Miller v Miller, 2018 WL 4008779 (E.D. Tennessee, 2018) [Canada] [Habitual Residence] [Petition denied]

          In Miller v Miller, 2018 WL 4008779 (E.D. Tennessee, 2018) the district court denied the Petition of James Christopher for the return of their three children to Humboldt, Saskatchewan, Canada.

          Mr. Miller and Mrs. Miller have been married for nine years and were the biological parents of J.M.M. A.B.M., and C.J.M., who were born in 2007, 2010, and 2012, respectively. In 2013, Mr. Miller and Mrs. Miller mutually decided to move their family from Chattanooga to Humboldt, Saskatchewan, Canada, to pursue economic opportunities and to avoid creditors associated with a failed business venture that Mr. Miller had launched in Chattanooga. They also mutually envisioned the move as a “five-year plan,” which meant that after five years they planned to reevaluate their decision to relocate to Canada and determine whether they wanted to live there for a longer time.

          After the Millers completed the move in May 2013, they eventually settled into a rental house in Humboldt, where J.M.M. had his own bedroom and A.B.M. and C.J.M shared a bedroom. At the time, J.M.M. was six years old, A.B.M. was three years old, and C.J.M. was five and a half months old. The Millers began to build their life in Canada. As a family, they applied for permanent resident status. Mr. Miller obtained employment in the construction industry. Mrs. Miller also obtained employment, though she was principally the children’s caretaker. The two oldest children, J.M.M. and A.B.M., enrolled in school, while the youngest, C.J.M., remained with Mrs. Miller or under a babysitter’s supervision. Mr. Miller and Mrs. Miller also enrolled the children in Canadian healthcare plans. As for the children’s social lives and activities, the children made friends in their neighborhood and through participation in sports programs.  J.M.M. became well-known by neighbors and picked vegetables from their yards, and the children viewed a pair of local family friends, Michael and Sherry Kwasnica, as their surrogate grandparents and referred to them as “grandpa” and “grandma.” J.M.M. and A.B.M. played youth-league ice hockey, though C.J.M. was too young for it. The children also took part in numerous outdoor activities, including Ducks Unlimited,³ canoeing, camping, quidding, kayaking, and ice fishing.

          Mr. Miller sensed that Mrs. Miller was depressed and not coping well with being away from her family. Their marriage suffered, and Mr. Miller knew it was “on the rocks.” They had lengthy discussions about their marital problems, and at one point, in February 2017, Mrs. Miller told Mr. Miller that they were “headed for a divorce.”  In the throes of their capsizing marriage, Mrs. Miller was eager for her family’s company. According to Mr. Miller, she issued an ultimatum to him: she was going to leave Canada and return to Chattanooga with or without him. In response, Mr. Miller agreed that he, Mrs. Miller, and the children would leave Canada together as a family, hoping that the move would buoy their marriage. The family began preparing for the move. They rented two U-Haul trucks, which they fully loaded with their belongings—including all the children’s belongings—and they sold or gave away anything that did not fit into the trucks. They also packed the ATV and the canoe they used for quadding and canoeing, respectively. The Millers’ friends threw farewell parties for them. Their friends also helped them empty and clean their house. The Millers canceled their utilities. They returned the house keys to the owner. Mr. Miller quit his job.

          On September 19, 2017, the Millers left Canada for Chattanooga.  During the trip, Mrs. Miller asked Mr. Miller for all the passports, and he surrendered them to her.

The children arrived there with their parents on September 21 or 22. he family unloaded the children’s and Mrs. Miller’s belongings into Mrs. Miller’s mother’s basement, which became the children’s new living space, but the family’s belongings were so numerous that they had to unload some of them into local storage units. Mr. Miller did not cohabitate with Mrs. Miller in the basement; they had agreed to maintain separate residences once they arrived in Chattanooga. Mr. Miller moved in temporarily with Mr. Castle, who opened his home to him, while Mrs. Miller stayed at her mother’s house with the children.  Later in September, Mr. Miller enrolled J.M.M. and A.B.M. in school. Despite living apart from the children, Mr. Miller continued to see them at least two weeknights and most weekends. In November, Mrs. Miller told him that she wanted a divorce. Within days of receiving this news, he returned to Canada and looked into resuming his old job and the availability of the family’s old house. Afterwards, he called Mrs. Miller, and he informed her that he “wanted to go back” to Canada and “wanted the boys to come back with [him].” According to Mr. Miller, Mrs. Miller expressed her desire for the children to remain in Chattanooga. While still in Canada, Mr. Miller did “homework” on the Hague Convention, and he pursued additional legal advice specifically relating to “how ... it work[s].” He returned to Chattanooga without contacting the Saskatchewan Central Authority and requesting the children’s return to Canada under the Hague Convention.

          On March 27, 2018, Mrs. Miller filed for divorce. On the same day, Mr. Miller contacted the Saskatchewan Central Authority and applied for the children’s return to Canada. After making the trip back from Florida a few days later, Mr. Miller arrived at Mrs. Miller’s mother’s house to drop off the children. He fled from the house—with the children—after learning that a process server was waiting there to serve him. Mrs. Miller testified that Mr. Miller refused to return the children to her until she instructed the process server to leave. Finally, during the course of all these events—which occurred roughly between September 2017 and March 2018—the bulk of the evidence indicated that the children had made friends in Chattanooga. Mr. Miller resided in Canada, in the same house that he once lived in with his family.

          The district court found that Mr. Miller indisputably agreed to leave Canada and return to Chattanooga with his family, out of concern for Mrs. Millers’ mental health and out of hope to boost their marriage. The Millers’ departure from Canada had every semblance of permanency. They packed all their belongings—so many that they actually had to unload some of them into storage facilities, and they sold or gave away the belongings that they were unable to pack. They canceled the utilities. They returned the keys. Mr. Miller resigned from his job. The Millers’ friends threw farewell parties for them, with going-away gifts. Other than claiming that one of these parties was actually a birthday party and not a farewell party, Mr. Miller opposed none of these facts.          

