[Germany][Petition granted][Grave risk of Harm][Ameliorative measures]
In our International Child Abduction Blog we report Hague Convention Child Abduction Cases decided by the US Supreme Court, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, Circuit Courts of Appeals, district courts and New York State Courts. We also provide information to help legal practitioners understand the basic issues, discover what questions to ask and learn where to look for more information when there is a child abduction that crosses country boarders.
[Germany][Petition granted][Grave risk of Harm][Ameliorative measures]
[Colombia] [Petition granted]
In Ruiz v
Zinsou, 2022 WL 3931454, (N.D. Georgia, 2022)the District Court found that
in 2014, Petitioner was deported to
Colombia. Sometime in 2015, Respondent moved with K.P.C.A. to Colombia to live
with the Petitioner. Though Petitioner and Respondent never married, the family
lived together in MedellĂn, Colombia from sometime in 2015 until May 28,
2021.Colombian law requires that, before a child leaves Colombia with one
parent or a third party, the parent remaining in Colombia sign a “Permiso Para
Salir Del Pais.” This document authorizes the child to be out of the country
for the dates specified in the document. Petitioner signed and notarized a
Permiso Para Salir Del Pais authorizing K.P.C.A. to travel to the United States
from May 28, 2021 through June 17, 2021. At the point that Petitioner signed
the travel authorization, it was clear that the trip was to be no more than
three-weeks. However, at some point between May 28 and June 17, Respondent
decided not to return as planned. She cancelled her ticket and stayed in the
United States with K.P.C.A. In October 2021, it became clear to Petitioner that
Respondent had no intentions of ever returning. This petition was filed on June
9, 2022 pursuant to Article 3 of the Convention. The
Court found that the retention of K.P.C.A. in the United States as of June 18,
2021 was wrongful. It further finds that Respondent did not meet her burden of
proving an affirmative defense under the Convention. K.P.C.A. did not
articulate a particularized objection to returning to Colombia sufficient to
meet the mature-child-objection defense. Respondent failed to meet her burden
as to this affirmative defense. Respondent failed to meet her burden
concerning consent. Nor was there evidence presented of formal acquiescence,
such as testimony in a judicial proceeding or a convincing written renunciation
of rights. Respondent raised the well-settled
defense, but the Court found that it is not available to her as a matter of law
since Petitioner filed his Petition within one year of the wrongful retention.
Pursuant to Article 13(b) of the Convention, courts are not required to order a
child to return where “there is a grave risk that his or her return would
expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child
in an intolerable situation.” Respondent bears the burden of proving this
defense by clear and convincing evidence. Respondent put forth minimal evidence
in support. She submitted the United States State Department’s travel advisory
for Colombia as well as some evidence that Petitioner had previous issues with
drugs and alcohol. Both Respondent and K.P.C.A. stated that they had never
witnessed any crime or act of terrorism in Colombia, or any reasonable risk of
harm at the hands of Petitioner. This did not meet the standard to show that
K.P.C.A. would be in a grave risk of harm if returned to Colombia.
[Germany] [Petition granted] [Rights of custody]
In Vonnahme v. Lugo, 2022 WL 3701578, (District Court, D. Nevada, 2022) the couple separated in 2014, and Vonnahme pursued a divorce in Cuba in 2015. That divorce was granted, and the decree established that “patria potestas” (parental authority) would remain with both parties, while “guardia y cuidada” (custody and care) would remain with Lugo. Later that year, Vonnahme applied to have the divorce recognized in Germany. The Dusseldorf High Regional Court recognized the Cuban decree to the extent that the parties were divorced, but it did not mention custody rights. The parties’ Cuban divorce decree stated that “[t]he custody and care of the minor daughter of the spouses ... remain with the mother, with parental authority remaining with both parents” and goes on to explain that the father must pay child support and “may visit the daughter as he pleases, without disturbing the times of sleep and meals; he can go for a walk with her.” The original Spanish-language version of the decree makes Lugo responsible for the “guardia y cuidado” of the child, while “patria potestas” remains with both parents. The court observed that American courts have explained that patria potestas, a term of art in many Spanish-speaking countries, “has consistently and rightly been recognized as a right of custody under the Hague Convention.” Cuba’s recognition of patria potestas similarly qualified. Cuban law defines “patria potestas” to include extensive rights and duties, including the duties to provide children with a stable home, arrange for their education, care for their property, and represent them in judicial actions. It also refers to “guardia y cuidado” rights when parents no longer live together and uses the term to define which parent the child will more permanently live with. But awarding one parent the rights to guardianship and care of a child does not terminate the other parent’s patria potestas rights. The Cuban Family Code also states that, in the event of divorce, the “court will grant patria potestas, establishing as a rule that both parents shall retain it over their minors.” Lugo and Vonnahme’s Cuban decree, recognized joint patria potestas rights while also specifying some visitation rights. So, this decree does not “eliminate any basis for relying on patria potestas,” because the decree itself recognizes Vonnahme’s patria potestas rights. The court found that, either under operation of Germany’s automatic assumption of joint custody or Germany’s implicit recognition of the Cuban divorce decree, Vonnahme had custody rights under the Hague Convention.
