Wrongful retention of child in Florida at end of
agreed upon visitation. Petitioner had rights of custody under the doctrine of
Patria Potestas. Although the now settled child exception was available the
court preferred to return the child in view of his unsettled immigration
status. Additionally, the court would exercise its Aequitable discretion under Article 18
to order the childs return.
Monday, May 23, 2016
Cillikova v Cillik 2016 WL 541134 (D.NJ, 2016) [Slovak Republic] [Fees & Expenses]
Petitioners motion granted $3148.96 in travel, lodging, and translation
expenses. Petitioners motion seeking to recover $158,955.75 in attorneys fees
and costs denied without prejudice, subject to the receipt of additional
submissions. The vast majority of
$13,734.25 in costs asserted by Petitioners counsel comprised claimed
WestLaw charges. Petitioner failed to submit sufficient evidence of their
necessity or reasonableness and the claimed $13,329.15 appeared facially
excessive, particularly for practitioners with experience in this discrete
field of law. Petitioner given time to submit evidence going to the necessity
and reasonableness of the hours worked by her counsel, including submission of
an unredacted itemized billing record for in camera review, her counsels
claimed hourly rates, and the asserted research expenses. Respondent given an
opportunity to raise specific challenges to this evidence (other than the
portions of the attorney invoices that the Court reviews in camera). The Court
granted additional time for the Respondent to submit evidence regarding his
financial circumstances and for either party to report any disposition as to former
joint property or other assets.
Albani v Albani 2016 WL 158583 (SD Cal, 2016) [Mexico] [Petition denied]
Child’s Habitual residence was United
States. Well settled defense also established
Gwiazdowski v. Gwiazdowska, 2015 WL 1514436 (E.D.N.Y.) [Poland] [Petition denied] [Now Settled Defense Established]
In Gwiazdowski v. Gwiazdowska, 2015 WL
1514436 (E.D.N.Y.) on February 11, 2014, Cezary Gwiazdowski
("Cezary") brought a petition pursuant to the Hague Convention for
the return to Poland of his two children, K.G. and M.G., who resided in the
United States with Anetta Gwiazdowska
("Anetta"), his wife and the biological mother of the two
children, since April 2011.
The District Court found that the
petitioner made out a prima facie case for return and addressed the Article 12
defense in its opinion. It observed that under Article 12 of the Hague
Convention, if a Hague Convention petition is filed more than one year after
the wrongful removal, the Court "shall ... order the return of the child,
unless it is demonstrated that the child is now settled in its new
environment." The respondent bears the burden of establishing this defense by a preponderance
of the evidence. 22 U.S.C. §9003(e)(2)(B).
Though the Convention does not define the term "settled," the
Second Circuit has stated that the term "should be viewed to mean that the
child has significant emotional and physical
connections demonstrating security, stability, and permanence in its new
environment." Lozano v. Alvarez, 697 F.3d 41, 56 (2d Cir.2012).
The Court held a hearing, and with consent from both parties, the Court
interviewed K.G. (age 10) and M.G. (age 8) in camera outside of the presence of
the parties and their respective counsel. It observed that this procedure
"is consistent with those adopted by district courts in Hague Convention
cases." Haimdas v. Haimdas, 720 F.Supp.2d 183, 187 n. 1 (E.D.N.Y.2010).
The district court found that in July
2003, the couple married in a Polish Catholic church in Brooklyn, New York, a
choice they made so that Anetta's mother, who lived in Maspeth, New York, could
attend the wedding. The couple returned to Elblag, Poland soon afterwards and
had two sons, K.G., born in 2004, and M.G., born in 2008. On April 11, 2011, Anetta left Poland with
the children and moved into her mother's home in Maspeth. Anetta did not inform Cezary that
she was taking the children or obtain his consent to do so. For the first several months following her
departure, Cezary held out hope that she would return to Poland and resume
their life together, though the couple spoke infrequently on the phone.
However, in early 2012, Anetta informed Cezary that she did not intend to
return to Poland and wanted to file for
divorce. Cezary traveled to New York in March 2012 to speak to her and the
children in person. When Anetta refused to meet with him or let him speak with
the children, Cezary consulted a lawyer
and filed a custody petition in Family Court.
