In Leser v Berridge,--- F.3d ----, 2011 WL 6811035 (C.A.10 (Colo.)) Respondent Alena Berridge relocated to Denver, Colorado from the Czech Republic with her two children. Subsequently, Petitioner Max Joseph Leser, Respondent's ex-husband and father of the children, filed a petition in the United States District Court seeking return of the children to the Czech Republic pursuant to the Hague Convention and ICARA. The district court held a hearing on the petition, at which it addressed Respondent's motion to continue. Respondent filed the motion to continue in response to a summons for the children to attend a custody hearing in the Czech court on March 24, 2011. Respondent indicated that the Czech court at the March hearing intended to rule on Petitioner's and Respondent's cross motions for "custody rights," "contact rights," and "the right to determine residence ." The district court asked respondent: "[Y]our position with regard to this ICARA action is that it is the Czech court that should make this determination and [you are] willing to take the children back to [the Czech Republic] so that indeed that determination can be made. Is that correct?"Respondent answered affirmatively. Petitioner also agreed that the Czech court was the court where all custody issues should be heard, including whether Respondent had the right to relocate the children to the United States. The district court asked Respondent if she planned to attend the March hearing in the Czech Republic. Respondent stated she would attend if Homeland Security would allow her to leave the United States without adverse effect to her visa status. Before pronouncing its decision, the district court stated it did not believe the real issue before the court was whether Respondent had wrongfully removed her children to the United States. Rather, the district court believed the issues to be which court, the Czech court or United States court, should interpret the custody orders and determine whether Respondent violated those custody orders. Because both parents agreed the Czech court was the appropriate court to hear these issues, the district court, pursuant to the stipulation and without objection, ordered the children returned to the Czech Republic for the March 24, 2011 hearing. The district court made no finding as to wrongful removal as required by the Hague Convention. Rather than granting Respondent's motion to continue, however, the court asked the parties to submit a proposed order setting forth the court's ruling. Respondent agreed to prepare the order and stated she could submit it to Petitioner the next day. But because the parties could not agree to the wording of a proposed order, both Respondent and Petitioner filed separate proposed orders with the court. The court then drafted and entered an order granting the petition for return of the children based not on wrongful removal, but on the parties' stipulation that the children would be present for the hearing in the Czech Republic: “ The Respondent represents that the children will be present for the hearing.... Given the parties' stipulation, there was no disputed issue for this Court to determine. Accordingly, pursuant to the authority of the Court under 42 U.S.C.
11603(a), it is ordered that (1) The Petition (# 1) is granted. (2) Respondent Alena
Berridge f/k/a Alena Leserova shall return the minor children, [M.L. and O.L.], to the
jurisdiction of the Czech Republic within such time as is necessary to participate in the
Czech court's hearing on March 24, 2011. The children shall remain within the
jurisdiction of such court until directed or authorized otherwise by such court. The
return of the children shall be expeditiously reported to the appropriate Central
Authority.”
Respondent appealed. Once the children arrived in the Czech Republic, the Czech courts seized the children's passports and issued new custody orders. The Tenth Circuit dismissed the appeal as moot. On appeal, Respondent asserted the district court order was ultra vires because the district court lacked jurisdiction to grant the petition. Respondent contended ICARA authorizes United States district courts "to order the return of a child to the country of habitual residence upon a finding of wrongful removal." According to Respondent, "the [district] court lacked jurisdiction to order anything" without a finding of wrongful removal. Thus, Respondent argued the district court erred when it ordered the children to attend and participate in legal proceedings in the Czech Republic despite the fact she agreed to it. Although Respondent acknowledged the district court did not make an explicit finding of wrongful removal of the children, at oral argument Respondent asserted that in granting the petition, the district court implicitly found wrongful removal and that such a finding was clear error based on the existing Czech custody orders.
The Tenth Circuit observed that Article III of the Constitution limits a federal court's jurisdiction to "cases and controversies." Its duty is to decide actual controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions. It is a basic principle of Article III that a justiciable case or controversy must remain extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed. A case or controversy no longer exists when it is impossible to grant any effectual relief. In this appeal, Respondent requested that the court reverse the district court order and dismiss the petition for return of children, or in the alternative, remand to the district court to hold an evidentiary hearing on the issue of wrongful removal. In discussing mootness at oral argument, Respondent criticized the district court order for "granting" the petition for return of children without a finding of wrongful removal. In making that argument, Respondent attacked the merits of the district court order. The Court held that because it could not offer Respondent any relief, it could not decide whether the district court erred in ordering Respondent to return the children to the country of habitual residence without a finding of wrongful removal, where the parents stipulated that the children would return to the Czech Republic for the hearing. The district court's order, entitled "Order for Return of Children," clearly articulated the court's belief that no disputed issues existed because of the stipulation to return the children. After "granting" the petition, the court ordered Respondent to return the children to the Czech Republic to participate in the custody hearing. The order also stated the "children shall remain within the jurisdiction of such court until directed or authorized otherwise by such court." Furthermore, the district court's language that the "children shall remain within the jurisdiction of such court until directed or authorized otherwise by such court" was not contrary to the parties' stipulation. Respondent expressed concern that, without reversal of the district court order, she would be in violation of the district court order if she returned to the United States with the children. The Court believed Respondent misread the district court order. Because ICARA empowers United States courts "to determine only rights under the Convention and not the merits of any underlying child custody claims," the Czech court has jurisdiction to decide custody issues-including jurisdiction to restrict the children's travel by seizing their passports. If the Czech court determines to return the children's passports and Respondent returns to the United States with the children, it envisioned no scenario where she would be in violation of the district court order. And if the children subsequently returned to the United States, Petitioner may file a second petition for the return of children if he believes such removal to the United States to be wrongful without being subject to either issue preclusion or claim preclusion. Because it concluded that the district court made no finding as to wrongful removal and because it found no language in the district court order preventing the children from returning to
the United States upon return of their passports, any ruling on the merits "would have
no effect in the world we now inhabit but would serve only to satisfy the curiosity of the
litigants about a world that once was and is no more." Wyoming, 587 F.3d at 1253. Thus, given the unique circumstances of this case, it concluded that this action was moot. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed as moot, the district court opinion was
vacated, and the action was remanded to the district court with instructions to
dismiss the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
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