[Australia.] [Petition denied]
In Livingstone v Livingstone, 2022 WL 3699832 (District Court, D. Colorado,2022) the Court concluded the children were habitually resident in Australia at the time of their removal. Petitioner failed to establish the other two elements of a prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence. First, Petitioner failed to show what custody rights, if any, he retained under the Australian Family Law Act while the protection order was in effect—a prerequisite to establishing that the children’s removal was in breach of such rights. No evidence or testimony was offered at the hearing as to this matter. Given the breadth of the protection order, the Court declined to assume that such remaining rights were substantial enough that Respondent’s removal of the children breached his rights. Second, Petitioner failed to show he was exercising his custody rights at the time of removal. The Court acknowledged that a petitioner’s burden of proof on this element is minimal in the ordinary case. See Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060, 1066 (6th Cir. 1996) (“[I]f a person has valid custody rights to a child under the law of the country of the child’s habitual residence, that person cannot fail to ‘exercise’ those custody rights under the Hague Convention short of acts that constitute clear and unequivocal abandonment of the child.”). And the Court found there was no evidence that Petitioner ever clearly and unequivocally declared any intention to abandon the children. However, in addition to failing specify what custody rights he still retained, Petitioner also failed to explain how he could exercise such rights while maintaining one hundred meters of separation between him and where the children live, work, or frequent, and without contacting them or arranging for others to contact them (other than through a lawyer) for a five-year period. Given this looming impossibility, the Court found that Petitioner’s contention that he would continue to be exercising his custody rights but for Respondent’s wrongful removal and retention of the children was a fiction. In fact, because of the protection order, he was no longer exercising his custody rights at the time of removal.
[Canada] [Fathers Petition for return granted] [ Motion for Petitioner’s Attorney’s Fees and Costs Pursuant to 22 USC § 9007(b)(3)]
In Romanov v. Soto, 2022 WL 3646325, (District Court, M.D. Florida, 2022) the Court found that under ICARA, the Father was presumptively entitled to a recovery of necessary expenses in this action because the Court ordered the return of the Children to Canada. The Mother had not presented any evidence that she believed in good faith that her actions were legal or justified. The Mother did not submit financial information and did not prove that any award of fees would be clearly inappropriate because of her financial circumstances. Rath v. Marcoski, 898 F.3d 1306, 1311 (11th Cir. 2018)) The Mother has not produced a financial affidavit. Nevertheless, the Court held that it may reconsider the Mother’s financial circumstances when determining the amount of fees to be awarded. The Mother could provide the Court with additional information regarding the question of whether awarding the full amount of the Father’s requested fees and expenses would be clearly inappropriate. The Mother had not demonstrated that any award of expenses would be clearly inappropriate. Therefore, the Court found that the Motion should be granted to the extent that the Father was entitled to an award of necessary expenses, “including court costs, legal fees, ... and transportation costs related to the return of the [Children].” 22 U.S.C. § 9007(b)(3). The Court directed the parties to confer as to the amount of expenses to be awarded, and the Father was given forty-five days to file a supplemental motion.
[Honduras] [Habitual residence] [Petition granted]
In Lopez v Ash, 2022 WL 3328888 (W.D. Louisiana, 2022) the court granted the petition of Soguey Aracely Ariza Lopez (“Ariza”) against Respondent Kelly Christopher Ash (“Ash”) for the return MCAA to Honduras. MCAA was born in 2012 in Utila, Honduras. Ash was not the biological father of MCAA, but his name appeared on the child’s birth certificate.. Ash moved back to the United States in 2017. On November 8, 2021, Ash and Ariza entered into a Settlement Agreement (“the Settlement Agreement”) in which Ariza was granted full custody of the child and Ash was prohibited from taking the child out of the country without prior authorization from Ariza. The Settlement Agreement explicitly authorized Ash to travel with the child to Tegucigalpa, Honduras, on November 9 and 10, 2021, to go to the American Embassy then return to Roaton, Bay Islands. The Settlement Agreement prohibited Ash from removing the child from the country at this time without prior authorization. Ash traveled with MCAA to the capital city on November 9, 2021. By November 11, 2022, Ash had not return to Roatan with MCAA. Ariza had little to no contact with MCAA at this time Ariza confirmed, that the child was removed from the country on November 9, 2022. Prior to his removal by Ash in November 2021, MCAA lived his entire life in Honduras.. The court found that the habitual residence of the child was Honduras. It rejected Ash’s argument that Ariza was not exercising custody rights at the time of removal and that she consented or acquiesced to MCAA’s removal. These arguments were unsupported. The Court reached a similar conclusion as to Ash’s argument that the child objected to leaving the United States and wished to remain with his father. It found that any apprehension the child had towards returning to Honduras had been fostered by Ash in an attempt to keep the child in the United States. Ash contended that MCAA should not return to Honduras because he was in grave risk of serious injury or harm there. The Court found his argument lacking in particularity and legitimacy. Ash could not point to a specific, real risk to the child but instead painted the whole of Honduras as an unsafe place with a bad educational system[Italy][Habitual residence][Petition granted]