          The district court observed that the record suggested that Mr. Miller initiated this case with the intent to forum shop—to postpone or circumvent custody-related proceedings in Tennessee and arrange for them to occur, if at all, in only one possible location, Canada.         From this evidence, the Court had a hardened conviction that Mr. Miller invoked the Hague Convention to duck the proceedings in Hamilton County Circuit Court and place Mrs. Miller in the difficult position of having to pursue those proceedings in his preferred forum, Canada. The evidence supporting the Court’s conviction of forum shopping was by itself a basis for denial of his Petition. See Jenkins, 569 F.3d at 557–58 .

          The court indicated that to establish wrongful retention under the Hague Convention, Mr. Miller must prove first by a preponderance of the evidence that Canada was the children’s country of habitual residence. Friedrich, 983 F.2d at 1400; Guevara, 180 F. Supp. 3d at 525; Hague Convention, art. 3; see generally Text and Analysis, 51 Fed. Reg. at 10504 If he succeeds in establishing that Canada is the children’s country of habitual residence, he must then prove by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) Mrs. Miller, by retaining the children in Chattanooga, breached his custody rights under Canadian law and (2) at the time of their retention, he was actually exercising those rights, or would have exercised them if not for their retention. Friedrich, 983 F.2d at 1400; Guevara, 180 F. Supp. 3d at 525; Hague Convention, art. 3.  The Sixth Circuit identified five lodestars to guide itself—and district courts in future cases—to a proper determination of a child’s habitual residence: First, habitual residence should not be determined through the “technical” rules governing legal residence or common law domicile. Instead, courts should look closely at “[t]he facts and circumstances of each case.” Second, because the Hague Convention is concerned with the habitual residence of the child, the court should consider only the child’s experience in determining habitual residence. Third, this inquiry should focus exclusively on the child’s “past experience.” “Any future plans” that the parents may have “are irrelevant to our inquiry.” Fourth, “[a] person can have only one habitual residence.” Finally, a child’s habitual residence is not determined by the nationality of the child’s primary care-giver. Only “a change in geography and the passage of time” may combine to establish a new habitual residence. Robert, 507 F.3d at 989 (quoting Friedrich, 983 F.2d at 1401–02).

          In Robert v. Tesson, the Sixth Circuit revisited the issue of habitual residence in a more complex context, addressing how to determine habitual residence “when a child has alternated residences between two or more nations.” 507 F.3d at 992. Concerned with the need for emotional and social stability in a child’s life, the Sixth Circuit adopted an “acclimatization standard.” Under this now well-known standard, “a child’s habitual residence is the nation where, at the time of their removal, the child has been present long enough to allow acclimatization, and where this presence has a ‘degree of settled purpose from the child’s perspective.’” Id. (quoting Feder v. Evans-Feder, 63 F.3d 217, 224 (3d Cir. 1995) ). The Sixth Circuit has not fitted the terms “acclimatization” or “settled purpose” with a tailored definition because every inquiry into habitual residence is a pliant, fact-specific analysis. See id. at 990 (stating that an analysis of a child’s habitual residence is not a formulaic one and requires courts to “look closely at ‘[t]he facts and circumstances of each case’ ” ; Friedrich, 983 F.2d at 1402 (“Every family dispute has its own unique set of facts.”).

           Under this fact-specific inquiry, various aspects of a child’s life may be pertinent to reaching a decision as to whether a child has become acclimated to and settled in a particular country. They include the child’s academic activities, social engagements, participation in sports programs and excursions, any personal belongings in the child’s possession when the child alternated residences, the child’s own stated desire, and any other relevant circumstances or meaningful connections with people or places. Robert, 507 F.3d at 996; see Jenkins, 569 F.3d at 556 (“[A]ll [of these things] point to the child being acclimatized.” But all of these aspects surrounding a child’s life in a new country, depending on the time of their occurrence, are not necessarily proper for consideration in an analysis under the acclimatization standard.

          A lynchpin of any inquiry under this standard is a determination of the time of the wrongful removal—or in this case, the time of the wrongful retention—because it lays the parameters for the Court’s analysis. See Robert, 507 F.3d at 993 (“[A] child’s habitual residence is the country where, at the time of their removal, the child has been present long enough to allow acclimatization[.]”; see also Panteleris v. Panteleris, 601 Fed.Appx. 345, 349 (6th Cir. 2015) (“[O]ur court’s precedent instructs courts to look back in time from the period of wrongful retention, not forward.”); Friedrich, 983 F.2d at 1401 (“[T]he court must focus on the child, not the parents, and examine past experience, not future intentions.”). In other words, the date of the children’s retention in Chattanooga operates as an expiration point, which means that the Court, when determining the children’s habitual residence, has to limit its review to the social and familial aspects of the children’s lives that developed before that point and not beyond it.

          Mr. Miller contended that Mrs. Miller began wrongfully retaining the children in Chattanooga on November 17, 2017, because on this date he expressed a desire to have the children return to Canada with him and Mrs. Miller expressed her desire for them to remain in Chattanooga with her. All the evidence led the Court to only one possible conclusion: the first time that Mr. Miller expressed anything weightier than tacit grumblings about the children’s presence in Chattanooga was when he pursued their return to Canada on March 27, 2018, by filing his application with the Saskatchewan Central Authority. And on this date—the same date when Mrs. Miller filed for divorce—Mrs. Miller had also announced her unequivocal intention to retain the children in Chattanooga through state custody proceedings.

          Having determined the date of the children’s retention, the Court—when it looked backward from that date—had no doubt that the children were present in Chattanooga long enough to become acclimated and settled. With the exception of C.J.M., who was too young, they were enrolled in Chattanooga’s school system, and J.M.M. became a member of the Science Olympiad Club and attended a playground-renovation project meeting. See Ahmed, 867 F.3d at 687 (“ ‘[A]cademic activities’ are ‘highly suggestive of acclimatization[.]’ ” They were doing well in school and showed no behavioral problems. See Jenkins, 569 F.3d at 556 (holding that a child was acclimated to his new country partly because he “was attending preschool ... and was, by all first-person accounts, doing well in that environment”).  They also had family in the area and interacted with them.

          The district court found that Mr. Miller failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Canada was the children’s habitual residence at the time of their retention in Chattanooga—whether the Court views the date of retention as March 27, 2018, or November 17, 2017. Their retention in Chattanooga was therefore not “wrongful” as the Hague Convention defines the term.

