire a “degree of settled purpose” there. As infants, they were unable to do so anywhere when Mrs. Ahmed traveled with them to the United States in August of 2015. The conclusion that the acclimatization standard is unworkable with children this young then requires consideration of any shared parental intent to determine if Mr. Ahmed has shown that the United Kingdom was the children’s habitual residence when they were retained. The district court’s factual findings showed that Mr. Ahmed has failed to carry his burden under the shared parental intent standard. He relied on the court’s finding of the couple’s settled mutual intent to live in the United Kingdom in the fall of 2013, before the twins were conceived. But what matters is where the Ahmeds intended the children to live. Nicolson, 605 F.3d at 104; Gitter, 396 F.3d at 133, 135; Feder, 63 F.3d at 224. There was no error in the district court’s findings of fact as to the Ahmeds’ lack of shared intent as to their children’s residence. The district court’s detailed factual findings established that the Ahmeds’ mutual intent for where their children would live was either unclear or absent from the time the children were conceived until Mrs. Ahmed retained them. Accordingly, Mr. Ahmed had not proven by a preponderance of evidence, under either standard, that the United Kingdom was the children’s habitual residence when Mrs. Ahmed traveled with them to the United States in August of 2015.

Cartes v Phillips, --- F.3d ----, 2017 WL 3141036 (5th Cir, 2017) [Paraguay] [Petition granted] [Habitual residence]

  In Cartes v Phillips, --- F.3d ----, 2017 WL 3141036 (5th Cir, 2017) Sebastian Cartes, the father of a three-year-old girl, O.C.P., petitioned to order Lisa Phillips, O.C.P.’s mother and Cartes’s wife, to return O.C.P. to Paraguay, where she had lived with both Cartes and Phillips from October 2015 to October 2016. 

       Cartes, a U.S. citizen who grew up in Paraguay, and Lisa Phillips, a U.S. citizen, met in California in 2012 and married there in February 2013. Their daughter, O.C.P., was born in California on September 23, 2013. Cartes and Phillips’s marriage was marked by drug use (Cartes’s), sickness (O.C.P.’s), and frequent travel and relocation. Neither Cartes nor Phillips had a job; they relied almost exclusively on Cartes’s mother Sarah, the sister of Paraguay’s current president, to pay their expenses. One month after O.C.P. was born, the family moved to Houston, where Phillips’s parents live. The family lived there for about two years. When Cartes wasn’t in rehab, the family lived together until September 2014, when Phillips and O.C.P. moved out and separately rented an apartment. From June through September 2015, Cartes and Phillips looked for apartments to rent in California. 

          Cartes testified that sometime in the spring of 2015, he moved to Paraguay without Phillips and O.C.P. to live there more permanently. He returned to the United States in early September to collect the rest of his things. At this time, he and Phillips talked about divorce. Cartes consulted with two divorce lawyers and sent Phillips an email telling her that he was leaving for Paraguay without her. At the district court’s bench trial, Cartes admitted that “at that time what was going through [his] mind [wa] s ... going back to Paraguay and ending [their] marriage.” He “wasn’t thinking at the time of ... [his] wife and child—or where they would live.”  A month later, on October 18, 2015, Phillips and O.C.P. flew to Paraguay. According to Cartes, before Phillips and O.C.P. arrived in Paraguay, he and Phillips “had several conversations about the possibility of going to live in Paraguay [for] employment, the financial future of [their] family, [and] the fact that [they] would have assistance with [their] daughter [from] nannies, parents and so on.” According to Phillips, however, she and O.C.P. weren’t moving to Paraguay. Rather, they wanted to be there when Phillips’s sister-in-law gave birth to Phillips’s nephew (O.C.P.’s cousin). Before leaving Houston, Phillips renewed the lease for her apartment. While in Paraguay, Phillips and O.C.P. traveled back to the United States at least twice. O.C.P. continued to have American health insurance and saw doctors in the United States. Similarly, Phillips maintained American health insurance for herself and Cartes. She also kept a car in Houston and paid her car insurance regularly while she was in Paraguay. But Cartes testified that he and Phillips also decided to develop O.C.P.’s connection to Paraguay. For example, the two decided that O.C.P. would attend a Paraguayan preschool, and school records reflected that she regularly attended.

