In Pennacchia v Hayes, --- Fed.Appx. ----, 2016 WL 7367848
(9th Cir., 2016) the Ninth Circuit affirmed a judgment which denied
Danilo Pennacchia’s petition for return of
his minor child to Italy. In observing that the dispute centered around the
habitual residence of the child the court pointed
out that to determine a child’s habitual residence, they first look for the
last shared, settled intent of the parents.
It explained that the district court concluded SAPH’s habitual residence
was the United States, and that in doing so, the court applied the correct legal
standard by focusing on the shared, settled intent of the parents. The district
court acknowledged that the parents’ testimony differed concerning their
intentions at the time they left the United States, but found Pennacchia’s
“testimony lacked credibility and evidence to support his position.” The Ninth Circuit indicated that it gives heavy deference
to factual determinations such as which witnesses to believe and which
documents corroborate the most credible version of disputed testimony. The
district court found Pennacchia agreed to and signed several documents, that
supported the mother’s testimony and evidenced the parties’ initial agreement
that “their living arrangement in Italy was conditional and ‘a trial period.’ It
held that the district court did not err
when it concluded that, for both parents, “the settled intention was for SAPH’s
habitual residence to be the United States.
The Ninth Circuit indicated that
for SAPH’s habitual residence to change, “the agreement between the parents and
the circumstances surrounding it must enable the court to infer a shared intent
to abandon the previous habitual residence.” Mozes, 239 F.3d at 1081. Although
it is possible for a child’s contacts standing alone to be sufficient for a
change of habitual residence, in view of
‘the absence of settled parental intent, [we] should be slow to infer from such
contacts that an earlier habitual residence has been abandoned.’ To infer
abandonment of a habitual residence by acclimatization, the ‘objective facts
[must] point unequivocally to [the child’s] ordinary or habitual residence
being in [the new country].’ It
indicated that SAPH had significant contacts in Italy, but the district court
did not find a shared parental intent to abandon her habitual residence in the
United States or that the objective facts pointed unequivocally to a change in
SAPH’s habitual residence. Pennacchia did not meet his burden on
acclimatization, and therefore, the district court did not err by concluding
SAPH’s habitual residence under the 1980 Hague Convention remains the United
States.
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