The Family Court proceedings apparently languished until late 2013, when
Anetta filed her own custody petition in Family Court.. During the pendency of
the Family Court proceedings, Cezary was permitted to speak with Anetta and the
children three times a week over Skype,
and was permitted to occasionally visit the children in the United States. Since March 2012, he visited the children approximately five times
a year. On June 10, 2014, the Department of State sent a letter to the Family
Court informing the court that Cezary had filed an application with the
Department of State for the return of the children. The letter further informed
the Family Court that, under Article 16 of the Hague Convention, the court
should defer decision on the merits of rights of custody until Cezary's Hague
Convention petition was adjudicated. See Hague Convention art. 16 ("After
receiving notice of a wrongful removal or retention of a child in the sense of
Article 3, the judicial or administrative authorities of the Contracting State
to which the child has been removed or in which it has been retained shall not
decide on the merits of rights of custody until it has been determined that the
child is not to be returned under this Convention...."). Despite this letter, on December 17, 2014,
the Family Court entered a final order in Anetta's custody proceeding. The
order granted legal and physical custody of the children to Anetta, and granted
Cezary visitation with the children on a schedule set by the Family Court,
subject to the condition that "[Cezary] must not remove the children
outside and beyond the United States" and that "[t]he children's
passports are to remain in the possession of [Anetta]." In February 2015, Cezary traveled to the
United States and went on vacation with the children to the Pocono Mountains in
Pennsylvania. Cezary plans to return to the United States in April 2015 for
M.G.'s First Holy Communion. When he is in Poland, Cezary speaks with his
children on Skype every Monday, Wednesday, and Friday, though he complained
that "maybe 30 percent of [the time] they are not available.”
The Court concluded that Anetta's
removal of the children in April 2011 was
wrongful under the Hague Convention. The children were habitually
resident in Poland at the time of the
removal. Cezary was exercising his
custody rights at that time, since Cezary and
Anetta lived together and had joint custody of the children at the time
of removal. Anetta's removal of the children appeared to have been in breach of
Cezary's custody rights under Polish law. See
In re Skrodzki, 642 F.Supp.2d 108, 115 (E.D.N.Y.2007).
However, the Court found that
Anetta established that the children are now settled in the United
States. The petition was filed almost three years after Anetta's removal of the
children from Poland, and the "settled" defense was available to Anetta.
See Hague Convention, art. 12. It
observed that to determine whether a child a settled, a district court must
consider a variety of factors,
including:(1) the age of the child; (2) the stability of the child's
residence in the new environment; (3)
whether the child attends school or day care consistently; (4) whether the child attends church [or
participates in other community or
extracurricular school activities] regularly; (5) the respondent's
employment and financial stability; (6)
whether the child has friends and relatives in the new area; and (7) the immigration status of
the child and the respondent. Lozano,
697 F.3d at 57.
The Court addressed these factors in
turn. If noted that the stability of a child's residence "plays a significant
role in the 'settled' inquiry." In re D.T.J., 956 F.Supp.2d 523, 535
(S.D.N.Y.2013). K.G. and M.G. lived at Anetta's mother's house since moving to
the United States and felt comfortable
in their home environment. The Court
concluded that the children had a stable and happy home in New York. Cezary acknowledged that the children had a
group of friends in school here, a fact confirmed by K.G. and M.G. during the
in camera interview. By contrast, the children did not appear to have
significant attachments to Poland. Further, while the children had several relatives who lived
in Poland, Anetta testified that most of their family members live eight hours
from Elblag by train and Cezary did not dispute this fact. It was therefore
unclear how much contact the children would have with these family members even
if they lived with Cezary in Elblag.