In Guzzo v Hansen, 2022 WL
3081159 (E.D. Missouri, 2022) the district court granted the
fathers Complaint for Return. In a judgment dated May 4, 2021 the Spanish court awarded: (1) the parties
joint parental authority; (2) Mother primary physical custody; and (3) Father
progressive visitation. Additionally, the Custody Judgement provided: “Neither
party may transfer [Child] outside the national territory without the express
consent of the other or, failing that, judicial authorization.” On September
13, 2021, Mother and Child travelled to St. Charles, Missouri. Mother
understood when she left Spain that she did not have the Spanish court’s
permission to remove Child from the country as required by the Custody
Judgment. Two days later, Mother emailed Father informing him they had moved. Father
reported Child’s removal to the local authorities in Seville on September 17,
2021. Approximately one month later, he filed a request in Spanish court for
changes to the Custody Judgment, as well as a formal request for Child’s return
under the Hague Convention. After a hearing, at which Mother was not present
but was represented by an attorney, the Spanish court determined that Mother’s
“actions were contrary to law and illegal,” provisionally withdrew Mother’s
custody rights, and granted Father exclusive custody. The Court found that prior
to being brought to the United States, Child’s country of habitual residence
was Spain. Mother claimed that returning Child to Spain would expose him to a
grave risk of psychological harm or otherwise place him in an intolerable
situation. Mother argued
that returning Child to Spain would cause him psychological harm because: (1)
Child “does not wish to return to Spain and lacks any sufficient degree of
accommodations there”; (2) Father “does not have a permanent home or stable,
long-term employment in Spain”; (3) Mother “is unable to live or work in Spain
because she is unable to secure the proper immigration status to do so”; and
(4) return to Spain “would subject [Child] to … tumultuous custody
proceedings[.]” The Court
found Mother failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that return to
Spain will expose Child to a grave risk of harm.
Second, she claimed that Child objects to being returned and
has attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take
his views into account. The Court found Mother failed to
demonstrate that Child expressed a particularized objection to returning to
Spain. He did not communicate dislike for Spain so much as a preference for the
United States. Child complained about Spain’s weather and stated that there was
“nothing to do there,” but he also reported that the home he shared with Mother
was “awesome” and there were “a lot of things to do there.” Child’s general
complaints about Spain did not suggest that “living in that country would be
unacceptable.”
The district court granted the fathers Complaint for Return. In a judgment dated May 4, 2021 the Spanish court awarded: (1) the parties joint parental authority; (2) Mother primary physical custody; and (3) Father progressive visitation. Additionally, the Custody Judgement provided: “Neither party may transfer [Child] outside the national territory without the express consent of the other or, failing that, judicial authorization.” On September 13, 2021, Mother and Child travelled to St. Charles, Missouri. Mother understood when she left Spain that she did not have the Spanish court’s permission to remove Child from the country as required by the Custody Judgment. Two days later, Mother emailed Father informing him they had moved. Father reported Child’s removal to the local authorities in Seville on September 17, 2021. Approximately one month later, he filed a request in Spanish court for changes to the Custody Judgment, as well as a formal request for Child’s return under the Hague Convention. After a hearing, at which Mother was not present but was represented by an attorney, the Spanish court determined that Mother’s “actions were contrary to law and illegal,” provisionally withdrew Mother’s custody rights, and granted Father exclusive custody. The Court found that prior to being brought to the United States, Child’s country of habitual residence was Spain. Mother claimed that returning Child to Spain would expose him to a grave risk of psychological harm or otherwise place him in an intolerable situation. Mother argued that returning Child to Spain would cause him psychological harm because: (1) Child “does not wish to return to Spain and lacks any sufficient degree of accommodations there”; (2) Father “does not have a permanent home or stable, long-term employment in Spain”; (3) Mother “is unable to live or work in Spain because she is unable to secure the proper immigration status to do so”; and (4) return to Spain “would subject [Child] to … tumultuous custody proceedings[.]” The Court found Mother failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that return to Spain will expose Child to a grave risk of harm.
Second, she claimed that Child objects to being returned and has attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take his views into account. The Court found Mother failed to demonstrate that Child expressed a particularized objection to returning to Spain. He did not communicate dislike for Spain so much as a preference for the United States. Child complained about Spain’s weather and stated that there was “nothing to do there,” but he also reported that the home he shared with Mother was “awesome” and there were “a lot of things to do there.” Child’s general complaints about Spain did not suggest that “living in that country would be unacceptable.”