  Cartes also testified that although he and Phillips fought frequently, they “always intend[ed] to reconcile.” According to Cartes, “[Phillips] agreed that she wouldn’t be as happy anywhere else and that she would be fine and happy there and that [Paraguay] was also her home.” Cartes reiterated that Phillips agreed that Paraguay “would always be” both her and O.C.P.’s “home” or “base.” Text messages between Cartes and Phillips illustrated that Phillips described Paraguay as “home.”  On October 23, 2016, Phillips decided to leave Paraguay, and she flew back to Houston with O.C.P. October 24. On December 1, 2016, Cartes filed a petition for O.C.P.’s return to Paraguay. On March 6, 2017, the district court ruled in favor of Cartes, finding that Paraguay was O.C.P.’s habitual residence and that Phillips had wrongfully removed her to the United States. 
The Fifth Circuit affirmed. It rejected Respondents argument that the district court applied the wrong legal standard because the district court did not point to any “explicit meeting of [Cartes’s and Phillips’s] minds to abandon the United States” as O.C.P.’s habitual residence before they traveled to Paraguay in October 2015. Phillips was correct that the “threshold” inquiry under its approach is whether “both parents intended for the child to abandon the habitual residence left behind.” Berezowsky, 765 F.3d at 578. However, that the district court did not legally err. The district court quoted circuit authority recognizing abandonment as the threshold inquiry and analyzed the parties’ positions in light of these references. It also rejected Respondents argument that it nonetheless factually erred by finding that Cartes and Phillips jointly intended to make Paraguay O.C.P.’s habitual residence before Phillips and O.C.P. returned to the United States. The district court’s habitual-residence finding that Cartes and Phillips were “determined to make a home for themselves and their minor child” in Paraguay was not “implausible” and thus not clearly erroneous. See Berezowsky, 765 F.3d at 466 & n.7. The record supported Cartes’s testimony, on which the district court heavily relied, that despite discord, he and Phillips agreed Paraguay would be O.C.P.’s habitual residence. Cartes also testified that during certain periods of reconciliation—specifically June, July, and August of 2016—he told Phillips that he wanted O.C.P. to live in Paraguay permanently and that Phillips agreed Paraguay “would always be” home to both her and O.C.P. See id. at 468 (“[S]hared parental intent requires ... the parents [to] reach some sort of meeting of the minds regarding their child’s habitual residence, so that they are making the decision together.”). Text messages between Cartes and Phillips supported the district court’s decision to credit Cartes’s version of events. 

           The Court observed that parents’ shared intent about their child’s habitual residence does not—and need not—always coincide with the child’s initial change in location. Sometimes, “the family as a unit has manifested a settled purpose to change habitual residence ... when both parents and the child translocate together under circumstances suggesting that they intend to make their home in the new country.” Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067, 1076-77 (9th Cir. 2001). In other cases, a parent may have “earlier consented to let the child stay abroad for some period of ambiguous duration [, but] circumstances surrounding the child’s stay are such that, despite the lack of perfect consensus, the court finds the parents to have shared a settled mutual intent that the stay last indefinitely.” Accordingly, it could not say that the district court’s finding of habitual residence was implausible in light of the record as a whole.

The Fifth Circuit agreed with Phillips that the district court erred by excluding evidence of emails between Cartes and various real estate agents in California. It noted that its approach to determining a child’s habitual residence is a subjective test requiring district courts to ascertain “parents’ intent or settled purpose” about their child’s home. With typical Convention cases between estranged spouses, it has encouraged courts to consider not only the parties’ testimony, but also, more generally, “all available evidence.” Because the threshold for relevance is “low,” Hicks-Fields v. Harris Cty., 860 F.3d 803, 809 (5th Cir. 2017), documentary evidence tending to corroborate testimony about the parties’ shared intent is likely to be relevant in most Convention cases. But any error in this case was harmless. 