K.G. and M.G. attended Saint
Stanislaus Kostka School in Maspeth, New York, since August 2011. The children's school records
demonstrated that they were in regular attendance and received good grades. In
addition, both parents acknowledged that K.G. and M.G. regularly attended
church in the United States. K.G. received his First Holy Communion in 2014,
while M.G. was scheduled to receive his First Holy Communion in April. K.G., who was 10 years old, and M.G., who was
8, were old enough to form meaningful attachments to their new environment. See In re Robinson, 983 F.Supp. 1339, 1345
(D.Colo.1997) (concluding that 10-year-old and 6-year-old "are old enough
to allow meaningful connections to the new environment to evolve ...[while]
children of a very young age are not").
Anetta was not currently employed in the United States but was attending
university and studying to receive a medical license in the United States. It
was unclear whether Anetta would be able to find employment once she completed
her studies or how much she would earn if she does. However, Anetta testified that her mother and
stepfather, who collectively earned approximately $200,000 a year, significantly
contributed towards the children's expenses.
As the Second Circuit has noted, "[t]he importance of a child's
immigration status [for the 'settled' defense] will inevitably vary for
innumerable reasons, including: the likelihood that the child will be able to
acquire legal status or otherwise remain in the United States, the child's age,
and the extent to which the child will be harmed by her inability to receive
certain government benefits." Lozano, 697 F.3d at 57. Anetta and the children were currently
residing in the United States on F1 non-immigrant visas, which allowed them to remain in the United
States as long as Anetta remained in school. The fact that the children were here legally was a
positive factor in the "settled" analysis. See Demaj v. Sakaj, No. 3:09-CV-255, 2013 WL
1131418, at *23 (D.Conn. Mar. 18, 2013) (concluding that mother and children's
approval for nonimmigrant U visas supported the mother's "settled"
defense). However, the Court was unclear whether Anetta would be able to obtain
legal residence in the United States
when her student visa ends, and Anetta presented no evidence of how she intended to pursue legal status upon
completion of her studies. After weighing all of these factors, the Court
concluded that Anetta met her burden of
demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that the children were
settled in their current environment. The Court
found that the elements of the Article 12 defense had been met.
The Court also considered whether it should
exercise its discretion to repatriate K.G. and M.G. notwithstanding that Anetta
has established an affirmative defense under the Hague Convention. See Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060, 1067
(6th Cir.1996) ("[A] federal court retains, and should use when appropriate,
the discretion to return a child, despite the existence of a defense, if return
would further the aims of the Convention."). Since there was no evidence
that Anetta's relocation to the United States was motivated by a desire to
remove the children to a jurisdiction
more favorable to her custody claims, the Court saw no reason to do so.
See In
re D.T.J., 956 F.Supp.2d at 549 (declining to exercise discretion to
remove children, notwithstanding
affirmative defense, because there was no evidence that mother removed children
to obtain a more favorable custody ruling). Cezary's petition was denied.
Panteleris v. Panteleris, --- Fed.Appx. ----, 2015 WL 468197(6th Cir., 2015)[Australia] [Petition granted] [Habitual Residence]
In Panteleris v. Panteleris, ---
Fed.Appx. ----, 2015 WL 468197(6th Cir., 2015), the Sixth Circuit affirmed the
district court's grant of plaintiff Anthimos Panteleris's petition for return
of their three children to Australia.
Anthimos Panteleris, a citizen of
Australia, and Aalison Panteleris, a citizen of the United States, married in
the United States in 2005. Four months after their first child was born in the
United States, the family traveled to Australia in March 2007. The Pantelerises
had two more children in Australia. The family lived together in Australia
until they traveled to the United States in March 2012. Mr. Panteleris testified that the family
intended to take a six-month to one-year extended vacation to visit Ms.
Panteleris's family in Ohio, similar to a holiday Mr. Panteleris had taken with
his parents when he was four years old. Ms. Panteleris testified that the
family had relocated to the United States indefinitely. At the time of their
arrival in the United States, the children were aged five years, three years,
and four months. In April 2012, after visiting Hawaii for several weeks, the
family arrived in Ms. Panteleris's hometown of Salem, Ohio. They moved into an
apartment with a one-year lease. Ms. Panteleris obtained employment and Mr.
Panteleris, who could not work under his visa status, stayed at home with the
children. The eldest two children were enrolled in school. Ms. Panteleris later
quit her job in November 2012, and the family's savings were largely depleted.