Flores v Alvardo, 2018 WL 3715753 (W.D. North Carolina, 2018) [El Salvador] [Habitual Residence] [Petition granted]

          In Flores v Alvardo, 2018 WL 3715753 (W.D. North Carolina, 2018) the district court found that Petitioner established by preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case warranting the return of V.S.G.M., a minor to El Salvador. Respondent failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence an affirmative defense proving a grave risk of harm to V.S.G.M. 

          Petitioner and Respondent married in El Salvador in December of 2012. In 2013, Respondent gave birth to a child in San Salvador, El Salvador. As Petitioner tells it, he lived with Respondent and Child in a familial residence in El Salvador until Respondent left with the Child in January of 2017. When Respondent left, she originally told Petitioner that she and the Child were going to stay with her aunts for a week in La Union, El Salvador. The truth, however, was that Respondent took the Child to the United States after disconnecting her cell phone.  Petitioner found out Respondent’s location after receiving a video showing her crossing the United States border with the Child. Petitioner promptly filed an abduction report to the local authorities. Petitioner and Respondent remain married today and no court in either El Salvador or the United States has entered an order regarding custody.

The Child was removed from El Salvador to the United States on or about on or about January 8, 2017. The Petitioner filed the petition on August 25, 2017, which is within one year of the Child’s removal from El Salvador. At the hearing, the parties also stipulated that the Minor’s habitual residence is in El Salvador.

          The Court found that Petitioner succeeded in establishing his prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence. It also found that Respondent failed to prove an affirmative defense under the Convention’s grave risk exception or failure-to-exercise-custody exception. Respondent presented no other evidence besides her own testimony and what allegations she posited were more geared to the best interest of the Child rather than the relevant query before the Court.

          The Court rejected Respondents Article 13(a) defense, Failure to Exercise Custody Rights. Respondent’s argument was that no custody order granted Petitioner custody rights over the Child. However, Petitioner successfully refuted this argument. Under El Salvador law, the parents of a child share custody jointly unless a custody order finds otherwise. Family Code, arts. 206, 207. Respondent admitted that no custody order exists that altered the default joint custody rule. As such, Respondent’s argument cut against the very assertion she attempted to make.

          Respondent also argued that returning the Child to El Salvador constituted a grave risk of physical or psychological harm. Respondent alleged that Petitioner habitually smoked marijuana and drank heavily around the Child. At one point, Respondent claimed that the Child was caught with a bag of marijuana in his mouth. Respondent also claimed that Petitioner endangered the Child by drinking and driving with him in the car. At least once, Respondent stated that the Child was in the car when Petitioner was involved in a minor car accident. Finally, Respondent claimed that Petitioner would argue with her and began kicking her out of the house.  Respondent states that Petitioner would “violently” remove her from the hoes when she refused to go without her son.

          The district Court found Respondent’s claims general and unsubstantiated. Respondent provided no other evidence besides her word, which the Court found less than credible. While Respondent stated that neighbors and a nanny witnessed the violence Petitioner subjected her to, she presented none of these parties as witnesses during the hearing. Respondent admitted that Petitioner showed no physical violence toward the Child.

          The Court was faced with Respondent’s testimony of drug and alcohol use against Petitioner’s testimony of a happy family that was abruptly separated by Respondent’s wrongful removal of the Child. Respondent faced a higher evidentiary standard than Petitioner and quite simply failed to produce sufficient evidence to corroborate her claims.

Asumadu v Baffoe, 2018 WL 3957696 (D. Arizona, 2018)[Canada] [Habitual residence] [Petition granted in part and denied in part]

          In Asumadu v Baffoe, 2018 WL 3957696 (D. Arizona, 2018) the district court granted in part and denied in part Asumadu’s Petition for Return of Children to Canada. Based on the Court’s finding that A.K.A.’s habitual residence was the United States, Asumadu did not make the showing required under the Hague Convention for a mandatory return of A.K.A. to Canada.  However, based on the Court’s finding that K.A.A.’s habitual residence was Canada and that Baffoe had not established by the requisite levels of proof that any of the narrow exceptions apply, Asumadu made the showing required for a mandatory return of K.A.A. to Canada.

          Asumadu and Baffoe were both born in Ghana. Asumadu immigrated to Canada in 1995 and was a Canadian citizen. Baffoe immigrated to the United States in 2004 and was a United States citizen. In 2005, the couple began a long-distance relationship. Although the couple lived apart for the majority of their relationship, Baffoe periodically traveled to Canada to visit Asumadu and visa-versa. In September 2016, Baffoe relocated to Canada, where she lived with Asumadu until returning to the United States in January 2018. Asumadu and Baffoe had two children together. Their son, K.A.A., was born on February 6, 2008, and their daughter, A.K.A., was born on July 20, 2011. Both children were born in the United States.

          K.A.A. lived in the United States with Baffoe until January 2010, when he moved to Canada to live with Asumadu.  K.A.A. lived there since January 2010. Baffoe contended that between 2010 and 2015 she made three unsuccessful trips to Canada to retrieve K.A.A. and return him to the United States. Baffoe testified that her efforts were thwarted by her fears of violent and physical retribution by Asumadu. Baffoe failed to take any legal action to have K.A.A. returned, testifying that doing so would be contrary to Ghanan custom and cultural norms. According to Baffoe, consistent with these cultural norms, she sought assistance from Asumadu’s parents and the elders of their village in Ghana. She was instructed to be patient.

          A.K.A., always lived in the United States with Baffoe. In 2016, Baffoe was in contact with Asumadu’s father, who advised her that Asumadu had changed and promised that if she joined Asumadu in Canada he would not mistreat her. In September 2016, Baffoe and A.K.A. made the trip to Canada. According to Baffoe, her plan was to give Asumadu a chance to prove that he would not be abusive. If he behaved, Baffoe intended to stay; if not, she intended to return to the United States with both children. Baffoe claimed that, upon her arrival in Canada, she immediately discovered that K.A.A. had suffered an untreated serious head injury. In support, she offered a picture K.A.A.’s head showing a small scarred area.