Cunningham v Cunningham, --- Fed.Appx. ----, 2017 WL 3867813 (Mem) (11th Cir., 2017)[Japan][Petition granted]

In Cunningham v Cunningham, --- Fed.Appx. ----, 2017 WL 3867813 (Mem) (11th Cir., 2017) after custody disputes in Florida state court led to Mr. Cunningham’s mother, Glenda Cunningham, obtaining physical custody of the minor child, and Mrs. Cunningham’s then abrupt departure from the United States to Japan, Mrs. Cunningham a verified petition for the return of her child pursuant to the Hague Convention to have the child returned to Japan. The district court concluded that the child’s habitual residence—before Mr. Cunningham and his mother retained the child—was Japan, that the child had been wrongfully retained in the United States, and that the child should return to Japan. The district court also concluded that Mr. Cunningham had failed to prove his affirmative defenses, finding that Mr. Cunningham did not establish that Mrs. Cunningham acquiesced to the child’s residence in the United States, that the child would be subject to a grave risk of harm if it were to return to Japan, or that the child was well-settled in the United States. Mr. Cunningham and his mother now appeal. The 11th Circuit affirmed.  It observed that a district court’s determination of a child’s habitual residence under the Hague Convention is reviewed as a mixed question of law and fact, so underlying factual determinations are reviewed for clear error and the application of legal principles to the facts are reviewed de novo. See Ruiz v. Tenorio, 392 F.3d 1247, 1251–52 (11th Cir. 2004). A district court’s rulings as to a respondent’s affirmative defenses under the Convention are similarly reviewed under a mixed standard of review. See Seaman v. Peterson, 766 F.3d 1252, 1258, 1261–62 (11th Cir. 2014) (applying a mixed standard of review in a case involving a grave risk of harm defense).” It affirmed for the reasons set forth in the district courts order.

The New York Matrimonial Trial Handbook, by Joel R. Brandes

The New York Matrimonial Trial Handbook was written for both the attorney who has never tried a matrimonial action and for the experienced litigator. It is not a treatise. It is a “how to” book for lawyers. This 800 page handbook is a companion work to Law and the Family New York, 2d (Thomson Reuters Westlaw), which contains extensive coverage of the substantive and procedural law related to matrimonial actions and family court proceedings. 

The New York Matrimonial Trial Handbook focuses on the procedural and substantive law, as well as the law of evidence, that an attorney must have at his or her fingertips when trying a matrimonial action.  It is intended to be an aide for preparing for a trial and as a reference for the procedure in offering and objecting to evidence during a trial.  The handbook deals extensively with the testimonial and documentary evidence necessary to meet the burden of proof.  There are thousands of suggested questions for the examination of witnesses at trial to establish each cause of action and requests for ancillary relief, as well as for the cross-examination of difficult witnesses.

The  New York Matrimonial Trial Handbook, by Joel R. Brandes will be in  bookstores and available on line in  October 2017.   Click on the title for more information about the contents of the book.  Click on this link for the complete table of contents.

If you would like to be notified when The New York Matrimonial Trial Handbook is on sale send an email to joel@nysdivorce.com with the words “notify me” in the subject line and your email address. The anticipated publication date is October, 2017.

Oliver A v Diana Pina B, --- N.Y.S.3d ----, 2017 WL 2467202, 2017 N.Y. Slip Op. 04548 (1st Dept., 2017) [Norway][Grave Risk of Harm][Petition denied]

In Oliver A v Diana Pina B, --- N.Y.S.3d ----, 2017 WL 2467202, 2017 N.Y. Slip Op. 04548 (1st Dept., 2017) the parties were married in New York in 2009, and their two children were born in Norway in 2010 and 2012. The family lived in Norway and also spent months at a time living in the maternal grandmother’s apartment in New York. In 2013, after the mother was directed to leave Norway, the parties sold much of their personal property and their car, and went to the Dominican Republic. They then went to New York and stayed with the maternal grandmother. In about March 2014, the father returned to Norway to look for an apartment and job, with the expectation that the mother would follow with the children. In court, the parties both confirmed their understanding that the mother would return to Norway with the children when he was settled. However, the mother testified that, following a long history of domestic violence, including a choking incident in February 2014 where the police were called she determined not to return to Norway and told the father she would not return.  In April 2015, the father filed a petition for the return of the children pursuant to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. 