On December 2, 2012, Mr. Panteleris returned to Australia alone. Mr. Panteleris
testified that he returned to Australia to obtain employment and prepare for
the family's return to Australia. According to Mr. Panteleris, after he secured
a stable job, he requested in May 2013 that Ms. Panteleris and the children
return to Australia but Ms. Panteleris refused.
Mr. Panteleris filed a petition for
return of the children in United States district court on February 28, 2014.
The court held a five-hour evidentiary hearing. In July 2014, the court issued
an opinion and order granting plaintiff's petition and ordering the children
returned to Australia. There the Sixth Circuit granted defendant's emergency
motion to stay the order pending appeal.
The Court pointed out that in a case
involving an action for return of a child under the Hague Convention, it
reviews the district court's findings of fact for clear error and reviews its
conclusions about American, foreign, and international law de novo. Simcox v.
Simcox, 511 F.3d 594, 601 (6th Cir.2007).
In this case, the district court found
that, at the time of wrongful retention, Mr. Panteleris was exercising his
custody rights under the Australian Family Law Act by maintaining a
relationship with his children. On appeal, Ms. Panteleris did not dispute that
Mr. Panteleris had custody rights, but argued that he voluntarily relinquished
his rights by returning to Australia and making only “sporadic” attempts to
contact the children. The Court found that this recharacterization of the facts
fells short of “clear and unequivocal abandonment.” The district court
addressed this issue in detail, observing that “courts should ‘liberally find
“exercise” whenever a parent with de jure custody rights keeps, or seeks to
keep, any sort of regular contact with his or her child. The district court
found that Mr. Panteleris “regularly” communicated with his children between
December 2012 and May 2013, the date of wrongful retention. Moreover, although
Mr. Panteleris did not provide direct financial support, Ms. Panteleris made
withdrawals from the parties' joint bank account in Salem, Ohio, and Mr.
Panteleris offered to reimburse her for family expenses if she provided him
with bills or receipts. There was no evidence that Ms. Panteleris had provided
Mr. Panteleris a bill or receipt that he refused to pay. Moreover, the court
observed that “[t]he record is replete with [Mr. Panteleris's] well-documented
visa difficulties and references to the poor financial situation of the
Panteleris family. It follows that the family members could ill afford airline
tickets to Australia, and the three children, one of whom was autistic and the
eldest of whom was now seven, could not safely fly unaccompanied. The district
court thus concluded that Mr. Panteleris had not failed to exercise his custody
rights during the relevant time period. The district court did not clearly err.
The Sixth Circuit pointed out
that a child's country of habitual residence is a question of fact that the
court reviews for clear error. Jenkins v. Jenkins, 569 F.3d 549, 556 (6th
Cir.2009); Robert v. Tesson, 507 F.3d 981, 995 (6th Cir.2007). Although the Convention does not define
“habitual residence,” the Court has held that a child's habitual residence is
the place where he or she has been physically present for an amount of time
sufficient for acclimatization and which has a degree of settled purpose from
the child's perspective. Robert, 507 F.3d at 998. It has established five principles to consider in
determining a child's habitual residence: First, habitual residence should not
be determined through the technical rules governing legal residence or common
law domicile. Instead, courts should look closely at the facts and
circumstances of each case. Second, because the Hague Convention is concerned
with the habitual residence of the child, the court should consider only the
child's experience in determining habitual residence. Third, this inquiry
should focus exclusively on the child's past experience. Any future plans that
the parents may have are irrelevant to its inquiry. Fourth, a person can have
only one habitual residence. Finally, a child's habitual residence is not
determined by the nationality of the child's primary care-giver. Only a change
in geography and the passage of time may combine to establish a new habitual
residence. Robert, 507 F.3d at 989
(citing Friedrich v. Friedrich, 983 F.2d 1396, 1401 (6th Cir.1993)
(“Friedrich I ”)).