          Baffoe, Asumadu, and their two children resided together in Canada from September 2016 until January 2018. During that period, Baffoe testified that there were three serious incidents of domestic disturbance arising out of seemingly minor disagreements. In January 2018, while Asumadu was at work, Baffoe left Canada for the United States with both children. She did not tell Asumadu she was leaving or where she was going. After Asumadu located Baffoe in Arizona, he filed a petition for return of his two minor children, K.A.A. and A.K.A., to Canada.

          The district court found that Asumadu had not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the parties had a shared intent for A.K.A. to habitually reside in Canada. After A.K.A. was born in July 2011, Baffoe and A.K.A. lived together in the United States until November 2015, when they visited Petitioner for ten to eleven weeks. Baffoe and A.K.A. made the 2015 visit and returned without abandoning their residence in the United States. The two made another lengthy trip to Canada in September 2016 on a trial basis. The Court credited Baffoe’s testimony that it was not her intent to make Canada her and A.K.A.’s permanent home unless and until she was convinced that Asumadu no longer would be abusive. Shortly after living with Asumadu during this trip, Baffoe concluded that he had not changed and began planning her return to the United States. Although she lived in Canada for more than a year, there was never a shared intent for A.K.A. to live anywhere other than with Baffoe. As such, A.K.A.’s habitual residence remained the United States. Because Asumadu had not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that A.K.A.’s habitual residence was Canada, his petition was denied as to this child. See Papakosmas v. Papakosmas, 483 F.3d 617, 621 (9th Cir. 2007).

          On the other had the court found that Asumadu had proven, that the parties had a shared intent for K.A.A. to habitually reside in Canada. For example, in January 2010, Asumadu travelled to the United States and moved K.A.A. to Canada. K.A.A. lived in Canada with Asumadu for eight years until he was removed by Baffoe in 2018. Although Baffoe contended Asumadu moved K.A.A. to Canada without her consent, the evidence did not support her contention. For instance, Baffoe signed an authorization for Asumadu to receive the Canadian tax benefit because K.A.A. lived with him in Canada. Baffoe also visited Canada multiple times after K.A.A. moved there, but until 2018 always returned to the United States without him. Nor did she inform law enforcement or file a petition under the Hague Convention seeking return of K.A.A. to the United States. Moreno v. Zank, 895 F.3d 917, 924-925 (6th Cir. 2018) (“[I]f Convention procedures are not fully pursued when a child is first abducted, it makes little sense to categorically permit later self-help abduction in the other direction, after the child has been acclimatized in the second country.”). Instead, Baffoe first raised her alleged lack of consent in the context of this proceeding, eight years after K.A.A. moved to Canada. The Court therefore found that the parties agreed in 2010 for K.A.A. to live in Canada with Asumadu and that his habitual residence is Canada.

          Baffoe raised the grave risk exception, which provides that the Court “is not bound to order the return of the child if ... there is a grave risk that his or her return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation.” Id. at 13(b), 19 I.L.M. at 1502. The party raising this exception must prove by clear and convincing evidence that returning the child to his habitual residence would expose him to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place him in an intolerable situation. Gonzalez, 194 F. Supp. 3d at 901. Baffoe claimed that Asumadu’s threats and acts of violence toward her committed in the presence of the children demonstrate that the children would be exposed to a grave risk of physical or psychological harm.  Despite the lack of corroborative evidence, the Court found he description of events provided by Baffoe was consistent with her having been the victim of some form of domestic violence. It was difficult to determine the full nature of the violence, but the Court found Asumadu likely struck Baffoe on more than one occasion. The Court, did not find the allegation that Asumadu put a knife to Baffoe’s throat credible. Nevertheless, physical abuse or threats towards a spouse are not the same as physical abuse or threats towards a child. See Nunez Escudero v. Tice-Menley, 58 F.3d 374, 375-78 (8th Cir. 1995); Tabacchi v. Harrison, No. 99-C-4130, 2000 WL 190576, at *12-16 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 10, 2000) (“Although [Petitioner’s abusive] behavior toward his wife is unacceptable, to qualify as a grave risk of harm under the convention, the risk must be to the child.”). Given the narrowness of this exception, the Court could not conclude that Asumadu’s acts of violence against Baffoe satisfied the grave risk requirement under the Convention. It held that      Baffoe had not proven by clear and convincing evidence that there was a grave risk that the return of K.A.A. would expose him to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place him in an intolerable situation.

          Baffoe argued that the consent or acquiescence exception applies. The Court found that the parties’ actions surrounding the removal were not consistent with a consensual removal of the children. Based on this evidence, Baffoe had not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Asumadu consented to K.A.A.’s removal to the United States from Canada.

Saltos v Severino, 2018 WL 3586274 (D. New Jersey, 2018) [Ecuador] [Habitual Residence] [Petition granted]

          In Saltos v Severino, 2018 WL 3586274 (D. New Jersey, 2018) the district court granted Petitioner Ronald Javier Velez Saltos’ petition for the return of the seven-year-old minor child, R.C., to Ecuador.

         Petitioner was the father of R.C., a citizen of Ecuador, and was living in Ecuador. Respondent was R.C.’s mother, a citizen of Ecuador, and residing in New Jersey with her new husband, Dalton Mejia, who was an American citizen. Petitioner and Respondent were married in Ecuador on February 13, 2010, and had R.C. on July 7, 2011. R.C. was born in Ecuador and lived there for the first five years of her life. The parties separated in February 2012, and later divorced on December 7, 2016.