The Appellate Division observed that a petition will be denied if the parent opposing return of a child establishes “by clear and convincing evidence” the exception set forth in article 13b of the Convention (22 USC § 9003[e][2][A] )—namely, that “there is a grave risk that [the child’s] return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation” (Hague Convention art 13 [b] ). It noted that the determination of a child’s “habitual residence” requires inquiry into the “shared intent” of the parents “at the latest time that their intent was shared,” taking into account the parents’ “actions [and] declarations,” as well as “whether the evidence unequivocally points to the conclusion that the child has acclimatized to the new location and thus has acquired a new habitual residence, notwithstanding any conflict with the parents’ latest shared intent” (Mota, 692 F3d at 112, quoting Gitter v.. Gitter, 396 F3d 124, 134 [2d Cir2005] ). 

Although the record supported Family Court’s determination that the parties’ last shared intent was to return to Norway, the court did not consider the mother’s evidence that the children had been acclimatized to New York, and whether that evidence trumped the parents’ shared intent (see also Hofmann v. Sender, 716 F3d 282 [2d Cir2013] ). It concluded that the mother met her burden to show, by clear and convincing evidence, that the children’s return to Norway would result in a grave risk of harm to them (Blondin v. Dubois, 189 F3d 240, 245 [2d Cir1999] ). The mother presented detailed testimony of multiple acts of domestic abuse towards her by the father, at times in the presence of the parties’ children. She also presented corroborating evidence, including the testimony of the maternal grandmother, who witnessed two of the violent incidents, including the February 2014 incident, and testified to visible signs of injury to her daughter, which was also noted in a Domestic Incident Report. The mother also submitted copies of text messages sent by the father threatening the mother’s life. She further showed that the father had a propensity for violent abuse, as demonstrated by his violent acts, jealous rages, and, on at least two instances, forceful treatment toward the older daughter (see Ermini v. Vittori, 758 F3d 153, 164–165 [2d Cir2014]; Souratgar v. Lee, 720 F3d 96, 104 [2d Cir2013]; Blondin, 189 F3d at 247). The mother presented evidence that the nature of the abuse was such that it would inevitably resume if the parties were reunited. The father acknowledged that the parties fought over the mother’s infidelity, but broadly denied the mother’s claims, other than admitting to pushing or grabbing the mother to restrain her. His testimony, however, was entirely uncorroborated. The mother further presented evidence that, as a noncitizen of Norway, there would be minimal, if any, domestic violence resources available to her if she were to move there with the children, and that, due to her immigration status, she would not be allowed to live there for more than 90 days.

Cohen v Cohen, --- F.3d ----, 2017 WL 2453777 (8th Cir.2017) [Israel][Habitual residence][Petition denied]

