In Mata-Cabello v . Thula, 2023 WL 3142323 (1st Cir., 2023) Taili Tee Thula appealed the denial of her request for an award of attorney’s fees, pursuant to the inherent power of the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, and the costs of translation services, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1920(6).
The challenges on appeal arose out of a pair
of actions -- one filed by Thula in the Puerto Rico courts and one filed by her
husband, Asdrúbal Simón Mata-Cabello (“Mata-Cabello”), in federal court. Thula’s
action in the Puerto Rico courts began when she filed a complaint against
Mata-Cabello, then residing in Colombia, in the Court of First Instance of the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico on February 20, 2020. The complaint alleged causes
of action for divorce under Article 96 of Puerto Rico’s Civil Code, P.R. Laws Ann.
tit. 31, § 321, custody of the couple’s two minor children,
child support, alimony, and “the division of the marital estate,” as well as
claims under Puerto Rico’s Domestic Abuse Prevention and Intervention Act, P.R. Laws Ann.
tit. 8, § 601 et seq. Thula
sought further relief under the Convention on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction, done at The Hague on October 25, 1980 (“Hague
Convention”), and its implementing legislation, the International Child
Abduction Remedies Act (“ICARA”), 22 § U.S.C. 9001 et seq. In response,
Mata-Cabello moved to dismiss Thula’s divorce and custody claims on the ground
that the Court of First Instance lacked jurisdiction under Puerto Rico law to
hear them because Thula had not been a resident of Puerto Rico for one full
year prior to filing her complaint. Mata-Cabello also requested relief pursuant
to ICARA and the Hague Convention. Specifically, he requested that the minor
children be returned to their “habitual place of residence” in Colombia so that
“the divorce and minor custody proceedings” could be resolved in accord with
Colombia law. On October 30, 2020, the Court of First Instance granted the
motion to dismiss, explaining that it lacked jurisdiction “to hear the merits
of the divorce [c]omplaint filed by [Thula].” The Court of First Instance also
dismissed Thula’s other claims. In doing so, the court did not address the
parties’ requests for relief under ICARA and the Hague Convention. Thula filed
a timely motion for reconsideration that was denied.
On December 4, 2020, Mata-Cabello filed a
petition under ICARA and the Hague Convention in the United States District
Court for the District of Puerto Rico that named Thula as the respondent. The
petition requested that the District Court order the return of the minor
children to their “habitual residence” in Colombia for resolution of the custody
proceedings under Colombia law. Mata-Cabello asserted in the petition that the
District Court had jurisdiction over the Hague Convention petition under 22 U.S.C. § 9003. That provision grants “[t]he courts of the States and the United States
district courts ... concurrent original jurisdiction of actions arising under
the [Hague] Convention.”
The Puerto Rico Court of Appeals, on March
12, 2021, decided Thula’s appeal from the Court of First Instance’s dismissal.
It ruled that the Court of First Instance had erred by “dismissing [Thula’s]
complaint in its totality, without having addressed and resolved all the claims
under [its] consideration.” Accordingly, the Puerto Rico Court of Appeals
ordered the Court of First Instance to: determine whether it has jurisdiction
over the matter [or] the authority to address the whole matter under the
protection of the Hague Convention [ ] and [ICARA]. If said forum were to
determine that it has the authority over the above cited laws, it shall
resolve: (1) whether Puerto Rico is the habitual resident of the minor children
procreated by the parties, and (2) establish a provisional legal precedent
related to custody, parent-child relationships, provisional child support and expenses.
Following the Puerto Rico Court of Appeals’ ruling, the District Court entered
the following order on April 23, 2021: It has come to the Court’s attention
that the Puerto Rico Court of Appeals has entered its ruling on [Thula’s]
appeal related to the instant matter. [Thula] is to file the resolution entered
by the Puerto Rico Court of Appeals dated April 5, 2021 in case no.
KLAN202001039 by April 28, 2021. A [c]ertified translation of said document is
to be filed no later than May 3, 2021.
After the District Court received the
translated resolution, it ruled on May 4, 2021, that it would abstain because
the ICARA and Hague Convention remedies “ha[d] been raised by both parties,
[were] currently being litigated in the Puerto Rico [c]ourts for the past
fourteen (14) months and [were] included in the [r]esolution of the Puerto Rico
Court of Appeals.” Accordingly, the District Court dismissed Mata-Cabello’s
action without prejudice on abstention grounds. Following the District Court’s
order dismissing Mata-Cabello’s action, on May 18, 2021, Thula filed a “Motion
for an Award of Attorney Fees and Costs to Prevailing Party Pursuant to Rule 54 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
Applicable Law.” The motion sought an award of $28,937.50 in attorney’s fees
and costs totaling $5,480.20 for “[i]nterpreter [s]ervices to translate Spanish
[d]ocuments and copies” under 28 U.S.C. §
1920(6). Thula identified 22 U.S.C. §
9007(b) as the statute “entitling [her] to the award
[of attorney’s fees].” Thula also moved, in the alternative, for the attorney’s
fees to be awarded based on the inherent power of the District Court. She did
so due to what she contended was Mata-Cabello’s “bad faith” filing of the
action against her in the District Court, given that a district court has the
inherent power to order a losing party to pay the “prevailing party” attorney’s
fees, even in the absence of a statutory provision, when the losing party has
“acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons,” Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness
Soc’y,
421 U.S. 240, 258-59 (1975).
As to the costs of translation services,
Thula moved for them pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1920(6). That statute provides that “[a] judge or
clerk of any court of the United States may tax as costs the following: ...
Compensation of court appointed experts, compensation of interpreters, and
salaries, fees, expenses, and costs of special interpretation services under
section 1828 of this title.”
On June 8, 2021, the District Court denied
Thula’s request for the award of attorney’s fees because: (1) 22 U.S.C. §
9007(b) “provides for fees only to a prevailing
petitioner; the section does not provide for fees to a prevailing respondent,
and indeed, does not even mention prevailing respondents”; and (2)
Mata-Cabello’s action in federal court was “brought in good The District
Court at that same time also denied Thula’s request for the costs of
translation services. It did so based on Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd., 566 U.S. 560
(2012), in which the Supreme Court of the United
States held that “costs stemming from the translation of written documents do
not qualify as [’]compensation of interpreters,[’] as that term is used in 28 U.S.C. §
1920(6), and, therefore, may not be taxed as costs
against a non-prevailing party. The First Circuit affirmed for the same reasons.
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