In Asumadu v. Baffoe, 2019 WL 1531793 (D. Arizona,
2019) the district court denied Petitioner Akwasi Damoah Asumadu’s motion for
necessary expenses and granted Respondent Hannah Boahemaa Baffoe’s motion for
review of the Clerk of Court’s judgment on taxation of costs as modified.
Asumadu sought recovery of “necessary transportation expenses” pursuant to 22 U.S.C. § 9007(b)(3): (1) $1,201.73 for transportation and lodging
related to the July 31, 2018 bench trial, and (2) $674.31 for transportation
and lodging related to K.A.A.’s return to Canada. The Court noted that in relevant
part, ICARA provides that: Any court ordering the return of a child...shall
order the respondent to pay necessary expenses incurred by or on behalf of the
petitioner, including...transportation costs related to the return of the
child, unless the respondent establishes that such order would be clearly
inappropriate. 22 U.S.C. 9007(b)(3). ICARA
“contemplates the use of such awards to restore a petitioner to the financial
position he or she would have been in had there been no removal or retention,
as well as to deter violations of the Hague Convention.” Aguilera v. DeLara, No. 14-01209-PHX-DGC, 2014 WL 4204947, *1 (D. Ariz. Aug.
25, 2014). As the respondent, Baffoe had the burden of establishing that an
award of fees and costs would be clearly inappropriate under the circumstances.
Baffoe asserted that an assessment of the sought-after expenses against her was
clearly inappropriate because her actions were a result of Asumadu’s physical
abuse, and that any assessment of expenses would cause her financial hardship.
Baffoe also argued that some of the sought-after expenses were unnecessary or
excessive. The Court pointed out that generally,
in determining whether expenses are ‘clearly inappropriate,’ courts have
considered the degree to which the petitioner bears responsibility for the
circumstances giving rise to the fees and costs associated with a petition.
Souratgar (citing cases). For example, awarding expenses is clearly
inappropriate where the prevailing petitioner physically abused the respondent,
see, e.g., Aguilera, 2014 WL 4204947, at *1-2, because “a [parent] should not be
required under the threat of monetary sanctions to choose between continued
abuse (mental as well as physical) and separation from a young child[.]” Guaragno v. Guaragno, No. 09-CV-187, 2010 WL 5564628, at *3 (N.D. Tex.
Oct. 19, 2010), adopted by 2011 WL 108946 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 11, 2011). The Court
previously found that “the description of events provided by Baffoe is
consistent with her having been the victim of some form of domestic violence,”
and that “Asumadu likely struck Baffoe on more than one occasion.” Under the
circumstances, the Court found that Baffoe “was faced with a cruel dilemma,
whether to continue to receive the physical abuse...from [Asumadu], or retreat and
suffer from the separation of the child.” Guaragno, 2010 WL 5564628, at *3. Accordingly, it held that an
award of expenses would be clearly inappropriate in this case.
In our International Child Abduction Blog we report Hague Convention Child Abduction Cases decided by the US Supreme Court, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, Circuit Courts of Appeals, district courts and New York State Courts. We also provide information to help legal practitioners understand the basic issues, discover what questions to ask and learn where to look for more information when there is a child abduction that crosses country boarders.
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