         In Cohen v Cohen, --- F.3d ----, 2017 WL 2453777 (8th Cir.2017 ) the 8th Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Yaccov Cohen’s petition for return . Yaccov Cohen and Ocean Cohen were the parents of O.N.C., who was born on December 6, 2009 in Israel. During the first three years of O.N.C.’s life, the Cohens lived together as a family in Israel. Between 2010 and 2011, Yaccov served approximately one year in jail on various criminal charges. Shortly after Yaccov’s release, Ocean and two of her brothers discussed the possibility of her family moving to St. Louis to join them. However, Yaccov was subject to a Stay of Exit Order placed on his visa that prevented him from leaving Israel until he paid his accumulated debt, which included criminal fines, penalties, and restitution payments. Yaccov and Ocean decided that Ocean and O.N.C. would move to St. Louis, and that once there Ocean would work to help Yaccov pay off his debt so he could join them. Ocean testified that they intended to move permanently to the United States, while Yaccov testified that they intended to move for a period of three to five years. To prepare for the move, Yaccov and Ocean went to the United States Embassy together to submit naturalization paperwork for O.N.C. In December 2012, Ocean and O.N.C. traveled to St. Louis. Ocean promptly enrolled O.N.C. in school and speech therapy, found O.N.C. a pediatrician, and secured employment. Ocean purchased a vehicle, obtained a driver’s license, and eventually rented an apartment. As arranged, Ocean sent money to Yaccov to help pay off his debts. In May 2013 and April 2014, Ocean and O.N.C. visited Yaccov in Israel for approximately two weeks each time. During the April 2014 visit, it became apparent that the marriage was deteriorating. Shortly before Ocean and O.N.C. were scheduled to return to St. Louis, Yaccov asked a lawyer to draft a “travel agreement” requiring Ocean and O.N.C. to return to Israel if Yaccov remained unable to join them in St. Louis within six months. Ocean signed the agreement after adding a clause requiring Yaccov to “stay away from crime and not get into trouble.” If he breached this condition, Ocean and O.N.C. would not be obligated to return to Israel at the end of the six-month period. In August 2014, Yaccov was arrested for driving without a valid license. In July 2014, Ocean filed for divorce in St. Louis County. The St. Louis County Circuit Court entered a default judgment granting the divorce in March 2015, giving Ocean sole custody of O.N.C. and Yaccov supervised visitation. In September 2015, Yaccov filed a complaint requesting O.N.C.’s return under the Convention.

          The 8th Circuit observed that habitual residence is determined as of the time “immediately before the removal or retention” and depends on “past experience, not future intentions.” Silverman v. Silverman, 338 F.3d 886, 897-98 (8th Cir. 2003) Habitual residence encompasses some form of settled purpose but only requires that the familyhave a sufficient degree of continuity to be properly described as settled. However, this settled purpose need not be to stay in a new location forever. The Eighth Circuit determines settled purpose from the child’s perspective, although parental intent is also taken into account. That said, parental intent need not be completely clear, and one spouse harboring reluctance during a move does not eliminate the settled purpose from the child’s perspective. In addition to settled purpose and parental intent, relevant factors include the change in geography, the passage of time, and the acclimatization of the child to the new country.Stern v. Stern, 639 F.3d 449, 451 (8th Cir. 2011). It held that the district court did not err in finding that O.N.C.’s habitual residence was the United States. From O.N.C.’s perspective, his move to the United States resulted in a sufficient degree of continuity to be properly described as settled. The record supports that the alleged wrongful retention occurred either in July 2014, when Ocean filed for divorce, or in October 2014, when the six-month period under the travel agreement expired. At either of these junctures, O.N.C. had been living in the United States for almost two years—a significant portion of his young life. From his perspective, his family had moved to the United States indefinitely and established a home there, and he maintained considerable connections to his environment. O.N.C.’s mother obtained employment, purchased a vehicle, and rented an apartment for the family. O.N.C. attended school and speech-therapy classes, had a pediatrician, socialized with friends, and had extended family in the area. During the relevant time period, he primarily spoke English and participated in activities at his local Jewish Community Center. At the same time, little evidence established O.N.C.’s connection to Israel. In sum, O.N.C. experienced “a clear change in geography” and had acclimated to life in the United States. Moreover, the parents’ intent supported this conclusion. Both Yaccov and Ocean intended to move O.N.C. to the United States for at least three to five years, if not indefinitely. They applied together for O.N.C.’s U.S. citizenship and planned for Ocean and O.N.C. to settle in St. Louis and establish a home there until Yaccov could join them. In furtherance of this plan, Ocean established a life in St. Louis—all the while sending money to Yaccov in an effort to enable him to join his family. Both parties understood that O.N.C. would be without Yaccov for a significant period of time and that Ocean would establish a home in his absence.

         The parties disputed the circumstances under which Ocean signed the travel agreement, but Yaccov did not seek to enforce the agreement. Rather, he offered it only for the purpose of demonstrating parental intent. The 8th Circuit noted that even if Yaccov had sought to enforce the agreement, parents cannot establish the child’s habitual residence by contract. Barzilay v. Barzilay, 600 F.3d 912, 920 (8th Cir. 2010). The 8th Circuit agreed with the district court that Yaccov had not demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that O.N.C.’s habitual residence was Israel.