          On November 23, 2012, the parties entered into a custody agreement, whereby R.C. would live with Respondent, and Petitioner would have visitation rights from 5:30 p.m. to 9:30 p.m. on weekdays, and noon to 5:00 p.m. on the last Sunday of each month. An Ecuadorian Court approved the custody agreement the following day. (Petitioner testified that, because R.C. was very young at the time of the custody agreement, the Ecuadorian Court thought it would be best for her to be in the primary care of her mother. Petitioner spent time with R.C. under the terms of the agreement, which included seeing R.C. at school and for birthdays and holidays, as well as taking R.C. to visit his three other children from a prior marriage. Petitioner was also required to pay child support to R.C. and his other three children in the amount of $800 per month. Petitioner’s child support payments for R.C. were made through a judicial process pursuant to a court order. Under Ecuadorian law, Petitioner was prohibited from leaving the country because he was paying child support through a court order.  At some point after the separation, Petitioner declared bankruptcy and, based on financial status and inability to make the child support payments, the amount that Petitioner paid in child support was reduced. Because Petitioner fell behind on his payments, Respondent alleges that Petitioner owed about $5,000.00 in child support arrears. Respondent also claims that Petitioner cancelled R.C.’s medical insurance, which Petitioner clarified was automatically cancelled after he declared bankruptcy, and that the child support payments were supposed to cover health insurance.

          In early April 2017, Respondent informed Petitioner that she wanted to take R.C. on vacation to Disney World in Orlando, Florida from April 23, 2017 to May 1, 2017, and wanted Petitioner to authorize the travel. According to Petitioner, he expressed concerns that, if something were to happen to R.C., he would be unable to travel to the United States because the court-mandated child support payments prevented him from travelling. Petitioner would only agree to authorize Respondent and R.C.’s trip if Respondent removed her claim with the court that he owed $5,000.00 in child support payments, and agree to let Petitioner pay child support directly to Respondent instead of through the court. Respondent indicated that she reluctantly agreed, and the parties completed the necessary exit permit for R.C. to travel from April 23, 2017 to May 1, 2017. Before the trip to Orlando, Petitioner paid a portion of R.C.’s school registration fees, and Respondent enrolled R.C. for the upcoming school year in Ecuador.

          On April 23, 2017, Respondent and R.C. traveled to the United States from Ecuador. On April 30, 2017, Petitioner received an anonymous phone call informing him that Respondent intended on remaining in the United States with R.C. On May 1, 2017, Respondent called Petitioner and explained that her then-boyfriend, Dalton Mejia, proposed, and that Respondent will be staying in the United States with R.C. permanently, in order to give R.C. more opportunities for her future. At no time prior to this phone call did Respondent tell Petitioner that she intended to get married in the United States or that she intended on taking R.C. to New Jersey. Respondent and R.C. then traveled from Orlando, Florida to Union, New Jersey, where they still reside today. R.C. was five at the time. R.C. completed first grade in New Jersey and was enrolled at Hannah Caldwell School, where she has been excelling both academically and socially.

          Since May 1, 2017, Petitioner was unable to contact R.C. Petitioner filed this emergency petition with the Court on May 1, 2018. Service of the emergency petition was made on Respondent, and the Court issued an Order to Show Cause why R.C. should not be returned to Ecuador.

          The district court found that the parties agreed that R.C. would travel to the United States from April 21, 2017 until May 1, 2017. Petitioner testified that he expected R.C. to return to Ecuador on May 1, 2017. Therefore, the date the allegedly wrongful retention occurred was May 1, 2017. The parties did not dispute that R.C.’s habitual residence prior to her allegedly wrongful retention was Ecuador, which was bolstered by the fact that R.C.’s family, school, and entire life was in Ecuador prior to her trip to Orlando, Florida. Therefore, it found that R.C. was a habitual resident of Ecuador before her allegedly wrongful retention in the United States.

         

          According to Petitioner, Respondent’s wrongful retention violated his custody rights under Ecuadorian law, which hold that both parents have joint custody unless there is a court order to the contrary. There was no court order that terminated Petitioner’s joint custody rights. Additionally, Petitioner asserted that R.C.’s wrongful retention violated his rights under the custody agreement entered into by the parties on November 23, 2012. Respondent conceded that Petitioner had joint custody based on this custody agreement. Petitioner was unable to exercise these rights or otherwise contact R.C. since May 1, 2017, when R.C. was retained in the United States without his consent. Therefore, Petitioner had shown by a preponderance of the evidence that his custody rights were breached by R.C.’s allegedly wrongful retention in the United States.  Based on the facts, it was clear to the Court that Petitioner was sufficiently exercising his custody rights at the time of R.C.’s retention in the United States. Therefore, Petitioner made out a prima facie case that Respondent wrongfully retained R.C. in the United States in violation of the Hague Convention.

          Respondent asserted several of the affirmative defenses recognized by the Hague Convention. These affirmative defenses included: (1) that R.C. had been here for at least a year and was well settled in her home and school in New Jersey, where she was excelling socially and academically; (2) that R.C. was of sufficient maturity and has articulated her desire to stay in the United States and did not want to return to Ecuador; (3) that Petitioner was not exercising his custody rights because he did not visit or care for R.C. as articulated in the custody agreement; and (4) that R.C. would be exposed to a “grave risk of harm” if she is returned to Ecuador, based on (a) the possible abuse she may face under Petitioner’s care and (b) the human rights concerns associated with Ecuador, including the sexual exploitation of minors. The Court rejected each affirmative defense.

          The Court found Petitioner filed this emergency petition on May 1, 2018. Petitioner argued in his brief that the wrongful retention began on May 2, 2018, and that his emergency petition was therefore filed less than a year later. However, the date of R.C.’s wrongful retention was May 1, 2017. Therefore, R.C.’s wrongful retention fells into the year or more required for Respondent to invoke Article 12’s “well-settled” exception. Nevertheless, Respondent had not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that R.C. is “well-settled” within the meaning of Article 12. Upon finding that a year or more has passed, the Court must weigh several factors “informative of the child’s connection with his or her environment,” including the age of the child, the stability of the child’s residence in the new environment, whether the child attends school or day care consistently, whether the child attends church regularly, the stability of the mother’s employment or other means of support, whether the child has friends and relatives in the area, and to what extent the child has maintained any ties to the country of habitual residence. Silvestri v. Oliva, 403 F. Supp. 2d 378, 387–88 (D.N.J. 2005).