In
this case, the district court considered the children's activities in
Australia, including school, social engagements, and meaningful connections to
people and places in Australia. It also considered the children's activities
and meaningful connections in the United States, but observed that it could not
accept evidence of habitual residence for dates after May 2013 because Sixth
Circuit precedent instructs courts to look back in time from the period of
wrongful retention, not forward. The district court also considered the
children's belongings that the family brought to the United States and items
left in Australia. Weighing all the evidence, the district court concluded that
Mr. Panteleris had established by a preponderance of the evidence that the
children were habitual residents of Australia at the time of the wrongful
retention.
On appeal, Ms. Panteleris argued that
the court's factual finding was clear error because a period of one year is
significant in the lives of young children and, under the Friedrich I factors,
the children had acclimatized to the United States. The Sixth Circuit held that
Ms. Panteleris's first argument reflected a difference of opinion on how to
weigh the evidence, but not clear error. Ms. Panteleris failed to establish
that the district court clearly erred in finding that, in light of all the
evidence, Australia was still the children's habitual residence from their
perspective.
The Sixth Circuit rejected Ms.
Panteleris argument that the court should consider “the subjective intent of
the parents” as an additional factor in determining a child's habitual
residence, at least with respect to young children and those with developmental
disabilities. The Court noted that it had previously considered similar
arguments. In Robert v. Tesson, 507 F.3d at 990–91, it rejected the Ninth
Circuit's approach in Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir.2001), which
considers “the subjective intentions of the parents [as] all but dispositive of
a child's habitual residence.” It found the Ninth Circuit's rule “inconsistent”
with Friedrich I and “the Convention's goal of deterring parents from crossing
borders in search of a more sympathetic court” because such a rule “empowers a
future abductor to lay the foundation for an abduction by expressing
reservations over an upcoming move.”
Robert, 507 F.3d at 992. Nevertheless, it left open the possibility that
“a very young or developmentally disabled child may lack cognizance of their
surroundings sufficient to become acclimatized to a particular country or to
develop a sense of settled purpose.” However, because that case did not present
such facts, it “express[ed] no opinion on whether the habitual residence of a
child who lacks cognizance of his or her surroundings should be determined by
considering the subjective intentions of his or her parents.” It did not need
to decide whether the Pantelerises' subjective intent should be considered
because it would not change the outcome in this case under the deferential
standard of review. The district court explicitly found that even if it were to
consider the subjective intent of the parents, “the evidence submitted as to
the intent of the parents favors [Mr. Panteleris's] version that the parties
intended to stay in Ohio for one year.” Just as the district court's factual
finding of the children's habitual residence was not clear error, Ms. Panteleris did not show that the
district court's implicit credibility determination favoring Mr. Panteleris's
version was clear error in light of all the evidence.
Rein v Rein, 1996 WL 273993 (S.D.N.Y., 1996)[PETITION DISMISSED] PETITIONER CANNOT INVOKE HAGUE CONVENTION UNLESS CHILD IS “HABITUALLY RESIDENT” IN A STATE SIGNATORY AND HAS BEEN REMOVED TO OR RETAINED IN A DIFFERENT SIGNATORY STATE.]
In Rein v Rein, 1996 WL 273993
(S.D.N.Y., 1996) Plaintiff Stewart Rein, brought an action on his own behalf
and purported to do so as well on behalf of his nine year old daughter Lindsey
Rein. The Court held , inter alia, that it lacked jurisdiction to hear
plaintiff's claims brought pursuant to ICARA. The remedy available under ICARA
is an order that the child be returned from the jurisdiction of his or her
wrongful removal or retention, and an adjudication of any custody dispute by the
jurisdiction where the child “habitually resided” prior to the wrongful removal
or retention. Plaintiff alleged in his amended complaint that Lindsey was a
habitual resident of France who was wrongfully removed to England. Even
assuming that Lindsey was in fact a habitual resident of France -- a question
which was disputed -- it was clear that plaintiff could not bring this action
in this jurisdiction seeking relief under ICARA. Pursuant to that statute, a
person seeking the return of a child may commence an action “in any court which
is authorized to exercise its jurisdiction in the place where the child is
located at the time the petition is filed.” 42 U.S.C. § 11603 (b) . Plaintiff
did not allege that Lindsey was abducted to the United States (let alone New
York) and she was not located in a place where the Court could exercise
jurisdiction over her; instead, she was allegedly being improperly held in
England. Any petition pursuant to the Hague Convention must be brought there.