Alvarez v Alvarez, 2017 WL 2335600 (D. Md., 2017) [Mexico] [Federal & State Judicial Remedies] [Comity]

In Alvarez v Alvarez, 2017 WL 2335600 (D. Md., 2017) Petitioner, Enedina Alvarez filed her Verified Petition for Return of the Children to Mexico on April 12, 2017. With her Petition for Return, the Mother included a copy of a Custody Agreement dated January 6, 2016 and a copy of the Mexico Appellate Court Decision  issued September 7, 2016.5 The Father filed his Answer on May 10, 2017, denying that the Mother had legal custody over the children and denying that the children had been wrongfully removed from Mexico. By the current Motion in Limine, the Mother requests this Court to accord comity to the Mexico Hague Convention Proceedings.

The district court observed that the Fourth Circuit has noted that “though foreign judgments are not entitled to full faith and credit, comity is at the heart of the Hague Convention.” Smedley, 772 F.3d at 189 (quoting Miller, 240 F.3d at 400). The United States Supreme Court provided a description of comity with some guiding principles in Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64, 202-03 (1895). Where comity is at issue, a court begins its analysis “with an inclination to accord deference to” a foreign court’s decision of a related Hague petition. Diorinou v. Mezitis, 237 F.3d 133, 145 (2d Cir. 2001). However, a court may decline to extend comity if the foreign court “clearly misinterprets the Hague Convention, contravenes the Convention’s fundamental premises or objectives, or fails to meet a minimum standard of reasonableness.” Smedley, 772 F.3d at 189 (quoting Asvesta, 580 F.3d at 1014). In Smedley, the Fourth Circuit found that the district court had properly found the foreign court’s decision was “at least minimally reasonable,” which was sufficient to accord comity. Id. at 191.

  The Court had access only to the Mexico Appellate Court Decision  which was attached to the Petition for Return. The decision which affirmed the lower court finding, details the facts considered and the law applied. There is nothing in the decision that would indicate that the court either misinterpreted the Hague Convention or was inconsistent with its fundamental premises and objectives. The Mexico courts found that the Father had consented to the children remaining in Mexico. Such a finding was supported by the evidence, such as the custody agreement. These decisions were issued in relation to the Father’s Hague Convention Petition for Return filed in Mexico against the Mother while the children were living with the Mother in Mexico. The appellate decision affirmed a lower Mexico court order finding that the Mother had not wrongfully retained the children in Mexico, and that the Father had consented for the children to live in Mexico with the Mother.

The Father noted that the custody agreement was intended to be temporary and did not entitle the Mother to keep the children in Mexico past the January 11, 2016 scheduled return to the United States. The Mexico court, however, considered this argument in its decision. The Mexico court determined that the vacation circumstances had radically changed due to an episode of violence between the Father and the Mother. The Mexico court further noted that since the Custody Agreement was signed on January 6, 2016, and the parties had full knowledge of the scheduled return date, if it was intended to end on that date, they had the opportunity to so specify but did not. Further, as noted by the Mother in her motion, the Mexico trial court appointed a guardian ad litem for the children, ordered psychological evaluations for the parties, and received extensive testimony and evidence, including documents and affidavits. After considering all of the evidence, the Mexico trial court found that the Mother did not wrongfully retain the children in Mexico, and this finding was upheld after further extensive analysis by the Mexico appellate court. The finding is certainly at least minimally reasonable. Accordingly, the Court directed that it would  accord comity to the Mexico Hague Convention Proceedings.

The Court’s held that its deference to the Mexico Hague rulings that the Mother did not wrongfully retain the children in Mexico did not end the Court’s consideration of whether the Father’s removal of the children from Mexico required an order for their return. Rather, the Court stated it would take into account the reasons for the Mexico courts’ decisions when deciding the instant Petition for Return. There remained other evidence to be considered, including the circumstances surrounding the Father’s removal of the children from Mexico, and the Convention’s defenses and exceptions. The Court held that it would consider all material evidence to be presented at a hearing prior to making an ultimate finding on the Petition for Return.