          While several of these factors weighed in favor of Respondent there were very serious concerns that weighed against applying the “well-settled” exception to this case. First, the majority of R.C.’s family lived in Ecuador, including her grandparents who R.C. remained in contact with. Second, R.C. wa at the very young age of seven, and her testimony is to be weighed accordingly. Furthermore, R.C.’s desire to remain in the United States was in part based on her living with, and under the influence of, Respondent. Notably, when R.C. was asked what she would want to do if her mother returned to Ecuador, R.C. responded, “I will go back to Ecuador because wherever [Respondent] is, I am. I am with her because we are a team.” This exchange, along with others, indicated to the Court that R.C.’s preference for New Jersey had less to do with her life in the United States, and more to do with being close to her mother. Last, and perhaps most important, Respondent and R.C. currently had an uncertain immigration status. Both Respondent and R.C. came to this country on a travel visa to Orlando, Florida, which was for a limited period of eight days.  Respondent’s Husband, Dalton Mejia, is an American citizen and was currently filing relative petitions for Respondent and R.C. to remain in the United States. However, the Court wasn’t convinced that Respondent and R.C.’s ability to remain in this country is certain, as they were vulnerable to deportation in the event that their relative petitions are denied. This fact, in conjunction with the other factors weighing against Respondent, outweighed those factors supporting the application of the “well-settled” exception. Therefore, the Court finds that Article 12’s “well-settled” exception did not apply to this case.

          For similar reasons as those expressed above, the Court found that Article 13’s second-to-last paragraph, also known as the “wishes of the child” exception, does not apply to this case either.  R.C. testified about how much she likes New Jersey, that she does not miss Ecuador, and that she does not want to return to Ecuador.  The most specific example R.C. gave as to why she does not want to return to Ecuador is that her half-sisters will tease her and pull her hair when they visit her. R.C. also testified that she wants to remain in the United States because she prefers her school here. However, much like the minor child in Tsai-Yi Yang, 499 F.3d at 279, R.C.’s testimony is more focused on why she prefers New Jersey, rather than why she specifically objects to returning to Ecuador.

          The Court also found that Respondent had not set forth sufficient facts to support the application of the exception articulated in Article 13(a) of the Hague Convention.

          A thorough review of the record in this case and Respondent’s arguments compelled the Court to conclude that there was no clear and convincing evidence that R.C. would suffer a grave risk of physical or psychological harm should she be returned to Ecuador. First, R.C. was not at risk of serious abuse or neglect if she returned to Ecuador. Respondent claimed that she had always been R.C.’s primary caretaker and to remove R.C. to Petitioner, whom she had not formed the same type of bond with, would cause R.C. great distress. R.C. also testified that she is afraid to return to Ecuador because she would no longer live with her mother. The distress caused from separating a child from their parent with whom they have a strong bond is generally not considered a grave psychological harm in cases brought under the Hague Convention. See, e.g., Carranco v. Munoz, Civil Action No. 12-7299, 2013 WL 150760, at *9 (D.N.J. Jan. 14, 2013) The Court rejected  Respondent’s arguments regarding R.C.’s risk of serious abuse or neglect in Ecuador. The Court also found that returning R.C. to Ecuador would not result in any risk of “imminent danger.” Respondent argues that the conditions in Ecuador make the country “not a safe place for a child.” For support, Respondent pointed to a 2017 Human Rights Report of Ecuador which reported high amounts of sexual abuse and exploitation of children.  While this report wass disturbing, it was not relevant to the Court’s determination, as it did not directly affect R.C. See Baxter, 423 F.3d at 373. Respondent conceded that “there is no direct evidence” to suggest that R.C. was or will be exposed to sexual abuse or exploitation in her hometown in Ecuador. Furthermore, the unfortunate fact that sexual abuse or exploitation can occur in Ecuador, like it can occur in almost any country, does not rise to the level of imminent danger articulated by the “grave risk of harm,” i.e., a war zone or the outbreak of a deadly virus. See Baxter, 423 F.3d at 373. Respondent also argues that the school system in the United States offers more opportunity than that of Ecuador. However, the loss of economic or educational opportunities alone does not rise to the level of “a grave risk of harm.” See Baxter, 423 F.3d at 373 (quoting Blondin v. Dubois, 238 F.3d 153, 162 (2d Cir.2001)). Therefore, the Court rejects both of Respondent’s arguments regarding R.C.’s risk of “imminent danger,” and found that Respondent cannot meet Article 13(b)’s “grave risk of harm” requirements as to apply the exception to this case.

Finally, even if any of the exceptions articulated above could be met, the Court would still act in its discretion to remove R.C., as almost all of Respondent’s arguments were focused on custody and the best interest of the child. 

Flores v Elias-Arata, 2018 WL 3495865 (M.D. Florida, 2018) [Peru] [Habitual Residence] [Petition granted]

          In Flores v Elias-Arata, 2018 WL 3495865 (M.D. Florida, 2018) the district court granted the petition for the return of the child, J.C.O.  from the United States to Peru.

          The Father and Mother, both citizens of Peru, first met when they were fifteen years old. Now in their late twenties, the parties have had a relationship over the last thirteen years with frequent break-ups and reconciliations. During the course of their relationship, the parties had a son together, who was born in Peru in January of 2013. After the Child’s birth, during the time periods when the Mother and Father were not a couple, the parties divided the parenting responsibilities and the Child spent time with both parents. The Mother lived in an apartment owned by the Father’s mother, and the Father lived with his parents. Both the Mother and Father worked, and a nanny, Ana Victoria Sanchez del Castillo, cared for the Child during the week.

           The Mother had long desired to move to the United States. Her mother was a United States citizen living in Fernandina Beach, Florida, and her father, who lived in Miami, Florida, has been a legal permanent resident of the United States since 2013. In 2010, during a time when the Mother and Father were not in a relationship, the Mother began the process of obtaining legal permanent resident status in the United States. When the Mother and Father reconciled a few months later, the Mother informed the Father of her pending permanent resident application. Later, when the Mother was pregnant with the Child, the Mother reminded the Father of her application for permanent resident status in the United States. In 2016, the parties agreed to include the Child in the Mother’s application for permanent resident status, and the maternal grandfather assisted with this process. The United States granted the Mother’s petition at some point in early 2017.