Accordingly, plaintiff's claims based on the Hague Convention and ICARA were
dismissed against all defendants for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Litowchak v Litowchak, 2015 WL 7428573 (D. Vermont, 2015) [Australia] [Federal & State Judicial Remedies] [Motion to Amend Petition to add Respondents Father as Respondent granted]
In Litowchak v Litowchak, 2015 WL
7428573 (D. Vermont, 2015) the Court granted the Petitioners motion to amend
the petition to add Dr. Alan Betts, Respondent Elizabeth Litowchak’s father, as
a respondent. The proposed Amended Petition included allegations related to Dr.
Betts’s participation in the alleged abduction of Petitioner’s and Respondent’s
children. Respondent opposes the motion, arguing that the proposed amendment
was futile because Petitioner lacks standing to sue Dr. Betts. In support of
his motion, Petitioner described Dr. Betts’s alleged “role in the removal and
retention of the Litowchak children.” Petitioner claimed that Dr. Betts
purchased plane tickets for Respondent and the children to leave Australia. He
alleged that thereafter Dr. Betts contacted Petitioner’s employer on multiple
occasions seeking reimbursement for expenses related to the children, including
the plane tickets that facilitated their removal from Australia. Petitioner
also asserted that Dr. Betts arranged and provided housing for Respondent and
the children after they left Australia, and that Dr. Betts concealed the children’s
location from Petitioner. Respondent argued that Petitioner’s proposed
amendment was futile because Dr. Betts did not have legal or physical custody
of the children, and therefore the court could not provide “the sole remedy
available under ICARA: an order directing Dr. Betts to remove the children from
the United States and return them to Australia.” The District Court observed that the Hague Convention and ICARA provide remedies
beyond orders requiring the return of a child. See 22 U.S.C. § 9003(h) (“The
remedies established by the [Hague] Convention and this chapter shall be in
addition to remedies available under other laws or international agreements.”);
22 U.S.C. § 9004(a) (“In furtherance of the objectives ... of the [Hague]
Convention ... [the] court ... may take or cause to be taken measures under
Federal or State law, as appropriate, to protect the well-being of the child
involved or to prevent the child’s further removal or concealment before the
final disposition of the petition.”). The Court found that Dr. Betts had a close familial relationship
with the children, and the allegations in Petitioner’s proposed Amended
Petition concerned Dr. Betts’s role in the removal of the children from
Australia and their alleged concealment from Petitioner. Dr. Betts’s actions
were therefore clearly within the scope of actions addressed by the Hague
Convention. Moreover, the court may redress those allegedly unlawful actions by
granting appropriate remedies in addition to the return of the children to Australia.
See 22 U.S.C. § 9004(a). Among other remedies, the court may order an
injunction requiring Dr. Betts to cease the “further removal or concealment” of
the children. 22 U.S.C. § 9004(a). Additionally, to the extent Dr. Betts
committed the abduction of the children, he may be liable for Petitioner’s
expenses. See 22 U.S.C. § 9007(b)(3) (“Any court ordering the return of a child
pursuant to an action brought under [§] 9003 of this title shall order the
respondent to pay necessary expenses incurred by or on behalf of the
petitioner[.]”). Respondent thus failed to demonstrate that amendment would be
futile. Absent such a showing, leave to amend should be freely granted.
Didon v Castillo, 2015 WL 5095231 (MD Pennsylvania, 2015) [St. Martin/French West Indies] [Petition granted] [Rights of Custody]
J.D. and A.D. were
habitual residents of both Sint Maarten and Saint Martin. The court concluded
that Didon did not have custodial rights to J.D. at the time of the wrongful
retention and denied Didon's petition with respect to minor child J.D. Court
granted petition with respect to minor child A.D.
Green v Green 2015 WL 7572603 (D. Nevada, 2015). [Canada] [Petition denied] [Habitual Residence]
Recommendation that
Petition for Return of Children be denied. While parents intended to abandon US
and establish habitual residence in Canada the Green’s children acclimated to
the U.S. and Las Vegas was children’s habitual residence.
Delgado v Osuna, 2015 WL 5651352 (ED Texas, 2015) [Venezuela] [Petition denied].
Petitioner failed to satisfy his burden to show that there was wrongful removal and/or retention, and the Respondent proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Petitioner consented to the removal and/or retention of the children in the United States
Sabogal v. Velarde, 2015 WL 2452702 [D. Maryland][Peru] [Federal & State Judicial Remedies] [Petition conditionally granted]
Petition for return
conditionally granted in this case where there was domestic abuse. Court finds
grave risk of harm that return of children to father in Peru during pendency of
custody proceedings would expose them to psychological harm or otherwise place
them in an intolerable condition. Undertakings ordered as a condition of
return.
Sabogal v. Velarde, 2015 WL 9906163 [D. Maryland] [Peru] [Federal & State Judicial Remedies] [Motion to find that Petitioner complied with undertakings order denied]
Motion to find that
Petitioner complied with undertakings order denied
Madrigal v Tellez, 2015 WL5174046, (WD Texas, 2015) [Necessary Expenses and Costs] [Denied] ] [Clearly inappropriate]
Rehder v Rehder, 2015 WL 4624030 [WD Washington] [Necessary Expenses and Costs] [Denied] [Clearly inappropriate]
Attorney fees denied
as clearly inappropriate where court found that the mother had “had a mistaken,
but nevertheless good faith belief that the parties had agreed that she would
take [the child] to the United States.”
Carlos Javier Escobar Villatoro v Figueredo, 2015 WL 6150769 (MD Florida) [Guatemala] [Necessary Expenses and Costs] [Granted]
Attorneys fees and
costs. Referee recommended that
necessary costs be granted in part
Pliego v Hayes, 2015 WL [WD Kentucky] [Turkey] [Necessary Expenses and Costs] [Granted]
Fees and Expenses of
$100,471.00 awarded to petitioner.
Sewald v Reisinger, 2015 WL 6964290 (MD Florida, 2015) [ Germany] [Necessary Expenses and Costs] [Granted]
Smedley v Smedley, 2015 WL 5139286 [ED North Carolina] [Germany] [Necessary Expenses and Costs] [Granted]
Warren v Ryan 2015 WL 4365489 (D.Colorado) [Australia] [Necessary Expenses and Costs] [Granted]
Petitioner’s motion for attorney fees and
costs granted in the amount of $64,984.90.
Guevera v Sota 2015 WL 9484502 (ED Tenn, 2015) [Mexico] [Federal & State Judicial Remedies] [TRO granted]
Temporary restraining
order granted prohibiting child from being removed from Courts jurisdiction.
Shafqat v Malik, 2015 WL 6739797 (D. NJ, 2015) [United kingdom] [Federal & State Judicial Remedies] [Motion for pro bono counsel]
Motion for Pro Bono
Counsel filed by pro se Respondents Shafqat Mahmood Malik, Saiqa Yusuf and
Qaiser Mahmood Malik (the “Respondents”) granted in part and denied in part.
Sanchez v Sanchez, 2015 WL 3448009 (WD Texas, 2015) [Mexico] [Federal & State Judicial Remedies] [Petition moot]
Petition denied as
moot; motion to dismiss granted.
Morais-Pierson v Pierson, 2015 WL 2365398 [ND Ohio, 2015] [Brazil] [Federal & State Judicial Remedies] [Motion for default judgment]
Motion for default judgment, upon defendants failure to appear or plead, denied without prejudice.
Karl v Cifuentes, 2015 WL 4940613 (ED Penn, 2015) [Argentina] [Federal & State Judicial Remedies] [Abstention]
Action dismissed because abstention under Younger v Harris, 401 US 37, 44 (1971) is appropriate in light of ongoing state court custody proceeding.
Garcia v Pinelo , 2015 WL 4910654 (ND Illinois, 2015) [Mexico] [Federal & State Judicial Remedies] [Summary judgment ]
Summary judgment granted in part and denied in part.
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