          At some point the parties agreed that the Child would travel with the Mother to the United States in June of 2017. In May of 2017, the Mother purchased a round-trip ticket from Lima, Peru, to the United States, and back to Peru. In addition, on May 15, 2017, the Mother and Father executed and notarized a form titled “Consent for Children Travelling Abroad.” The Form states that in accordance with Peruvian law, the Father and Mother “hereby give consent for their 4-year old son [the Child] to travel from Peru to the United States of America and back by air (Avianca Airline).”  According to the Consent to Travel Form: It is hereby stated for the record that the Child will travel with [the Mother]; she will take care of the Child during the stay in the destination above. Likewise, the appearing parties declare to know that this consent is valid for 90 (Ninety) Days after the issuance date. The minor will travel to the United States on June 13, 2017 and return to Peru on August 25, 2017.

          On June 10, 2017, the Mother moved out of the apartment where she was living. On June 12, 2017, the day before she was set to depart for the United States with the Child, the Mother filed a domestic violence claim against the father. On June 13, 2017, the Mother and Child traveled to the United States and have not returned to Peru since, remaining instead at the Child’s maternal grandmother’s house in Fernandina Beach, Florida.

          Soon after moving in with the maternal grandmother, the Mother furnished a room for the Child, started working, and enrolled the Child in daycare, all with the Father’s knowledge and without his objection. Indeed, the Father communicated frequently with the Mother using Facebook Messenger, and stayed in regular contact with the Child. However, in July of 2017, a disagreement arose between the parties regarding the Child’s future and as a result, the Mother filed a petition in Peru for the “Change of Residence of a Minor.”  In the Change of Residence Petition, the Mother petitioned the Peruvian court for “the change of regular residency of [the Child], who is four (04) years old, changing his address from the Republic of Peru to the United States of North America.” After the Mother and Child failed to return to Peru in August as scheduled, the Father filed a request on October 2, 2017, for the international return of the Child with the Peruvian Central Authority for the application of the Hague Convention. The Verified Petition followed in January. In the Verified Petition, the Father contends that the Mother either wrongfully removed the Child from Peru under false pretenses, or is unlawfully retaining the Child in the United States without the Father’s consent.

          The district court found that prior to June 13, 2017, the Child had lived in Peru his entire life. As such, unless the Child’s habitual residence changed when he came to the United States in June of 2017, the Child’s habitual residence remained in Peru. See Mozes, 239 F.3d at 1077 (instructing that a change in habitual residence “requires an actual change in geography” .The Father maintained that the Child’s habitual residence wa Peru because the Child’s visit to the United States was intended to be for only a limited period of time, and the Mother unilaterally decided to keep the Child in the United States. The Mother contended that the Child’s habitual residence changed to the United States because, according to her, the parties shared a settled intent that the Child live in the United States as of June 13, 2017. In addition, the Mother asserted that return was not warranted, even if the Child’s habitual residence was Peru, because the Father consented or acquiesced to the Child living in the United States.

          The Father maintained that the Mother first told him that she would not return to Peru with the Child via Facebook in July of 2017. The Father tried to convince the Mother to return on the agreed upon date, but the Mother refused, and at some point, in July or August, the Mother told the Father that she had filed the Change of Residence Petition. According to the Father, the Mother refused to return to Peru unless the Father signed an agreement allowing the Child to live in the United States permanently, which he initially refused to do. Eventually, in an attempt to gain the return of the Child, the Father told the Mother he would sign the paperwork allowing the Child to live in the United States, but only if the Mother brought the Child back to Peru first. The Father testified at the Hearing that he was desperate and did not actually intend to sign the paperwork had the Mother returned to Peru. When it became clear to him that the Mother was not going to let the Child return, the Father attempted to obtain a visa to travel to the United States but his application was denied. The Father then sought a remedy under the Hague Convention.  The father insisted that he told the Mother on many occasions prior to the trip that he did not consent to the Child living permanently in the United States, and according to the Father, the parties had an ongoing disagreement about the coordination of the Child’s studies between the United States and Peru.

          The Mother maintained that the purpose of the June 13, 2017 trip to the United States was to move here permanently with the Child. According to the Mother, throughout the course of her relationship with the Father, she was always open about her pending application for permanent resident status and her intention to move to the United States. In addition, the Mother testified that after she became pregnant she reminded the Father of her intention to live in the United States, and he told her: “‘Yes. Don’t worry about that. We will arrange that.’” Indeed, the Mother asserts that she and the Father agreed to include the Child in her permanent resident application because they intended for the Child to live in the United States.

          As to the June 13, 2017 trip, the Mother testified that she told the Father that the purpose of this trip was to move to the United States. According to the Mother, she quit her job, disposed of her furniture, and moved out of the apartment because she was moving to the United States permanently with the Child. Likewise, the Mother obtained a job in the United States, enrolled the Child in daycare here, and furnished a room for the Child at the grandmother’s house in Fernandina Beach, Florida. The Mother insisted that the Father’s awareness of these activities demonstrated his knowledge of the move’s permanence. Specifically, the Mother testified that the “initial plan” was “that my [C]hild would remain permanently here [in the United States], begin school, and that I would visit him with my [C]hild in Peru. So, the initial plan was that the [C]hild would live here and ... we would coordinate the visits to Peru in accordance to his schooling and my job.”

Although the parties’ testimony conflicted, the documents submitted into evidence during the Hearing supported only one version of events, that the parties never reached an agreement, either before or after the Child’s departure from Peru, about where the Child should live.

In addition to the Facebook messages, the Mother’s contention that the parties shared a settled intention for the Child to permanently relocate to the United States was contradicted by her actions in filing a domestic violence claim against the Father the day before she was scheduled to depart with the Child to the United States.

Based on the evidence, the Court was convinced that the Father never agreed to allow the Child to live in the United States. Unable to convince the Father to see things her way, the Mother, who had long planned to move to the United States, unilaterally decided that the Child would remain with her in the United States. While the Mother may have formed this intention well before she left Peru with the Child, in the absence of shared parental intent, the Child’s habitual residence remained in Peru. Thus, return of the Child was mandated under the Convention unless the Mother could establish an affirmative defense. See Baran, 526 F.3d at 1344. However, the Mother’s affirmative defenses failed for the same reasons−the Father never agreed that the Child could move to the United States.

The Mother’s argument that the Father consented to the Child’s permanent relocation to the United States was primarily based on his agreement with and participation in obtaining permanent resident status for the Child. However, in light of the Father’s testimony, as corroborated by the Facebook messages, it was apparent that the Father did not believe that obtaining this status for the Child required the Child to live in the United States.

 Likewise, the Mother’s argument that the Father subsequently acquiesced to the Child’s change of residence was not supported by the evidence.

Because the parties never shared a settled mutual intent to relocate the Child to the United States, the Child’s habitual residence remained in Peru. Likewise, as the Father neither consented to a permanent move prior to the June 13, 2017 departure, nor acquiesced to a permanent retention after the departure, the Mother failed to establish an affirmative defense. Accordingly, the Hague Convention mandated the prompt return of the Child to Peru to allow the Child’s country of habitual residence to resolve the ongoing custody dispute between the parties.

Crossan v Clohessy, 2018 WL 3614635 (W.D. Louisiana, 2018)[Ireland] [Rights of Custody] [Petition granted]

          In Crossan v Clohessy, 2018 WL 3614635 (W.D. Louisiana, 2018) Keith Crossan, a citizen of Ireland, sought return of his minor child M.T.C.C. to Ireland after the child’s mother, Louise Clohessy, removed M.T.C.C. to the United States without Mr. Crossan’s knowledge or consent.

          The district court observed that under the Convention, wrongful removal occurs when (1) a parent takes or retains the child outside of his country of habitual residence, (2) the removal/retention breaches the custody rights of the non-removing parent under the laws of that country, and (3) the non-removing parent was exercising or attempting to exercise his custody rights at the time of the removal or retention, or would have exercised those rights but for the wrongful removal or retention. Sealed Appellant v. Sealed Appellee, 394 F.3d 338, 343 (5th Cir. 2004); Larbie v. Larbie, 690 F.3d 295, 307 (5th Cir. 2012). It is the petitioner’s burden to establish these factors by a preponderance of the evidence. Larbie, 690 F.3d at 307; 22 U.S.C. § 9003(e)(1).

           The district court found that under Irish law, unmarried fathers such as Mr. Crossan are not considered custodians of right but may attain that status under the “cohabitating provisions” of The Guardianship of Infants Act of 1964, as amended by The Children and Family Relationships Act of 2015. Under the Guardianship of Infants Act, as amended, an unmarried father obtains rights of guardianship if he was a cohabitant with the mother for at least twelve consecutive months, three of which occur “at any time after the birth of the child ... during which both the father and mother have lived with the child.” Guardianship of Infants Act, as amended, § 6B (3). This amendment is effective prospectively from January 18, 2016. For purposes of the Convention as well and assuming that the non-removing parent has custody rights, that parent must also have been exercising or attempting to exercise his guardianship rights by keeping regular contact with the child at the time of removal.

          The parties agreed that M.T.C.C. was removed from Ireland, his habitual residence, on August 28, 2017, by his mother, Louise Clohessy and without the permission of his father, Keith Crossan.  The district court found that that Mr. Crossan had established by a preponderance of the evidence that the cohabitating relationship between these individuals existed from September of 2015 until Ms. Clohessy removed her belongings and those of the minor child from the home in Carrick-on-Shannon in June of 2017. The period of time in which Mr. Crossan was renovating the home in Carrick-on-Shannon and Ms. Clohessy was recuperating from childbirth at her parents’ home did not represent a break in their consecutive cohabitation. Nor was the period of cohabitation interrupted by any of Ms. Clohessy’s visits to her parents’ home from November 2016 to June 2017, during which period witness testimony and documentary evidence reflect that she considered and held Carrick-on-Shannon out as her family residence with M.T.C.C. and Mr. Crossan. The fact of the parties’ ongoing co-habitating relationship throughout this time was amply supported by Facebook messages between Mr. Crossan and Ms. Clohessy referring to their shared home and status as a family, as cited in the court’s bench ruling; the fact that M.T.C.C.’s birth certificate, completed in December 2016, lists Carrick-on-Shannon as the current residence for both parents; the fact that Ms. Clohessy received correspondence from the Department of Social Welfare Services at the address in Carrick-on-Shannon as late as February 2018; the fact that M.T.C.C. received his immunizations, through May 2017, in Carrick-on-Shannon and had a prescription filled there in February 2017; and the fact that the house at Carrick-on-Shannon was fully furnished for an infant, to the point where multiple witnesses testified that Ms. Clohessy required a truck to move out their belongings in June 2017. Additionally, neighbors of Ms. Clohessy and Mr. Crossan in Carrick-on-Shannon testified that they interacted with the family during this period and that Ms. Clohessy acted as if Carrick-on-Shannon was her residence. On the other hand, Ms. Clohessy relied largely on her own account and that of her parents to establish that she and M.T.C.C. were actually residing in County Limerick during this period. For reasons more fully explained in our bench ruling, we determined that the Clohessys’ accounts were contradicted by the documentary evidence and tainted by the negative feelings they expressed toward Mr. Crossan.

          The parties did not appear to dispute that Mr. Crossan was exercising his rights as a father, and we likewise find that he did so through his contact with his child from birth through August 28, 2017, when Ms. Clohessy prevented any further contact by removing the child from the country without Mr. Crossan’s knowledge or consent and concealing his whereabouts.

          The court found that  Mr. Crossan had shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that at the time of M.T.C.C.’s removal from Ireland that he (Mr. Crossan) had and was exercising rights of guardianship over M.T.C.C. under the cohabitating provisions of The Guardianship of Infants Act of 1964, as amended by the Children and Family Relationships Act of 2015, (1) because he had cohabitated with Louise Clohessy for at least twelve consecutive months from January 18, 2016 (when the cohabitation provisions of The Guardianship of Infants Act became effective), onward, and for at least three consecutive months within that period with both Ms. Clohessy and their child, M.T.C.C., and (2) because he was attempting to exercise his guardianship rights under Irish law by keeping regular contact with the child at the time of removal.

          Therefore Ms. Clohessy’s removal of M.T.C.C. from Ireland to the United States violated the Hague Convention and ICARA, under which Mr. Crossan instituted proceedings in this court, and Mr. Crossan’s petition for return of the child had to be granted